NASA's Infrastructure Cross Roads

KSC An image, circa 2000, of key facilities at the Kennedy Space Center. NASA is grappling with aging infrastructure that hindres its ability to carry out future missions, a recent report concluded. (credit: NASA) NASA’s infrastructure crossroads by Jeff Foust Monday, November 4, 2024 Bookmark and Share The next administration will have its share of challenges involving NASA to deal with. There may be scrutiny of NASA’s Artemis lunar exploration campaign, including both its technical approach and its schedule. It will have to examine if NASA’s plans to replace the International Space Station with commercial stations are feasible and on a schedule that will permit the ISS’s retirement in 2030. NASA’s science programs are also facing budget challenges, and the next administration could revisit whatever the agency decides in the coming months on a new approach to the Mars Sample Return program. Underlying all of those issues is problems with the agency’s infrastructure. Many of NASA’s field centers still rely on facilities built many decades ago, dating back to the original space race with the former Soviet Union if not earlier. That aging infrastructure is putting a strain on NASA’s ability to carry out its various missions independent of specific technical or budgetary challenges those missions face. “NASA’s solution to the problem has been to underinvest in infrastructure and so on in the future,” Augustine said. “That tactic, frankly, has run out of gas.” The problem with NASA’s infrastructure is not a new one, but is now an issue that can no longer be deferred. That was the overarching conclusion of a report issued in September by a National Academies committee chartered by Congress in the 2022 NASA authorization act and chaired by Norm Augustine, the retired chairman and CEO of Lockheed Martin. The report, titled “NASA at a Crossroads,” got its name from the committee’s conclusion that the agency was at a crossroads regarding investment in its infrastructure. “The underpinnings of the unique and critical capabilities the agency provides to the United States are eroding and will be inevitably lost if certain trends are not reversed,” the report stated. In a webinar held by the National Academies to roll out the report, Augustine and other committee members said that NASA has underinvested in facilities because of budget pressures. The amount of the agency’s budget that went to “mission support,” a line that includes facility maintenance, fell from 20% of NASA’s overall budget in 2013 to 14% in 2023. “In an opportunity-rich environment, such as NASA has confronted over the years, the choice has too frequently been to pursue near-term missions at the expense of investing in the ostensibly invisible foundational assets of the organization,” the report stated. Augustine, at the webinar, offered a blunter explanation of that “opportunity-rich environment”: NASA was being asked to do more than its budget provided. “NASA’s solution to the problem has been to underinvest in infrastructure and so on in the future,” he said. “That tactic, frankly, has run out of gas.” The committee’s concerned ranged from specific infrastructure, like the Deep Space Network that is increasingly overtaxed trying to support a growing number of missions, to basic facilities like labs and offices. “In fact, during its inspection tours, the committee saw some of the worst facilities many of its members have ever seen,” the report stated. “The concerns that it faces are ones that have built up over decades,” Augustine said of the agency during the webinar. “NASA truly is, in our view, at a crossroads.” The infrastructure comments in the report got the most attention, but the committee also raised concerns about investment in enabling technologies, its workforce, as well as “systemic” issues like a shift in management authority from field centers to NASA headquarters. The committee came up with eight major recommendations included in the report. It called for sufficient funding for infrastructure “even if that requires a rebalancing of the relative allocations of funding between mission work versus institutional support,” as well as the establishment of a working capital fund for infrastructure upkeep. Others called for improving investment in technologies and development of a human capital strategy. The report did not prioritize those recommendations. However, in an interview after the release of the report, Augustine said he considered two of the eight recommendations the most important. One was the recommendation on increasing investment in mission support, which he said could be tackled in two ways. “The first solution is to give NASA more money,” he said, arguing that NASA is a “miniscule” part of the overall budget, even with the recent caps on discretionary spending. “Getting more money is something you can hope for but can’t bet on.” The second approach, he said, it to shift money from missions to mission support. “Just don’t so some of the missions,” he said. “That’s going to be really painful.” He added that neither he nor the committee attempted to identify what missions should be curtailed or cancelled to free up money for mission support. “What are the institutional transformation initiatives we need to implement starting today,” Swails said of the ANSA 2040 effort, “to make sure we’re set up for success in the future?” The other recommendation he considered the most important was what the report called a “priority assessment of its current mission management model,” which he said involves ensuring the “proper checks and balances” between center management and management of mission directorates at headquarters. “The belief of the committee is that this is out of balance and could have dire consequences,” he said in the interview. He added, though, that his committee was “very reluctant” to tell NASA what that balance should be. “That is something it will have to address on its own.” NASA 2040 The National Academies report comes as NASA is working on an internal effort to reshape the agency called NASA 2040. “It’s an agency transformation initiative to propel us into the future,” said Casey Swails, NASA deputy associate administrator, during a talk at the American Astronautical Society’s von Braun Space Exploration Symposium last week in Huntsville, Alabama. NASA has mentioned the NASA 2040 initiative from time to time but rarely discussed it in detail outside the agency. The effort has the goal of making NASA the “preeminent organization” in space science and engineering through various institutional reforms. Swails said the approach to NASA 2040 is modeled on other strategies, like its Moon to Mars architecture, that “start from the right” with a specific end state and work backwards to determine how to get there. “What are the institutional transformation initiatives we need to implement starting today,” she said, “to make sure we’re set up for success in the future?” That work has focused on what the initiative calls “workstreams” in seven areas: mission, structure, budget, people, infrastructure, technology, and process. Those efforts are led by personnel at both headquarters and the field centers with assistance from more than 200 “employee champions” that serve as liaisons between leadership and the overall workforce. “This is a whole-of-agency effort,” she said. “We’ve been focused on this as an entire leadership team.” She highlighted the work of the technology workstream, which is looking less at mission-specific technologies than those that enable agency operations, from artificial intelligence to cybersecurity. “This is more around the technology to help us do our jobs.” One example of the efforts coming out of those workstreams is the concept of a “NASA front door” for companies interested in working with the agency. “How many of you can say where NASA’s front door is?” Swails asked the audience, getting muted laughter in return. Even at a single center, she argued, there can be so many ways for companies to try to seek to do business with, or engage in partnerships with, the agency, that it can make it confusing for companies to figure out the best way to proceed. She said NASA is looking at ways through technology to create such a front door. An example she gave is a company looking for access to a wind tunnel going to this portal to find out what agency facilities and expertise could meet its needs. “It's not about creating this big organization you have to go through,” she said, “it’s about a technology platform to see what’s out there.” “If you don’t know NASA, it can be hard to partner with NASA,” said Joseph Pelfrey, director of the Marshall Space Flight Center, of that “front door” initiative in an interview during last week’s conference. “We’re trying to make it easier for industry to be able to come in and identify where those capabilities are, where those test facilities are, and where they have capacity to support.” “Their response has been very encouraging,” Augustine said of NASA. “Many of the things we talked about they are addressing.” He said he was optimistic about the prospects of NASA 2040 making lasting, positive reform to the agency. “It's very committed to really looking at ourselves through the mirror to say, how can we be better as an agency, and what do we need to focus on to really enable the goals of the nation in space exploration, to enable commercial space, to be a good partner.” Pelfrey said the NASA 2040 effort identified the need for infrastructure investment would be a challenge. “The National Academies report validated that, in that we have not been able to invest in the infrastructure and somewhat in the workforce for at the level that we would like,” he said. Swails said that the NASA 2040 effort got underway just before the National Academies study started. “What it’s really shown us is that we’ve been on the right track with the things that we’ve been working on,” she said of the study. “A lot of their summary and the findings of their report are really well aligned with the things that we’ve been working on in the last year for 2040.” That includes, she said, the need for more infrastructure investment and a “complex matrix structure” for agency management. The efforts of the various workstreams are wrapping up, she said, providing recommendations to NASA management. Implementing recommendations will begin some time in 2025, although funding for specific efforts may have to wait until fiscal year 2026. Augustine said in September that his committee had briefed NASA on its report shortly before the public release. “Their response has been very encouraging,” he said. “Many of the things we talked about they are addressing.” That response, he said, was one reason he had a “fair amount of optimism” about NASA’s future as it grapples with infrastructure and other institutional challenges. Another, he said, is because “NASA is not going to have much of a choice.” Jeff Foust (jeff@thespacereview.com) is the editor and publisher of The Space Review, and a senior staff writer with SpaceNews. He also operates the Spacetoday.net web site. Views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone.

