JacksMars
Since I was a young child Mars held a special fascination for me. It was so close and yet so faraway. I have never doubted that it once had advanced life and still has remnants of that life now. I am a dedicated member of the Mars Society,Norcal Mars Society National Space Society, Planetary Society, And the SETI Institute. I am a supporter of Explore Mars, Inc. I'm a great admirer of Elon Musk and SpaceX. I have a strong feeling that Space X will send a human to Mars first.
Wednesday, November 18, 2026
AST SpaceMobile Says It can Launch its Backlift Rocket In 2028
Blacklift
AST SpaceMobile says that its Blacklift rocket can begin launches as soon as 2028 because it uses engines developed by Firefly Aerospace. (credit: AST SpaceMobile)
Rolling their own
by Jeff Foust
Monday, November 16, 2026
On Saturday, a Starship upper stage, or ship, emerged from the cloud deck over SpaceX’s Starbase launch site where the vehicle lifted off 22 and a half hours earlier. The descending vehicle flipped from a horizontal orientation to a vertical one, maneuvering into place at the tower, where it was grasped by two large metallic arms. For the first time, SpaceX caught a ship back at the launch site.
With the supply of launches constrained and demand for launches only growing some satellite operators are taking matters into their own hands.
The catch was immediately hailed as a major step in SpaceX’s efforts to make Starship rapidly reusable. “We caught a Starship, and now everything changes,” one SpaceX employee said on the webcast. That assessment might be a bit premature—SpaceX has yet to refly a ship, and the company once again failed to catch the Super Heavy booster on this launch—but it is a sign of progress.
The ship that flew the Flight 15 mission last week was designated Ship 42, or “S42” as was painted on the side of the vehicle. In a nod to Douglas Adams, below S42 were the words, “Don’t Panic.”
Tell that to the rest of the space industry. Since it became clear earlier this year that SpaceX was phasing out its workhorse Falcon 9, initially for rideshare missions but soon for all commercial missions, satellite operators have been racing to find alternatives. Those worries have been exacerbated by the growing belief that Starship will be primarily for used for SpaceX’s own missions.
The panic ratcheted up a level less then 24 hours after Ship 42’s return when a ULA Vulcan rocket lifted off from Cape Canaveral on its first mission in nine months. Within an hour, ULA reported that the mission failed because of an unspecified anomaly ten minutes into flight (although telemetry suggests the problem started earlier, during the first-stage burn.) Vulcan will be out of service again for the foreseeable future.
With the supply of launches constrained and demand for launches only growing some satellite operators are taking matters into their own hands. In the last few weeks, two companies—one deploying a constellation of satellites to communicate directly with mobile phones, and the other working on orbital data centers—said they would build their own launch vehicles. Both companies, though, may be underestimating the task in front of them.
Blacklift
AST SpaceMobile has been working for several years on satellites operating in low Earth orbit with very large phased-array antennas, allowing them to provide broadband services directly to mobile phones. The company has lined up partnerships with terrestrial mobile operators and has set up a satellite production line in a Midland, Texas, factory. The problem has been getting the satellites launched.
AST had been betting on Blue Origin’s New Glenn, which can place up to eight of AST’s BlueBird satellites into orbit. But New Glenn has been grounded since a pad explosion in May, with its return to flight now moved into early next year. Worse, on the previous New Glenn launch, an upper-stage problem stranded the single BlueBird satellite on board in an orbit too low for the satellite to recover from.
“AST gets control of their own launch schedule. Firefly gets steady, non-dilutive funds to reinforce our launch services production,” Kim said.
The company is currently relying on SpaceX’s Falcon 9, which can carry three BlueBirds per launch, but wants additional options. For a time this summer, it appeared AST was looking to acquire a launch company, raising more than $1 billion in debt for what it called “partnerships and/or acquisitions to further vertically integrate its business and mitigate risks associated with third-party launch providers.”
Instead, AST SpaceMobile announced November 6 it would develop its own launch vehicle—with some help. It announced a partnership with Firefly Aerospace to acquire engines that launch company produces as well as a license to allow AST to manufacture its own. Those engines would be used for a launch vehicle AST called Blacklift.
“The Blacklift rocket is the springboard to significantly expand our total addressable market, providing AST SpaceMobile with regular unconstrained access to orbit and providing for most favorable owners’ economics in the industry,” Abel Avellan, CEO of AST SpaceMobile, said in a statement.
The company said little about Blacklift itself in the announcement, other than it could place up to 20 tons into low Earth orbit, with room for five BlueBird satellites. The rocket, AST emphasized, would be used exclusively for launching its own satellites. It said at the time it would hold an “unveiling” for the rocket the following week in New York.
Between the announcement and that event, AST released its quarterly financial results and held an earnings call, giving Avellan a chance to provide more details. The rocket, he said, would have three stages, an unconventional approach for a vehicle designed for LEO missions where two stages are usually sufficient. It would also use carbon composite materials to save weight, using the experience the company has with those materials on those satellites.
He also indicated Blacklift would initially launch from an existing pad at Wallops Island, Virginia, originally built for Northrop Grumman’s Antares and being refitted to support Firefly’s Alpha and the joint Firefly/Northrop Eclipse. “Our first launches are going to be upgrades on existing launch, which Firefly already have prearranged for their Eclipse configuration,” he said. “Wallops will require an upgrade that we can fit in the timeframe that we have.”
Firefly held its earnings call around the same time. Jason Kim, CEO of the company, repeatedly called the $1.3 billion deal—$800 million for the engine license, $250 million for a set of Miranda and Vira engines for the first three Blacklift vehicles, and $250 million in engineering services—a “win-win” for both companies.
“AST gets control of their own launch schedule. Firefly gets steady, non-dilutive funds to reinforce our launch services production, strengthen our supply chain and infrastructure, grow our team and push the boundaries of what is possible in space,” he said.
The money, he said, would provide an injection of capital to help ramp up engine and vehicle production and testing. That will help Firefly develop Eclipse, a medium-class vehicle with a payload capacity only somewhat less than that of Blacklift.
He suggested that this was better for Firefly than selling Eclipse launches to AST. While Firefly loses a launch customer in the long term, it gains capital in the short term to help with developing the vehicle and serving other commercial and government customers, emphasizing that Blacklift is intended only for AST’s own spacecraft.
On Thursday of last week, AST held the unveiling event for Blacklift. There was no launch vehicle hardware to unveil, though, only animations of the rocket and videos of Firefly’s engines. Fareed Zakaria, a CNN commentator, served as master of ceremonies, introducing Avellan and later hosting a Q&A with him and AST president Scott Wisniewski.
Avellan took the stage wearing a leather jacket, cracking a joke about Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang. “I’m not resigning today,” he said a little more than an hour after Nvidia announced the resignation of Huang, known for his leather jackets.
Much of the presentation focused on the company’s satellite development work, and only well into the hour-long event did he turn to Blacklift. “We’re not doing this thing because we like rockets. We’re not doing this thing because we want to be in the launch business. We want this because we have so much demand for our satellites, and as you have seen it, we cannot get enough launches on time.”
The unveiling did not unveil a lot of additional details about the rocket, beyond reiterating its three-stage design and use of composites. He emphasized, though, perhaps the most ambitious part of Blacklift: that the company believes it can start launching the rocket in just two years.
Avellan argued that, by buying engines, the company was skipping most of the timeline of vehicle development. “A typical design cycle of a rocket could be over a decade. Eighty percent of that is on the engine,” he said. “We’re starting this program on third base.”
The event did not address many of the issues about Blacklift. The three-stage design, he said, was intended to support reusability for the booster. “When you have three stages, the first stage will go up not that much and will come back down very easily,” he said, even though other existing and planned reusable vehicles use a two-stage design.
“A rocket, you can think about it—of course, rocket engineers are going to get mad with me—but you can simplify it as a big tank, feeding engines,” Avellan said.
Avellan said that the company was already making carbon composite tanks for the rocket, with the first set of ten to be ready for testing in January at its Midland factory. However, large composite structures can be difficult to produce, as Rocket Lab has discovered with its Neutron rocket. That company suffered problems producing large first-stage tanks for Neutron this year, pushing back that vehicle’s first launch to some time in 2027.
There is also the issue of where Blacklift will launch from. The company used the unveiling event to reiterate previous statements that it would launch from the former Antares pad at Wallops. “Antares heritage pad at Wallops, already being upgraded for Miranda engines,” a slide from the company’s presentation stated.
