Artemis II On The Way To The Moon

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RNO8XoqTYvg

One Of Most Beloved Films of All Time-"Mission To Mars"

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nLQ-4od77ME

Igniting A New Vision For NASA

lunar baee An illustration of a proposed lunar base, the centerpiece of the NASA Ignition event. (credit: NASA) Igniting a new vision for NASA by Jeff Foust Monday, March 30, 2026 On January 14, 2004, President George W. Bush spoke in the auditorium at NASA Headquarters to discuss what became known as the Vision for Space Exploration. It was one of the biggest space policy announcements of the post-Apollo era: retiring the Space Shuttle in 2010 after completing the International Space Station, with a human return to the Moon no later than 2020 (see “Looking beyond vision”, The Space Review, January 19, 2004.) “The difference between success and failure will be measured in months, not years,” Isaacman said. Last week, in the same auditorium, was one of the biggest announcements since then. Rather than a brief presidential speech, NASA leadership spent a full day going through a major revamp of its exploration, science, and space technology plans. Some of the announcements at the “Ignition” event were surprising, while others were widely anticipated. The combination, though, represented the effort by NASA’s administrator, Jared Isaacman, to quickly put his stamp on the agency just months after being sworn in, with the backing of the White House. He opened the event with discussing the competition with a “real geopolitical rival”—China—to land the next humans to the Moon. “The difference between success and failure will be measured in months, not years. They may be early, and recent history suggests we might be late,” he warned. “This is why it is imperative we leave an event like Ignition with complete alignment on the national imperative that is our collective vision,” he told an audience of industry executives and representatives of national space agencies. Replacing Gateway with a moon base One major element of NASA’s plans at Ignition was also one of the least surprising. NASA confirmed it would not continue development of the lunar Gateway, electing instead to develop a lunar base. The Gateway had already been targeted for cancellation in last year’s budget and, despite funding in last year’s budget reconciliation bill, was notably absent in the sneak preview of NASA’s exploration plans announced a month earlier (see “Accelerating Artemis”, The Space Review, March 2, 2026.) “While that is still relevant for future exploration goals, it is not required to accomplish our primary objectives,” said Carlos Garcia-Galan, who previously had been a top manager of the Gateway. “As a result, we are announcing today that NASA is pivoting from the Gateway architecture to focus on building the Moon base.” Garcia-Galan’s new title is program executive for what NASA simply calls “Moon Base”; Isaacman, at a press conference at the end of the day, dubbed him the “lunar viceroy.” In his talk, Garcia-Galan outlined the plans NASA has quickly developed to create a moon base. “Starting today, we’re building humanity’s first deep space outpost,” he said. That plan involves three phases from now through the mid-2030s. Phase 1, from 2026 to 2028, “is all about getting to the Moon reliably,” he said, increasing the cadence, but also the reliability, of robotic lunar landers. It will also focus on developing enabling technologies and getting “ground truth” for potential base locations at the lunar south pole. Phase 2, from 2028 through 2031, would start building the base, using larger cargo landers and twice-yearly crewed missions. The infrastructure there would include communications, power, navigation, and other systems needed to support a human presence there. Phase 3, starting in 2032, will enable “long distance and long duration human exploraiton” on the moon, he said, with routine logistics missions to the Moon and uncrewed cargo return missions from the Moon. “Starting today, we’re building humanity’s first deep space outpost,” Garcia-Galan said. It would be by far the most ambitious lunar exploration effort yet, with dozens of missions to orbit and land on the Moon. He estimated Phases 1 and 2 would cost $10 billion each while Phase 3 would cost at least $10 billion, one of the few cost estimates provided throughout the day. Besides redirecting Gateway, the lunar base plan would affect other programs. Last year, three companies—Astrolab, Intuitive Machines, and Lunar Outpost—submitted proposals to NASA for the Lunar Terrain Vehicle (LTV) program, where NASA would support commercial development of unpressurized rovers for future Artemis missions. The companies had expected NASA to announce its selection late last year, but months passed with no updates from the agency. At Ignition, Garcia-Galan said NASA was pivoting on the LTV program. Instead of selecting one of the proposals, it asked the companies to revise their proposals to offer a smaller, simpler rover that could be ready earlier. There will be plenty of other procurements and requests for information, some of which were released last week. “I hope this is a signal that we want to work with you,” he said. “We’re going back to Moon. We’re going to stay there.” SR-1 SR-1 Freedom would demonstrate nuclear electric propulsion on a mission to Mars launching in late 2028. (credit: NASA) Propelling nuclear Later in the day, NASA outlined a new nuclear propulsion initiative. The effort replaced a program that started last fall to develop a fission reactor for the lunar surface, for which NASA issued a couple of draft solicitations but never a final version to industry. That approach involved a partnership with industry that the agency later concluded was too ambitious. “We realized that when we went out and said, ‘Industry, you do it all,’ that was a big ask,” said Steve Sinacore, program executive for NASA’s Fission Surface Power program. The challenges, he said in an interview, went beyond technology to financial and regulatory issues, like indemnification. “This really is a NASA near-impossible thing. Let’s trailblaze, let’s be the pathfinder, and then hand off to them,” he said. That resulted in what NASA announced at Ignition: Space Reactor 1 (SR-1) Freedom, a spacecraft that will demonstrate nuclear electric propulsion. The spacecraft will feature a 20-kilowatt fission reactor generating power for the Power and Propulsion Element (PPE), a spacecraft originally built for the Gateway, using solar power for its electric thrusters, but was being repurposed for this mission. “PPE gives us a huge leg up. That’s the only thing that makes this achievable,” he said. “That’s a very capable spacecraft bus that is going to be adaptable.” “This really is a NASA near-impossible thing. Let’s trailblaze, let’s be the pathfinder, and then hand off to them,” Sinacore said. One of the challenges for making it achievable is the schedule. NASA wants to launch SR-1 Freedom to Mars in the launch opportunity in late 2028. As proposed, it will spend a year going to Mars, and upon arrival drop off three small helicopters modeled on Ingenuity, the Mars helicopter that accompanied the Perseverance rover, to scout a future landing site. SR-1 Freedom is designed to kickstart space nuclear power at NASA. Sinacore, in his presentation, noted the billions of dollars spent on past efforts, blaming their failures on several managerial and technical factors like those identified in a report last year (see “From advice to action on space nuclear power”, The Space Review, September 22, 2026). “SR-1 Freedom is designed to break every one of those patterns,” he said. NASA would lead development of the reactor, rather than industry, with the agency giving those technical plans the agency develops to companies for future reactors, including one for the lunar surface. Commercial space station redirect Ignition was focused on more than Moon and Mars exploration. The agency, in a more controversial move, said it wanted to reconsider how it supported the development of commercial space stations. NASA’s Commercial Low Earth Orbit Destinations, or CLD, program was working with several companies on initial designs of stations. The agency has planned to issue a solicitation last fall for the next phase of the program, backing one or more companies on development and demonstration of those stations with the goal of having them ready by the time the International Space Station is retired in 2030. NASA revealed at the event it had doubts that was the right approach. “Though we have seen investor interest, there’s no independently verifiable market research indicating the economic viability of a commercial station that is only partially funded by NASA,” said Dana Weigel, NASA ISS program manager. The agency was also concerned about the ability of companies to handle what associate administrator Amit Kshatriya called the “incredibly complicated” logistics and operations of a space station. “Right now, the current industry that we have that’s proposing to build destinations does not have direct experience with that, or the resources.” NASA said it was considering an alternative approach. The agency would procure a “core module” that would be installed on the ISS. Additional commercial modules developed by space station companies could be docked to it, giving them access to power, life support, and other resources. That could then become the basis of a commercial space station that separates from the ISS. “A NASA-procured core would serve as a hub for commercial module expansion, allowing for maturation of industry and continued demand growth after the station detaches from ISS,” Weigel said. It was a return to concepts first presented a decade ago where NASA offered to make a docking port on the ISS available for a commercial module. The agency selected Axiom Space in 2020 to access that port, to which Axiom originally planned to attach a series of modules that would later become a commercial station. More recently, Axiom planned to use the ISS only briefly, testing a core module there before separating to dock with other modules for its station. NASA issued an RFI seeking feedback on the concept, but it was clear that industry was opposed to this change in the CLD program. “Yesterday, NASA announced it is considering yet another major change to the Commercial LEO Destination program, sowing concern and, really, sowing confusion among the commercial space companies I represent,” Dave Cavossa, president of the Commercial Space Federation, said at a House Science Committee hearing on CLDs the next day but scheduled in advance of the Ignition event. He argued there was strong demand for commercial space stations, based on investment Axiom and Vast recently raised and Starlab Space’s announcement that it had fully booked commercial payload space on its proposed station. “The commercial market is there. We’ve been building it,” he said. “NASA’s stated rationales for changes to the program are flawed and, ultimately, not addressed by their proposal yesterday.” Joel Montalbano, NASA’s acting associate administrator for space operations, also testified at the hearing and defended the alternative approach. “NASA’s stated rationales for changes to the program are flawed and, ultimately, not addressed by their proposal yesterday,” said Cavossa. “We expected a launch market that was going to take off. We expected tourism to take off. We expected the ability to do research and technology development on the International Space Station, bring it back to Earth and mass produce it,” he said. “We’re not seeing any of those three things.” One member of the committee, Rep. George Whitesides (D-CA), also was concerned about NASA’s potential change of plans. “Based on the old plan, several companies raised probably in excess of $2 billion in private capital and did so on the expectation that NASA would follow through,” he said. “My concern is that if NASA is not a reliable partner for private investors, we’re not going to get that money and we’re not going to then save money by being able to cost-share with the private sector,” he warned. Montalbano said that NASA wants to move quickly on any changes to its CLD plans. Responses to its RFI are due April 8, and he said NASA would follow up with a “final RFI” in late April and potentially a request for proposals in June. Isaacman NASA administrator Jared Isaacman discusses the agency’s proposed new programs to an audience of industry and international officals and legislators. (credit: NASA/Bill Ingals) Reaction The Ignition event features more announcements that, had they been made on their own, would have captured headlines. Lori Glaze, NASA acting associate administrator for exploration, hinted at potential changes in Artemis beyond Artemis 5, which might include replacing the SLS with commercial vehicles. (Notably, there was little news about how Blue Origin and SpaceX are accelerating work on their human lunar landers to be ready for a landing as soon as early 2028.) Nicky Fox, the associate administrator for science, talked about two new Earth science mission concepts that would leverage commercial capabilities and sensor technologies that could also be used for future Moon and Mars missions. There was a lot to digest at the event. Some companies, speaking privately, said they were overwhelmed by the announcements, including the many RFIs NASA issued along with them. They said they would have to pick and choose which ones they had the time and resources to respond to. International partners had a muted reaction. For major partners like the Canadian Space Agency, ESA, and JAXA, tearing up the Gateway means uncertainty about their investments in Artemis and future roles; many elements designed for the Gateway may not be easily repurposed for a lunar base. However, the UAE, which planned to develop an airlock module for the Gateway, expressed its support for the new approach. “Following NASA's recent announcements on establishing a sustained lunar presence, MBRSC reaffirms that its engagement with the Artemis program and partnership with NASA continue, as it advances its own lunar capabilities with a clear sense of purpose,” the Mohammed bin Rashid Space Centre said in a statement. “NASA does not have a topline problem,” or the size of its overall budget, Isaacman said. “This is just where we choose to concentrate our resources.” There is also the need to win over stakeholders on Capitol Hill. “We try to have a ‘no surprises’ policy,” Isaacman said, which include conversations with members of Congress as well as White House and industry in advance of the announcement. “Everybody understands what’s at stake right now, meeting the moment.” Despite his “no surprises” comment, some in industry as well as among foreign agencies said privately that they had been taken by surprise by some of the announcements at Ignition that will affect their plans. The announcements come just days before the White House is expected to release its fiscal year 2027 budget proposal. The 2026 budget proposal sought major cuts to science and space technology, along with a nearly 25% overall budget cut for NASA, which Congress largely rejected. Some fear the White House’s Office of Management and Budget will make similar proposed cuts in 2027. Beyond the estimates for the lunar base, NASA said little about the costs of the initiatives it rolled out at Ignition. “NASA does not have a topline problem,” or the size of its overall budget, Isaacman said. “This is just where we choose to concentrate our resources.” He suggested that budget, whatever its topline size, will focus on the priorities rolled out in Ignition. “You’re basically looking across the various mission directorates and making sure that, if you have a component and resources, they contribute to one of the major objectives in the president’s national space policy, like the moon base,” he said. He also made clear he wants to move quickly, making his mark before the end of the Trump administration and thus likely his tenure as NASA administrator. That contrasted with past plans, like those offered by President Bush on the same stage 22 years ago, that deferred the milestones well beyond his time in office. “This is what it takes if we’re going to get the job done, to go to Moon, do so before our rivals, build the base, and do the other things,” he said. Jeff Foust (jeff@thespacereview.com) is the editor and publisher of The Space Review, and a senior staff writer with SpaceNews. He also operates the Spacetoday.net web site. Views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone.