Comparing Harris And Trump On Space Policy

Harris Vice President Kamala Harris speaks at a December 2023 meeting of the National Space Council. (credit: NASA/Joel Kowsky) Comparing Harris and Trump on space policy by Jonathan Coopersmith Monday, November 4, 2024 Bookmark and Share Space exploration and development will shift very few voters in this week’s presidential election between Vice President Kamala Harris and former President Donald Trump. Space policy has historically been a bipartisan area which presidential campaigns have largely ignored. Indeed, contra the argument recently made by former US Representative Bob Walker, both candidates’ platforms support space commercialization and innovation, returning astronauts to the Moon, and continuing American leadership in space. Trump prefers to “go it alone”; Harris’s approach is “together, we can—and will—do great things.” Significant differences do exist between the two candidates, though not necessarily the way Walker implies. Harris bests Trump in three areas of growing national and international importance: emphasizing greater cooperation and coordination among all the sectors involved in space exploration; using our needs in space technology as a stimulant for preparation of the high-tech workforce our nation needs for many purposes; and leveraging space technologies to monitor and address the existential threats posed by climate change. Although the United States has dominated, and there are competitive and even military aspects to what one might still call the space race. Space is increasingly an environment that requires multilateral coordination on rules and norms, if not always cooperation on specific missions. Failing to develop clear “rules of the road” for commercial operations, especially on the Moon, can create uncertainty and hinder development. While the Trump Administration originated the Artemis Accords, non-binding principles to guide civil space exploration and exploitation, in fact 38 of the 47 countries currently signed on to the Accords joined during the Biden Administration, reflecting the priorities and achievements of the National Space Council under Vice President and now candidate Kamala Harris. Harris has encouraged and worked for international cooperation and coordination in areas ranging from banning debris-generating anti-satellite (ASAT) tests in space to developing standards for commercial development of space both in orbit and on celestial bodies like the Moon and asteroids. Trump prefers to “go it alone”; Harris’s approach is “together, we can—and will—do great things.” A less photogenic, but nonetheless critical, area is workforce development. Whether a young American wants to become an aerospace technician or computer chip designer, she or he will require STEM education and specialized training. A burgeoning space sector provides a growing opportunity that incentivizes young people to get the right training, which will benefit our nation in all its endeavors. All the Biden Administration’s high-tech initiatives such as the CHIPS and Science Act have included an emphasis on STEM education and training. As a demonstration that Harris “gets” this key issue better than Trump, in 2022 she helped launch the Space Workforce Coalition. The biggest threat to NASA’s budget is the growing federal deficit. In this context, NASA’s Artemis program to return to the Moon may become its own worst enemy. Perhaps the biggest difference between the two candidates lies in their different approaches to climate change and its intersections with space technology. The Trump Administration tried to kill NASA’s Orbiting Carbon Observatory 3 and other Earth-oriented missions and reduced funding for NOAA’s environmental satellite programs. In contrast, the Biden Administration supported greater space monitoring of the environment. Ignorance and denial do not equal strength: accurate understanding and effective action are the best ways to respond to climate challenges. Imagine handling hurricanes and wildfires without satellites managed by public agencies that do not have to earn a profit! Upcoming challenges With her appreciation of the benefits from closer international and national cooperation and coordination, Harris is better positioned than Trump to understand and address the challenges NASA and the military will surely face. The biggest threat to NASA’s budget is the growing federal deficit. In this context, NASA’s Artemis program to return to the Moon may become its own worst enemy. The program has fallen behind its ambitious schedule and experienced huge cost overruns. What will be sacrificed to make the numbers work? While both candidates (and Congressional leaders) have not yet fully acknowledged the seriousness of the fiscal situation, a nonpartisan group of economists calculated Trump’s proposals will expand the national deficit by $7.5 trillion compared with Harris’s $3.5 trillion. That’s a lot more financial pressure not to spend money on the full range of NASA priorities and missions. In military space, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated the growing importance of military operations in orbit and the threats posed by adversaries to GPS and other satellites. While international cooperation is essential for global navigation (and the resultant benefits), so too is the development of alternative technologies in case GPS is jammed, spoofed, or otherwise downgraded. Building on the creation of Space Force under Trump, the Biden Administration has expanded cooperation with NATO allies into space. In short, our country would significantly benefit more from a Harris Administration’s space foci on international coordination and cooperation, dealing with—not denying—climate change, and providing training for future jobs. Jonathan Coopersmith is a historian of technology who had the honor of teaching at Texas A&M University for over 30 years. His most recent article covers the failure of space commercialization in the 1970s and 1980s. Note: we are now moderating comments. There will be a delay in posting comments and no guarantee that all submitted comments will be posted.

