The Jump Seat Satellite Begins Operations

JUMPSEAT The JUMPSEAT satellites began operations in 1971 and the program was finally shut down in 2006. The satellites provided signals intelligence information from orbits high over the northern hemisphere. (credit: NRO) High Jump: the JUMPSEAT signals intelligence satellite by Dwayne A. Day Monday, February 2, 2026 On March 21, 1971, a new and unusual rocket lifted off from Vandenberg Air Force Base on the California coast. It was a night launch and nobody viewing the rocket climb into the cold Pacific sky could tell that it was different than other Titan rockets that had launched from there many times before. But anybody at the base who saw it knew that it was new. Previous Titan rockets had narrow, pointy noses half the diameter of the Titan core stage. But this rocket had a thicker fairing, the same diameter as the core, indicating a new and bigger payload. The fairing was also tall, meaning that something long was packed inside. Once it reached orbit, anybody who had access to the orbital data could tell that rather than a low Earth orbit, it had instead headed into a highly elliptical orbit highly inclined to the Equator, one that took it low and fast over the southern hemisphere and then high and slower over the northern hemisphere, perfect for staring down on the Soviet Union for longer periods of time. By the mid-1960s, signals intelligence experts began to consider launching signals intelligence satellites into higher orbits. This led to two different new signals intelligence satellites: CANYON and JUMPSEAT. The satellite was named JUMPSEAT, and it was the first of a new kind of signals intelligence collector. It was equipped with two large dish antennas and a small telescope at the base of its “antenna farm.” In orbit, it flew with its spinning bus covered with solar panels up, and its antenna farm pointed down toward the Earth. In December 2025, the National Reconnaissance Office declassified the JUMPSEAT signals intelligence satellite, announcing it on January 28. Eight JUMPSEAT satellites were launched from 1971 to 1987, and the program was finally shut down in 2006—meaning that at least one satellite lasted 19 years or longer in orbit. Although the NRO provided only a limited amount of information on JUMPSEAT, in a press release the office indicated that it would reveal more information in the future. Most notably, the NRO released over a half-dozen photos of the early spacecraft, including models, artwork, and flight hardware. JUMPSEAT The JUMPSEAT satellites were manufactured by Hughes, which gained extensive experience in spin-stabilized high-altitude satellites beginning in the 1960s. Note that the big dish is not fully deployed. It appears to have had wings that folded out after reaching orbit. (credit: NRO) Origins of JUMPSEAT Starting in the late 1950s, the Air Force, CIA, and Navy began developing systems that could collect radar and other signals from space. The Navy was the first to orbit a radar detector in 1960 as part of a program named GRAB. The Air Force also sought to collect radar signals using both dedicated satellites and payloads attached to other satellites. The CIA was interested in determining if the Soviet Union was trying to track and interfere with its satellites. These efforts were the natural outgrowth of existing projects to put signals intelligence sensors on aircraft, ships, and submarines that had proliferated as the Cold War progressed and the United States military developed a greater appreciation for Soviet radar capabilities. By 1961, multiple satellite intelligence programs were loosely coordinated under the direction of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). The Navy satellites were developed by a special component of the NRO centered at the Naval Research Laboratory in Washington, DC, and known as Program C. The Air Force component of the NRO, known as Program A and based in Los Angeles, was responsible for developing signals intelligence satellites as well as photographic reconnaissance satellites. Throughout the 1960s, the signals intelligence projects grew more diverse. The Navy continued to develop the GRAB and later POPPY programs, while the Air Force pursued both large signals intelligence satellites as part of Program 770, and smaller suitcase-sized satellites as part of Program 11 (later Program 989). These satellites targeted radars of multiple types, such as air search radars and big, powerful anti-ballistic missile radars. They also focused on other signals such as navigational beacons and communications, including Soviet air traffic control communications. The smaller satellites had many different names such as PUNDIT, MAGNUM, SAVANT, TIVOLI, LAMPAN, TOPHAT, and ARROYO. The satellites were all contained within a security compartment amusingly named EARPOP. (See “A flower in the polar sky: the POPPY signals intelligence satellite and ocean surveillance,” The Space Review, April 28, 2008; “Little Wizards: Signals intelligence satellites during the Cold War,” The Space Review, August 2, 2021; “And the sky full of stars: American signals intelligence satellites and the Vietnam War”, The Space Review, February 12, 2018.) JUMPSEAT Slightly different photo of the same JUMPSEAT satellite in the factory. “EARPOP” was the security compartment for signals intelligence satellites at the time. (credit: NRO) The satellites all operated in low Earth orbit, which placed them relatively close to their targets, but limited the amount of time they could collect emissions before moving out of range. The GRAB and POPPY satellites beamed their collected signals directly down to ground stations as soon as they gathered them, whereas many of the others recorded them on sometimes-problematic tape recorders for replay when the satellite was in view of a ground station. The newly released images of the JUMPSEAT satellites, and the fact sheet about the satellite from the NRO, indicate that JUMPSEAT carried several different antennas for collecting signals. By the mid-1960s, signals intelligence experts began to consider launching signals intelligence satellites into higher orbits. From a higher perch, the satellites could collect signals for longer periods of time, including intermittent signals such as radars that were turned on and off as needed. A satellite in a high orbit