However, a spokesperson for the Virginia Spaceport Authority, which operates the commercial launch pads at Wallops, said that while it has started preliminary discussions with AST, those talks specifically excluded the Antares pad, which the authority calls Pad 0-A. The company’s earlier comments about using the pad reportedly raised concerns with both Firefly and Northrop.
AST SpaceMobile, the authority said, could instead redevelop Pad 0-B, used infrequently for solid-fuel rockets like Minotaur, or develop a brand-new pad. Both options would require significantly more time and expense.
The company did not provide a detailed development schedule at the event or a cost estimate beyond the $1.3 billion already earmarked to Firefly for engines. But Avellan seemed to think that building a new rocket would not be that hard.
“A rocket, you can think about it—of course, rocket engineers are going to get mad with me—but you can simplify it as a big tank, feeding engines,” he said.
Big Iron
Cowboy Space says that its Big Iron rocket can begin launches as soon as 2028 because it uses engines it is developing internally. (credit: Cowboy Space)
Big Iron
If AST’s plans sound audacious, they are positively mundane compared to what Cowboy Space announced late last month.
The company was founded several years ago as Aetherflux with a goal of pursuing another of the space industry’s holy grails: space-based solar power. Earlier this year, though, the company pivoted sharply, changing its name to Cowboy Space and its market to orbital data centers.
When it made that pivot, it said that it would not only develop large data-center spacecraft, it would also build the rocket needed to launch them. It said little about those launch plans, though, until an event in late October.
“We set out to build data centers in space and found there weren’t enough rockets to get them there, so we’re building our own,” said Baiju Bhatt, CEO of Cowboy Space, who founded the company after his time leading financial services company Robinhood.
“A lot of things have to go right for that to happen,” Bhatt said of that 2028 schedule, “and it’s not a guarantee.”
The vehicle, called Big Iron, can place 15,000 kilograms into Sun-synchronous orbit. A unique aspect of the vehicle is that the upper stage is also the payload. Once in orbit, the upper stage deploys giant solar arrays and radiators to support racks of Nvidia processors.
Cowboy Space has further increased the level of difficulty of its launch vehicle by choosing to develop its own engine, called Clydesdale. (The company is fully committed to the cowboy theme, down to the cowboy hat and bolo tie Bhatt wore on stage at the event.) The reusable first stage, made of stainless steel, would be powered by nine Clydesdale engines, each producing 300,000 pounds-force of thrust using liquid oxygen and methane.
At its own unveiling event, the company said it had just started testing of one element of the engine: the gas generator, itself a small engine that powers the turbopumps for the main engine. It said it expects tests of the full Clydesdale engine to begin next summer.
“We think that this is going to be one of the critical pieces of technology that’s going to let us get to orbit relatively quickly,” Bhatt said of the engine, outlining a schedule that called for an initial launch as soon as late 2028.
That, of course, is a remarkably fast timeline for a new vehicle powered by a new engine, one that is not backed up by experience. Neutron, for example, was set to make its first flight in 2024 when it was announced in 2021, and has yet to launch. Multi-year delays are not uncommon for new vehicles.
“A lot of things have to go right for that to happen,” Bhatt said of that schedule, “and it’s not a guarantee.”
Cowboy Space did not announce where Big Iron would initially launch from. The company instead announced a concept called Trailhead, which would combine production facilities with launch sites that he said would be scattered around the country and overseas, primarily in locations that can support Sun-synchronous launches. (The proposed data-center satellites would operate in dusk-dawn orbits to maximize solar power.) Each Trailhead would include five launch pads that company envisioned would launch salvos of Big Iron rockets.
The company did not disclose the projected cost of developing Big Iron. The company raised $275 million earlier this year, an impressive amount but only a small fraction of the likely cost for the vehicle, as illustrated by AST’s $1.3 billion deal for engines alone. It did not that each Trailhead site would cost $1 billion to develop.
Big Iron is a means to an end, that end being a constellation of orbital data center satellites called Stampede. The company has filed plans for up to 20,000 such satellites: deploying them, one at a time on Big Iron launches over five years, would require about 11 launches a day, every day.
Unlike AST and Blacklift, Cowboy Space said it will offer Big Iron to other customers as well. “Opening it to the rest of the industry makes every flight safer and more efficient, and gives the country another path to orbit,” Bhatt said. In an industry with limited paths to orbit, desperate times call for desperate measures. Or panic.
Jeff Foust (jeff@thespacereview.com) is the editor and publisher of The Space Review, and a senior staff writer with SpaceNews. He also operates the Spacetoday.net web site. Views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone.
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A Modest Proposal For Clearing Orbital Debris
orbital debris
A Falcon 9 upper stage re-entering the atmosphere above Berlin, Germany, on February 19, 2025.[1] (credit: Gizmodo, Mr. Gerd Baumgarten)
A modest proposal for orbital debris modeling
by Michael Puckett
Monday, November 16, 2026
Orbital-breakup models rely on laboratory tests and observations of accidental explosions and collisions. Laboratory tests allow fragments to be recovered and measured. Orbital events occur under representative conditions but are usually detected after the debris cloud has formed. Neither method provides close, multi-angle observations of a complete upper-stage breakup in orbit.
Its principal product would be a better estimate of the number, size, velocity, and directional distribution of fragments produced by an upper-stage breakup.
A secondary experiment using a spent Falcon 9 second stage and several inexpensive small satellites or cubesats could provide those observations. The stage would first deliver its working payload. It would then deploy the observer satellites into a very low orbit with a lifetime of no more than a few days. After the satellites assumed their assigned positions, the stage would undergo a controlled energetic breakup.
The experiment would measure the material generated by the breakup event. Its principal product would be a better estimate of the number, size, velocity, and directional distribution of fragments produced by an upper-stage breakup.
The modeling problem
NASA’s Standard Satellite Breakup Model estimates the fragment populations produced by spacecraft and upper-stage explosions and collisions. It provides distributions for fragment size, area-to-mass ratio, and separation velocity. These outputs support debris-environment forecasts, conjunction assessments, shielding design, and post-event analysis.[2]
The explosion portion of the model is derived substantially from observations of historical orbital breakups. NASA has compared its modeled distributions with cataloged fragments from several upper-stage explosions. Those observations are most complete for larger objects. Smaller fragments, particularly those between one millimeter and ten centimeters, are less completely measured.[2]
A breakup model must estimate the population below the detection threshold of normal tracking systems. Errors in that portion of the distribution affect estimates of collision risk because small debris is more numerous than cataloged debris and can still damage spacecraft.
An upper-stage experiment would provide direct measurements during the first seconds and minutes of debris-cloud formation. Multiple nearby cameras could record fragments before the cloud dispersed beyond useful optical resolution.
DebriSat
DebriSat is the principal modern laboratory experiment developed to improve satellite-breakup models. NASA’s Orbital Debris Program Office conducted the project with the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center, The Aerospace Corporation, and the University of Florida.[3]
The project constructed a 56-kilogram spacecraft mock-up representative of a modern low-Earth-orbit satellite. It incorporated carbon-fiber composites, multilayer insulation, solar cells, wiring, batteries, circuit boards, and contemporary structural panels.
On April 15, 2014, researchers struck DebriSat with a 570-gram hollow aluminum projectile traveling approximately 6.8 kilometers per second. The impact catastrophically fragmented the spacecraft inside a ground-test chamber.[4]
Foam panels surrounding the target captured and decelerated the fragments. Researchers sought to recover approximately 90% of the original mass and characterize fragments with dimensions as small as two millimeters. Measurements included size, mass, shape, density, material, area-to-mass ratio, optical properties, and radar cross section.[5]
NASA's Standard Satellite Breakup Model had forecast approximately 85,000 fragments of two millimeters or larger from the impact. Researchers ultimately collected more than 130,000, with roughly 250,000 expected once characterization was complete—nearly three times the model’s forecast.[6] The test also showed that modern composite structures can produce large numbers of thin, flake-like, and needle-like pieces that are poorly represented by assumptions based on spherical particles.[7]
DebriSat provides detailed physical measurements that an orbital experiment cannot duplicate. Its fragments can be recovered, weighed, and examined individually. However, DebriSat tested a 56-kilogram satellite mock-up under laboratory conditions. It did not test a complete upper stage or observe the development of an uncontained debris cloud in orbit.
orbital debris
DebriSat during impact. High-speed frame of the laboratory breakup (credit: NASA)
A Falcon 9 second stage has thin-walled propellant tanks, an engine, pressure vessels, plumbing, avionics, wiring, insulation, and structural interfaces. An orbital test would apply DebriSat’s empirical approach to a representative launch-vehicle stage.