The Case For Space Policy Stability In The Next Administration

Trump President Donald Trump speaking after the launch of the Demo-2 commercial crew mission in May 2020. (credit: NASA/Bill Ingalls) The case for space policy stability in the next administration by Thomas G. Roberts Monday, November 4, 2024 Bookmark and Share The Conversation The next president of the United States could be the first in that office to accept a phone call from the Moon and hear a woman’s voice on the line. To do so, they’ll first need to make a series of strategic space policy decisions. They’ll also need a little luck. Enormous government investment supports outer space activities, so the US president has an outsized role in shaping space policy during their time in office. For many candidates, getting into the weeds of their space policy plans may be more trouble than it’s worth. Past presidents have leveraged this power to accelerate US leadership in space and boost their presidential brand along the way. Presidential advocacy has helped the US land astronauts on the surface of the Moon, establish lasting international partnerships with civil space agencies abroad, and led to many other important space milestones. But most presidential candidates refrain from discussing space policy on the campaign trail in meaningful detail, leaving voters in the dark on their visions for the final frontier. For many candidates, getting into the weeds of their space policy plans may be more trouble than it’s worth. For one, not every president even gets the opportunity for meaningful and memorable space policy decision-making, since space missions can operate on decades-long timelines. And in past elections, those who do show support for space initiatives often face criticism from their opponents for their high price tags. But the 2024 election is different. Both candidates have executive records in space policy, a rare treat for space enthusiasts casting their votes this November. As a researcher who studies international affairs in outer space, I am interested in how those records interface with the strategic and sustainable use of that domain. A closer look shows that former President Donald Trump and Vice President Kamala Harris have used their positions to consistently prioritize US leadership in space, but they have done so with noticeably different styles and results. Trump’s space policy record As president, Trump established a record of meaningful and lasting space policy decisions but did so while attracting more attention to his administration’s space activities than his predecessors. He regularly took personal credit for ideas and accomplishments that predated his time in office. The former president oversaw the establishment of the US Space Force and the reestablishment of US Space Command, as well as the National Space Council. These organizations support the development and operation of military space technologies, defend national security satellites in future conflicts and coordinate between federal agencies working in the space domain. He also had the most productive record of space policy directives in recent history. These policy directives clarify the US government’s goals in space, including how it should both support and rely on the commercial space sector, track objects in Earth’s orbit, and protect satellites from cyber threats. He has called his advocacy for the creation of the Space Force one of his proudest achievements of his term. However, this advocacy contributed to polarized support for the new branch. This polarization broke the more common pattern of bipartisan public support for space programming. Like many presidents, not all of Trump’s visions for space were realized. He successfully redirected NASA’s key human spaceflight destination from Mars back to the Moon. But his explicit goal of astronauts reaching the lunar surface by 2024 was not realistic, given his budget proposals for the agency. Should he be elected again, the former president may wish to accelerate NASA’s Moon plans by furthering investment in the agency’s Artemis program, which houses its lunar initiatives. He may frame the initiative as a new space race against China. Harris’s space policy record The Biden Administration has continued to support Trump-era initiatives, resisting the temptation to undo or cancel past proposals. Its legacy in space is noticeably smaller. As the chair of the National Space Council, Harris has set US space policy priorities and represented the United States on the global stage. Notably, the Trump Administration kept this position that the president can alter at will assigned to the vice president, a precedent the Biden Administration upheld. Given their past leadership, it is unlikely that either candidate will seek to dramatically alter the long-term missions the largest government space organizations have underway. In this role, Harris led the United States’ commitment to refrain from testing weapons in space that produce dangerous, long-lasting space debris. This decision marks an achievement for the US in keeping space operations sustainable and setting an example for others in the international space community. Like some Trump administration space policy priorities, not all of Harris’ proposals found footing in Washington. The council’s plan to establish a framework for comprehensively regulating commercial space activities in the US, for example, stalled in Congress. If enacted, these new regulations would have ensured that future space activities, such as private companies operating on the Moon or transporting tourists to orbit and back, pass critical safety checks. Should she be elected, Harris may choose to continue her efforts to shape responsible norms of behavior in space and organize oversight over the space industry. Alternatively, she could cede the portfolio to her own vice president, Minnesota Gov. Tim Walz, who has virtually no track record on space policy issues. Stability in major space policy decisions Despite the two candidates’ vastly different platforms, voters can expect stability in US space policy as a result of this year’s election. Given their past leadership, it is unlikely that either candidate will seek to dramatically alter the long-term missions the largest government space organizations have underway during the upcoming presidential term. And neither is likely to undercut their predecessors’ accomplishments. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article. Thomas G. Roberts is a postdoctoral fellow in international affairs at Georgia Tech’s Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, where he leads a research portfolio dedicated to issues of international coordination, sustainability, and security in outer space.