could also send its data directly to a ground station in “near-real time,” where newer and more powerful computers could process their data in minutes rather than the weeks and even months it took to process signals early in the decade. This led to two different new signals intelligence satellites: CANYON and JUMPSEAT. CANYON, which remains classified, was designed to intercept communications between Soviet microwave towers that crisscrossed the vast Soviet landmass. The basic outlines of the JUMPSEAT program have been known for several decades. Its name was revealed in the mid-1980s and its unusual orbit had been observed since the 1970s. Its overall mission had also been guessed, without much certainty, by independent observers in the 1980s. The NRO contract for JUMPSEAT was awarded to Hughes Aircraft Company in 1967. At this time, debate within the intelligence community about the capabilities of Soviet anti-ballistic missiles (ABM) was reaching a fever pitch. Detecting ABM signals and other related intelligence was a key priority for JUMPSEAT. (See “From TACSAT to JUMPSEAT: Hughes and the top secret Gyrostat satellite gamble,” The Space Review, December 21, 2020.) JUMPSEAT This appears to be a different satellite than the one in the other photos. Note the different (and additional) sensors near the base of the de-spun platform. (credit: NRO) JUMPSEAT was equipped with a large antenna nearly four meters (13 feet) in diameter for collecting radar, communications, and other emissions from the ground, and a smaller antenna for relaying that data to a ground station. JUMPSEAT was a SIGINT satellite. SIGINT is the overall term for the collection of electronic transmissions. SIGINT also includes electronic intelligence (ELINT), which usually means the collection of radar signals; and communications intelligence, or COMINT. Many of the NRO’s smaller satellites were ELINT satellites. At the time JUMPSEAT entered development, the NRO already operated large SIGINT satellites in low Earth orbit as part of Program 770. By the latter 1960s, a series of Program 770 satellites known as MULTIGROUP was being replaced by a new series named STRAWMAN, equipped with multiple antennas. Operating in low Earth orbit, the STRAWMAN satellites did not spend much time over Soviet territory. JUMPSEAT originated as a higher-altitude replacement for STRAWMAN, with a payload for detecting the elusive ABM radar signals. The newly released images of the JUMPSEAT satellites, and the fact sheet about the satellite from the NRO, indicate that JUMPSEAT carried several different antennas for collecting signals. It also carried additional small payloads, some of which remain enigmatic. JUMPSEAT Close up of part of the JUMPSEAT model. JUMPSEAT was equipped with at least one staring infrared sensor for detecting short-burn rockets, such as Soviet anti-ballistic missiles. It could also detect reentry vehicles during tests. It appears that an additional sensor was mounted above the infrared sensor. (credit: NRO) Infrared from high orbit About the same time that TRW was beginning work on the Defense Support Program infrared early warning satellite for the Air Force, and Hughes was successfully bidding for the JUMPSEAT signals intelligence payload for the NRO, another infrared sensor mission was gaining support in the USAF. The new mission appears to have started out in the same organization, Space and Missile Systems Organization (SAMSO), that created the Program 949 (Defense Support Program). The infrared mission apparently did not originate in the much more secretive NRO. In March 1967, the Air Force’s senior leadership presented the results of a study concerning the ability of an infrared sensor operating in the wavelength range of 2.68 to 2.97 microns in either medium altitude or geosynchronous orbit to detect ICBMs and short-burn missiles such as ABMs. The sensor would need to have a much higher scanning rate than the Defense Support Program satellite, which rotated six times a minute. This higher scanning rate was necessary to detect the ABMs before their engines burned out. As a bonus, the higher scanning rate would also enable the sensor to detect reentry events, such as Soviet warheads during ICBM tests. According to a memorandum summarizing the briefing from the director of the NRO (DNRO) Al Flax to the Secretary of the Air Force, Harold Brown, this would be an intelligence sensor, not one intended to directly support Air Force operations like the Defense Support Program satellites. Despite the highly classified nature of JUMPSEAT, a year before the first launch Aviation Week had already revealed its Air Force code number, 711, its launcher, its elliptical orbit, its contractor, and its SIGINT mission. Because Aerojet had their hands full with the DSP sensor, the Air Force determined that these other sensors could best be built by Hughes, and that a Lockheed satellite then being built “for another program”—almost certainly CANYON—could host them. The goal then was to have a spacecraft available in 15–18 months, presumably because of the urgency that then surrounded the resolution of the ABM controversies. For unknown reasons, the new sensor was incorporated into JUMPSEAT instead. With Hughes building both the sensor and the spacecraft, the integration task would have been simplified, although the satellites operated in vastly different orbits. JUMPSEAT JUMPSEAT Two illustrations of the JUMPSEAT satellite. Note that they have different sensors mounted at the base of the de-spun platform. In operation, the antenna farm pointed down towards the Earth. (credit: NRO) Listening from on high The NRO put increased emphasis on collecting information on Soviet anti-ballistic missile radars starting in 1967. Beginning in 1968, the STRAWMAN low-altitude electronic intelligence satellites carried a payload named CONVOY to detect such signals, and the NRO also launched at least one POPPY mission as well as small spacecraft named TIVOLI and MABELI that targeted ABM radars. Some reports indicate that JUMPSEAT was developed to detect Soviet ABM radars, partly as a consequence of a committee chaired by Harry Davis that developed a strategic plan for signals collection from space. If JUMPSEAT originated as an ABM radar detection satellite, it apparently evolved to take over most of the STRAWMAN mission, because STRAWMAN was