Delta 180
Delta 180 provides the closest orbital precedent. The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization launched the experiment on September 5, 1986.
The experiment should use a Falcon 9 launch already scheduled to deliver an operational payload. Payload delivery would remain the primary mission.
The mission placed a Delta second stage and a maneuvering Payload Assist System into orbitts at approximately 220 kilometers. After separation, the vehicles conducted relative maneuvers and collected infrared, ultraviolet, visible-light, radar, and lidar observations.
Approximately 205 minutes after launch, the maneuvering vehicle struck the Delta second stage nearly head-on at about 2.9 kilometers per second. The collision produced two distinguishable debris clouds and at least 381 cataloged fragments ten centimeters or larger.[8]
Delta 180 demonstrated separation, relative navigation, close observation, and a deliberate destructive event during a single short mission. Its observing spacecraft was also the impactor. It therefore did not remain available to measure the debris cloud after impact.
orbital debris
The two spacecraft smashing into each other over the Pacific Ocean. The United States observed the mission using multiple sensors, making it a highly complex operation. (credit: SDIO)
A low-altitude intercept precedent
Operation Burnt Frost provides a relevant debris-residency record. On February 20, 2008, a US Navy Standard Missile-3 intercepted the failed USA 193 satellite at an altitude of approximately 247 kilometers. NASA later reported that all cataloged debris reentered in less than one year.[9]
The USA 193 record is included as an example and an extreme upper bound on debris residence, not as evidence of a several-day lifetime. It provides measured decay data for fragments created near the lower edge of low Earth orbit. Mission analysis should compare that record with breakup-model predictions and propagate the proposed fragment population across credible area-to-mass ratios and separation velocities. A days-long limit would require a substantially lower orbit and conservative treatment of the longest-lived fragments.
orbital debris
Breakup of USA 193 (credit: US Department of Defense)
The experimental orbit will differ from the primary payload’s operational orbit and be conducted at the minimal necessary orbit. The second stage would require sufficient performance to deploy the payload as planned and then enter the lower orbit. Missions whose payload trajectories do not permit that sequence would not qualify.
A secondary Falcon 9 mission
The experiment should use a Falcon 9 launch already scheduled to deliver an operational payload. Payload delivery would remain the primary mission. The breakup experiment would begin only after the payload had separated and the second stage had completed all tasks associated with that delivery.
Falcon 9 is suitable because the second stage already carries payloads to orbit and is capable of deploying multiple spacecraft. SpaceX also operates a small-satellite rideshare program with established payload-integration and deployment procedures.[10]
The experiment could accompany a rideshare mission to maximize cost and operational efficiencies. Launch, payload integration, deployment support, and ground coordination would be shared with the primary mission. All customer payloads would be deployed before the second stage entered the experimental orbit.
The experiment would add:
Several small satellites or cubesats
Standard deployment hardware
A command and timing package on the second stage
An explosive charge mounted on a composite overwrapped pressure vessel (COPV)
Ground software for formation verification and data collection
The mission should avoid a specialized carrier spacecraft. The Falcon 9 second stage would serve as the target, deployment platform, and central reference object until the event.
The charge would rupture a selected pressurized COPV and initiate the breakup from a known location and energy state. Charge size, vessel pressure, and mounting geometry would be fixed before launch and included in the predicted fragment distribution and safety analysis.
orbital debris
Proposed six-satellite observer formation around a spent Falcon 9 second stage with its payload dispenser.
The observer satellites should use commercial buses, cameras, radios, navigation receivers, and attitude-control components. Their useful life would be measured in days. Long-duration systems would be unnecessary.
orbital debris
SpaceX rideshare payload dispenser (credit: SpaceX)
Observer arrangement
Several viewpoints are necessary because the stage and larger fragments will conceal portions of the event from any single camera.
A basic formation could use four to six observer satellites:
One ahead of the stage
One behind it
Two positioned to either side
One above or below the orbital plane
An optional more distant observer to record the full cloud
The positions would be determined by camera resolution, lighting, communications, and fragment-risk analysis. Separation distances should reduce collision risk while retaining sufficient resolution during initial expansion.
The resulting measurements would provide an empirical upper-stage fragment distribution and show how much of that population remains undetected by ground-based systems.
The formation trade would balance viewing geometry against orbital mechanics, cost, and vehicle complexity. Positions requiring substantial plane changes, stationkeeping, or propulsion should be avoided unless they materially improve the measurements.
The satellites would be released sequentially after payload deployment. Differential drag, spring deployment, and limited propulsion could establish the formation. Deployment directions should provide most of the required relative motion.
Each satellite would confirm its position, attitude, camera pointing, time synchronization, communications, and data storage before the event. Failure to establish the required geometry would cancel the breakup. The second stage would then follow its normal disposal procedure.
Instrumentation
The payload should be limited to instruments required to characterize the breakup. Each observer would carry:
One or more high-frame-rate visible-light cameras
A wide-field camera for cloud expansion
Precise time synchronization
Position and attitude sensors
Onboard data storage
A high-rate communications system
Different satellites could use different focal lengths. Wide-field cameras would record the overall event, while narrow-field cameras would resolve smaller fragments over limited portions of the cloud.
One or two satellites could carry commercial infrared cameras if cost and mass permitted. Small particle-impact sensors could be placed on the outermost observers or on one expendable unit to sample particles below the optical resolution limit.
Ground radar and optical systems would track the larger fragments after the event. The nearby satellites would cover the interval before the cloud expanded and before fragments could be cataloged individually.
The experiment would measure:
Fragment count by observable size
Initial fragment-size distribution
Separation velocities
Directional distribution
Debris cloud expansion rate
Large fragment shape and tumbling
Apparent area-to-mass relationships derived from early motion
Differences between onboard observations and ground-based detection
The data would be compared with the population predicted by NASA’s Standard Satellite Breakup Model for an explosion involving a stage of the same mass.
Orbit selection
The orbit must remain viable long enough to deploy the satellites, establish their positions, verify the formation, and conduct the experiment. It should decay within several days.
A fixed altitude cannot guarantee that lifetime. Atmospheric density at very low altitude varies with solar activity, geomagnetic conditions, vehicle attitude, and ballistic coefficient. Final orbit selection would require conservative atmospheric assumptions and current space-weather data.
The limiting factor is the lifetime of the longest-lived credible fragment. Some fragments will receive velocity changes that raise their apogees or perigees. The orbit must remain low enough that those fragments also reenter within the approved period.
The observer satellites would reenter with the stage debris. Their design would not depend on later recovery or disposal maneuvers.
Controls
The proposal conflicts with the normal requirement to prevent intentional creation of orbital debris. The US Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices direct programs to limit debris released during normal operations and prevent accidental explosions.[11]
Approval should require:
Independent review of the predicted fragment distribution
Conservative analysis of the longest-lived fragments
Conjunction screening before the event
Exclusion of trajectories approaching crewed spacecraft
Coordination with civil and military tracking organizations
Multiple command inhibits
Verified satellite positions before authorization
Cancellation following any navigation, communications, or timing failure
Selection of an orbit and event location that limit reentry risk
Immediate release of tracking data to affected operators
The breakup would occur only after completion of the primary mission. A failed observer deployment would result in conventional disposal of the stage.
Cost and scope
The experiment is intended to use hardware already required for another mission. The principal existing asset would be the second stage after payload deployment. The observer satellites would use short-life commercial buses and modest sensor packages.
Costs would be concentrated in:
Observer satellite procurement
Payload integration
Relative-navigation software
Breakup hardware
Mission analysis
Regulatory review
Ground data reception
Post-event reconstruction and model comparison
This mission, being of limited scope, would only record the breakup and initial development of the debris cloud.
Conclusion
DebriSat demonstrated the value of destroying a representative spacecraft under controlled conditions and measuring the fragments. Its laboratory setting allowed detailed characterization down to two millimeters but did not reproduce the breakup of a complete upper stage in orbit.
Delta 180 demonstrated that a second stage and a separate spacecraft could maneuver relative to one another and complete a destructive orbital event during a short mission. It lacked surviving nearby observers dedicated to debris measurement.