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Mysterious MOL Concepts

MOL Figure 1: MOL concept with Gemini B on top of a crew cabin cylinder. Mysterious MOL concepts Long forgotten manned military space station ambitions by Hans Dolfing Monday, October 28, 2024 Bookmark and Share The year 1963 was a year of turmoil in the United States. On the military side, the US Air Force had left the Army and Navy behind with efforts on military manned space flight. In the tug-of-war between civilian and military spaceflight goals, the Military Orbital Space Station (MODS) was cancelled and discussion on a more national space station picked up steam. At the same time, the US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, during his seven years in office, exercised influence to de-emphasize military manned spaceflight in favor of civilian space exploration. On the civilian side, just as NASA and the Apollo program were picking up speed to go to the moon, the visionary John F. Kennedy was murdered and Lyndon B. Johnson took over. What is under appreciated is the amount of spaceflight vision, ambition, and concept studies in that time. Within that historical context, December 1963 recorded two important events related to manned spaceflight and the following fiscal year's budget. The military Dyna-Soar (X-20) space glider was cancelled and the USAF ambitions for space were reduced to a small military space station called the Manned Orbital Laboratory (MOL), which was announced December 10, 1963. What is under appreciated is the amount of spaceflight vision, ambition, and concept studies in that time. This article highlights a few forgotten MOL concepts discussed behind the scenes based on documents preserved at the National Archives and Records (NARA) that demonstrate those grand USAF ambitions that were ultimately curtailed into the small MOL announced in December 1963. [1,2] First, as part of a set of almost 40 pages, NARA has documents from HQ Air Force System Command (AFSC) titled “MOL Study Reporting Meeting Minutes of Meeting No. 7” dated December 10, 1963.[1] The meeting took place at AFSC Space Systems Division (SSD) in Los Angeles and the chairmen were Col. John M. Coulter and Dr. M. I. Yarymovych from NASA. The two-page cover letter and one-page agenda show that several presentations on the SR-17527 Military Test Space Station (MTSS), SR-79814 Space Logistics, Maintenance and Rescue (SLOMAR) and Extended Apollo were contributed to this MOL meeting. Figure 2 shows three example pages. NASA contributed reports from its biomedical and scientific experiment workgroups. [1] documents Figure 2: Example documents [1] The two-page distribution list shows that these meeting minutes were copied to a list of illustrious spaceflight names including Wernher von Braun (NASA Marshall Space Flight Center), Abe Silverstein (NASA Lewis Research Center), George von Tiesenhausen (NASA Launch Operations Center), Rene Berglund and Edward Olling (NASA Manned Spacecraft Center), Col. Lowell Smith (USAF MTSS liaison) and dozens more. To further demonstrate the scope of spaceflight related studies flowing into these MOL meetings, here is the list of studies attached to this particular seventh MOL meeting, which include many "MOL Study Monthly Status Report" with reports on various activities and subcontracts. These one-page status documents include details and schedules. Table 1 summarizes the status reports. table Table 1: List of "MOL Study Monthly Status Report" at 7th meeting Dec. 10, 1963. [1] Related to these meeting minutes, there is an undated, five-page work statement titled “A study of the Operational Problems Associated with A Manned Orbiting Telescope,” plus a one-page cover letter and two-page justification. This was clearly written by Langley Research Center (LaRC) in 1963 as part of a small concept study. To summarize these archival documents, almost 40 pages discuss mostly forgotten projects feeding into the MOL space station concept before its announcement in December 1963. Finally, there is a three-page memo on "Eighth Manned Orbital Laboratory Study Reporting Meeting" dated January 5, 1964. On the military USAF side, the document says that the USAF still wishes to go ahead with its OSS Study as originally planned, though it is unapproved at that date. Also, the published MOL configuration is not necessarily the final configuration though it is clear it will not have a centrifuge. On the civilian NASA side, NASA’s position towards the MOL program has been clarified and the NASA space station activities have been grouped under an umbrella program called Orbital Research Laboratory (ORL) comprising four programs with increasingly longer stays in space named Apollo-X, Apollo Research Laboratory (AORL), MORL where the M stand for Manned or Medium, and LORL as the largest facility. To summarize these archival documents, almost 40 pages discuss mostly forgotten projects feeding into the MOL space station concept before its announcement in December 1963 with a few example pages in Figure 2. [1] Below are more details on the telescope proposal, the nuclear power source, and the thinking about a very large space station for the USAF. The discussion about telescopes in space was ongoing in the US already in the 1950s when Wernher von Braun discussed the concept for astronomical purpose. Similarly, Nancy Roman already wrote in 1960 about the advantages of telescopes in space, which is one reason why NASA has named a future space-based telescope after her.[4,14] The role of the MOL was primarily aimed at finding out the military requirements in space. In Figure 1, a small telescope was attached to the MOL for Earth observations. The larger types of space stations, to be discussed later, had much greater potential for astronomical and other observations. As telescopes can look up and down, the military realized that a small telescope in orbit or a larger one of the Moon could be useful for observations of Earth. In California, the astronomical Hale telescope on Mt. Palomar with a 200-inch (five-meter) mirror was completed in 1949. Based on that experience, it is known that military, space-based 200-inch manned telescopes were considered in 1959. One option was to be based on the Moon to achieve 100-foot (30-meter) resolution in Earth imaging.[15] Obviously that was not good enough compared to the one-foot (30-centimeter) resolution requested during the MOL program in 1965, which is why discussion on space locations and orbits, ground resolution, and budgets were ongoing.[3] The NARA documents discuss an early Langley Research Center study on a 120-inch (four-meter) Manned Orbital Telescope for astronomical purposes. The manned aspect is emphasized as advantageous for operation and maintenance. For comparison, the concept of a 120-inch Manned Orbital Telescope for astronomical purpose in a 200-nautical-mile (370-kilometer) orbit in 1963 is indeed a sizable mirror. Actually, it is a large mirror compared to Hubble (96-iinch), the ground-based Mt. Palomar (200-inch) and later MOL studies labelled Dorian and KH-10 (72-inch). The NARA document also mentions that the optical aspects would be studied more by a company named “Fecker” leading to a final report that concentrates on the technical aspects and barely mentions manned operation at all.[12] That report seems to indicate that manned telescope operation was unnecessary but a large telescope in space was technically feasible. In summary, the manned orbital telescope was a topic of discussion in 1963, as part of the wider discussion what man’s role in space was going to be for both civilian and military projects. The enabling effects of what is now known as exponential growth of computing power was only starting to register. Lockheed concept Figure 3: Lockheed “Tinkertoy” concept [2,16,17] To continue from telescopes to larger space stations, at the time of the announcement in December 1963, the MOL was going to be a small military space station for one or two astronauts, zero-G environment, with a pressurized volume of about 1,000 to 1,500 cubic feet (28–42 cubic meters).[3] That size was very similar to some space station sizes in the phase I of the even earlier MTSS concepts.[13] In the middle of 1963 the military mission in space was not well defined. A small station was needed to define the military missions better. On the civilian side, NASA was very clear that a large space station would not be achieved in a single step due to too many unknown factors.[2] That explains why small, medium, and large space stations were studied at the same time as MOL because this would provide better knowledge on how to scale up in future. One particular unanswered question was how effective can men work in space, with the related question whether zero-G stations were simply good enough or whether spin-gravity was required for effective work in space. Keep in mind that Apollo was the main human space effort in the country and budgets for military space were shrinking as a result. In particular, NASA investigated a medium-sized Manned Orbital Research Laboratory (MORL) that also had a larger cousin, the Large Orbital Research Laboratory (LORL), with a projected volume of 67,000 cubic feet (1,900 cubic meters) and 24 astronauts or more.[2,5,10,11] In June 1963, after several years of internal studies, Douglas Aircraft got a two-phase civilian contract for MORL as well as a LORL zero-G contract in August 1963.[10] In parallel, LMSC studied a large station with artificial gravity and had looked at a large “Tinkertoy” station a few years earlier.