The NRO and Space Shuttle In 1976

Vandenberg Significant money and effort was spent by the Air Force in the early 1980s to develop a shuttle launch site at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. Many National Reconnaissance Office satellites required this launch site. (credit: USAF) A little more light in the shadows: the NRO and the Space Shuttle in 1976 by Dwayne A. Day Monday, March 30, 2026 There are few gaping holes in American space history, subjects that have not received the coverage they deserve. But an important and still neglected history subject is the National Reconnaissance Office’s role in the Space Shuttle program. Much of that history remains classified, but bit by bit, the NRO, which manages and operates the United States’ fleet of intelligence satellites, is releasing more information about the office’s two-decade involvement in the Space Shuttle program. It was an often-rocky relationship. What we are now learning is what the NRO considered doing with the shuttle in the years before it flew, when they were essentially throwing ideas at the wall, evaluating what new capabilities shuttle might provide beyond simply replacing the NRO’s existing fleet of expendable launch vehicles. In early March, the NRO declassified several significant documents as part of the annual government-wide “Sunshine Week.” NRO policy has been to declassify documents from 50 years ago, and the NRO is now releasing documents from the mid-1970s. This was an important transitional period for the NRO in many ways. It was a time when the super-secretive organization finally had to submit itself to regular budget review and scrutiny by Congress after mostly avoiding that for over a decade. This was also a period when “national” level satellite reconnaissance systems were beginning to be made available to tactical-level military forces. And it was a time when the NRO was preparing to start using the Space Shuttle, and NRO officials were asking what the shuttle could do and how it could benefit the satellite intelligence effort. Whoever chose the documents to declassify smartly provided a great insight into a key transitional period for the intelligence space program. By 1976, NRO payloads constituted 30–35% of the total Department of Defense payloads designated for the shuttle. But in some ways the NRO had even more influence than the rest of the DoD, because they were considered so vital to national security and understanding what the Soviet Union was doing. They also carried a mystique due to their highly secretive activities. The Space Shuttle entered service in 1981 and was declared “operational” a year later. It served until 2011, with notable gaps following the 1986 Challenger and 2003 Columbia accidents. During the shuttle’s lifetime, seven classified NRO shuttle missions flew—all within the first 11 years of shuttle operations—and little has been revealed about them. What we are now learning is what the NRO considered doing with the shuttle in the years before it flew, when they were essentially throwing ideas at the wall, evaluating what new capabilities shuttle might provide beyond simply replacing the NRO’s existing fleet of expendable launch vehicles. NRO officials did this with significant skepticism. Vandenberg Launch of a Titan-IIID rocket in the late 1970s carrying a classified payload. The Titan was then the most capable rocket in the American inventory. Shuttle offered more payload mass and volume, but it was controlled by NASA. (credit: Peter Hunter Collection) Before the change According to a July 1976 NRO report to the Committee on Foreign Intelligence, an early idea proposed for the shuttle was to fly “covert piggyback reconnaissance packages with might be carried routinely on shuttle flights.” There is no indication what they would be, but the most likely candidate would be an electronic intelligence sensor to determine if the shuttle was being tracked by radar during its flight. Similar sensors had been regularly mounted on NRO satellites since the early 1960s. However, mounting a classified sensor to an unclassified vehicle that would presumably be maintained by NASA personnel and contractors without security clearances, and would also carry non-American astronauts, would have been risky, and there is no evidence that the NRO ever pursued this concept. The NRO was also studying “the potential benefits of the Spacelab capability” to support its activities. The report stated that the NRO’s policy on the shuttle was “to accomplish the Shuttle transition as early as is practical without degrading mission accomplishment, while maintaining the security of the NRP and considering the overall cost-effective operation of the programs.” (NRP stood for National Reconnaissance Program.) But this was not easy “because of continuing changes to the vehicle design and deployment strategies of NRO spacecraft systems.” The shuttle did provide new capabilities: more lift capability than the Titan III rocket and a wider payload bay than existing Titan III fairings. Other documents refer to the shuttle’s large payload bay and its ability to carry satellites with large diameter optics, presumably larger than the 2.4-meter-diameter mirror of the KENNEN reconnaissance satellite then entering operation. The shuttle’s payload bay was 4.6 meters wide, meaning that it could have handled a spacecraft with optics up to approximately four meters. Earlier in the decade, NASA had abandoned plans for a space telescope with a three-meter-diameter mirror apparently because the 2.4-meter diameter mirror for the KENNEN was already in development, and it would make it easier for NASA to build what became the Hubble Space Telescope. Now the NRO was considering larger optics. The shuttle’s large payload bay, according to one document, could also be used to carry large antennas, larger than those already carried by the NRO’s existing Titan III rocket. There are some indications that the NRO ultimately did this for a pair of satellites launched in the 1980s. The newly declassified documents occasionally imply a certain reticence about using the shuttle but couched in bureaucratic language. In congressional testimony in 1976, Director of Central Intelligence George H.W. Bush stated that all NRO payloads would be transitioned to the shuttle by the early 1980s and predicted that the NRO costs would be around $250 million (see “The spooks and the turkey – Intelligence Community involvement in the decision to build the space shuttle,” The Space Review, November 20, 2006; and “The NRO and the Space Shuttle,” The Space Review, January 31, 2022.) But those costs were increasing, and highly dependent upon what assumptions were used about the transition. A November 1977 top secret report by the House Appropriations Committee noted that the NRO’s transition to the shuttle would have “extremely high costs.” There were multiple reasons for this, including the NRO’s insistence on maintaining a backup launch capability until the shuttle had demonstrated a high confidence level, and “that stringent security requirements be maintained.” The NRO had projected that its 1975–1982 transition costs were $467.1 million, of which $266.9 million was for expendable launch vehicles to back up the shuttle. This was more money than the development costs of an entirely new satellite program. The report noted that “some knowledgeable officials have expressed reservations concerning the feasibility of optimizing intelligence payloads for the STS. The concept of recovering, refurbishing, and reusing intelligence satellites was viewed as most questionable.” NRO officials believed that their satellites were too complex, and intelligence requirements were constantly evolving, making this impractical. The mid-1970s documents do not discuss the shuttle’s ability to service satellites in orbit like NASA later did with the Hubble. However, in 1973, the NRO commissioned a study about using the shuttle with the HEXAGON reconnaissance satellite and that study evaluated multiple options, including servicing a HEXAGON satellite that had been specially modified to have its consumables, including film for its cameras, replaced in orbit. But there were people in the NRO who were wary of such proposals, especially for satellites carrying film, which had to be carefully threaded through a complex path inside the camera. Doing this on the ground would have been extremely difficult; on orbit it would have been nearly impossible (see “Black ops and the shuttle (part 1), On-orbit servicing and recovery of the HEXAGON reconnaissance satellite,“ The Space Review, February 13, 2017.) The newly declassified documents occasionally imply a certain reticence about using the shuttle but couched in bureaucratic language. NRO officials did not enthusiastically embrace the shuttle throughout much of the 1970s. This reluctance is probably the most fascinating, important, and difficult historical aspect of the NRO’s relationship with the shuttle. To date, we have few declassified interviews with NRO officials from this era about their views on shuttle. Vandenberg Two DSCS-III satellites were carried into space on a classified shuttle mission. This was not an NRO mission, but is the only declassified shuttle mission. (credit: USAF) The big push In January 1977, Charles Cook, the deputy NRO director, updated NRO’s guidance for use of the shuttle. He identified 12 planning objectives, including having sufficient control over operations involving NRO payloads as well as designing no payloads as shuttle-only. Cook stated: “No NRP [National Reconnaissance Program] spacecraft will be designed in a space shuttle-only configuration prior to the demonstrated capability and reliable operation of the STS,” a reiteration of the “fly-before-buy” policy. Cook also indicated that the DoD should maintain an expendable launcher capability. This was also necessary in case using a shuttle on a mission during heightened world tensions was undesirable, or if a shuttle was, in his words, “neutralized.” Later on, as plans for launching shuttles from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California were formalized, one of the requirements was to store multiple external tanks near the launch site, in case enemy action closed the Panama Canal and prevented them from being shipped to the West Coast. “I was very anxious to get the military involved in the shuttle because it was in fact the most capable launch vehicle that we were building at the time,” Mark explained in a 1997 interview. Cook also wanted the NRO to be able to take advantage of the shuttle’s capabilities in a stepping-stone fashion. All new NRO spacecraft or major block changes to existing systems entering design subsequent to fiscal year 1976 “will be designed in a modular configuration (provided the additional weight capability of the Space Shuttle would be advantageous to mission accomplishment) so that when the Space Shuttle has demonstrated its reliability, improvement modules can be added to the NRP spacecraft. This will allow us to take maximum advantage of the increased Space Shuttle capability.” This period from mid-1976 to mid-1977 was when the anti-shuttle holdouts at the NRO were starting to lose the battle. In summer 1977, Hans Mark became director of the NRO, serving from August 3, 1977, to October 7, 1979, and then becoming Secretary of the Air Force. Mark heavily pushed the NRO to use the shuttle. In a 1987 book, without mentioning the still-classified National Reconnaissance Office, Mark wrote: During my service in the Pentagon from 1977 to 1981, I tried to modify the policies of the Air Force toward the Space Shuttle. One thing I tried to do was to urge people to design their spacecraft in such a way that full advantage would be taken of the capability of the Space Shuttle. I was partially successful in doing this, and certain spacecraft were designed to take full advantage of the payload capacity of the shuttle and of the volume of the payload bay. (It is interesting that seven years earlier the design of the shuttle was, of course, developed in such a way that just these things could be done.) In addition, I also succeeded in getting some of the people in the Air Force to think about the possibility of building their spacecraft in such a way that they could be retrieved and then refurbished and used again. There was even the possibility of repairing, replenishing, and maintaining spacecraft on orbit by using the ability of the shuttle crews to go out and perform extravehicular activities. Ten years later, Mark provided more of his rationale. “I was very anxious to get the military involved in the shuttle because it was in fact the most capable launch vehicle that we were building at the time,” Mark explained in a 1997 interview. “I was very anxious to have the military take advantage of the human capability in orbit to check out satellites before you dump them” in orbit, Mark explained, “then later on to repair them on orbit. We were going to launch satellites out of the West Coast so that you could repair and fix polar orbiting birds too.” Mark Hans Mark was Director of the National Reconnaissance Office from summer 1977 to fall 1979 and pushed for increased NRO use of the Space Shuttle. (credit: USAF) The newly declassified documents indicate that the shuttle’s larger payload bay could carry larger antennas. Mark pushed for a large signals intelligence satellite that could only use the shuttle, arguing that it was vital for arms control. The shuttle eventually launched two of these during the 1980s. Many details remain classified, although it is also known that Mark was the primary advocate for the Wide Area Surveillance Payload studies about using the shuttle to host a camera that could image large portions of the Earth. This later transformed into a system named DAMON to fly a converted HEXAGON satellite reconnaissance camera in the shuttle bay, essentially using the shuttle like an SR-71 spy plane. This would have required two or three dedicated reconnaissance missions per year. (DAMON was “Nomad” spelled backwards, a name apparently chosen by some NRO Star Trek fans in reference to an episode of the original series.) DAMON was later canceled by Congress after Mark left the NRO (see “Top Secret DAMON: the classified reconnaissance payload planned for the fourth space shuttle mission,” The Space Review, July 1, 2019.) To his credit, in his 1987 book, Mark admitted that the NRO’s shuttle critics probably had a point: On balance, I believe that the conservative attitude of the Air Force toward the Space Shuttle at the time was probably justified. We were to encounter delays and problems in the Space Shuttle program that would indeed call for a cautious approach. Perhaps the most articulate exponent of the Air Force position at that time was Mr. Jimmie D. Hill, who was then a member of the undersecretary’s staff and who would later become the deputy undersecretary of the Air Force for space systems. Hill had an encyclopedic knowledge of Air Force space systems as well as a first-class intelligence that he applied to the problems at hand. By taking positions that were generally opposed to mine, we usually arrived at workable compromises that could be implemented. Slowly, ever so slowly, we are getting closer to a time when NRO will begin revealing one of the important remaining eras of American space history, when the intelligence community reluctantly climbed on board the Space Shuttle. Dwayne Day is always researching the NRO’s interest in using the space shuttle. He can be reached at zirconic1@cox.net Dwayne Day is always researching the NRO’s interest in using the space shuttle. He can be reached at zirconic1@cox.net.