phased out of service soon after JUMPSEAT began operating. Despite the highly classified nature of JUMPSEAT, a year before the first launch Aviation Week had already revealed its Air Force code number, 711, its launcher, its elliptical orbit, its contractor, and its SIGINT mission to “monitor foreign radar activity.” The name JUMPSEAT was not revealed until the late 1980s, in Seymour Hersh’s book about the 1983 shooting down of Korean Airlines flight KAL 007 by a Soviet fighter plane. JUMPSEAT A Hughes Syncom/Leasat communications satellite being prepared for launch on the space shuttle. Leasat was used as the basis for the second generation Satellite Data System relay satellites. Hughes acquired significant experience with spinning satellites and high-altitude signals and communications satellites for the National Reconnaissance Office and the military. (credit: NASA) After the 1971 launch, more JUMPSEAT satellites were launched in 1972, 1973, and 1975. Starting in the early 1970s, the Air Force (not the NRO) began development of a new Satellite Data System (SDS) satellite with a communications relay mission. The Air Force was responsible for developing the satellite, and the CIA was responsible for the communications relay payload. Hughes won that contract, probably helped by its experience developing JUMPSEAT. Whereas JUMPSEAT used the HS-318 satellite bus, the SDS, also known by the classified name QUASAR, was apparently based upon Hughes’ somewhat larger commercial Intelsat IV satellite bus. A later version of QUASAR was based on Hughes’ much wider Leasat satellite bus. In June 1976, the NRO launched the first SDS data relay satellite, which operated in a similar orbit as JUMPSEAT. Much later in the 1990s, some versions of SDS added a geostationary capability. Hughes’ military and intelligence satellite work, as well as its popular Intelsat IV design, enabled the company to become a powerhouse in high-altitude satellites for the next several decades. JUMPSEAT JUMPSEAT had a large main dish for collecting signals, and a smaller dish for relaying signals to ground stations in the United States. The dishes were on a platform that was de-spun from the satellite bus. Note the unlabeled sensor at the base of the de-spun platform. (credit: NRO) Known and unknown The NRO has not released substantial information on JUMPSEAT at this time, but will review information for further release “as time and resources permit.” It did release illustrations of “the early JUMPSEAT systems” and the “early JUMPSEAT models.” They reveal a large circular dish antenna with a smaller circular dish antenna mounted above it atop a tall tower. Construction photos indicate that the larger dish was stowed in a partially folded configuration during launch and deployed in orbit. According to a source who was briefed about JUMPSEAT’s role in Operation Desert Storm in 1991, by that time JUMPSEAT’s antennas were mounted side-by-side rather than one atop the other. The purpose of this new configuration is unknown, but the company may have gained confidence from its SDS satellite operations, which required that the antennas be pointed towards different targets. JUMPSEAT The National Reconnaissance Office released several photos of JUMPSEAT models. These models reveal features of the design. (credit: NRO) The illustrations of JUMPSEAT released by NRO do reveal some information not mentioned in the public fact sheet or declassification memo. Notably, the staring infrared sensor is visible at the base of the de-spun antenna platform. In one image, a second optical sensor is present. The optical sensor also appears to have another sensor mounted above this, although its purpose is unknown. The NRO’s JUMPSEAT declassification is a start, but it will likely be several years before significantly more information is released, such as official histories, mission reports, and documents and memos. In summer 2023, the NRO declassified the PARCAE ocean surveillance satellite, but two and a half years later it still has not released any documents or even photos of the flight hardware. JUMPSEAT will remain mysterious for a while longer.

Sub orbital's Descending Trajectory

New Shepard Blue Origin’s New Shepard lifts off January 22 on the NS-38 mission, the last for New Shepard for at least two years. (credit: Blue Origin) Suborbital’s descending trajectory by Jeff Foust Monday, February 2, 2026 January 22, 2026, may turn out to be a pivotal day in the history of Blue Origin, but not for reasons that were obvious that day. “Wow! Wow! Wow!” Stiles said after landing. “Oh my gosh!” In West Texas, the company conducted the latest launch of its New Shepard suborbital vehicle. The NS-38 mission was a typical flight for the company, the tenth in less than 12 months for the program. The one thing that stood out at the time is that one of the six customers who was named to the flight fell ill. He was replaced two days before the flight by a Blue Origin employee, Laura Stiles, who had worked on the program in various capacities and was now director of New Shepard launch operations. While Stiles was more familiar with the vehicle than almost anyone else, she still came away from the flight stunned. “Wow! Wow! Wow!” she said on the Blue Origin webcast moments after stepping out of the capsule. “Oh my gosh!” “To be able to do something like that with all of these amazing, amazing coworkers,” she said a few minutes later, “it’s going to take a long time to process what just happened.” The same day that Stiles and the others on NS-38 got to experience a taste of space, another Blue Origin spacecraft emerged from a factory across the country in Florida. The first Blue Moon Mark 1 lander, called “Endurance” by the company, was trucked from the factory just outside the gates of the Kennedy Space Center to nearby Port Canaveral. There, it was loaded onto a ship to be transported to Houston. In Houston, Endurance will undergo testing in a thermal vacuum chamber at the Johnson Space Center, one originally used for the Apollo program and, more recently, by the James Webb Space Telescope. Once those tests are complete—a process expected to take at least a few weeks—the lander will ship back to Florida for launch on a New Glenn rocket, bound for the south polar region of the Moon. At the time, the two events appeared unrelated, other than to perhaps