[2,11] The NARA documents show all of this was still on the table on the military side before a much smaller military station was announced in December 1963. Additional contemporary work on space stations is supported by the earlier Table 1, entry 1, by North American Aviation. The monthly status report says, “The Phase I contract (NAS 9-1963) of the Extended Apollo terminated as of Nov. 30, 1963 with the submission of the final report except for Addendum No. 1 which is for the total price of $49,000 to investigate ‘Modular Concepts.’ Work under the addendum began Nov. 18, 1963.”[1] For more work on the large space station, we find in entry 5 in Table 1, which also mentions the study “Large Zero-Gravity Space Station Concepts” by Douglas Aircraft. It says, “‘Preliminary design’ effort is continuing in a satisfactory manner. Work is divided into two separate efforts at this time. Subsystems are being integrated using the Phase I trade-off studies and the external and internal structural configurations are being determined. The preliminary system design specification is continuously being revised as the system design is formulated.” This work is related to the left concept in Figure 4.[1,10] other concepts Figure 4: Douglas and Lockheed LORL concepts Finally, as entry 3 in Table 1, and also Figure 2, there is Lockheed working on a contract titled “Operations and Logistics Study of a (Large) Manned Orbital Laboratory,” which relates to both Figure 3 and 4. The status mentions “The contractor delivered three copies of the rough draft of the final report on November 18,” which demonstrates there was hard work going on to feed preliminary work on large orbital stations to the military space station meetings before the decision was made for a small MOL station. The Lockheed logistics study NAS 9-1422 was overlapping with the large rotating station in NAS9-1655, which contains the concept on the right in Figure 4.[1,11] To summarize, there were several reasons to go from a “big” to a “small” MOL. First, in the middle of 1963 the military mission in space was not well defined. A small station was needed to define the military missions better. In addition, contracting budgets and sanity prevailed to start with a small military station to answer specific military questions though even a few months earlier far larger military stations were considered for MOL. Had it not been for the war in Vietnam, and a Cold War race to moon via Apollo, the budgets might have supported very different goals such as both large civilian and military space stations. Finally, on nuclear energy, in the 1950s and 1960s, nuclear energy was seen as the way of the future. Application anywhere including in space was a natural thing to study.[6,9] Within that context, the Systems Nuclear Auxiliary POWER (SNAP) program studied both radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTG) as well as space nuclear reactors.[7,8,18] The difference was typically in the way heat was transformed to power. The RTG projects were typically odd numbered while the even-numbered studies were nuclear reactors. [7] Nuclear power for the MOL was studied both ways. Per Table 1, entry 8, a Martin Company study investigated to use radioisotopes to generate power, specifically via polonium-210 and a Brayton cycle. It was titled “Application of Radioisotopes to MOL” and carried out between June 1963 and February 1964, reported on December 6, 1963. Sadly, the “von Braun” ideas of large space stations would not be pursued for decades by either the civilian or military agencies. The transport of such radioactive cargo to a space station presented unique challenges. One proposed approach was to mount the RTG and materials on the outside of the Mercury capsule, which would improve the shielding for the astronauts. The complication would be that this would be an imbalance of the capsule and would require more counterweights to keep it stable. Another nuclear energy study considered was a SNAP-8 reactor with 35 kilowatts output to power MOL. Per the NARA documents in Figure 2 as well as Table 1, entry 9, the study was titled “Application of Nuclear Electric Power to MOL,” between June 1963 and August 1964, by General Electric Co., MSD and status reported on December 6, 1963.[6] The status report says: Accomplishments, November 1963: The effort during November 1963 was concentrated on completing the first Topical Report and initiating the conceptual design phase. After discussions with MSC, it was decided to design a 35-KW SNAP-8 system for integration into the large rotating Y-type space station. Studies to date have disclosed that some compromise in the arrangement of living quarters, or the distribution of weight within the space station will be necessary unless large shielding weight penalties are accepted. Plans for December 1963: General Electric will be investigating the possible powerplant configurations that could be attached to the hub, or an arm, of the space station. Before January 15, 1964, one concept will be eliminated and the effort concentrated on the other. The possibility of a separate launch for the powerplant and the associated penalties will also be investigated. As with RTGs, shielding of the reactor was important. A full shield around the reactor would be prohibitively heavy and impossible to launch. Therefore, the practical approach was to mount the reactor away from the astronauts on an extended beam or similar. An alternative approach involved a “shadow shield” between reactor and astronauts. SNAP-8 had a joint AEC- and NASA-sponsored development and was envisioned with a 30- to 60-kilowatt output for about 1.5 years.[7] SNAP-8 was tested on December 11, 1963, to full power for the first time, which is one day after the seventh MOL meeting discussed earlier.[18] We can only speculate on the dates but it almost looks like there was an effort to achieve this datapoint in time for this meeting. While odd-numbered RTGs made it to space, e.g., in the Transit satellites, the SNAP-8 reactor envisioned for MOL never reached space.[9,18] To summarize, these NARA documents showed that the USAF vision in 1963 included very large orbital stations powered by nuclear reactors, which then required a large logistics effort with shuttles to support the military mission in space. Shrinking budgets and an unclear military mission in space collapsed those visions into a small, single launch orbital station called the MOL. Sadly, the “von Braun” ideas of large space stations would not be pursued for decades by either the civilian or military agencies. Instead, the nation concentrated on the singular, peaceful goal of Apollo to land a man on the Moon while the military was put on a reconnaissance track in space. References RG 255, NACA Langley Memorial Aeronautical Laboratory and NASA Langley Research Center Records, A200-4 Manned Space Stations, Series II: Subject Correspondence Files, 1918-1978, Box 421, Sep. 1963 - Nov. 1964, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Philadelphia. Irving Stambler, “Orbiting Stations; Stopovers to Space Travel”, LCCN 65020700, published by G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1965. “The DORIAN files revealed : A compendium of the NRO's Manned Orbiting Laboratory documents”, edited by James D. Outzen, Ph.D., incl. Carl Berger’s - “A History of the Manned Orbiting Laboratory Program Office” Aug. 2015 Wernher von Braun, “Collier’s articles on conquest of space (1952-1954)” Roger D. Launius, Space Stations: Base camps to the stars, ISBN 1-56852-716-0, 276 pages, 2003 “Nuclear electric power for manned orbiting space station Final presentation”, NTRS 19690071195, CR-105379, 69N75374, NAS3-4160 “SNAP-8 Summary report”, Atomics International Division, Rockwell International, AI-AEC-13070, 1973 Wikipedia, “Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power (SNAP)” Dwayne A. Day, “Nuclear Transit: nuclear-powered navigation satellites in the early 1960s”, "The Space Review", February 2024. “Douglas Orbital Laboratory Studies”, Douglas Report SM-45878, January 1964, Missile & Space Systems Division (MSSD), Santa Monica, CA via JSC History Collection at University of Houston-Clear Lake, Space Station Series,McDonnell Douglas, Box Number 2. “Study of a Rotating Manned Orbital Space Station”, Lockheed Spacecraft Organization, California, Burbank, submitted to NASA Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), Houston, Texas, March 1964, NAS9-1665, LR-17502, cost $300,000, NTRS 19640047936,19640047964 et al, 11 volumes via Bellcomm, Inc Technical Library Collection, Accession XXXX-0093, National Air and Space Museum, Smithsonian Institution., Box 139, Folder 11 to Box 141, Folder 7. “Final Report Feasibility Study of a 120-inch Orbiting Astronomical Telescope”, AE-1148, NTRS 19720068070, NAS1-1305 by J.W. Fecker Division, American Optical Company, Pittsburgh, PA./li> H. Dolfing, “The Military Test Space Station (MTSS)“, "The Space Review", August 2024. Nancy G. Roman, “Satellite Astronomical Observations" in "Proceedings of the Manned Space Station Symposium”, pp 125-127, Los Angeles, CA, April 20-22 1960. ”S.R. 183 Lunar Observatory Study”, Project No. 7987, Task No. 19769, Volume 1 and 2, AFBMD TR 60-44, April 1960. “Tinkertoy, early Lockheed space station concept by Saunders B. Kramer”, NASA History Division, RG-11, Boxes 9088 and 9090. Saunders B. Kramer, “Early engineering designs of space stations in the United States: A Memoir”, Journal of the British Interplanetary Society (JBIS), Vol. 46, pp. 163-172, 1993. “US Astro-nuclear History part 2: SNAP-8, NASA’s Space Station Power Supply”, BeyondNerva, 2018. Hans Dolfing is an independent computer scientist with a passion for spaceflight, software, and history.