Corvair's Manned Astronomical Research Station

MARS Figure 1: Astronaut with MARS, March 20, 1961. [1] Convair’s Manned Astronomical Research Station (MARS) by Hans Dolfing Monday, March 30, 2026 In 1960, Convair in San Diego was an independent division of General Dynamics/Astronautics (GD/A) and employed experienced engineers such Krafft A. Ehricke and Karel J. Bossart under the directorship of James R. Dempsey.[10] Work from 1959 to 1961 resulted in a mockup space station to evaluate many aspects of confined life in space. Many documented 1960s space stations were only paper concepts but this project “bent metal” and hardware was built for a full mockup space station. The name of this space station was the Manned Astronomical Research Station (MARS).[1-4] A series of more than 100 Convair GD/A archival photos plus a movie shed new light on this early American military and civilian episode to prepare man for life in space stations.[1,2] No paper reports were located but photos show these existed.[1,3,21] The US Air Force, with its military space efforts, was already heavily engaged in the transition from aviation medicine to space medicine, and project Mercury would be the first American space laboratory where humans could be evaluated in weightlessness, severe g-forces, and radiation tolerance. Bioastronautics would apply equally in the military and civilian domains and NASA was quite willing to make maximum use of the USAF superior biomedical research resources.[19] Many documented 1960s space stations were only paper concepts but this project “bent metal” and hardware was built for a full mockup space station to evaluate on the ground as shown in Figures 1 to 6. MARS Figure 2: Overview of Convair GD/A San Diego with MARS at building 28, February 1961. [1,4] MARS Figure 3: MARS construction, January 19, 1961. [1] All the construction images in Figure 3 are labeled with the same date, which indicates a MARS construction period between late 1960 and early 1961. MARS Figure 4: MARS placement outside Building 28, February 7, 1961. [1] As shown in Figure 2 and 4, MARS was placed outside of Building 28, the Astronautics space research building. At first glance, it might look like a water tower or large boiler but this was a full-scale mockup for a multi-man space station. MARS was planned to be made available to other companies to study and encourage life support system research in the private industry. The station had a diameter of ten feet (three meters) and was about 14 feet (4.3 meters) tall. The inverted cone beneath the station is not an engine but a mockup for a Mercury-style re-entry capsule. Overall, the mockup was 28 feet (8.6 meters) tall as shown in Figure 5.[2-4] MARS Figure 5: MARS February 27, 1961. On the left (L-R) W. Kudenov, F. D’Vincent, J. Tearnen. [1] MARS had two floors. The upper floor was a working compartment and the lower floor was used for housekeeping, cooking, and sanitary facilities. Figure 6 shows a glimpse of the interior. Sleeping was planned in the reentry module. Obviously, the mockup station was not a zero-G facility, but it allowed testing of oxygen supply systems, contaminant monitoring, water regeneration, and similar systems. A vacuum chamber was nearby for additional testing. [2-4] MARS Figure 6: MARS interior, April 12, 1961 with (L-R) W. Kudenov, Tiernon, R.C. Armstrong. [1] MARS was closely related to earlier Convair concepts. Krafft Ehricke at Convair worked on the multi-man “Outpost” space station during 1958 and 1959. [15-17]. Immediately after that in 1959 and 1960, Convair designed the Three Man Space System Experimental Laboratory (TASSEL), shown in Figure 7. TASSEL was designed by Krafft Ehricke and Freeman Vincent as a three-man laboratory to be placed in a 200-nautical-mile (530-kilometer) orbit. As an early but post-Mercury space station, it would be launched by Atlas Centaur and conduct two- to three-week missions. The customer was ambiguous: civilian or military or both. The station allowed for research with artificial gravity. The report was submitted in July 1960 based on work earlier in the year.[11-14] MARS Figure 7: TASSEL Laboratory [11] To demonstrate the close relation between MARS and TASSEL, note the photos in Figure 8 of the MARS laboratory. These are undated, but probably are from late 1960. While still under construction, there was a TASSEL poster next to the MARS hardware. The TASSEL poster is in the left part of Figure 8 to the bottom left of the mockup, to the left of the engineer at the base. The right part of the Figure 8 is just an enlarged version to demonstrate it is the same picture as in Figure 7.[1,11,12] MARS Figure 8: TASSEL, example for MARS. [1] By April 1961 MARS was part of the Convair GD/A Life Science section headed by R.C. Armstrong who, since 1956, served as Convairs’ flight surgeon [3,4] MARS was coordinated with the human factors section under W. E. Woodson and the Convair life support section under John O. Tearnen. One objective was to design the instruments for effective human-machine interfacing under all circumstances. MARS Figure 9: Bio-astronautical instrumentation. [1] Figure 9 shows one example of the type of physiological tests conducted at MARS. Later in 1962, crews were evaluated inside MARS for up to 30 hours.[2] Figure 10 demonstrates some of the MARS command module mockups.[1,2] MARS Figure 10: MARS Command Module June 15, 1961. [1,2] On February 1, 1961, McDonnell Aircraft proposed the civilian “One-man Space Station” as the flip side of the military one-man MTSS, an example of how companies designed multipurpose space stations.[9] Did the Convair GD/A MARS have mostly civilian customers at NASA or also military customers in the Air Force? There are two pieces of evidence that clearly show that MARS had a military customer. First, there was a presentation by Col. Lowell B. Smith on December 10, 1963, at NASA Ames Research Center on the topic of the Military Test Space Station (MTSS) study, SR-17527, which was extensively discussed in an earlier article.[6-8] MARS Figure 11: Quote from MTSS presentation. [6] The quote in Figure 11 clearly demonstrates that Convair GD/A submitted the MARS concept and laboratory to the US Air Force as their entry for the Phase-1, pre-1965 MTSS. [6] The 1200-cubic-foot (34-cubic-meter) volume fits very well with the earlier given MARS size of 10-foot diameter and about 14-foot height. The MARS mockup built in early 1961 is also a good fit for the MTSS timeline. The presentation by Col. Smith has no image of this MARS submission but the quote with “crew of 3” matches the TASSEL crew size of three. In addition, the description of artificial gravity in the quote matches exactly what TASSEL proposed to do including a tether stability study. [2,11,12] Did the Convair GD/A MARS have mostly civilian customers at NASA or also military customers in the Air Force? To recap the MTSS history, the USAF SR-17527 MTSS study was started January 1960, followed by an RFP in April 1960, the selection of five contractors in August 1960, and a final report on the six month study “Phase 1 MTSS - Early capability” in February 1961. “Phase 2” Advanced MTSS reports were due in July 1961 after another roughly six months. [8] The thinking of Convair GD/A might have been that many of the 27 planned MTSS biomedical tests could be prototyped in the MARS mockup on the ground. Simple checks like oxygen consumption or “does it fit” could be done on the ground. [7,8] The second piece of evidence is that most of the MARS photos are annotated by the San Diego Air and Space Museum (SDASM) with “MTSS/MARS” in their detailed descriptions. [1] Why MTSS was added to MARS is never explained but, from the evidence, it seems clear that this was the Convair GD/A submission to the MTSS study. The Convair GD/A MTSS hardware was hiding in plain sight, which is very exciting as the technical reports by Convair GD/A are still not released.[1,5,8] MARS was offered to the private industry for space station evaluation in 1961.[3] How this Convair shared space station mockup and training related to other bio-astronautical work in the USAF is an open question. In 1963, there were at least eight studies titled “The Centralized Space Training Facility Study”.[20] That work was done in 1963 at the Aerospace Medical Research Laboratories at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (WP-AFB), Ohio. Part III was titled “Training for the Military Test Space Station”.[20.iii] This is a tantalizing connection to the Convair GD/A MARS work but a better understanding will have to wait till more reports are declassified. The foresight by Convair GD/A to record their work with photos and a movie as historical records is appreciated just like the work by SDASM to publish these records from NARA.[18] In conclusion, the Convair GD/A MARS space station mockup was derived from TASSEL and largely overlapped with their MTSS concept offered to the USAF in August 1960. Photos from the station construction, the interior, command console and other details show in color that this was a high-fidelity mockup for both civilian and military space stations. To have the mockup must have been a big advantage in Convair GD/A space proposals. The photos also show in color the first interior details of any of the five MTSS contractor studies. References “Manned Astronomical Research Station (MARS)” photos from Convair General Dynamics/ Astronautics, Atlas Negative Collection, published by SDASM via NARA. “Convair Space Station Development Program 10/17/62 HACL Film 00188”, San Diego Air and Space Museum Archives, 1962. “Astronautics Life Science Center Will Serve All Convair Divisions”, Convairiety, San Diego Edition, page 8, April 12, 1961. “Space Station Mockup Will Include Kitchen”, Convairiety, San Diego Edition, page 4, March 1, 1961. General Dynamics/Astronautics (GD/A), San Diego, Calif., Contr. AF 33(600)-42457, Rept. no. AE 61-0570, ASD TR 61-208, Dated: 15 Jul 1961. SR-17527, “MILITARY TEST SPACE STATION. VOLUME I. SUMMARY (U)”, AD 328 351L, AE61-0570-Vol-1, vol. 1, 75 pages. SR-17527, “MILITARY TEST SPACE STATION. VOLUME II, PART I, PRE-1965 SPACE STATION (u)”, AD 328 352L, AE61-0570-Vol-2-Pt-1, vol. 2, part 1, 166 pages. SR-17527, “MILITARY TEST SPACE STATION. VOLUME II, PART I, PRE-1965 SPACE STATION (U)”, AD 328 353L, AE61-0570-Vol-2-Pt-2, vol. 2, part 2. SR-17527, “MILITARY TEST SPACE STATION. VOLUME III. ADVANCED SPACE STATIONS (U)”, AD 328 354L, AE61-0570-Vol-3, vol. 3, illus. tbl. refs. “Presentation on MTSS SR 17527 by Col. Lowell B. Smith”, “Presentation on SLOMAR SR-79814 by Maj. Jack W. Hunter”, 10 Dec 1963, 19 pages, RG 255.4.1, NACA Ames Aeronautical Laboratory and NASA Ames Research Center, Series 24, Box 3, Central Files - research correspondence, 1943-1965, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Pacific Region (San Francisco), San Bruno, California. “MTSS experiments”, RG 255, NACA Langley Memorial Aeronautical Laboratory and NASA Langley Research Center Records, A200-4 Manned Space Stations, Series II: Subject