demonstrate that Blue Origin was big enough to carry out these activities simultaneously. Eight days later, though, their paths collided. In a two-paragraph press release issued around mid-afternoon Friday, January 30, Blue Origin announced it was halting New Shepard flights for at least two years. “Blue Origin today announced it will pause its New Shepard flights and shift resources to further accelerate development of the company's human lunar capabilities,” the company stated. “The decision reflects Blue Origin's commitment to the nation's goal of returning to the Moon and establishing a permanent, sustained lunar presence.” “First of all, it’s a good business,” Limp said last year. “There is an insatiable demand out there for human beings who grew up thinking about space and want to get to space.” The announcement took the space industry, and even many people inside Blue Origin, by surprise. The company had not hinted it was halting or scaling back New Shepard flights. “As we enter 2026, we're focused on continuing to deliver transformational experiences for our customers through the proven capability and reliability of New Shepard,” Phil Joyce, senior vice president for New Shepard at Blue Origin, said in a statement after NS-38. Both he and Dave Limp, Blue Origin’s CEO, said in the last year that New Shepard was both useful for technology development and also a good business. “New Shepard serves two really big purposes. The first is that it is a testbed for almost everything that we do,” Limp said at a conference last February. The other was the “profound experience” of spaceflight for customers. “I do believe New Shepard will be a very good business for us.” He doubled down on those comments at another conference in May. “First of all, it’s a good business,” he said. “There is an insatiable demand out there for human beings who grew up thinking about space and want to get to space, but it’s still very hard to do right now.” He added that even if the business case for New Shepard wasn’t good, “we would still fly New Shepard because it’s such a good testbed.” The strongest case for New Shepard came from Joyce in a talk at the Global Spaceport Alliance’s International Spaceport Forum in Sydney, Australia, in late September. He announced there that Blue Origin planned to increase the New Shepard flight rate from less than once per month to “approximately weekly” over the next few years. That would be accomplished, he said then, by adding more vehicles to the fleet, including versions with modifications intended to support higher flight rates. The company was also considering additional launch sites beyond West Texas for the vehicle. That increase was driven by customer demand. “The demand is really strong,” Joyce said. “We’re continuing to see sales every week, every day.” It was those customers, he added, that led the company to consider alternative launch sites. Blue Origin’s Launch Site One is in a remote area of West Texas, a long drive from the nearest major airport in El Paso. “A lot of our target customer base, ultrahigh-net-worth individuals, don’t want to spend a day and a half getting to the destination, so that’s a consideration,” Joyce said of potential spaceport locations. So how did New Shepard go from a program that the company was planning to ramp up to one that it is halting? A key factor is something that took place a few weeks after Joyce spoke in Sydney, when NASA’s acting administrator at the time, Sean Duffy, expressed his displeasure with SpaceX’s development of the Starship lunar lander for Artemis and said he would be “opening that contract up” to competition (see “The (possibly) great lunar lander race”, The Space Review, November 3, 2025.) NASA said it asked both Blue Origin and SpaceX, the two companies with Human Landing System (HLS) contracts, for “acceleration approaches” that could speed up a lunar landing. Both companies complied, but neither they nor NASA have disclosed details about those plans. “They asked us, ‘Can you get to the Moon faster?’” Limp said in an interview in November. “My answer is, if the country wants it, yes.” “We believe that we have a simplified architecture that closes. We believe we can do it very quickly,” he said of the new approach, details of which he did not disclose. “The reason we can do it very quickly is that it uses the pieces and parts that we’re already working on, but with simpler CONOPS and a simplified mission.” While the push for an accelerated lunar landing program started under Duffy’s temporary leadership of NASA, it has continued since Jared Isaacman took over in December. In an interview Friday before the Blue Origin announcement, he said the agency was committed to helping both companies speed up their lander development. “We are going to do everything we can to enable the acceleration plans that were submitted by both HLS providers,” he said. “We are willing to rethink a lot of our requirements in order to achieve the objective on time.” Virgin expected to begin test flights of the first Delta-class spaceplane in late 2025 and begin commercial service in 2026 but, like so many other aerospace programs, those schedules have slipped. Earlier last month at a briefing during the Artemis 2 rollout, Isaacman called both companies’ concepts “very good plans” that reduced technical risk. He added that the key for both companies will be to increase the flight rates of both Starship and New Glenn, since both companies are planning to use in-space propellant transfer for their landers. “So, I’d say if we’re on track, we should be watching an awful lot of New Glenns and Starships launch in the years ahead,” he said. Chinese suborbital Two models of planned Chinese suborbital vehicles, each resembling New Shepard, on display in the exhibit hall at the International Astronautical Congress in Sydney last year. (credit: J. Foust) The relevance of suborbital Blue Origin, in its statement, said that halting New Shepard flights would free up resources for its lunar work, but did not elaborate. Some employees working on New Shepard will move over to Blue Moon and related programs, particularly engineers and technicians. Less clear, though, will be what happens to those who has been working on things more specific to New Shepard, such as training, operations, and sales of tickets. Since Friday afternoon, some