Planning For A Coninuous Human Presence In LEO

Haven-2 In its final form, Haven-2 will feature eight modules attached to a larger core module. (credit: Vast) Planning for the future of continuous human presence in LEO by Jeff Foust Monday, October 28, 2024 Bookmark and Share It is not clear that the sprawling exhibit hall at the International Astronautical Congress (IAC) earlier this month in Milan had a center, with exhibitors split into two halls with a tent-like temporary structure connecting the two. But, certainly, one the exhibits at the heart of the hall, based on the activity there, was commercial space station company Vast. The company’s large booth features VR experiences of its proposed station and a model of its “patent-pending signature sleep system” that it says will allow for a better night’s sleep for future astronauts on its station. Vast used IAC to highlight the final design of Haven-1, the single-module space station it plans to launch in the second half of next year on a Falcon 9. It will be visited by up to four four-person crews for brief stays, carrying out research and other work while giving Vast experience for future stations. “We operate under the assumption that we are all-in on winning CLD,” Haot said. More importantly, the company used the conference to unveil its plans for Haven-2, the company’s next station and the one it plans to offer to NASA as a commercial successor to the International Space Station. That facility will be built in phases over several years, one module at a time. “Our competitors have put out designs of what they plan to do, and Vast has only shown Haven-1,” Max Haot, CEO of Vast, said in an interview. That’s a reference to space station proposals from Axiom Space, Starlab Space, and the Orbital Reef effort of Blue Origin, Sierra Space and others that, unlike Vast, has support from NASA’s Commercial LEO Destinations (CLD) program. Vast does not have a CLD award—the company started operations only after the “Phase One” awards in late 2021—but it has been working hard to catch up, fueled by investment from company founder Jed McCaleb, a cryptocurrency billionaire. The release of the Haven-2 design at IAC was the company’s effort to show prospective customers, including NASA, what its plans are for the station. Haven-2 would start with a single module launched on a Falcon Heavy in 2028. The module is a stretched version of Haven-1, five meters longer and with twice the usable volume. That module alone could support some crew-tended missions. Vast, though, would follow that initial module with three more identical ones, launching about six months apart through 2030. The four would dock with each other in a line to form the first phase of Haven-2. Each module would be functionally identical but could be outfitted differently inside to serve different needs, such as lab space versus habitation. The second phase would begin around 2030 with the launch of a core module with a seven-meter diameter on SpaceX’s Starship. The four modules of the phase-one station would then undock from one another and attach themselves to four docking ports on that core module, which also has additional docking and berthing ports for visiting vehicles, a robotic arm, and an airlock for spacewalks. Vast will then launch four more modules similar to the first four, although some will have unique features: one will have an external payload rack and airlock similar to that on the Kibo module on the ISS, while another will have a cupola 3.8 meters across, much larger that the ISS cupola. The company envisions the station reaching that final version in 2032. “By that time, it’s more capable than the ISS,” Haot said, “and we hope and expect more capable than anything China and Russia have on orbit at that time.” Vast, since the company’s founding, has outlined ambitious plans for large space stations, including those that would rotate to provide artificial gravity. However, the company is making clear with the rollout of the Haven-2 design that it is focused on winning the next phase of the CLD competition, securing NASA funding for certifying the station for NASA astronauts and for providing space station services to NASA. “We operate under the assumption that we are all-in on winning CLD,” Haot said when asked if the company had a backup plan should NASA not select Haven-2 for the next phase of the program. He said Vast sees NASA as the anchor customer, but not the only one, for Haven-2. With NASA, along with other companies and space agencies, “we can be a profitable company.” Because of that, Vast is deferring to NASA on some aspects of the station’s design. The orbit, Haot said, will depend on what NASA defines in the next phase of the CLD program. While Vast has a close relationship with SpaceX for Haven-1, including requiring the use of Crew Dragon’s life support system to enable crewed operations, Haot said the company will be open to other vehicles, like Starliner. Haven-2 also will not have an artificial gravity capability despite Vast’s stated interest in it. “Haven-2 is really designed for NASA as the anchor customer, and NASA’s requirement is the opposite of artificial gravity. It’s a microgravity laboratory in space,” he said. Haven-2 At the end of one phase of Haven-2’s development, it will have four largely identical modules attached in a line. (credit: Vast) NASA’s microgravity strategy and redefining “continuous presence” With Vast’s unveiling of the Haven-2 design, most of the likely competitors for the next phase of the CLD program have shown what they plan to offer to NASA as commercial successors to the ISS. Axiom Space is developing a series of modules it will initially install on the ISS before detaching them to create a commercial station. Starlab Space is planning a large single-module station launching on Starship. Orbital Reef is pursuing a modular station, although one of its partners, Sierra Space, has discussed launching one of its inflatable modules as a standalone pathfinder station first. “Continuous human presence: what does that mean?” Melroy asked. “Is it a continuous heartbeat or a continuous capability?” Those companies are now looking to NASA to provide details on its specific requirements for commercial stations. A formal request for proposals is slated for release next year—preceded by a draft for industry comment—with phase two awards planned for 2026, said Robyn Gatens, ISS director and acting commercial spaceflight director at NASA headquarters, during a briefing at the IAC. NASA has, in the meantime, been working to define exactly what it wants to do on such commercial stations. The agency released in August a draft of a LEO Microgravity Strategy modeled on its Moon to Mars strategy. The strategy outlines goals and objectives, from research to exploration planning to workforce development. “It’s an effort to define what it is we want to accomplish in the next generation of human presence in low Earth orbit,” NASA deputy administrator Pam Melroy said in a talk at IAC. NASA requested comments on the strategy and received more than 1,800 responses, Melroy said. That will lead to a final version of the strategy by the end of the year, and feed into the requirements NASA plans to include in the request for proposal for the next phase of the CLD program. NASA has emphasized, throughout the effort to help develop commercial replacements for the ISS, its desire to maintain a continuous human presence in LEO. That includes an overlap between the first commercial station and the retirement of the ISS, currently proposed for 2030, to enable a smooth transition. But Melroy, at IAC, suggested that NASA was rethinking the concept of “continuous human presence” or, at least, how NASA defines it. “Continuous human presence: what does that mean?” she said in her talk about the LEO microgravity strategy at IAC. “Is it a continuous heartbeat or a continuous capability? While we originally hoped that this would just emerge from this process, we’re still having conversations about that.” The idea of “continuous heartbeat,” she explained at a later briefing, was what most people thought of regarding continuous human presence: having people in space without a break, maintaining the current 24-year record of humans on the ISS. Doing so, she said, had benefits for both maintaining scientific research and national prestige. “There’s a national posture element to it, to not have humans on orbit after what would be nearly 30 years of continuous presence” when the ISS is retired in 2030. The alternative, “continuous capability,” would be to maintain the ability to have humans in orbit but not continuously. That would instead involve shorter missions with gaps, which she suggested would be an interim solution while companies developed the capabilities for permanently crewed stations. “We know that our partners are going to evolve,” she said. “We didn’t build the space station overnight and they won’t either, so they will have limited capabilities to start with.” Gatens offered a similar assessment at the briefing. “Do we need continuous heartbeat to achieve our objectives, or could we live with something like a crew-tended capability and maybe evolve to a continuous heartbeat?” she asked. “Do we need continuous heartbeat to achieve our objectives, or could we live with something like a crew-tended capability and maybe evolve to a continuous heartbeat?” Gatens asked. Melroy suggested she was leaning towards the more traditional “continuous heartbeat” approach since it was also needed to support providers of commercial crew and cargo providers, who might struggle if flights to crew-tended stations are less frequent than to stations that are permanently crewed. “It doesn’t matter if you have a space station if there’s no way to get there,” she noted. What was less clear from the discussion, though, is what would happen if NASA adopted the continuous capability option, at least temporarily. What would it mean for the business cases of commercial space stations, as well as when and how—or even if—would NASA shift to the continuous heartbeat approach. Answering those questions will be important not just for NASA’s strategy but also for the business plans of the companies that are relying on NASA to be an anchor customer for the commercial stations they seek to develop. Jeff Foust (jeff@thespacereview.com) is the editor and publisher of The Space Review, and a senior staff writer with SpaceNews. He also operates the Spacetoday.net web site. Views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone.