A spent Falcon 9 second stage, several inexpensive small satellites or CubeSats, and existing deployment hardware could combine those two precedents. The resulting measurements would provide an empirical upper-stage fragment distribution and show how much of that population remains undetected by ground-based systems.
A future follow-on could characterize the effects of a collision between space objects and the development of the initial debris field. Broadly similar to Delta 180, a purpose-designed impactor would strike a spent upper stage at a selected relative velocity, impact point, and angle. The mission would use the observer architecture where practical but require a guided impactor and more demanding relative navigation.
Endnotes
Passant Rabie, “Study Confirms: Reentering SpaceX Rockets Are Peppering the Upper Atmosphere With Metal Pollution,” Gizmodo, February 20, 2026.
NASA Orbital Debris Program Office, Orbital Debris Quarterly News, October 2011, discussing fragment size, area-to-mass ratio, and velocity distributions in the NASA Standard Satellite Breakup Model, and comparing the modeled explosion distribution with cataloged fragments from seven upper-stage breakups.
NASA Orbital Debris Program Office, “DebriSat.”
J.-C. Liou et al., “Successful Hypervelocity Impacts of DebrisLV and DebriSat,” Orbital Debris Quarterly News, Volume 18, Issue 3 (July 2014), pp. 3–5.
E. Ausay et al., “A Comparison of the SOCIT and DebriSat Experiments,” NASA, 2017.
B. Shiotani et al., “Characterizing DebriSat Fragments: So Many Fragments, So Much Data, and So Little Time,” NASA, 2017.
NASA Orbital Debris Program Office, Orbital Debris Quarterly News, November 2018.
U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, SDI: Technology, Survivability, and Software, 1988; John Dassoulas and Michael D. Griffin, “The Creation of the Delta 180 Program and Its Follow-Ons,” Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest, Volume 11, Numbers 1 and 2 (1990); Dwayne A. Day, “Smashing satellites as part of the Delta 180 Strategic Defense Initiative mission,” The Space Review, July 17, 2023.
Eric Stansbery, “NASA Orbital Debris Program Office,” NASA, 2013, discussion of USA-193 reentry preparations and cataloged-debris decay.
SpaceX, “Falcon 9” and “Smallsat Rideshare Program.”
National Space Council, U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices, November 2019 Update.
Michael Puckett is a Regulatory Compliance Professional. He has, in the past three decades, worked with or in most environmental media types including programs regulating mining, water, air, solid and hazardous waste. He wants to see our civilization build a durable spacefaring infrastructure and to do so in an environmentally responsible manner. His views represent those of no one but himself. He can be contacted at mdpuckett@gmail.com.
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You Cannot Jam Your Way To Space Superiority
Meadowlands
A Meadowlands jammer used by the Space Force to disrupt satellite communications. (credit: L3Harris)
You cannot jam your way to space superiority
by Christopher Stone
Monday, November 16, 2026
The US Space Force is demonstrating the operational value of electromagnetic warfare. A recent Wall Street Journal report describes electromagnetic warfare systems employed in operations against both countries to protect American troops and degrade enemy satellite capabilities.[1] These are important operational contributions. But they raise a more fundamental question: Are we building a force capable of achieving space superiority against an armed adversary, or are we mistaking the ability to disrupt an enemy for the ability to defeat one?
Electronic warfare enhances combat power in every domain; it does not replace the weapons needed to destroy an enemy’s ability to fight.
The Space Force must stop treating electronic warfare as a substitute for the combat power needed to achieve space superiority. Jamming and spoofing can disrupt adversary operations, but they cannot physically defeat hostile spacecraft or prevent an enemy from attacking American systems. The Space Force needs an arsenal that integrates electronic warfare with kinetic weapons, cyber operations, intelligence, and maneuver. Without it, the service risks entering a war with a force incapable of escalation dominance-based space superiority against adversaries prepared to do just that.
EW enhances combat power
Electronic warfare (EW) can disrupt communications, deny signals, and suppress enemy defenses. But adversaries can change frequencies, employ alternative sensors, restore communications, maneuver spacecraft, or exploit redundant systems. Russia’s efforts to jam Starlink in Ukraine and Ukraine’s efforts to destroy Russian jamming systems demonstrate this reciprocal contest: Each side adapts and counters the other’s capabilities.[2] Electronic attack creates opportunities; it does not eliminate the need to defeat opposing forces.
No serious military planner would expect an army to defeat tanks with jammers alone, a navy to sink a fleet by jamming its radars, or an air force to establish air superiority while leaving hostile aircraft unopposed. Electronic warfare enhances combat power in every domain; it does not replace the weapons needed to destroy an enemy’s ability to fight.
Space is no exception. China and Russia possess counterspace capabilities spanning electronic warfare, direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles, directed-energy weapons, and orbital systems with counterspace applications.[3] An American force focused primarily on electronic disruption risks an asymmetric contest in which adversaries can physically attack US infrastructure while the United States lacks credible options to physically defeat hostile spacecraft.
Doctrine without weapons is a wish list
The Space Force’s Space Warfighting: A Framework for Planners correctly recognizes that space superiority requires coordinated offensive and defensive operations across orbital, link, and terrestrial segments.[4] But a framework’s value depends on whether the service fields the capabilities needed to execute it against a resisting enemy.
Progress must be measured by combat power delivered to the warfighter, not organizational constructs, doctrinal terminology, or acquisition plans that perpetually promise decisive capabilities in the future.
What weapons can American forces employ to defeat hostile spacecraft when disruption is insufficient? What capabilities hold adversary counterspace forces at risk? How quickly can those systems be deployed, and how long can the force sustain combat against an opponent employing electronic warfare, cyberattacks, maneuver, and kinetic weapons simultaneously? These are questions of weapons, readiness, force structure, and operational planning—not doctrinal terminology.
Survivability remains essential. Proliferated constellations, maneuverability, redundancy, and rapid reconstitution make American systems harder to target and destroy. But surviving an attack is not the same as preventing one, and absorbing punishment is not the same as imposing it. A force designed only to endure enemy attacks leaves the initiative with the adversary.
Build a Space Force that can win
The Space Force needs a balanced arsenal integrating electronic warfare, cyber operations, intelligence, fires, maneuver, and kinetic options. Electronic warfare should disrupt enemy systems; cyber operations should exploit vulnerabilities; intelligence and space domain awareness should identify threats and support targeting; maneuver should preserve friendly options; and kinetic capabilities should physically defeat hostile spacecraft when necessary.
This arsenal is also essential to deterrence. An adversary contemplating an attack must consider more than the prospect of being jammed in return; it must recognize that its own military space capabilities could be physically defeated. Deterrence requires actual capabilities, operational readiness, and the ability to employ weapons when authorized. A declaration of intent is not a weapon. A doctrinal concept is not a weapon. Nor can a future acquisition objective deter an adversary prepared to fight today.
There is reason for optimism. At the Air, Space & Cyber Conference in September, Chief of Space Operations Gen. Douglas Schiess identified “arm and grow the Guardian force” as one of his three priorities. He acknowledged the accelerating counterspace capabilities of China and Russia, highlighted existing on-orbit “space control” weapons, and emphasized the importance of credible combat power and the resolve to employ it.[5]
Now the Space Force must translate that commitment into combat capability. “Arm the Guardian” must mean fielding weapons, developing targeting capabilities, training warriors, and sustaining the capacity to defeat hostile space forces when deterrence fails. Progress must be measured by combat power delivered to the warfighter, not organizational constructs, doctrinal terminology, or acquisition plans that perpetually promise decisive capabilities in the future.
General Schiess has an opportunity to move the service beyond the status quo. The test is whether “arm and grow the Guardian force” produces the capabilities needed to seize and maintain the initiative against a determined, technologically sophisticated enemy. The Space Force has spent years explaining why space is a warfighting domain. It must now ensure its Guardians are armed and equipped to win the fight that follows.
Endnotes
Shelby Holliday, “The Space Force Showed Us Its Weapons Used in Iran and Venezuela,” The Wall Street Journal. The article describes Space Force electromagnetic warfare capabilities and their operational employment. The specific operational details and characterizations in the article should be consulted in the original report.
Reuters, “Russia Tries to Jam Musk’s Starlink Systems to Counter Ukrainian Drones,” July 8, 2026. The report describes Russian electronic warfare efforts against Starlink-supported Ukrainian operations and Ukrainian efforts to counter Russian jamming systems.