Correspondence Files, 1918-1978, Box 421, 422, Sep. 1963 - Nov. 1964, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Philadelphia. Dolfing, H., “The Military Test Space Station (MTSS)”, August 2024./li> Dolfing, H., “McDonnell’s Military Test Station (MTSS)”, March 2026. Dolfing.H, “Satellite bombs, gliders, or ICBMs? Krafft Ehricke and early thinking on long-range strategic weapons”, December 2022. Ehricke, K.A., Vincent, F., “TASSEL - Space Laboratory (Three Astronaut Space System Experimental Laboratory)”, Convair Astronautics, GD/A, San Diego, CA, AE-600228, 91 pages, AD0851662, NASA NTRS 19690091102, July 1960. Pengelley, C.D., “Preliminary survey of dynamic stability of a ‘tassel concept’ space station”, General Dynamics/Convair, San Diego, CA, AE63-0125, NASA NTRS 19650082879, March 1963. “Proposed Three-man station”, Missiles and rockets, July 3, page 41, 1961. Shayler, D.J., Godwin, R., “Outpost in Orbit”, page 26, ISBN 9781-989044-03-2, 2018. “Convair plans Four-man Space Station”, Aviation Week, pp 26-28, April 28, 1958. Ehricke, K.A, “Hearings before the Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration”, Eight-Fifth Congress, 2nd Session H.R. 11881, pp. 613-646, April-May 1958. Ehricke, K.A., Accession 2003-0025, National Air and Space Museum (NASM), Smithsonian Institution, Box 6, Folder 1, “Space Station for Development and Orbital Flight Training”, KE59-2, Convair GD/A, San Diego, CA, 25 pages, May 12, 1959. RH 50173-15, “To support a project to process approximately 165,000 images from the Convair/General Dynamics collection of the Atlas rocket program from its inception in the 1950s through the mid-1980s. Approximately 50,000 images will be digitized and available online”. Berger, C., “The Air Force in Space. Fiscal Year 1962”, USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, ADA 606606, 1966. “The Centralized Space Training Facility”, Reports, 6570th Aerospace Medical Research Laboratories, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (WP-AFB), Ohio, March 1963, “Part I. Summary, Conclusion, and Recommendations”, P-30-I, AD 339 342L, “Part II. Training for the Global Surveillance System”, P-30-II, SR-178, “Part III. Training for the Military Test Space Station”, P-30-III, SR-17527, AD 339 343L “Part IV, Training for Space Logistics, Maintenance, and Rescue System”, P-30-IV, SR-79814 SLOMAR, AD 339 571L, “Part V. Training for the Earth Satellite Weapon System”, P-30-V, SR-79821 ESWS, AD 341 367, “Part VI. Training for Space Plane Recoverable Booster”, P-30-VI, SR-89774, AD 339 645L, “Part VII, Training for Lunar Systems”, P-30-VII, “Part VIII, CSTF Training Concepts”, P-30-VIII. “Convair II-6 Instrumentation Design Laboratory”, piction ID: 45174753, catalog ID: 14_016812, March 1961. Hans Dolfing is an independent computer scientist with a passion for spaceflight, software, and history and can be contacted at beta_albireo@protonmail.com.

Project Hail Mary And The Risks And Benefits Of Human Spaceflight

Project Hail Mary Project Hail Mary is showing one aspect of human spaceflight at the same time Artemis 2 prepared to go around the Moon. (credit: Amazon/MGM Studios) Artemis 2, Project Hail Mary, and the risks and benefits of human spaceflight by Scott Solomon Monday, March 30, 2026 The Conversation The central premise of the blockbuster film Project Hail Mary is a long-shot mission with a familiar goal: Save humanity from extinction. While the details of the threat facing humanity are new to this story, moviegoers are used to bingeing on popcorn while watching a heroic quest to save the Earth from certain doom. And like so many popular movies of this genre, from Armageddon to Interstellar, the hero’s journey involves a seemingly impossible mission into space. Given the moment, it’s worth reflecting on what those investing billions in human space exploration, whether tax dollars or private funds, are trying to accomplish. The film’s release is well timed for the new era of space exploration. NASA’s Artemis 2 mission, scheduled to launch in early April, will send four astronauts around the Moon on a path that may take them deeper into space than any humans have ever traveled. The flyby mission is primarily about testing equipment for a lunar landing in 2028. But the broader plan was outlined in detail in March by NASA officials: to establish a permanent base on the Moon. NASA is not alone in its lunar ambitions. Private space companies SpaceX and Blue Origin are developing next-generation spacecraft, rovers, and drones to facilitate the American Moon base. And other nations, notably China, are working toward their own lunar outposts. These nations and corporations see the Moon as a stepping stone toward more ambitious goals: a major human migration into deep space, including Mars. Given the moment, it’s worth reflecting on what those investing billions in human space exploration, whether tax dollars or private funds, are trying to accomplish. As a biologist, I recognize the limitations of humans as space explorers. As I explain in my book, Becoming Martian: How Living in Space Will Change Our Bodies and Minds, while biologists have learned a lot about how the conditions of space affect the human body and mind, sending people on longer missions deeper into space will expose people to unknown health risks. Boldly going Plans to send people to the Moon and beyond are accelerating. NASA’s new administrator, Jared Isaacman, has argued that beating China to the Moon is a matter of national security, calling the Moon “the ultimate high ground.” He has also promoted the economic benefits of establishing a space economy that includes mining and manufacturing on the Moon. Subcommittees in both the House and Senate have advanced bills to codify these initiatives into law, making the goal of creating a permanent base on the Moon official US policy. They appear to have bipartisan support, and votes in both houses of Congress are expected soon. The United States and China are targeting landing humans on Mars in the 2030s, with the intention of building infrastructure that enables long-term habitation. In March, NASA also announced that the agency intends to test nuclear propulsion during an uncrewed flight to Mars in 2028. Nuclear-powered rockets have the potential to substantially reduce the time it takes to reach Mars, which would make crewed flight to the Red Planet more feasible. Humans or robots? But why do people need to go to Mars? As with the Moon, the purported motivations for both the US and China establishing a human presence on Mars are scientific, economic, and geopolitical. Yet these are distinct objectives that are often conflated. If having people on the Moon and Mars is indeed necessary to achieve these objectives, let’s be clear about the risks that the people undertaking these missions will be assuming. In terms of science, NASA has had dramatic success with its Mars rovers, including the discovery last year of a potential biosignature that could be the best evidence yet that the planet was once home to microbial life. Robotic missions also have a lower price tag and a higher acceptable risk margin than human missions. While Isaacman remains publicly committed to the Artemis program and its human spaceflight goals, the agency’s plan also includes a suite of robotic missions to the Moon’s surface it hopes to develop in partnership with companies, universities, and international partners. Likewise, some economic objectives, such as establishing mining and manufacturing facilities, could be accomplished using AI-equipped robots, such as those Tesla is developing. Robots are a long way from being able to accomplish the full range of tasks that a human can do, but prioritizing robotic activities could lower the exposure that people have to the hazards of space. If having people on the Moon and Mars is indeed necessary to achieve these objectives, let’s be clear about the risks that the people undertaking these missions will be assuming. Space and the human body While scientists have learned a lot about how space affects the body during the six decades of human spaceflight, there are still significant blind spots. Among them are the effects of deep-space radiation. The 24 Apollo astronauts who traveled to the Moon are the only people who have ever been past the Van Allen radiation belts, an area of space surrounding our planet formed by Earth’s magnetic field. By trapping radiation from the Sun and from deep space, our planet’s magnetic field is part of what makes Earth habitable for us and other life forms. The Moon and Mars lack magnetic fields, so radiation levels on their surfaces are substantial. NASA researchers are now conducting experiments on rodents using simulated galactic cosmic rays, which are largely blocked by Earth’s magnetic fields. Preliminary results suggest that this type of radiation may impair cognitive abilities, but the actual effects on people are unknown. Similarly, while medical researchers know that floating in a zero-g environment causes muscle atrophy and bone density loss during long stays on the International Space Station, they know relatively little about how partial gravity affects muscles and bones. The Moon has one-sixth the gravity of Earth, and Mars has a little over one-third. Pilots on Earth can simulate partial gravity for up to 30 seconds at a time during parabolic flights, but only the 12 Apollo astronauts who walked on the Moon have ever experienced it for longer than that. The longest they stayed was about three days. Scientists can only speculate about whether prolonged exposure to the partial gravity of the Moon or Mars would have consequential health effects. Human interest Sending robots to space avoids having to deal with risks to human health. But there are downsides. Not only do robotic space missions have fewer capabilities than crewed missions, they often fail to capture interest and imagination and demonstrate national prestige in the same way that human missions can. The four members of the Artemis crew will captivate people worldwide watching their daring mission around the Moon, much like moviegoers root for Ryan Gosling’s character in Project Hail Mary as he boldly seeks to save humanity from certain doom on the big screen. That human interest is the common link that ties together public and private space ambitions worldwide. While robotic missions are more practical and cost effective, they simply don’t inspire the masses the way a human crew can. Beyond achieving any economic, political or scientific goals, space exploration is ultimately about people doing difficult things. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article. Scott Solomon is a Teaching Professor of BioSciences at Rice University and a Research Associate at the Smithsonian Institution’s National Museum of Natural History. Dr. Solomon’s research examines the ecology and evolution of insects, microbes, and humans on Earth and beyond. As a science communicator, Dr. Solomon regularly speaks and writes about science for the public.