Blue Origin employees who had been on the New Shepard program have posted on social media that they are looking for opportunities both inside and outside the company, but none said explicitly that they had been laid off. Halting New Shepard flights for lunar work is ironic, since the suborbital vehicle is how the company got its start on lunar landers. As Christian Davenport recounted in his recent book Rocket Dreams, the company pitched a lunar lander to the first Trump administration’s NASA transition team based on its work landing the New Shepard booster: “We can land something like it on the Moon,” they said, a “completely off-script” statement since the company did not have a lunar lander in development. After the meeting, they did. (See “Review: Rocket Dreams”, The Space Review, September 22, 2025.) Blue Origin’s statement made clear it was not formally cancelling New Shepard, only halting flights for at least two years. But that is long enough that the company will need to make a significant investment if it decides in 2028 or later to restart the program. Vehicles and equipment will need to be taken out of mothballs, production lines restarted, sales funnels reopened. The institutional knowledge about the vehicle, which is never fully captured in documentation, will need to be relearned as the people working on New Shepard disperse to other Blue Origin programs or leave the company. Blue Origin’s departure, at least for now, leaves Virgin Galactic alone in the suborbital commercial human spaceflight market. And that company has not flown since June 2024, when the company retired its SpaceShipTwo vehicle, VSS Unity, to focus its resources, and its cash, on the improved Delta class of suborbital spaceplanes. At the time, the company expected to begin test flights of the first Delta-class spaceplane in late 2025 and begin commercial service in 2026 but, like so many other aerospace programs, those schedules have slipped. In its latest earnings call in November, Virgin executives said test flights would now begin in the third quarter of 2026, followed by research flights in the fourth quarter. Flights with private astronauts—aka space tourists—might not begin until 2027. “We feel good and confident in our Q3 start of flight test,” Michael Colglazier, CEO of Virgin Galactic, said in the earnings call. The company will likely update that schedule in its next earnings call in the next several weeks. The company is unlikely to give up easily on suborbital spaceflight. Unlike Blue Origin, which has multiple programs—the company announced last month plans for its own broadband constellation, TeraWave, to serve enterprise customers—there is no Plan B for Virgin to fall back on. The technical and fiscal success of the Delta-class vehicles is essential to the company’s future, although executives say they are optimistic that, once the Delta vehicle start flying, they can do so profitably. When Peter Diamandis announced the X Prize almost 30 years ago, suborbital space tourism was a means to an end: reusable launch vehicles that could achieve the promise of low-cost access to space with high flight rates. The only other likely options for commercial human suborbital spaceflight for the foreseeable future are in China. In the exhibit hall at the International Astronautical Congress in Sydney last year, two Chinese companies just a few dozen meters apart showed off models of similar suborbital vehicles, both modeled on New Shepard but with design elements taken from SpaceX. AZSpace’s vehicle had a capsule that looked like New Shepard, with large windows, but its propulsion module included Falcon 9-like grid fins. A similar design by CAS Space also included grid fins, but with a capsule that looked a little more like a Crew Dragon. A third Chinese company, InterstellOr, is also developing a suborbital vehicle whose capsule again looks like New Shepard, this time with aerodynamic fins on the side; its booster is like a Falcon 9, down to the design of the landing legs. The company announced last month it sold a ticket to a Chinese actor, Johnny Huang Jingyu, and a report stated it now has more than 20 confirmed customers that included “academicians, business executives, and silicon-based robots.” (The report didn’t explain why a robot would fly on such a vehicle.) It’s quite possible that one or more of these ersatz New Shepards will fly before the real one returns to the skies. They may also find some degree of commercial success. However, it may only end up being a footnote in the development of the global space economy. When Peter Diamandis announced the X Prize almost 30 years ago, suborbital space tourism was a means to an end. That end was reusable launch vehicles that could achieve the promise of low-cost access to space. That required a high flight rate, and he and others involved with the prize concluded that satellites alone would be insufficient: after all, at the time the largest satellite systems numbers in the dozens of spacecraft, and only the most ambitious systems, like Teledesic, proposed hundreds of satellites. People, by contrast, represented a potentially much larger customer base: self-loading carbon-based payloads that come with their own money, as he used to quip. Only they could justify the high flight rates needed to make reusable vehicles economical, it seemed. Today, that argument has been turned on its head. It is satellite constellations that feature thousands of satellites that are driving launch demand, including efforts to develop partially and fully reusable rockets. Just a few hours after Blue Origin announced it was suspending New Shepard flights, SpaceX filed an application with the FCC for a constellation of up to one million (yes, million) satellites to serve as orbital data centers for AI. SpaceX bypassed the suborbital market, and others have followed. Even the Chinese companies that are developing New Shepard-like vehicles have ambitions for orbital vehicles, rather than being a pure-play suborbital company like Virgin Galactic. Suborbital space tourism was a means to an end, but the end has found other means. Jeff Foust (jeff@thespacereview.com) is the editor and publisher of The Space Review, and a senior staff writer with SpaceNews. He also operates the Spacetoday.net web site. Views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone.