U.S. Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Authorization Request for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2025 and the Future Years Defense Program,” congressional testimony on the counterspace capabilities being developed by China and Russia. See also U.S. Space Force, “Space Threats,” which describes electronic warfare, kinetic-energy weapons, directed-energy weapons, and orbital attacks as distinct threats to space systems.
U.S. Space Force, Space Warfighting: A Framework for Planners, 2025. The framework identifies space superiority as a joint-force priority and emphasizes coordinated offensive and defensive operations across orbital, link, and terrestrial segments. See also U.S. Department of Defense, “Space Force’s Fundamental Role: Space Superiority,” March 5, 2025, for the Space Force leadership’s description of space control as encompassing disruption, degradation, and destruction when necessary.
Gen. Douglas Schiess, “Remarks by CSO Gen. Douglas Schiess at the Air and Space Forces Association’s 2026 Air, Space and Cyber Conference,” September 15, 2026. See also U.S. Space Force, “Chief of Space Operations Schiess Outlines Priorities to Strengthen Space Force Combat Power,”, September 2026.
Christopher Stone previously served as Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy (2018–2019). His insights and opinions reflect independent analysis of space deterrence challenges and do not reflect the opinions of the Department of War or United States Government.
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Project Meridian Could Reshape Lunar Bases Before Cislunar Weapons Arrive
Project Meridian could reshape lunar bases before cislunar weapons arrive
by Zohaib Altaf
Monday, November 16, 2026
On September 30, US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth gave Project Meridian 120 days to examine future battlefields “from subterranean depths to the cislunar frontier.” MITRE will lead the study, with Elon Musk, Palmer Luckey, and Newt Gingrich as co-directors, and issue a public report with a classified annex. Formally, Meridian is a study: it has ordered no cislunar weapon, created no lunar unit, and announced no deployment date. But what makes the project significant is that the Earth-Moon region has entered an official search for future warfighting capability.
What makes the project significant is that the Earth-Moon region has entered an official search for future warfighting capability.
Even if none of Meridian’s recommendations becomes a deployed weapon, that decision could influence how the United States, China, and their partners design lunar settlements. Bases planned for science and exploration may be hardened against military disruption; antennas, navigation links, and reactor power may later support military spacecraft as well as crews. The result would be an awkward reversal. Infrastructure built to keep astronauts alive could acquire military value, while measures intended to protect it could look like preparations to control access. Washington therefore needs safety rules before it needs a lunar weapons policy.
A wider battlefield
For most of the Space Age, cislunar space was treated mainly as a route to the Moon and a setting for scientific missions. But in April 2025, the US Space Force published a warfighting framework that divided counterspace operations among orbital, electromagnetic, and cyberspace warfare and listed such actions as orbital strike, space-link interdiction, and active space defense. On September 14, 2026, Air Force Secretary Troy Meink said the United States had “on-orbit space control weapons,” although he declined to identify them. Two days later, Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Dan Caine said the joint force must be prepared to “fight, endure, and win” from the seabed to cislunar space. Meridian followed two weeks later.
That chronology matters, but the three claims do not carry the same weight. Meink placed the acknowledged weapons in Earth orbit. When Caine widened his description of the operating environment to cislunar space two days later, he did not announce a lunar campaign. Meridian goes no further than commissioning a study. But together, the three developments move military planning outward: not a deployment order yet, but a signal.
And that signal is backed by programs closer to hardware. President Donald Trump’s January 27, 2025 missile-defense order called for proliferated space-based interceptors. By April 2026, Space Systems Command had awarded 20 agreements to 12 companies, with a possible combined value of $3.2 billion, for a low Earth orbit interceptor constellation intended to demonstrate an initial capability in 2028. Meink said in September that the program had moved from initial contract to “flight-ready hardware” in less than a year. The distinction is important: flight-ready hardware is not necessarily an operational interceptor in orbit, and Golden Dome interceptors are different from the undisclosed space-control weapons. In fact, one program is producing hardware while another official is acknowledging weapons already overhead.
To read those developments as proof of imminent warfare around the Moon would go too far. Cislunar orbit and the lunar surface are physically and operationally distinct, and Meridian’s public documents specify neither a cislunar threat nor a weapon for meeting one. But treating the two regions as strategically unrelated would be just as misleading. A sustained base on the surface will depend on communications relays, navigation, transport, warning, and logistics that pass through the surrounding space. Competition in that connective tissue will reach the base through antennas and cables.
The civil timetable is already crowded. Artemis 2 carried four astronauts around the Moon in April. NASA plans an Artemis 3 rendezvous and docking demonstration in Earth orbit in 2027 and its first Artemis lunar landing during Artemis 4 as soon as early 2028. In September, the agency sought proposals in five areas for lunar base at the south pole, including vertical solar arrays, oxygen extraction from regolith, radioisotope power, advanced manufacturing, and nanomaterials. NASA and the Department of Energy are also working toward a lunar surface reactor by 2030; an earlier industry request set a minimum output of 100 kilowatts electric, enough to make power distribution an organizing feature of the settlement.
China’s schedule is slower but structurally similar. Beijing’s International Lunar Research Station plan calls for a basic south pole station by 2035 and an expanded system, linking the surface, lunar orbit, and Earth by 2045. Chang’e-7, a four-part mission intended to survey the south pole and search for water ice, missed its August 2026 launch window; partner institutions now expect a 2027 attempt. Chang’e-8 will test resource use later in the decade. Russia has proposed a reactor for the joint station by 2035, while a Chinese mission presentation has included nuclear power among the possible energy sources. Indeed, the dates may move. The wiring comes first.
The base as signal
What looks like a civil engineering choice in Houston or Beijing may become a military signal at the lunar south pole. Why would a peaceful settlement adapt to a warfighting study? Because a weapon need not land beside a habitat to affect it. A relay can be jammed, a data link can be penetrated, a navigation service can be denied, or a supporting spacecraft can be disabled. The International Committee of the Red Cross already identifies electronic warfare, cyber operations, directed energy, and harmful proximity operations among the threats facing space systems. Those methods could reach a surface crew through the services on which it depends.
A broken Earth link would remove more than instructions from mission control. The crew could lose medical consultation and some warning information at the same time, while a separate failure in navigation would complicate the arrival of a lander or an emergency delivery. Interruption of reactor controls presents a different problem because power would probably support heat, oxygen production, communications, and other basic functions. Designers are therefore likely to ask for extra batteries, local sensors, manual controls, shielding, and a shutdown function that works without permission from Earth. Some of this equipment would sit quietly for years, but would matter on the first bad day.
Once American officials place cislunar space inside a future warfighting study, Chinese planners have a reason to examine what an American protective architecture could do, not simply what Washington says it is for.
Those precautions, sensible by themselves, make the settlement harder to classify once military users enter the network. The high-gain antenna that returns scientific data could later carry a military message. A beacon installed to guide cargo landers might also guide a military spacecraft, while the reactor that keeps the habitat warm might power a tracking sensor for several hours. Not only could military use alter the legal position of a particular component, but it could also make a civilian service dependent on the survival of a military network.
Calling the entire settlement “dual-use” would nevertheless be too crude. Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I, which defines military objectives through their nature, location, purpose, or use, requires two findings. The object must contribute effectively to military action, and its destruction, capture, or neutralization must offer a definite military advantage in the circumstances then prevailing. Would military traffic through one antenna turn the adjoining habitat into a military objective? No. It could affect the antenna, perhaps its dedicated terminal, but the legal test still has to be applied to each object and to what that object is doing at the time.
But the distinction works only if the engineering leaves something to distinguish. Lunar planners, who will face strict limits on mass, spare equipment, and available power, have good reasons to connect several loads to one electrical bus or route several users through one communications terminal. That arrangement saves hardware. It also means that an operation directed against a military sensor could interrupt the heater or oxygen plant that shares its power supply. If targeting data passed through the settlement’s principal terminal, a cyber operation intended to stop that traffic might take the civilian link down with it. No such combined base exists today. This is a design risk that can still be removed.
Protection brings a second ambiguity. An escort accompanying cargo through cislunar space might genuinely be there to guard the vehicle, but another operator would see its trajectory and operating range, not its private instructions. A proximity sensor could be used to avoid collision and, with different software or data, to support targeting. Even a safety zone changes character if a military spacecraft appears ready to enforce it. What was announced as deconfliction could then be read as control over an approach route.