Fusion Propulsion To Mars

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RohseUoSHkM

Artemis 2 Returns To The Pad

Artemis 2 rollout Artemis 2 returns to the pad early March 20, ahead of a launch as soon as April 1. (credit: NASA/Brandon Hancock) The science of Artemis 2 by Jeff Foust Monday, March 23, 2026 The next humans to leave Earth orbit may launch as soon as next week. Just after midnight Friday, the Space Launch System rocket, with its Orion spacecraft on top, reemerged from the Vehicle Assembly Building, making an 11-hour trek back to Launch Complex 39B. The vehicle had spent the last three weeks in the VAB to fix a blockage of helium in the upper stage that caused NASA to call off a launch in an early March window, along with other maintenance. “We are using Artemis 2 as an opportunity to get science to prepare for our later Artemis missions when science is more of a driver,” and Richardson. NASA is now targeting a launch of the Artemis 2 mission as soon as April 1, with daily launch opportunities through April 6. Officials said at a briefing earlier this month they felt confident enough in the vehicle, after correcting past issues with hydrogen leaks in a fueling test, that they would not do another fueling test before a launch attempt. “From my perspective, when we tank the vehicle the very next time, I would like it to be on a day we could actually launch,” said Lori Glaze, NASA’s acting associate administrator for exploration. “If we are able to successfully fully tank the vehicle, I want to be able to poll ‘go’ to launch.” Artemis 2 is primarily a test flight, a long-awaited demonstration of the Orion spacecraft in deep space, carrying four astronauts around the Moon on a ten-day mission. After a one-day shakeout in Earth orbit, including performing proximity operations with the SLS upper stage, the Orion will head out on its free return trajectory around the Moon. However, Artemis 2 won’t solely be a test of vehicle systems. The mission will also be an opportunity carry out science, both of the Moon and involving the people on board. Artemis 2 would not, at first glance, seem like much of an opportunity to study the Moon. Orion will fly around the Moon rather than go into orbit, and during that flyby will not get particularly close to the Moon: to the astronauts on board, the Moon will look similar in size to a basketball at arm’s length. “Science wasn’t in the driver’s seat to define what Artemis 2 is,” said Jacob Richardson, deputy lead of Artemis 2 lunar science at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center, during a panel discussion at the Goddard Space System Symposium March 12. “Instead, we are using Artemis 2 as an opportunity to get science to prepare for our later Artemis missions when science is more of a driver.” “We’re going to find the opportunity to flex our science muscles on these missions,” he added. “We’re going to have our own baby steps towards success on our way towards landed surface missions, towards a moonbase and a sustained presence on the lunar surface.” That panel came after Kelsey Young, science flight operations lead for NASA’s Artemis internal science team, discussed the science plans for the mission. There are ten lunar science themes for Artemis 2 with varying priorities. At the top are studying color and albedo variations as well as look for any flashes from lunar impact. Other topics range from various aspects of lunar geology to observing the Earth from space. In addition to the science itself, Artemis 2 provides an opportunity to exercise science operations, including planning for science and operations of a science team back on Earth during the mission as well as capturing data during the mission. “We actually had a lot of questions from the crew over the first few months of training: ‘What can our observations tell you about science that orbiting spacecraft cannot?’” she recalled. “We really rose to the challenge of convincing them that your words carry scientific weight. What you describe helps us, the lunar science community, really unlock these high priority mysteries that we have.” Verbal descriptions by the astronauts of what they see are, in fact, one of the key science data sets from the mission. “Human beings are the most sophisticated detector there is, and they’ll be giving some very nuanced verbal descriptions,” she said. “I can say that in confidence having trained them over the last few years.” The astronauts will also make annotations of what they see, much like a field geologist might in a notebook, with both words and illustrations. Those annotations will be made in their tablets. A third data set will be photos they take, using a Nikon camera with an 80-400 mm zoom lens. Three of the four astronauts have previously flown on the International Space Station, Young noted, and have experience photographing the Earth from inside the station. “We actually had a lot of questions from the crew over the first few months of training: ‘What can our observations tell you about science that orbiting spacecraft cannot?’” Young recalled. “We really rose to the challenge of convincing them that your words carry scientific weight.” “Our goal was never going to be to take better pictures than LRO,” or the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter, said Ariel Deutsch, a NASA planetary scientist who is part of the Artemis 2 science team, during a presentation at the Lunar and Planetary Science Conference (LPSC) March 16. “Our goal is to instill and promote and maximize the human science that can be done on this mission as the crew views the Moon and the lunar environment with human eyes for the first time in several decades.” That more distant view has its advantages. “They’ll be afforded this whole-disk view,” Young said. “They’ll have this interesting perspective that enables them to contextualize the observations they see in one section of the Moon to another section of the Moon in the blink of an eye.” They may also see portions of the Moon not seen before directly by humans. For example, much of the lunar farside was not directly seen during the Apollo missions since they were targeting landings during the day on the near side. The low equatorial orbits of the Apollo missions also kept them from seeing the poles. One challenge for planning lunar science on Artemis 2 is the timing of the mission. The portion of the Moon visible if the mission launches April 1 will be different than if it launches April 6. Young said the crew will have “study time” on the way to the Moon to review what will be visible and what targeting plan the science team has developed for the critical hours of the flyby. That study time will be a bit of last-minute cramming after extended training before launch. “We had three years with them. The science team put together a multi-faceted approach for training the crew,” said Cindy Evans, Artemis geology training lead at the Johnson Space Center, during an LPSC session. That included both classroom and field work as well as testing on the equipment they will use. Artemis 2 commander Reid Wiseman, she recalled, “challenged us to put together a lunar training program for the crew office so he could walk down the hallway of the crew office and talk to any of his colleagues about the Moon. It was designed to raise the literacy in the crew office about the Moon.” That one-week “Lunar Fundamentals” class the scientists put together was used not just for the astronauts but also flight controllers and others. It featured lunar geology and the importance of collecting lunar samples and studying volatiles that may exist at the poles. “We provided them with some key talking points because they’re public speakers: they’re going out and they need to be talking about why we’re going to the Moon,” she said, “how the Moon is important for all of us to understand.” There will be additional, non-lunar science beyond observations of the Moon. That includes work in biology, human research, and space weather, said Jacob Bleacher, chief exploration scientist in NASA’s Exploration Systems Development Mission Directorate, during a briefing in January. “During this flight we will learn how the spacecraft behaves and through our research campaign we will also learn how we, human beings, behave in that same environment,” he said. “The Moon is this incredible object that we are so fortunate to have, and we take it for granted,” Petro said. An example is AVATAR, or A Virtual Astronaut Tissue Analog Response. It will use tissue-on-a-chip devices to mimic individual organs of the astronauts, comparing their response to the environment beyond Earth orbit with data taken before and after the flight from the four astronauts. Bleacher said that could lead to personalized medicines for individual astronauts on future deep space missions. Other experiments include movement and sleep monitors worn by the astronauts and studies of their immune systems. The German space agency DLR will provide radiation monitors for the mission like those flown on Artemis 1. Bleacher said that, as soon as possible after landing, the astronauts will go through an obstacle course to see how well they function after returning to one G, as well as a simulated spacewalk several days later. “That prepares is for landing on the Moon and, eventually, down the road, going to destinations such as Mars.” Those studies overall, he said, show “how we will we react to, survive, and thrive in that deep space environment.” The public focus, though, will be on the Moon, including the images that the astronauts on Artemis 2 return from their unique perspective. At the Goddard Symposium, Noah Petro, Artemis 4 project scientist, urged a space industry audience to share the excitement he feels about the Moon. “The Moon is this incredible object that we are so fortunate to have, and we take it for granted,” he said, telling people to go out and take 30 seconds to look at, and contemplate, the Moon. “You want to get people hooked on the Moon? Start by going out and looking at it. Because in a month, the Moon is going to be different to us because we will have just sent people there.” Jeff Foust (jeff@thespacereview.com) is the editor and publisher of The Space Review, and a senior staff writer with SpaceNews. He also operates the Spacetoday.net web site. Views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone.