When Do We Deorbit a Satellite-Part 2

illustration NASA’s Earth Fleet missions (blue circle) in the 2020 Senior Review (credit: NASA) Weighing overall societal benefit: Case studies on deciding when to deorbit satellites (part 2) by Marissa Herron Monday, October 28, 2024 Bookmark and Share [Editor’s Note: Part 1 was published last week.] NASA’s Senior rReview process Each of NASA’s Science Mission Directorate (SMD) Division’s pursue a Senior Review process. This process considers whether or not to continue the operations of ongoing missions that have reached the end of their primary mission. The process is done in response to the NASA Authorization Act, which requires biennial reviews of each of SMD’s divisions “to assess the cost and benefits of extending missions that have exceeded their planned operational lives.” The results of the Senior Review are publicly available and describe the parameters considered and the reasoning for the decisions concluded upon. As is the intent, the Senior Review process focuses on the scientific contribution, or the public good, against budget constraints, but not ODMSP compliance. The Senior Review process of the Earth Sciences missions is available on NASA’s website. The Review Panel considers “…the scientific performance of each mission and the continued relevance of each mission to the NASA Science Strategic Plan. Performance factors include scientific merit, national needs, the technical status of the mission, and budget efficiency. Missions that pass the senior review process may then be extended beyond their primary operational phase into an extended operational phase.” Panel members can consist of “respected members of the science and academic communities and may include NASA employees not affiliated with the projects under review and representatives from other Federal, state, and nongovernmental organizations that use NASA data products for operational purposes.” A flow chart describing the overall process for the 2020 review demonstrates the review process (for the Earth Sciences Division). illustration The 2020 Earth Science Division (ESD) Senior Review Kickoff presentation (below) provides a summary description for each of the above four parameters, or evaluation criteria, considered: scientific merit, national need, technical status, and budget constraints. The “Science” criterion evaluates each mission against its relevance to the latest Decadal Survey, which is the 2017 Survey for Earth Science. This criterion also assesses the quality of the data products, particularly the potential impacts that may occur during mission extension. Scientists value the consistency of a dataset and the long-term value that dataset can contribute to research. With these values in mind, the potential impacts of sensor or platform degradation during mission extension are carefully considered. illustration When considering the data products of each mission, the panel also considers how and by whom the data is being used. The table below (also from the 2020 ESD Senior Review) considers the various governmental and non-governmental entities that use each mission. The some-, high-, and very high-utility grades are represented by the purple, blue, and green colors, respectively. illustration Terra and Aqua rank highly amongst all of the entities listed. The US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) uses Terra for land cover and fire applications. The US Geological Survey (USGS) uses Terra for the mapping of minerals and volcanic hazards. Other entities use Terra data to assess the aerosol emissions, sea ice analysis, monitoring fire growth and fire detection, agricultural changes, carbon monoxide trends, and more. Aqua contributes data to weather prediction models, environmental health applications, monitoring of drought conditions, ice analyses, snow cover products, croplands for food security, water use assessments, drought studies, and natural resource assessments. The widespread use of these missions demonstrates great utility and continued contribution to the public, particularly when remembering that the data is provided as part of a free and open data policy. What happens when a mission is recommended for extension that will lead to non-compliance with ODMSP? The remaining two evaluation criteria, technical status and budget, consider the life expectancy of a mission. This assesses how the satellite hardware is performing, as well as the current and predicted health of the mission. The budget necessary to continue operating the mission and the proportion of the budget available is further evaluated. The panel’s summarized assessment of these evaluation criteria for each mission considered during the 2020 review are summarized below. The panel recommended each of the missions for extension. Their scientific merit and relevance to the decadal survey were deemed appropriate for continued operations. illustration As is the intent, the Senior Review process focuses on the scientific contribution, or the public good, against budget constraints. The Senior Review process does not appear to address Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices (ODMSP) compliance; however, these details are evaluated as part of the waiver process, if applicable. What happens when a mission is recommended for extension that will lead to non-compliance with ODMSP? The existing process appears to prioritize the continued benefit of the public good (the science data) over the concerns for ODMSP non-compliance. To be fair, NASA carefully assesses all options to compliance and/or minimizing the risk associated with non-compliance. The TRMM mission is a good example of the consideration of the public good against a higher reentry risk. The value of the contribution was considered greater than the increased risk associated with an uncontrolled reentry. Alternative approaches The 2021 NASA IG Report expressed concern over the Terra and QuikSCAT missions due to their high mass, extended time in orbit, and explosive concerns. The report indicates that although NASA has done well with debris mitigation efforts, but the agency could benefit from alternative approaches such as debris removal. At present, NASA’s satellites are built to minimize the amount of debris that survives reentry. This approach opens the opportunity for uncontrolled reentries, thereby reducing the dependency upon controlled reentries and valuable fuel resources. The remaining fuel can be used for on orbit collision avoidance maneuvers and mission extension. NASA may benefit from additional approaches to ODMSP compliance, such as drag deployment devices or active debris removal (ADR). Drag deployment devices are mechanical methods that alter the exposed cross section of the satellite to the velocity vector. In other words, these devices change the shape of the satellite such that more drag is experienced causing the satellite’s orbit to decay faster. This approach is effective in LEO where a small amount of atmospheric drag remains. The risk of these deployment devices is accidental deployment. A premature deployment of a drag device is ultimately mission ending, so implementation of these devices will need to ensure reliability of the device and a willingness (or incentive) to accept the risk. The public good benefits of a government satellite will continue to challenge the 25-year disposal rule. ADR refers to the use of a satellite that intentionally removes defunct satellites from orbit. ADR has been discussed for decades with many creative concepts considered. The technology development is not the reason for lack of implementation. Instead, the cost of access to space remains high. Additionally, the uncertainties that come with deploying a new technology create additional concerns. For example, what if the ADR device unintentionally damages the target satellite? This would create more debris in orbit; potentially small, untrackable debris that can prematurely end the missions of nearby satellites. When ADR is eventually employed, the risks of both the new technology and the target satellite will need to be considered. At present, these risks and uncertainties create a disincentive to spending limited resources on removing defunct satellites as opposed to building new satellites for the science community. Future Studies Future exploratory efforts could include a review of other government agency satellites, such as NOAA, USGS, and DoD. These reviews could assess the passivation aspect of ODMSP and discuss the challenges of passivation. Consideration of the NOAA satellites that experienced multiple explosions of their defunct satellites due to battery issues can contribute to this study. Similarly, commercial and international satellites could also be reviewed for the ability to meet ODMSP compliance and the obstacles they also encounter. The cost of mitigation efforts in the design phase and the cost of operations could be compared to the cost of active debris removal missions, or even the cost of satellite servicing and refueling missions. Northrop Grumman completed two privately funded satellite servicing missions in 2020. These efforts were in GEO (not LEO), where a designated disposal orbit is used since atmospheric decay is not an option. What satellite servicing business cases exist? Could these business cases support satellite operations and also encourage sustainment of the environment? Could government agencies benefit from satellite servicing to extend the mission of a valuable satellite until a replacement is on orbit, and then properly dispose of the satellite at end of mission? Launch vehicle debris is an often overlooked topic. A study of the mass, location, and time in orbit may reveal new opportunities for debris mitigation. Where and how much debris is left in orbit with each launch? How long does this debris last and whom does the debris impact? Can launch vehicles be upgraded to reduce the amount of debris released and at what cost? Conclusion The public good benefits of a government satellite will continue to challenge the 25-year disposal rule. Disposal, or debris removal, technologies exist. What remains to be seen is the incentivized application of these debris removal technologies. This is an area where the commercial sector, under regulatory incentivization, can demonstrate regular application of debris removal capabilities that potentially leads to services. Commercial satellites are typically not considered public goods and the benefit of a continued mission is done for profitable purposes. Regulatory incentivization could include reducing the disposal timeframe or creative approaches that support debris removal service business cases. Astroscale, for example, developed a business case on the anticipated failure of satellites in large constellations, such as Starlink and OneWeb. This company is now partnering with the New Zealand government for debris removal and the UK government to study potential debris removal targets. The private sector and international governments appear to be taking the lead in debris removal (and related satellite servicing) services. In 2021, the Space Force announced the Orbital Prime program, which is an effort to incentivize the development of on orbit servicing, assembly, and manufacturing (OSAM) services. These combined efforts appear to be headed in a direction that encourages the sustainability of the orbital environment. Disclaimer: the views expressed in this paper are solely those of the authors, not of NASA or of the Federal Government. Dr. Marissa Herron is currently a Senior Space Policy Analyst with NASA. She previously served as the Program Executive for the Sustainable Land Imaging (Landsat) Program. She has over 20 years of experience as a NASA Aerospace Engineer in space situational awareness, mission operations, and flight dynamics analysis for human spaceflight and robotic missions.