That possibility does not mean Meridian will recommend armed escorts or defenses around a Moon base. It may not mention either. Yet once American officials place cislunar space inside a future warfighting study, Chinese planners have a reason to examine what an American protective architecture could do, not simply what Washington says it is for. American planners would make the same calculation about China. If both sides add sensors, electronic protection, or escort vehicles in response, an arriving spacecraft could be judged against an anticipated military role before its actual purpose is known.
There are limits to this argument. Meridian remains a 120-day study, NASA has revised lunar schedules before, and the postponement of Chang’e-7 shows that Chinese plans can slip too. Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty, moreover, reserves celestial bodies for peaceful purposes and prohibits military bases, installations and fortifications, weapons tests, and military maneuvers on them. None of this supports a claim that weapons are about to appear near a lunar settlement. Yet since power lines, communication terminals, and approach procedures must be settled before a crew arrives, expectations can enter the architecture years ahead of hardware. In fact, that is when they are hardest to see.
Rules before hardware
The law does not begin from zero. Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty contains the Moon’s peaceful-use restrictions, while its rule for orbit expressly prohibits weapons of mass destruction, not every conventional weapon. Article VI places responsibility for national activities on states and requires them to authorize and continually supervise private operators. Article IX adds due regard and consultation when an activity may cause potentially harmful interference. Article XII, meanwhile, permits reciprocal visits to stations and equipment after reasonable advance notice. Those terms govern relations between states, but they do not yet tell an operator how to run traffic around a working base. How close may an unidentified vehicle come to a reactor? If a relay changes orbit, how much notice is enough? And what should be disclosed about an antenna that serves a crew one hour and military users the next?
Section 11 of the Artemis Accords carries the discussion closer to operations. A signatory is expected to disclose the location and general nature of its activities, coordinate where harmful interference may arise, and limit a safety zone to the operation that justifies it. Before an accident, that shared routine has value. But it only works among states that have accepted it. The vehicle causing the alarm may belong to one that has not.
To give Article VI practical force before launch, a national regulator should ask the operator for a functional-separation plan. The useful part would begin with a wiring diagram. Does the reactor controller share power or a data path with military tracking equipment? Is the crew’s emergency link routed through a command system? Complete physical separation may consume too much mass and duplicate equipment that is already difficult to deliver. That constraint does not excuse a single, inseparable network. A regulator could require identified isolation switches, a local manual mode, and a shutdown sequence that still works after Earth contact fails. There is no reason to publish frequencies, encryption arrangements, or system vulnerabilities. Indeed, another operator needs to recognize which functions are reserved for crew safety but doesn’t need instructions for entering them.
Meridian cannot negotiate a lunar treaty in 120 days, even if that was included in its scope. It can, though, put the relevant agencies to work.
A distance rule would settle only where the vehicle may fly. Notice should also cover the communication window that an approaching vehicle will use, its expected route, and what it will do if contact fails. Article XII visits need a comparable procedure because “reasonable advance notice” will mean little if the host and visitor have never agreed on a channel or response time. Were Washington and Beijing to publish compatible practices before permanent crews arrive, a vehicle that goes silent could first be handled as a navigation failure. Without them, silence leaves more room for speculation.
The larger omission concerns nuclear safety. The COPUOS-IAEA Safety Framework for Nuclear Power Source Applications in Outer Space, adopted in 2009, covers the launch, operation, and end-of-service phases of nuclear power sources, but it is voluntary. More importantly, its stated objective concerns people and the environment in Earth’s biosphere. Protection of humans in space, which the document describes as an area of continuing research, lies outside its scope; so does protection of the environments of other celestial bodies. That limit reflects the problem the 2009 framework mainly had in view: launch accidents and nuclear power sources carried by spacecraft. A reactor in the 100-kilowatt class, supplying a settlement from the lunar surface, moves the risk beside the people who depend on it. The question becomes harder if its power system feeds oxygen equipment and a military load as well as the habitat.
COPUOS and the IAEA don’t need to address the legality of a future military operation to deal with that risk. A supplement to the 2009 framework could begin with the loss of remote command. Which loads are isolated? How is an autonomous shutdown checked, and when is another state told that the reactor has malfunctioned? Local radiation monitors belong in the answer because an instruction from Earth may arrive after the dangerous period. In fact, the proposal is narrow: finish the reactor guidance where the existing framework stops.
Article 56 of Additional Protocol I creates a different uncertainty. It gives nuclear electrical generating stations special protection when an attack may release dangerous forces and cause severe losses among civilians, although the protection has narrow exceptions. China and the United States enter that argument from different legal positions. China acceded to the protocol in 1983. The United States signed but did not ratify it, and it has rejected Article 56 as customary law. What counts as the protected population is unsettled too: lawyers may dispute whether a small lunar crew amounts to the “civilian population” the provision contemplates. The engineer cannot wait for that dispute to be settled. Reactor controls kept outside military command networks have a clearer safety function, which makes them easier to identify and spare. They also give an attacker less to gain.
Meridian cannot negotiate a lunar treaty in 120 days, even if that was included in its scope. It can, though, put the relevant agencies to work. The Pentagon, State Department, NASA, and Department of Energy should be asked to agree on functional separation and reciprocal approach procedures, then take the uncovered reactor questions to COPUOS and the IAEA. These sound like administrative matters. In practice, they decide where a cable runs, which switch remains usable after Earth contact is lost, and how to interpret a silent vehicle. Should Meridian instead describe cislunar space as an empty theater awaiting weapons, civilian planners will still build against the omitted risks. Rival governments, seeing the precautions without the assumptions behind them, will probably read the worst case. Long before an interceptor reaches lunar orbit, the first arms-control decision may be written into lunar infrastructure.
Zohaib Altaf is Associate Director at the Centre for International Strategic Studies Azad Jammu and Kashmir (CISS AJK), Pakistan. His work focuses on nuclear strategy, deterrence stability, and emerging military technologies. He has written for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the Stimson Center, The Diplomat, and the South China Morning Post. He is also an alumnus of the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA), National Defense University, Washington, DC.
Indian Flattop Photographed From Space
aircraft carriers
India’s first aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant, was photographed by an American HEXAGON reconnaissance satellite in 1977 as she headed out to sea. The ship played a role in the conflict with Pakistan, and in the 1980s was modernized to operate Harrier jump-jets. (credit: via Harry Stranger)
Indian flattop photographed from space
by Dwayne A. Day and Harry Stranger
Monday, November 16, 2026
In the 1970s, numerous countries around the globe were reducing their naval fleets, retiring old and wornout ships built during the Second World War, many of them obtained from the United States and Great Britain. United States intelligence assets monitored these naval forces worldwide. And even though the United States’ primary interest was the Soviet Navy, they continued to keep tabs on other naval forces worldwide. One of the ships of interest to the US intelligence community was India’s first aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant, which had a long career as a workhorse in the Indian Ocean, and played an important role in India’s on-again-off-again conflict with Pakistan.
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The HMS Hercules was placed in mothballs by the Royal Navy in 1946 before she was complete. A decade later she was purchased by India and completed, entering service in 1961. (credit: Wikimedia Commons)
Hand-me-down carriers
By the end of the Second World War, both the United States and Great Britain possessed impressive navies, equipped with the most modern naval weapon, the aircraft carrier. Both countries had additional ships under construction and canceled many of them as unnecessary. Britain had begun construction of its fifth Majestic-class aircraft carrier, to be named HMS Hercules. Ordered in August 1942, laid down in October 1943 by Vickers-Armstrongs at High Walker on the River Tyne, the ship was unfinished when the war ended. She was launched in September 1945 and construction was suspended in May 1946, when she was 75% complete.
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INS Vikrant operated various aircraft during her four decades of service. Built as a light carrier, her deck space was limited. (credit: Wikimedia Commons)
The Royal Navy already had more ships than it could afford, and HMS Hercules was laid up in Gareloch off the Clyde. There she sat, for ten years.
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In 1967, an American CORONA reconnaissance satellite photographed the Vikrant in drydock. Although the photograph is low-resolution, the stern elevator is clearly in the lowered position. (credit: Harry Stranger)
In January 1957, she was purchased by India. The ship was towed to Belfast to complete construction and modification. The famed shipbuilder Harland & Wolff performed the work, adding a modified island, steam catapults, and an important British invention, the angled deck. In March 1961, the ship was commissioned as INS Vikrant. The name was derived from the Sanskrit word vikrānta meaning “stepping beyond,” “courageous,” or “bold.”