The Orion Heat Shiled Could Be A Problem

heat shield The Orion heat shield from the Artemis 1 mission, whose erosion led to a lengthy investigation that has significantly delayed Artemis 2. (credit: NASA) Normalization of deviance by Robert Oler Monday, February 2, 2026 With all forms of motion, there exist the risk of errors committed in the execution process that are not trapped, coupled with flawed decision-making processes where threats are underestimated, played down, or inaccurately mitigated. Usually, errors in the decision-making process become more of a threat than the threats that are known to exist. Today, how individuals lead others managing machines has become the prime issue in unsatisfactory outcomes and evaluating how they unfolded. If Captain Smith, late of RMS Titanic, had judged the risk of icebergs prudently, history would be different. Paramount on Smith’s mind was neither icebergs nor history. As many excellent books and well-acted movies have illustrated and the written record has shown, a desire to please his corporate master was. Once the liner went to top speed, random chance controlled events. Titanic operated in an unsafe fashion long before the iceberg appeared. NASA human spaceflight has been here before. The interaction of human decision-making with machines has been studied intensely since several near and catastrophic events in the 1970s. Over the decades, various models of decision-making have evolved, driven by maturing technology. Today, how individuals lead others managing machines has become the prime issue in unsatisfactory outcomes and evaluating how they unfolded. The latest version of these models is labeled by the major regulators of aviation (including the FAA) as Competency Based Operation. Task-based skills, such as procedure application and basic operational skills, are evaluated with equal weight on both their execution and how the decision was made to employ them. Evaluation of events is centered around whether the leader was able to recognize if what was predicted to happen is or is not occurring. If the answer is yes, there is a high level of safety. If not? Leaders are taught to react to what is causing the difference and then question the soundness of the overall decision-making process looking for a root cause of failure. The US lunar landing program has been a goal for at least eight years. By any observation, little is going according to plan both in general and its execution. Ambiguity—what A competency-based operation would call lack of situational awareness—permeates the entire program. A timely example is the issue of the Orion heat shield. NASA flew a prototype heat shield on an uncrewed test called EFT 1 in 2014. It performed well. After the flight, with contractor agreement, NASA significantly changed the design of the heat shield. On Orion’s next flight, the “new” heat shield did not ablate as it was designed. Instead, massive chunks came out of the heat shield. The crew would have survived, but the heat shield did not act as predicted by any engineering model. This is unsafe. As results came from the first flight, the current flight heat shield had already been attached to the capsule. That was three years ago. Full scale testing of the shield on Earth is not possible. Subscale testing of the heat shield material attempted to define the threat that was revealed on Artemis 1 and explored mitigation. The current Orion’s heat shield is worse in the suspected issue than its predecessor. A fix—redesigning the heat shield—would delay Orion flying with a crew even further, ending any opportunity for a lunar landing in the term of this administration. A redesign is in work for the next Orion. It is unclear whether it will ever be tested at full scale before flying a crew. That would take another test flight like EFT 1, at a high cost. NASA’s answer was to avoid the conditions which they believed cause the anomaly as much as possible. In other words, to accept deviation from the desired standard. The aviation equivalent to this is long landings. The thing about normalization of deviance is, having accepted the risk, it is impossible to know when it is too much. Long landings, or landings outside the marked touchdown zone markings on the runway, are a persistent and widespread issue. Some are due to pilots lacking skill and experience in dynamic meteorological conditions. Many, however, are of choice. Why? Runways are long and pilots try and minimize time to get to the gate. Nearly all end without incident. It does, however, lead to normalization of deviation (NOD) from prescribed standards, which occasionally can turn out badly. A recent incident in Virginia had the captain making an approach in bad weather to a shorter runway which required optimum technique. The approach was both fast and high on the preferred approach path. Despite two “go around” calls by the copilot, the captain persisted and touched down about midfield. A special form of concrete that deforms under load prevented the airplane from leaving the runway. The investigation is still ongoing, but the likelihood is high that the captain had normalized landing long as standard procedure. US human spaceflight has been here before. Both shuttle losses were caused by NOD influencing bad decision-making. The thing about NOD is, having accepted the risk, it is impossible to know when it is too much. Unfortunately, heat shields are like foundations of houses: they are either capable or cracked. For the upcoming mission experts agree on one point, the heat shield will crack. How much and how badly is harder to predict. The likelihood is it will not be catastrophic. If the thermal protection system fails, as the shuttle Columbia demonstrated, there will be a hull loss. The decision will become an “orphan” spread among faceless people, nor will the process survive scrutiny. New NASA administrator Jared Isaacman agrees with the mitigation. He is in a difficult spot. While being confirmed, the capsule was already sitting atop its rocket. He lacks expertise in the matter and lacked control of the decision process. This is the second major decision in the lunar landing program made without any administrator first-line accountability. The first was picking SpaceX to provide the lunar lander and the terms under which that would be accomplished. That person left NASA and went to work at SpaceX. It is fair to wonder what had that person’s attention? “Safety” entered the English language in the 14th century. Today it is incorrectly and informally defined as an absolute. “Being safe” is not the absence of peril. “Being safe” is an organization or person doing what is supposed to be done as defined by standards and protocols, even when doing so is difficult or costly or displeases leadership. In an era of slide rules and pocket protectors, the nation and its engineering teams designed vehicles where the operation of heat shields was never in doubt. Nearly $30 billion has been spent on Orion and yet NASA is going with a mitigation where a solution is called for in a critical component. NASA and its contractors are quick to express concerns about safety: “it’s our highest priority” is a key phrase oft repeated. Is it? The Orion issue is not unique. The entire program is riddled with ambiguity and lack of solid performance. This is not a good trend. Robert G. Oler is a founding member of the Clear Lake Group on Space Policy. These are his own views. He can be reached at orbitjet@hotmail.com Note: we are now moderating comments. There will be a delay in posting comments and no guarantee that all submitted comments will be posted.