NVIC: India's Jinxed Navigational Program

NVS-02 The NVS-02 navigation satellite before its ill-fated launch last year. (credit: ISRO) NavIC: India’s “jinxed” navigational program, or a cornerstone of India’s misplaced space priorities? by Ajey Lele Monday, March 23, 2026 India’s NavIC (Navigation with Indian Constellation) is a regional satellite navigation system developed to provide accurate positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) services across India and up to 1,500 kilometers beyond its borders, with plans for a further extension out to 3,000 kilometers. Originally known as the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS), it has been designed, developed, and operated by the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO). For ISRO, NavIC poses a challenge, since it is not about any single failure but instead a compounding series of technical setbacks. Unlike global satellite navigation systems such as GPS, which deploy satellites in medium Earth orbit (MEO), NavIC is a regional system that uses seven satellites (along with backups) placed in geostationary and geosynchronous orbits. NavIC provides two main services: the Standard Positioning Service (SPS), offering accuracy of about 5–20 meters for civilian use, and the Restricted Service (RS), intended for strategic users. The first satellite in this constellation was launched in 2013, and the system was declared operational by 2018. Today, NavIC, is facing a major service disruption, with only three satellites currently being functional. A minimum of four functional satellites are required for accurate positioning. Recently, ISRO declared that the atomic clock of the ten-year-old IRNSS-1F satellite has failed on March 13. This follows earlier setbacks like the flawed launch of the next-generation NVS-02 satellite in January 2025. In a February 25 statement, ISRO announced the outcome of an investigation about this failure. NVS-02 was successfully placed into a geostationary transfer orbit, but failed to reach its intended final orbit because its onboard engine could not fire. The investigation found that a pyrotechnic valve in the engine had failed to open due to a command signal not reaching it, and thus blocking oxidizer flow to the orbit-raising engine. For a variety of reasons, six of the 11 satellites launched by ISRO for the purposes of navigation have suffered failures or partial failures. Many failures were mainly associated with the problems in Swiss-made atomic clocks. Apart from this, IRNSS/NavIC satellite failures have stemmed from reasons such as engine and valve failures, missed command signals, and aging hardware. Reliance on imported components and insufficient redundancy have further degraded constellation reliability. The term “jinxed” is scientifically incorrect because it suggests that failures are caused by bad luck rather than identifiable technical issues. In reality, the IRNSS/NavIC satellite failures have clear known causes. Yet, given ISRO’s otherwise impressive track record of successes in other major space projects, the repeated setbacks in the NavIC program are almost making people to think that ISRO’s navigational program is jinxed! Experiencing failures and encountering malfunctions are not uncommon for space agencies worldwide. However, for ISRO, NavIC poses a challenge, since it is not about any single failure but instead a compounding series of technical setbacks. All this has made the India’s navigation system dysfunctional, which has both civilian and strategic importance. Amid ongoing military operations in India’s backyard, happening in the Iranian and Afghanistan theatres, the importance of a fully functional satellite navigation system for India has never been clearer. Experiences from India’s own Operation Sindhoor (May 6–7, 2025) had highlighted NavIC’s limitations and the risk of operating with a partially dysfunctional constellation. For, India the challenge is more acute since China provides military-grade BeiDou signals to Pakistan. In the Asia-Pacific region, experts feel that BeiDou’s performance is better than GPS. Various recent conflicts like Armenia‑Azerbaijan, Russia‑Ukraine, and US/Israel-Iran have shown how unmanned aerial vehicles or drones can decisively shape battles of the day. Beyond-visual-range engagements, precision-guided munitions, joint direct attack munitions, hypersonic weapons, and missile defense systems are now central to modern military conflicts. These military systems rely heavily on accurate, real-time positioning and targeting data. Major militaries all over the world are depending mainly on timely satellite-derived information to detect, track, and intercept threats. Hence, a reliable space-based navigation system is a critical enabler for operational effectiveness and central to battlefield success. Like other major space programs around the world, ISRO has suffered its share of failures, and there is no assurance that future missions will be free from setbacks. However, the challenges facing NavIC appear to extend beyond purely technological glitches or supply chain constraints. These failures are pointing towards deeper policy and planning issues such as delays in satellite replacement, gaps in constellation planning, delays in indigenous development of atomic clocks, limited redundancy, and slower integration with civilian and strategic users. Essentially, there is a requirement of putting development of this program in a mode with a stronger policy framework, better long-term planning, and clearer prioritization among the other big programs being developed by ISRO. Has the success of high-visibility missions like missions to Moon and Mars encouraged a push toward more ambitious, stature-driven projects like human spaceflight without first fully consolidating critical strategic systems like satellite navigation? Along with the satellite operations, there have also been problems with the user segment. According to ISRO, the user segment mainly consists of a single-frequency IRNSS receiver capable of receiving the signal at L5 or S-band frequency, a dual-frequency IRNSS receiver capable of receiving both L5 and S-band frequencies, and a receiver compatible to IRNSS and other GNSS signals. It is difficult to realize how a professional organisation like ISRO had sidelined the issues related to the development of ground elements and the user segment during the initial phase of the program. For some years, some of their navigation satellites were idle in space since there was no ground network planed for making the signal available for the common users and this has turned precious investments meaningless. In fact, the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) had flagged delays and cost overruns in the NavIC project, noting that the system was not fully operational as of June 2017. According to the report, by March 2017 ISRO had incurred a total expenditure of approximately $375–380 million, including both core program and launch vehicles, satellite maintenance, and ground infrastructure. The system was expected to become widely available in a user-friendly mode by April 2020; however, while NavIC services have since been operational, adoption has remained much limited. Even by 2026, its use on mainstream mobile devices, though enabled in some chipsets, is still not yet prevalent, and common mobile users in India do not have easy access to NavIC. What do the setbacks in NavIC indicate? Rather than pointing to a single cause, they raise broader policy queries about prioritization and sequencing in regards to the nature of projects undertaken by ISRO. Has the success of high-visibility missions like missions to Moon and Mars encouraged a push toward more ambitious, stature-driven projects like human spaceflight and plans for a space station and mission to Venus, without first fully consolidating critical strategic systems like satellite navigation? Is ISRO “punching above its weight” within limited resources while attention is being spread too thin, creating gaps in core capabilities that have direct strategic and civilian implications? By contrast, major space powers like the United States, China, and Russia have historically ensured that foundational critical space infrastructure like robust navigation, communication, and surveillance systems, is firmly in place before expanding into more symbolic or exploratory missions. The NavIC story should be an eye opener to India’s policy planners, demonstrating the requirement for India to have a sharper policy focus on strengthening strategic necessities first. Ajey Lele is Deputy Director General at MP-IDSA, New Delhi, India and the views expressed are personal.