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INS Vikrant in January 1975. This photo was taken from an oblique angle. An aircraft appears to be on the flight deck. (credit: Harry Stranger)
During the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War Vikrant was involved in combat operations, and at one point the Pakistani Navy sent the submarine Ghazi to sink her. But Ghazi sank under mysterious circumstances, possibly running into the bottom during a crash dive, or being damaged by Indian depth charges.
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IINS Vikrant photographed by a HEXAGON reconnaissance satellite in 1977. This is a small section of a much larger photograph which was used by American intelligence analysts to track any changes to the dispersal of military forces. Among other things, regular photography like this enabled American intelligence analysts to assess the state of India's fleet and whether it was about to be deployed. (credit: Harry Stranger)
In the 1970s and later the ship saw less service. From 1979 to 1981 she was modernized to extend her lifetime and to operate the new Sea Harrier vertical takeoff and landing jet. The Harrier demonstrated its value to the Royal Navy during the 1982 Falklands War. During a second refit in 1987–1989, Vikrant was further modernized, and in 1991 she began operating Sea King anti-submarine helicopters. She was retired in 1997.
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INS Vikrant was photographed by an American HEXAGON reconnaissance satellite in 1983. Some of her large helicopters are visible on the flight deck. (credit: Harry Stranger)
Throughout her service, INS Vikrant monitored at sea by American signals intelligence posts as well as US Navy vessels. But she was also photographed in port numerous times by American reconnaissance satellites. Vikrant was photographed in port by a CORONA satellite in November 1967, and possibly several other times. HEXAGON satellites photographed her in 1975, 1977, and 1979 just before she entered drydock, and then again in 1983. Her whereabouts and status were certainly tracked by the US Navy.
aircraft carriers
aircraft carriers
aircraft carriers
Retired INS Vikrant (R11) seen here anchored at Darukhana, India in 2014, awaiting scrapping. A modern INS Vikrant has replaced her. (credit: Maxar Technologies)
After her retirement, India began work on an indigenously-built replacement also named Vikrant. Design work began in 1999 and the keel was laid in 2009. The ship was floated in December 2011 and launched in 2013. But building aircraft carriers in the modern age is not easy. They are complicated ships, and the new INS Vikrant did not begin sea trials until August 2021. In the meantime, India acquired an ex-Soviet aircraft carrier that was heavily modified after a long and expensive refit in Russia. That carrier, the INS Vikramaditya, entered service in 2013. INS Vikrant was commissioned in late 2022. She currently serves as the flagship of the Indian Navy.
Redwire Is Pursuing Very Low Earth Orbit Satellites
VLEO satellite
Redwire is among the companies pursuing very low Earth orbit satellites. (credit: Redwire)
Low and clean: very low Earth orbit is space’s self-cleaning frontier for defense, commerce, and science
by Tim Franta
Monday, November 16, 2026
Every debate about orbital sustainability seems to come to the same conclusion: we are overcrowding the heavens in dangerous ways and no government has (or seems to want) the authority to enforce any rules to prevent an inevitable catastrophe.
VLEO is, in effect, a self-cleaning orbital environment.
We have spent two decades considering ways to legislate, insure, and engineer our way around this problem with capture systems, graveyard orbits, and incentivized deorbit schemes. These all make sense because a dead satellite at 800 kilometers can circle the Earth for more than a century. A fragment from a collision at that altitude will become a hazard our grandchildren will inherit.
But there is an underutilized part of space where the problem largely solves itself. Very Low Earth Orbit (VLEO), roughly 100 to 450 kilometers up, sits inside the thin outer reaches of the atmosphere (specifically, the thermosphere and ionosphere) where residual air creates a variable but relentless drag on spacecraft. Satellites without propulsion typically last from weeks to a few years in this domain, depending on their altitude, size and the solar cycle. VLEO is, in effect, a self-cleaning orbital environment.
For decades, that drag made VLEO an orbit to avoid. Today it is becoming an orbit of choice, especially for small, inexpensive satellites built for short, high-value missions.
The military use cases for VLEO are the most compelling. The Space Force envisions satellites that can be launched within hours’ notice for high-need missions, like VLEO deployments for tactical surveillance, producing sharper imagery, lower latency, and better-defined targets. Pairing responsive launch capabilities with VLEO satellites allows disposable tactical constellations that can enable a high-value campaign, then remove themselves from the battlespace without leaving debris that threatens other orbital assets. Redwire has been awarded more than $64 million from DARPA for VLEO demonstrations.
The commercial uses are also attractive. Flying lower means a smaller camera sees more, a smaller antenna connects faster, and the whole satellite gets cheaper. Juniper Research projects global VLEO satellite investment will nearly double, from $5.2 billion this year to $9.8 billion by 2031. European startup NewOrbit just raised $18.5 million to fly customer payloads between 200 and 300 kilometers. For these operators, built-in disposal is not a compliance burden. It is a feature of the neighborhood.
To best position VLEO as an orbit of choice, regulators should recognize VLEO as a distinct regime, with streamlined licensing and debris-mitigation reviews.
For scientific missions, the region below about 300 kilometers is one of the least-measured parts of our atmosphere: too high for balloons and aircraft, yet too low for conventional satellites to survive. Its density swells with solar storms, its atomic oxygen, or ATOX, erodes spacecraft surfaces, and who knows what other phenomena might hide there. In February 2022, a modest geomagnetic storm thickened the atmosphere enough to doom most of a 49-satellite Starlink batch deployed at low altitude. Fleets of short-lived science microsats, along with suborbital and air-launched probes, could close that gap and make every VLEO mission safer.
At this year’s Smallsat Conference in Utah, my company was exploring a conceptual payload to measure the VLEO atmosphere, as our STARLAUNCH air-launch system is being designed for VLEO missions. “ATOX” was a buzzword at the event. Turns out, multiple companies, including Redwire, with Defense Department sponsorship, are developing novel air-breathing propulsion systems that will exploit the atomic oxygen to keep VLEO microsatellites in orbit longer.
To best position VLEO as an orbit of choice, regulators should recognize VLEO as a distinct regime, with streamlined licensing and debris-mitigation reviews for satellites whose orbits guarantee rapid natural decay. The military should view VLEO as a deliberate tactical destination, not a perpetual experiment. And NASA, NOAA, and the Space Force should jointly invest in characterizing VLEO so every operator flies with better data.
We cannot easily clean up the orbits we have already cluttered. But we can choose to build the next era of tactical, scientific and commercial space activity where nature doesn’t allow unused satellites to loiter.
Tim Franta is the CEO of Starfighters Space (NYSE American: FJET), which operates its fleet of F-104 aircraft at Kennedy Space Center in Florida and the Midland International Air & Space Port in Texas. Their aircraft are configurable as a platform for air-launched payloads, supersonic training for pilots, and to support RDT&E (Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation) for hypersonic technologies, advanced materials, missile defense systems, microgravity science, spaceflight hardware validation, and defense electronic systems.
Wednesday, November 11, 2026
Argentina's Aircraft Carrier from Space
aircraft carriers
Throughout the Cold War, the United States monitored the activities of friend and foe alike. American reconnaissance satellites regularly overflew the naval bases of nations around the world and photographed them. In February 1981, a HEXAGON satellite photographed Argentina's aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo and the light cruiser ARA General Belgrano. A little over a year later, the Belgrano was sunk by a British nuclear submarine. (credit: Harry Stranger and Mariano Sciaroni)
Argentina’s flattop: The aircraft carrier Veinticinco de Mayo spotted from space
by Dwayne A. Day, Harry Stranger, and Mariano P. Sciaroni
Monday, November 9, 2026
In May 1982, a cat-and-mouse game played out in the South Atlantic between a Royal Navy nuclear-powered submarine and an Argentine aircraft carrier. At times both came close to shooting at each other before they separated and escaped unscathed. Another game had much more deadly consequences when HMS Conqueror fired two torpedoes and sank the Argentine light cruiser ARA General Belgrano, with substantial loss of life. Now, newly declassified satellite photos demonstrate that the United States intelligence community kept tabs on the disposition of the Argentine Navy over many years. But it was nothing personal—the United States watched all the navies of the world, including Argentina’s regional rival, Brazil. There is an old joke among members of the US intelligence community: in God we trust, all others we monitor.
aircraft carriers
aircraft carriers
ARA Veinticinco de Mayo moored at Puerto Belgrano, the Argentine Navy’s main naval base (November 1972 by a HEXAGON reconnaissance satellite). The carriers’ berth was known as “Battleship Pier”: it had been home to the Navy’s huge dreadnoughts, ARA Rivadavia and ARA Moreno, whose draft of more than ten meters demanded deep water. The first Argentine carrier, ARA Independencia, took their place there in 1958. The two ships in line are the Brooklyn-class cruisers ARA General Belgrano and ARA 9 de Julio, and the ship furthest to the left is possibly the ARA Cándido de Lasala (Q-43), an Ashland-class dock landing ship. (credit: via Harry Stranger)
Naval rivals in the South Atlantic
For years, there was a naval rivalry in the South Atlantic between two roughly equally matched opponents, Argentina and Brazil. In 1972, Argentina operated an aircraft carrier named ARA Veinticinco de Mayo, three light cruisers (soon reduced to two), eight destroyers, three frigates, and two corvettes. In November of that year, an American HEXAGON reconnaissance satellite overflew Argentina’s Puerto Belgrano and photographed the carrier, two cruisers, and other ships in port.