China Builds A New Nuclear Powered Aircraft Carrier As Satellites Watch

carriers China's newest aircraft carrier under construction. Two large square compartments visible in satellite photos are most likely reactor compartments. (credit: ChinaPLA via X) Dragonship: China builds a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier while satellites watch by Dwayne A. Day Monday, February 2, 2026 In the fall of 2025, China commissioned its first indigenously-designed and built aircraft carrier, Fujian, named after a Chinese province. The commissioning ceremony was photographed from overhead by Western commercial reconnaissance satellites, but of course China proudly released their own photographs of the ceremony. The conventionally powered aircraft carrier is large and impressive. Although not quite as big as the US Navy’s Nimitz-class or Ford-class carriers, Fujian sports modern equipment, such as electromagnetic catapults and arresting gear. Satellites are a primary source of information on China’s latest naval developments. But even as Fujian was formally entering service after an extended period of sea trials, another large carrier was taking shape in China. It too has been photographed by commercial reconnaissance satellites, and Western amateur analysts have been keeping tabs on the progress, trying to assess its size and capabilities. They soon saw indications that this ship, unlike its predecessors, will be nuclear-powered. Satellites are a primary source of information on China’s latest naval developments. carriers China’s second aircraft carrier, Shandong, leaving port. (credit: Satellogic) Fujian China’s Navy has been growing rapidly over the past decade and a half. While the US Navy has struggled to begin construction of a new frigate—canceling a program that was underway for seven years—China has been launching modern destroyers, frigates, and even experimental vessels. In satellite photos, the scale of the construction program has sometimes been startling, with multiple warships under construction in China’s vast shipyards. China currently operates three aircraft carriers, the Fujian, Shandong, and Liaoning. Liaoning was an incomplete Soviet-era hulk rusting away in a Ukrainian shipyard when China surreptitiously purchased it in the 1990s. The ship was extensively overhauled and modernized, and launched in 2012. In 2015, China launched Shandong, which was mostly based upon the same design as Liaoning. Both ships have limited aviation capabilities, primarily due to their lack of catapults, which requires their jet aircraft to take off under their own power, with limited fuel and weapons. (See “Carriers—and battleships—from space (part 3): The Mighty O and the Mighty Mo,” The Space Review, October 6, 2025; “Flattops from space: the once (and future?) meme of photographing aircraft carriers from orbit,” The Space Review, July 19, 2021; “Carriers from space (part 1),” The Space Review, July 15, 2024; “Carriers from space (part 2): Contemporary use of satellite imagery for open source intelligence,” The Space Review, August 12, 2024.) carriers China’s second and third aircraft carriers in port. CV-18 Fujian (top) has only recently entered service. Note the differences in the flight deck compared to CV-17 Shandong. CV-16 Liaoning is similar to Shandong and was originally built for the Soviet Union. (credit: ImageSatInternational) In 2017, Western satellites began photographing a large ship under construction at the Jiangnan Shipyard. Because many observers of Chinese military programs expected China to begin work on a new aircraft carrier, they suspected that this new hull was a carrier from the start. They were rewarded within the year when it became clear that the ship was not a large cargo vessel (which would have had big open cargo holds), but a heavily compartmented military ship. Eventually, a flight deck was built on top of the hull, and over time, the flight deck was covered with ventilation hoses to pump air below decks. The observers noticed that the ship, unlike Liaoning and Shandong, had catapults, enabling it to launch bigger and heavier aircraft. The ship was launched in 2022, and then went to sea for extensive trials, culminating with launching and recovering aircraft in 2025. In fall, a large stage structure was erected on its dock, clearly intended for the commissioning ceremony. Upon commissioning, the carrier was formally named Fujian. carriers The proliferation of commercial imagery satellite companies has resulted in more and better images becoming available. Independent observers now monitor when ships go to sea and where they are operating. (credit: BlackSky) The Type 004 In May 2025, satellites photographed initial preparations for construction of a new large ship at the Dalian shipyard. Keel blocks were laid out on the floor in the shape of a very large hull. Rather than another conventionally powered carrier, there was speculation among military observers that China’s next carrier, euphemistically known as the Type 004, would be nuclear powered. In August 2025, satellite photos revealed that the ship’s hull was under construction, with two large hull sections being built. By mid-October 2025, the two large hull sections were merged. Unlike for Fujian, the available satellite photos have been lower quality, possibly because the increasing cost of imagery has meant that fewer amateurs can afford it. There have been photos taken at a distance both from the ground and from commercial aircraft, but these too have been relatively poor quality. China does not release updates on its current naval ship production. carriers The aircraft carrier USS John F. Kennedy, which recently went to sea on trials, is seen here under construction in 2017. The ship's two large box-like reactor compartments are clearly visible. (credit: US Navy) By November 2025, satellite and aerial photos revealed two large square structures in the two hull sections. Observers noted that these seemed similar to large structures seen in the construction of US Navy nuclear carriers and used to contain nuclear reactors. Although the evidence appears strong, only when the ship’s island is spotted will it be confirmed: if the island does not include exhaust ports, then the ship is nuclear-powered. Trained intelligence analysts looking at much higher quality photos certainly already know. In fact, for intelligence agencies, satellites may no longer be the best source of data on such subjects. The US National Security Agency, for example, is almost certainly doing everything possible to hack Chinese military databases and steal blueprints and other technical information. China, after all, has been doing that to the United States. carriers Landsat photo of China's fourth aircraft carrier, nicknamed the Type-004, under construction at the Dalian shipyard. To date, most of the satellite photos of the ship have been low quality. This may change as more satellite companies take interest in it. (credit: USGS) But for the general public, satellite photos remain the best source of information on this new large warship and the status of the rest of China’s fleet. China’s government has not clearly stated that it is building the ship, although there has been wide speculation about it within China, and models of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier have been displayed. As the construction progresses, it is more likely that higher-quality satellite photos will be published in the US, as more organizations capable of affording the photos acquire and release them, and as the shape of this giant new vessel becomes more apparent.