Zarya: The Super Soyuz That Lived Twice

Zarya Left: “Reusable manned spacecraft Zarya: 1. Descent module 2. Cargo 3. Landing engine 4. Work compartment 5. Pressure vessel 6. Porthole 7. Star sensor 8. Ejection seat 9. Control panel 10. Antenna of the rendezvous equipment 11. Engine compartment 12. On-board equipment 13. Docking and orientation engines 14. Heat shield shock absorber 15. Doppler velocimeter 16. Refueling and propulsion system 17. Expendable compartment 18. SEP and EKhG 19. Wall-mounted radiator”. Right: landing of the Zarya spacecraft. Semyonov (ed.), 1996, scanned and processed by the author. Zarya: the Super-Soyuz that only lived twice by Maks Skiendzielewski Monday, March 23, 2026 In the late 1980s, with the development of the first modules of Mir nearing its end and their launches on the horizon, NPO Energia started work on the station’s successor. It was to be another generational step after Salyut-6 introduced multiple docking ports allowing continuous crewed operation and resupply missions and Mir became the first truly modular station, drastically expanding the available volume and bringing specialized modules to the mix. Initially, Mir-2 was just the backup to the Mir base block that would have replaced its original in orbit or have been used to build another Mir-type complex, but by the early 1980s, the focus had shifted to a massive orbital complex utilizing a large truss as its backbone—likely conceived with the American Space Station Freedom at the back of the designers’ minds. By 1991, that concept was abandoned in favor of the more modest “Mir-1.5” plans and later a cozy DOS-8-based station with a compact truss, photovoltaic cells, and solar concentrators, but it’s that mid-to-late-80s period where a need arose to match the next-generation station with a next-generation crew ferry. And thus, the Zarya was born. It’s that mid-to-late-80s period where a need arose to match the next-generation station with a next-generation crew ferry. And thus, the Zarya was born. The development of the spacecraft—also known under its GRAU designation 14F70 and Energia’s internal project code 7K-SM—was approved by a January 27, 1985, resolution of the Military Industrial Commission. Department 178 of NPO Energia, headed by I.L. Minyuk, was tasked with the work, with Konstantin Feoktistov as the project lead. NPO Energia’s General Designer Valentin Glushko personally supervised the project. Zarya was to take full advantage of the then-new Zenit, a standalone two-stage version of the mighty Energia’s Blok A strap-on booster. The increase in performance over the Soyuz allowed the designers to draw up a larger and more capable space station ferry that would use more modern technology than the two-decade-old design it would have replaced. At a later stage, the spacecraft was to be developed further into a versatile multi-mission vehicle, capable of operating autonomously or aided by a tug, in orbits as high as geostationary and inclinations up to 97°. By December 22, 1986, preliminary drawings were created, followed by the release in the first quarter of 1987 of the preliminary design. That received some adjustments on review released in May 1988. The capsule was designed to ferry between two and eight crew with cargo to Mir and back, with a certified on-orbit life of at least 195 days (later increased to 270 days). It could also be configured for uncrewed cargo missions, including the return of payloads from orbit, rescue missions to space stations and Buran orbiters, and specialized Ministry of Defense and Academy of Science missions. Under the hood Zarya was designed with the Zenit in mind as the launch vehicle, and therefore inherited its 4.1-meter diameter, although the crew module (capsule) itself had a diameter of 3.7 meters. At a length of five meters and launch mass of around 15 tonnes, the capsule would also comfortably fit in Buran’s payload bay. In the 15-tonne configuration, the Zenit would deliver Zarya to a 190-kilometer reference orbit at an inclination of 51.6°. With two crew, the cargo capacity was 2.5 tonnes with 1.5 to 2 tonnes return, while with no crew the capacity was three tonnes with 2–2.5 tonnes return. With the maximum crew of eight, the capsule would not take any meaningful cargo. The crew module’s aerodynamic shape was derived from the Soyuz descent module, with a lift/drag coefficient of 0.26 at velocities over Mach 6. The equipment on board was a mix of Soyuz-TM hardware and newly developed units, with the control systems taking full advantage of 1980s computer technology. Unlike the three-compartment Soyuz, which consists of separate orbital and descent pressurized modules, Zarya only had one large pressurized compartment, which separated from a stubby service compartment before reentry. Like the Soyuz-TM, Zarya could be equipped with either the traditional SSVP “probe-and-drogue” docking assembly, or the APAS-89 system developed for the Buran program—presumably with a small payload penalty, as the APAS system was 120 kilograms heavier—which was protected during launch by a jettisonable cover. Zarya was designed with the Zenit in mind as the launch vehicle, and therefore inherited its 4.1-meter diameter. The crew module could be reused up to 30 to 50 times thanks in part to the use of Buran-derived reusable thermal protection on the outside of the capsule. During descent, a small drogue chute would deploy to stabilize the vehicle. Instead of a main parachute, the spacecraft was equipped with a ring of liquid-fuel rocket engines that would land the vehicle propulsively. A single-use honeycomb heat shield panel at the bottom of the capsule protected the area with highest thermal load during reentry and doubled as a “crumple zone” upon touchdown to reduce the stresses on the vehicle structure. As this landing method would clearly need some practice to perfect, on the initial flights all crew would be in ejection seats, although that would limit the crew size to four. In the first two images below, you can see what could be the early ejection seat variant on the left—note the circular ejection hatches in the tile grid—and the fully operational variant with no ejection seat accommodations in the center. On the right is the attachment diagram of the Buran-derived silica tiles. Zarya Thermal protection system tile layout of the Zarya spacecraft. Left and center legend: I. heatshield-clad honeycomb crumple panel, II. tile mounting on the windward side, III. tile mounting on the leeward side. Images: Novosti Kosmonavtiki, 2014 №8, Tvoy Sektor Kosmosa on YouTube (lecture). Twenty-four main engines of the Unified Propulsion System (initially designed for the launch abort system before a Soyuz-style escape tower was chosen), pushing 1.5 tonnes-force of thrust each on a mix of hydrogen peroxide and kerosene, together with sixteen 62 kilograms-force monopropellant orientation thrusters, would be used to land the spacecraft in the Kazakh steppe with an accuracy of just 2.5 kilometers. The landing engines and fuel were located inside the descent module, so a non-toxic propellant mix was chosen for crew safety. Nevertheless, as one can imagine, the acoustic load level on the crew during landing was described as “high”. The acceleration limit was also set rather high at 10G when compared to the modern Soyuz’s 6G, although the contemporary TM series still subjected its passengers to a hefty 12G. Orbital maneuvering duties were taken care of by the expendable service compartment, analogous to the one on Soyuz. It used two 300 kilograms-force N2O4-UDMH maneuvering engines and a number of orientation thrusters to raise Zarya to the operational orbit (200–550 kilometers) after separation from the Zenit second stage. Radiators were mounted flush with the surface of the compartment around its perimeter. Interestingly, the standard Zenit did not have quite the performance necessary to lift the heavy capsule, so the second stage tanks were to be filled with syntin instead of kerosene to increase the impulse, and the launch abort system tower would be activated before Zarya separated from the second stage and only jettisoned after it gave the stack the extra push (or rather pull). Zarya Left: Zarya on top of the Zenit in the Manned Spacecraft Servicing Unit. Right: Various reusable crewed spaceflight projects, including Zarya on Zenit in the leftmost column and possibly an air-launched variant in the rightmost column. Images: HausD via the raumfahrer.net forum, Tvoy Sektor Kosmosa on YouTube (lecture). Five major launch configurations were described; Zarya could be easily reconfigured between them without affecting the general layout and systems: space station ferry with 2–4 crew and cargo launch and return rescue vessel launched with 1–2 crew, returning 2–4 crew rescue vessel launched empty, returning up to eight crew in-space assembly or repair spacecraft with 2–3 crew uncrewed spacecraft for cargo launch-return missions to orbits as high as 36,000 kilometers altitude with a special tug In January 1989, work stopped due to insufficient funding, by which time “main design documentation was completed” at NPO Energia, according to the company history book. Later that year, on October 5, 1989, the Scientific and Technical Council of the Ministry of General Machine Building and the USSR Academy of Sciences, meeting on the topic of Mir-2, “recognized the need to stop work” on Zarya. While the project never reached the production of flight hardware, some things were built and can still be seen today, namely the “Manned Spacecraft Servicing Unit” for the Zenit at Baikonur’s Site 45, built to service the Zarya-Zenit stack. According to one source, designs for the Zarya were among the items sold to China in the early 1990s when Sino-Russian relations warmed and Chinese officials visited a number of space enterprises in the former USSR. Zarya The “Manned Spacecraft Servicing Unit” at the Zenit launch site in Baikonur and a drawing of the facility with Zarya and Zenit. Left: I. Marinin. Right: Vovan via the NK Forum. Role in space station operations Being the prospective replacement of the Soyuz, Zarya played an important role in the Mir-2 plans of the late 1980s. The long on-orbit life resource and larger crew capacity meant that the capsule was a very convenient crew ferry and lifeboat for the large next-generation orbital complex. While relatively few illustrations of either Mir-2 or Zarya have been made public, the even scarcer ones with them both show a version of the future, where instead of Shuttle-Mir-Soyuz we have Buran-Mir-2-Zarya. Preliminary estimates showed a requirement for two flights of Zarya to supply Mir-2 every year, along with three Progress M2’s and one to two Buran orbiters. In the 1987 draft design of the 180GK version of Mir-2, a modified Soyuz-TM launched on Zenit or a standard Soyuz-TM launched on Soyuz-U2 were described as possible alternatives for Zarya. Zarya Zarya as part of two variants of the Mir-2 complex. via buran.ru However, Mir-2 was not the only station we know of where Zarya could have docked. Before military tensions eased significantly in the 1990s, NPO Energia had been working on a number of space-borne weapons, among them a modular space station for attacking high value ground targets. A DOS-7K-series module would be its core, just like on Mir, but instead of FGB-based science modules, the station would use “autonomous modules” based on the Buran airframe. Wingless orbiters with docking ports in the nose would separate from the station, maneuver to their strike positions and deploy ballistic weapons or BOR-based dive bombers. The Zarya spacecraft would be used to crew the station. The project never got off the drawing board, but Energia’s 1996 company history features an illustration showing how wild this station would have looked. Zarya “Space station for hitting ground targets 1. Transport ship 7K-SM [Zarya] 2. Command module 3. Base station unit 4. Target station module 5. Combat module”. Semyonov (ed.), 1996. Zarya died in January 1989 amid increasing tensions between Feoktistov and Glushko when funding for the project dried up. But the big Soyuz would be reincarnated six years later, if only for a brief moment. Zarya 2: Assured Crew Boogaloo The collapse of the Soviet Union coincided with dramatic delays in and eventual cancellation of the intial GK-180-variant of Mir-2 in mid-1991. The only way for the project to continue was to reconfigure the massive station into a smaller, Mir-1-sized affair or even only use the existing DOS-8 module to replace Mir’s core in orbit and extend the station’s lifespan. Meanwhile, NASA’s Space Station Freedom and its budget had also been shrinking by the minute, with the station losing one of its iconic four solar array pairs in 1991. Throughout the project, there was a clear need for the development or procurement of a rescue vessel for the station: the Space Shuttle could only dock for two weeks and any crew that stayed on a long-duration mission would be stranded if anything went seriously wrong. It would launch on shuttle—and hence sport some trunnions for attachment in the payload bay—and stay docked to the ISS for up to five years. By 1992, multiple rescue vessel concepts had been investigated under the Assured Crew Return Vehicle (ACRV) project name; the project was just entering the “system definition” phase. The concepts were mostly homegrown designs, ranging from scaled up Apollo command modules to lifting bodies, but some more exotic vehicles like the British “Multi-Role Recovery Capsule” also appeared in submissions to NASA tenders. At the time, the space station was due to start assembly in 1995 but only reach Permanently Manned Capability in 1999 when the ACRV arrived at the station. In October 1991, the head of NPO Energia, Yuri Semyonov, offered his company’s vehicles as the lifeboat for Freedom until the “proper” ACRV came online and repeated the offer on February 21, 1992, while appearing at a US Senate subcommittee hearing. At least three options were presented: the Soyuz-TM, a clean sheet design resembling the Apollo CM, and a modified version of the cancelled Zarya spacecraft. The last option would be able to seat five to six astronauts and fly on Zenit—like in its ’80s guise—or in the shuttle’s payload bay. Zarya In March 1992, officials from both countries discussed cooperation in crewed spaceflight and a NASA delegation visited Moscow to “hold exploratory talks on the concept of using Soyuz as an ACRV” and the Soyuz-TM option was developed further. The 1993 agreement to form the International Space Station from the Freedom program and what remained of Mir-2 led to the ACRV program being put on hold until 1997. In 1995, anticipating a tender from NASA, NPO Energia (which had by that time become RKK Energiya) resumed development of an ACRV, focusing on the Zarya-derived concept and bringing in as partners Rockwell International and, by the end of the year, Khrunichev. Zarya Russian ISS lifeboat based on the Zarya spacecraft. Semyonov (ed.), 1996 The new lifeboat had a launch mass of 12.5 tonnes, sat eight crew and was made up of three sections: the eight-tonne descent module, a short “transition compartment”, and the service module which housed instruments, batteries, fuel tanks, control thrusters, and engines. A larger jettisonable docking assembly with an APAS port joined the ACRV to the station and could be used as an airlock in free flight if needed. The total length of the vehicle was 7.2 meters with the same 3.7-meter capsule diameter. It would launch on shuttle—and hence sport some trunnions for attachment in the payload bay—and stay docked to the ISS for up to five years. The instrumentation was based on the Soyuz-TM. Work on the vehicle stopped after NASA switched to modified Soyuz-TM as a lifeboat for the first years of the ISS in June 1996. The ACRV program refocused on what would become the X-38, which was itself cancelled in 2001. The Soyuz ended up serving as the station’s lifeboat until 2021, when it started sharing that duty with Crew Dragon. But that’s not all… There is one more chapter to the Zarya story. A later Soyuz replacement, the PTK NP, aka Federatsiya, aka Oryol, also has Zarya heritage. After the Zarya-like large Soyuz descent module became the preferred configuration for the Euro-Russian Advanced Crew Transportation System (ACTS), the design was inherited by PTK NP. The story of ACTS/Oryol is one for another day, but I will sign off with some truly cursed Zarya-derived concepts from Oryol development documentation. Zarya Federatsiya/Oryol concept with an enlarged Soyuz descent module and an orbital module tumor. RKK Energiya via NK Forum. Zarya Federatsiya/Oryol and Kliper variants. RKK Energiya via NK Forum. Bibliography Bart Hendrickx, From Mir-2 to the ISS Russian Segment, London, British Interplanetary Society, 2002. Yuri Semyonov (ed.), Raketno-kosmicheskaya korporatsiya Energiya 1946–1996, Moscow, 1996, pp. 423–425 Igor Afanasyev, Dmitry Vorontsov, Nesostoyavshayasya «Zarya», Novosti Kosmonavtiki, 2014 №8 V.S. Syromyatnikov, 100 rasskazov o stykovke i odrugikh priklyucheniyakh v kosmose i na Zemle, Chast’ 2: 20 let spustya, M. University Book, Logos, 2010, pp. 206–208, 210–211, 221 The Russian Soyuz spacecraft, ESA, accessed 09.08.2025 Anatoly Zak, Russia proposes lifeboat for a US space station, Russian Space Web, accessed 09.08.2025 V. Mokhov, Modul dlya «Burana», Novosti Kosmonavtiki, 1998 №23–24 Igor Afanasyev, Neizvestnye korabli, Znanie, Moscow, 1991 Rex D. Hall, David J. Shayler and Bert Vis, Russia’s cosmonauts: inside the Yuri Gagarin Training Center, Springer Praxis, 2006, p. 228 Yuri Baturin, Mirovaya pilotiruyemaya kosmonavtika: Istoriya. Tekhnika. Lyudi, “RTSoft” Publishing House, Moscow, 2005, pp. 534–535 Craig Covault, “Mir Cosmonauts Prepare For Reentry As NASA Holds Soyuz Talks in Moscow”, Aviation Week, March 23, 1992, p. 24 Maks Skiendzielewski can be found on The Artist Formerly Known as Twitter at @galopujacy_jez. A version of this article was previously published by the author on Medium.