To Argentina’s north, Brazil also had a substantial navy at the time, including a carrier nearly identical to Veinticinco de Mayo, two World War II-era former US Navy light cruisers, eleven destroyers, five frigates, and ten corvettes. Both navies' destroyers were mostly upgraded US Navy World War II-era Fletcher, Gearing, and Sumner-class vessels—excellent ships in their day, by now all showing their age.
The two navies were thus roughly matched, with one important exception: Argentina’s carrier would soon operate Douglas A-4 Skyhawk attack jets, whereas Brazil’s carrier only operated the Grumman S-2A Tracker, flown by the Brazilian Air Force rather than the Navy. Both ships also operated helicopters (see “Carriers from space (part 2): Contemporary use of satellite imagery for open source intelligence,” The Space Review, August 12, 2024.)
The British Colossus-class light aircraft carrier HMS Warrior was sold to Argentina in 1958, becoming ARA Independencia (V-1). The ship operated until 1970 when she was placed in reserve and scrapped a year later. She was replaced by that country’s second carrier, ARA Veinticinco de Mayo (V-2), which had first served in the Royal Navy as HMS Venerable and then the Royal Netherlands Navy as HNLMS Karel Doorman. The ship was transferred to Argentina in 1968. Brazil´s Minas Gerais had been modernized at a Dutch shipyard in the late 1950s, so by 1970 both Argentina and Brazil were operating sister ships with very similar capabilities, both modernized by the Dutch.
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The Argentine aircraft carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo. The ship started life serving in Britain's Royal Navy as HMS Venerable, then in the Royal Netherlands Navy as HNLMS Karel Doorman. She was transferred to Argentina in 1968 and entered service in 1971. (credit: Wikimedia Commons)
Veinticinco de Mayo’s air wing initially consisted of North American T-28P Fennec and Grumman S-2A Tracker ASW aircraft. But in the 1970s they were replaced with A-4Q Skyhawks, S-2E Tracker anti-submarine warfare aircraft, Sikorsky Sea King and Sud-Aviation SA.316 Alouette III helicopters. This gave Argentina the ability to attack other ships and submarines at distance, whereas Brazil only had an anti-submarine capability with its carrier. In February 1981, a HEXAGON satellite again overflew Puerto Belgrano. By this time, one of Argentina’s two cruisers had been retired, but the satellite photographed many ships in port, including the carrier and the ARA General Belgrano astern.
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Veinticinco de Mayo photographed in February 1981 by an American HEXAGON reconnaissance satellite. ARA General Belgrano is astern of the carrier. She would be sunk in May 1982 by a Royal Navy submarine. (credit: via Harry Stranger)
The 1982 war
When Argentina moved to seize the Malvinas (Falkland Islands) in April 1982, the aircraft carrier was the centerpiece of its navy. During Operation Rosario on April 2, she sailed with the covering force of Task Force 20, supporting the amphibious landing near Stanley. Her air group was built around three units: the A-4Q Skyhawks of the 3ª Escuadrilla Aeronaval de Caza y Ataque, S-2E Trackers for anti-submarine work and reconnaissance, and Sea King helicopters. The newly acquired Super Étendards had not yet been integrated for carrier operations.
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Excerpt from a Top Secret CIA report on the Falklands War, assessing the deployment of Argentina's fleet. (credit: CIA)
Her decisive moment came in the first days of May. Rear Admiral Gualter Allara’s Task Group 79.1 was deployed north of the islands, while the cruiser General Belgrano group (TG 79.3) operated to the south, threatening the British Task Force from two directions. On May 1, after the first British attacks on the islands, the carrier’s S-2 Trackers located elements of the British fleet, and a Skyhawk strike was prepared for dawn on May 2. Nature intervened. A near-total calm, combined with the carrier’s limited speed, meant she could not generate enough wind over the deck to launch the Skyhawks with a useful bomb load, and the strike was called off. Later that day, submarine HMS Conqueror sank the Belgrano, and the nuclear submarine threat became the overriding factor in Argentine naval planning.
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The ARA Veinticinco de Mayo at dock in 1979 with the ARA General Belgrano moored astern. (credit: Mariano Sciaroni)
The carrier’s own war became an anti-submarine one. On May 5, two Trackers and two Sea Kings from ARA Veinticinco de Mayo detected a submerged contact near the carrier, held it, and attacked it. It was not a British submarine. With the surface fleet ordered back to shallow coastal waters, where British nuclear submarines could not operate freely, the carrier entered port on May 10 and took no further part in operations at sea. Her Skyhawks still flew extensively in combat, operating from the naval air base at Río Grande (see “Satellite reconnaissance and the Falklands War,” The Space Review, November 4, 2024.)
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Veinticinco de Mayo photographed by an American HEXAGON reconnaissance satellite in September 1984. By this time the ship had been modified to carry Super Étendard attack planes, which had proved to be highly capable during the 1982 Falklands War. But by 1986, the ship was no longer operable. (credit: via Harry Stranger)
In recent years, newly-declassified information from British archives indicates that British forces evaluated a long-range aircraft strike against the ship while she was in port. However, the war ended before such an operation entered advanced planning stages (see: “Buccaneers of the high frontier: Program 989 SIGINT satellites from the ABM hunt to the Falklands War to the space shuttle,” The Space Review, November 7, 2022.)
In 1984, another HEXAGON satellite—the last one to ever fly—overflew Puerto Belgrano and photographed the carrier in port. In place of the cruiser Belgrano were two destroyers moored astern.
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The naval base in 1996. The Veinticinco de Mayo is still there, but no longer operable. She was soon stricken and towed to India for scrapping. (credit: via Mariano Sciaroni)
The end of an era
In the 1940s and 1950s, the United Kingdom had sold off its smaller, so-called light carriers to countries like Australia, Canada, India, and the Netherlands. By the 1980s, many of those carriers were worn out and being retired. As those World War II-era carriers were decommissioned and scrapped, the number of aircraft carriers around the world rapidly diminished.
Veinticinco de Mayo was mostly confined to port by 1986. Plans to modernize her stalled due to lack of funds, and by 1996 she had been stripped of many parts, some of which were used to service Brazil’s aircraft carrier, Minas Gerais. In 2000, she was towed to Alang, India, for scrapping.
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A Carrier at Risk is Mariano Sciaroni's account of the cat and mouse game between the ARA Veinticinco de Mayo and a Royal Navy submarine in 1982. (credit: Helion Press)
Mariano Sciaroni holds a master’s degree in Strategy and Geopolitics as well as a postgraduate diploma in Contemporary Military History, both earned at the Argentine Army’s Military Academy. He is also an active member of the Argentine Institute of Military History and serves as a sub-lieutenant in the Argentine Army Reserve (Army Aviation Reserve Squadron. He is the author of several books on the 1982 war, including A Carrier at Risk, about the cat and mouse chase between the Veinticinco de Mayo and the Royal Navy; Go Find Him and Bring Me Back His Hat, about Argentine anti-submarine operations; and Handbrake!: Dassault Super Étendard Fighter-Bombers in the Falklands/Malvinas War 1982. His upcoming book Wings Against Warships in the South Atlantic: Argentine Naval Aviation Tactics in the Falklands Conflict, is based upon new archival research and interviews with participants in the war and will be published in spring 2027.
Harry Stranger’s website is https://spacefromspace.com/.
Dwayne Day can be reached at zirconic1@cox.net.
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