Japan Is Developing National Security Space Capabilities

QZSS Japan is developing national security space capabilities thorugh programs like the Quasi-Zenith Satellite System. (credit: Cabinet Office, Government of Japan) From pacifism to pragmatism: Japan’s evolving space security policy by Safia Mansoor Monday, February 2, 2026 The transformation of Japan from a hardcore pacifist state to a security-conscious space actor signifies the co-existence of national security imperatives and normative restraint. The shift from unique position on international space law and constitutionalism pacifism is driven by regional geopolitics and strategic contestation in outer space. The Basic Space Law authorized the development of non-aggressive military space capabilities, similar to the interpretation of Outer Space Treaty by other spacefaring nations. The Basic Space Law of Japan enacted in 2008 formally changed the Japan’s security policy towards outer space. This change is attributed to the two key security shocks: the launch of ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan by North Korea in 2006 and the antisatellite test by China in 2007. Prior to enactment of the law, Japan’s space activity was solely non-military in nature. Japan adopted a unique position with respect to 1967 Outer Space Treaty when its parliament, the Diet, approved the Peaceful Purposes Resolution in 1969, forbidding any kind of military space activity. By contrast, many other nations, including the United States, interpreted that the treaty allows non-aggressive military space activity. The Peaceful Purposes Resolution is also commensurate with pacifist constitution of Japan, notably article 9, which repudiates war and the use of threat or force as the nation’s sovereign right. The 2008 Space Law altered this interpretation by taking two crucial steps in furthering military space activity of Japan. First, it centralized space policymaking by handing over to Japan’s Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy the responsibility to make its space policy. Before the Basic Space Law, Japan’s science and technology bureau controlled the space agencies. Secondly, the Basic Space Law authorized the development of non-aggressive military space capabilities, similar to the interpretation of Outer Space Treaty by other spacefaring nations. It highlighted the need of Japan to use outer space for national security. Article 24 (2) of the 2008 Space Law underlies the formulation of the Basic Plan on Space Policy, Japan’s key plan for exploitation of space to support policies with respect to “space development and use.” As of now, five such plans have been issued: two in 2013, a third in 2015, a fourth in 2020, and the fifth in 2023. They are grounded on aims for space policy, programmatic targets, measured plans, and concrete approaches, and understanding of geopolitical threats. The fourth Basic Plan on Space Policy is particularly important as it covers four quintessential aspects. It signifies the environment and context in which the space policy of Japan functions and also highlights the important circumstances such as power balance in outer space, increasing significance of space security, aggravating risks to sustainable use of space, swift progress in science and technology, and the ascent of private sector. Second, it reflects the space policy goals that, in turn, further the national interests of Japan such as space security; bolstering national resilience, disaster countermeasures, and addressing various global issues; actualizing economic growth driven by space; and generating knowledge through exploration of space. Third, it underlies Japan’s basic stance for promoting its space policy, which entails directions on prioritizations of fundamental facets of space policy, procedures to implement policy, and budget allocation. It prioritizes output-driven policy of outer space that also fulfill the security requirements of Japan, harnessing human and financial resources; enshrining long-term planning to dispense investment predictability, and ensuring cooperation with other nations, notably allies; Finally, it entails concrete approaches with regards to space policy, outlining programmatic measures to achieve space policy objectives. In 2023, Japan issued the fifth Basic Plan on Space Policy which focuses on quest for space security, economic dividends of space sector, international cooperation, and harnessing space for disaster prevention. This recalibration of its strategic posture with respect to outer space is an example signifying how a pacifist state fulfills its the national security imperatives without abandoning its normative commitments. Japan is continuously improving its space defense capabilities. The positioning, navigation, and timing system of Japan, called the Quasi-Zenith Satellite System, launched in 2018 and plays an important role in providing those services. Japan also operates reconnaissance satellites for radar and optical imagery. Additionally, Japan is working to enhance its space situational awareness efforts through development of a deep-space radar system coupled with a command and control center. To strengthen its communication capabilities as well as command and control, Japan is also developing X-band communication satellites. The Space Security Initiative is the key guiding document that guides Japan’s military space outlook. It enshrines Japan’s three approaches to outer space: security from space, or harnessing outer space for national security; security in space, or the secure use of outer space; and furthering its space industrial base and create a virtuous cycle of security. All these developments suggest Japan’s calibrated approach to space security while retaining its normative essence and adapting to regional security environment. This recalibration of its strategic posture with respect to outer space is an example signifying how a pacifist state fulfills its the national security imperatives without abandoning its normative commitments. Safia Mansoor is a PhD Scholar of International Relations at School of Integrated Social Sciences, University of Lahore, Pakistan. She has done MPhil in International Relations with gold medal from Kinnaird College for Women. She has also served as Research Associate at Maritime Centre of Excellence, Pakistan. She has number of publications published nationally and internationally. Recently she has completed Gaming for Peace Fellowship (2025) under Nuclear Scholars Initiative by University of Lahore, Pakistan. Her area of interest includes Defense and Strategic studies, Emerging Military Technologies, South Asia, and Asia-Pacific Region.

Why Artemis II Launch is Now Delayed Until March

Disaster! NASA SLS Leaked during Test Delayed Artemis II. SpaceX Starshi...