The Legal Aspects Of Outer Space Settlers And Settlements

Mars base Any future settlements on Mars or elsewhere beyond Earth face legal challenges. (credit: SpaceX) The legal aspects of outer space settlers and settlements by Dennis O’Brien Monday, March 23, 2026 We have reached the point in human history when advances in technology, finance, and law have made the utilization of outer space resources feasible. In response, the UN’s Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) created the Working Group on Legal Aspects of Space Resource Activity. For similar reasons, it is time to focus on the legal aspects of outer space settlers and settlements. First, some definitions. A Settler is anyone who spends any time in orbital space or beyond. A Settlement is any location where one or more persons is living. Within these broad definitions, there are four general areas of study, which will be discussed below. The current framework of national and international law The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 (OST) is the foundation of space law. It is a binding treaty that has been ratified by 118 countries and signed by 20 more, including all the countries that are active in outer space. There are several articles that affect settlers and settlements, including: Article I: Guarantee of free access; Article II: Prohibition against appropriation; Article IV: Prohibition against military bases/installations; Article VI: Requirement for authorization/supervision of all national activities; Article VIII and XII: Extension of a country’s jurisdiction and control; Article IX: Protection against harmful interference. Article VI establishes the interactive framework of national and international law. Every member state (or an intergovernmental organization like ESA) must authorize and supervise the outer space activities of any of its nationals, including all non-governmental entities such as individuals and corporations. Thus, any early settlers/settlements will be operating under the laws of the country or organization that authorizes and supervises their activities. If more than one country or organization is involved, there will need to be an Operating Agreement among them, as with the International Space Station. Outright ownership of land will probably need to wait until a settlement becomes independent, at which time it must be made available to individuals. Because of Article II’s ban on appropriation, neither countries nor their nationals can claim outright ownership of any location in outer space, though their jurisdiction and control will extend over objects, stations, and facilities (Articles VIII, XII). In addition, Article IX prohibits harmful interference, so there will be a de facto right of noninterference for any occupied location. COPUOS is currently considering the adoption of a principle that removing a resource from in place is not inherently appropriation (an issue unaddressed in the OST), even if it is regolith that is removed from the surface to build a lunar shelter or facility. Thus, buildings will be owned (and marketable), even if the location is not, and will be protected from interference. Human rights and the right to development In addition to the OST, there are two international declarations that are relevant to outer space settlers and settlements: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 (UDHR) and the Declaration of the Right to Development (1986). The UDHR has two provisions of interest: Art. 14: “Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution”; Art.17: “Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.” It is important to acknowledge the right to asylum, as OST Article VIII states that “A State Party… shall retain jurisdiction and control over… any personnel… while in outer space or on a celestial body.” Most space-faring countries have already signed the Refugee Convention (1951) or Protocols (1967), with India and many Middle East countries notable exceptions. Although the ban on appropriation in the OST does not explicitly mention private entities, Article VI requires countries to assure that activities of their nationals conform with the Treaty. But we should nevertheless acknowledge that individual settlers will have the same property rights that are available to any country, such as ownership of resources removed from in place and ownership of the right of non-interference, which will protect locations in use. Outright ownership of land will probably need to wait until a settlement becomes independent, at which time it must be made available to individuals. Article 1 of The Declaration of the Right to Development states: The right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized. The human right to development also implies the full realization of the right of peoples to self-determination, which includes… the exercise of their inalienable right to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth and resources. Although these Declarations are not binding, they have established principles that have guided both national and international governance for decades. We must take them with us as we leave the home planet. Self-governance and autonomy Some in the private sector are already planning the details of settlement self-governance. The efforts of SpaceX are perhaps the most ambitious: its Starlink terms & services agreement states that “The parties recognize Mars as a free planet and that no Earth-based government has authority or sovereignty over Martian activities". However, this clause directly contradicts OST Article VI and would not be enforceable. [1] Those who support self-governing settlements should promote national laws that facilitate such growth. A clearer path to autonomy is the development of self-governance as the need and opportunities arise. Although almost every minute of activity on the ISS is controlled by Earth-based authorities, a time will come when settlers want to decide their own schedules and how they work and live with each other. Such devolution of governance is common on Earth; many countries have federal systems, with political subdivisions like states and territories responsible for most functions other than foreign policy and defense. Until a settlement is ready to become independent, seeking autonomy within the legal framework of the authorizing and supervising country or organization is the only legal path available for the development of self-governance. Those who support self-governing settlements should promote national laws that facilitate such growth. Independence Becoming an independent sovereign state will be more difficult. A settlement will at least need to meet the four standards established by the Montevideo Convention, which has been widely accepted as customary international law: a permanent population; a defined territory; a government; and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. Although Article 3 of the Convention states that “the political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states,” such recognition is important as a practical matter. Any new sovereign state will not be bound by the OST and will be able to claim territory. It could then offer to adopt the OST and be subject to customary international law in return for other countries recognizing its claims. [2] Note that the prohibition against appropriation in OST Article II actually favors independent settlements: it keeps the current world powers from claiming land while preserving it for future settlements. Those who support future settlers and settlements hereby declare their intention to seek independence and call upon the state members of COPUOS to do nothing at this time—politically, economically, or environmentally—that would interfere with their future interests. Conclusion: A call for support At every session of COPUOS, more than a hundred delegates from around the world gather to represent their own country’s present and future interests. But there is no one to represent the future interests of the settlers. This is not to say that the countries and their delegates are wrong or uncaring. It is proper for representatives of a sovereign state to give the interests of their country and its people the highest priority. That is how institutions of international governance function. There is an assumption that such a process, and the requirement for consensus decisions, will ensure that the interests of all humanity will be served. But will they? Humanity is more than just the sum of its national interests. We have dreamed about the heavens since before countries existed. We wrote about traveling in outer space before we could fly. In October 1957, most of humanity stood outside at sunset, looking to the west to watch a blinking light pass high overhead, the tumbling upper stage booster of Sputnik, the world’s first artificial satellite. Some felt an increase in Cold War anxiety, but most of us felt awed and inspired. All the dreams of the writers and the poets—indeed, of all humanity—suddenly seemed within reach. Humanity’s departure from the home world offers a rare opportunity, a clean slate, a chance to restore hope. Then came the Space Race, as the Earth’s two great powers, and the two dominant ideologies, sought to prove that their system was the best to lead humanity to the to the New Frontier. Although people still dreamed, almost all space activity was controlled by national governments. Even after we reached the Moon, governments maintained their monopolies. When the Space Shuttle began service, the US government required all domestic satellites to use it for launches. Even though other countries joined in—most notably China and the member states of the European Space Agency—the dream of civilians building a new life in space seemed unattainable. But in January 1986, the shuttle Challenger exploded on liftoff. After a thorough review, the US government decided that it must open the launcher market to private industry. But it kept the monopoly on human spaceflight, as did other governments. The Soviet, and later Russian, government focused on space stations, the first settlements in space. Other governments followed suit, culminating in a joint venture (without China) to build the International Space Station. In November 2000, humanity began its continuous presence in outer space with the arrival of Expedition 1. Human spaceflight remained a government monopoly until two events occurred. In February 2003, the shuttle Columbia disintegrated on its return to Earth. In response, the US government finally decided to relinquish its monopoly on human space flight. But it would still be the major funding source and mission controller, as the private sector had not yet developed the technology and financing needed for an economically sustainable human presence in space. All of that changed in 2015. On December 22, SpaceX, a US corporation, successfully landed a reusable booster from Earth orbit after deploying satellites there. Do you remember where you were that day? More importantly, do you remember what you felt the moment the booster touched down safely? Once again, humanity’s dreams seemed achievable. Despite the war, suffering, and neglect that dominated the world, humans looked to the skies and began to believe that they really could build a better world. Humanity’s departure from the home world offers a rare opportunity, a clean slate, a chance to restore hope. It is not too early to begin to consider the settlers and settlements as we develop outer space policies, to protect their rights and to chart a path to self-rule and independence. They are counting on us. In many ways, we are the settlers. Let us do our best to create that shining city on the hill that will light the way for all. Refrrences Cristian van Eijk, Sorry, Elon: Mars is not a legal vacuum – and it’s not yours, either, Völkerrechtsblog, 05.11.2020, doi: 10.17176/20210107-183703-0. See, e.g., Adele Ankers-Range, Apple's Beloved Sci-Fi Series Returns in Epic Season 5 Trailer, Movieweb, February 24, 2026. Dennis O’Brien chairs the Space Policy Committee of Space Renaissance International, a COPUOS Permanent Observer, and thanks the committee members for many informative discussions over the years. For more information about SRI and its proposed 18th Sustainable Development Goal: Civilian Development of Space, please go to https://spacerenaissance.space/.