Book Review-Infinite Cosmos

book cover Review: Infinite Cosmos by Jeff Foust Monday, October 28, 2024 Bookmark and Share Infinite Cosmos: Visions From the James Webb Space Telescope by Ethan Siegel National Geographic, 2024 hardcover, 224 pp., illus. ISBN 978-1-4262-2382-2 US50.00 Out of sight, out of mind. For more than two decades, development of the James Webb Space Telescope dominated discussions and debate about space-based astronomy and—particularly given its cost and schedule challenges—management of big NASA programs. But with its successful launch at the end of 2021 and beginning of science operations in mid-2022 from its location 1.5 million kilometers away, it has faded somewhat into the background. It is, of course, still delivering tremendous amounts of data and a regular set of public image releases, but with only modest attention and publicity. That examination of the science of JWST, about half of the book, is where Infinite Cosmos excels. Infinite Cosmos is a reminder of why JWST was worth all that effort getting it into space. The large-format book, written by astrophysicist Ethan Siegel, is primarily a collection of images of JWST during its development and launch, and from JWST after it started its long-anticipated science observations in 2022. The latter includes images showing the telescope’s contributions in fields from planetary astronomy to cosmology. This is not the first book to study JWST in images: Inside the Star Factory, published last year, used photographs to chronicle the development of the telescope (see “Review: Inside the Star Factory”, The Space Review, January 2, 2024). But while that book focused on JWST’s development, Infinite Cosmos balances that with the science it is performing, explaining what JWST can do that other telescopes cannot (such as side-by-side comparisons of Hubble and JWST images of the same objects), and how it is making discoveries like distant galaxies from the very early universe. That examination of the science of JWST, about half of the book, is where Infinite Cosmos excels. The first half, covering development, launch, and commissioning, is fine, but falls short of the level of detail of Inside the Star Factory. Notably, the examination of JWST’s development in this new book feels a little airbrushed: there are almost no references to the technical and programmatic problems developing JWST, or its threats of cancellation amidst delays and budget overruns, or even the controversy over the name itself. A reader not otherwise familiar with those issues would come away from the book with no idea of the problems and near-death experiences the telescope had in its development. Those problems have been largely forgotten in general as JWST has exceeded scientific expectations in the last two-plus years. JWST is pleasing scientists and the general public alike, the latter with images like those in the pages of this book. JWST has enough fuel on board to operate at the Earth-Sun L-2 point for another two decades or more, around which time NASA may be ready to launch its next giant space telescope the Habitable Worlds Observatory—provided it can navigate the technical and other challenges it will face, like JWST did. Jeff Foust (jeff@thespacereview.com) is the editor and publisher of The Space Review, and a senior staff writer with SpaceNews. He also operates the Spacetoday.net web site. Views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone.

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When Deciding When To Deorbit A Sattelite

illustration NASA’s EO-1 is an example of a mission that will not comply with guidelines for deorbiting spacecraft within 25 years of the end of their lives. (credit: NASA) Weighing overall societal benefit: Case studies on deciding when to deorbit satellites (part 1) by Marissa Herron Monday, October 21, 2024 Bookmark and Share This paper was inspired by the 2019 Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices (ODMSP) update and, in particular, the enthusiastic debate surrounding the disposal rule. The programmatic and societal perspectives that NASA frequently encounters were not included in the discussions. Programmatic impacts are most simply described as the technical, cost, and schedule impacts, but do not immediately convey the unintended consequences. For example, mandating propulsive capabilities could significantly increase the costs of small satellites and severely challenge the continuation of science programs, or broader societal benefits from a satellite's data could justify an extended lifetime. This paper does not state a recommendation on the disposal rule, but instead seeks to encourage additional perspectives from which to design future disposal rules. What is ODMSP? The Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices (ODMSP) were first established in 2001 and updated in 2019. These standard practices are intended to apply “...guidelines for USG activities…” and serve as a “reference.... for other domestic and international operators .” What is the “25-year rule”? The “25-year rule” refers simply to the removal of an object from orbit within 25 years of mission completion. The 25-year rule was introduced in the 1990s in an effort to limit the growth of debris in Low Earth Orbit (LEO). The 2010 United Nations Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UN COPUOS), in a similar spirit, calls for the limitation of a long-term presence of defunct spacecraft and rocket bodies in LEO, but does not explicitly identify the number of years. The June 2021 Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) also specifies disposal within 25 years. A slightly more detailed look at the ODMSP for postmission disposal, or the disposal of a spacecraft following the completion of the mission, is shown in the graphic below. The original 2001 version and the updated 2019 version is shown graphically for comparison. Note that the figure is only referring to the postmission disposal aspects of the ODMSP and not the passivation, large constellation, or other objectives within the ODMSP. illustration Comparison of the 2001 and 2019 ODMSP rules. When considering postmission disposal, there are three major aspects: Dispose of the spacecraft within 25 years of mission completion, If atmospheric reentry is the disposal method, then ensure the human casualty risk (or risk to the public) is less than 1 in 10,000, and Implement a disposal method with a probability of success greater than 90%. Item one inherently refers to passivating the spacecraft such that batteries and energy sources are drained to minimize explosion potential. Ideally, a spacecraft will maintain the ability to do collision avoidance maneuvers and get as low as possible before passivation. The lower a spacecraft is in LEO, the more drag the spacecraft will experience which helps speed up an atmospheric decay disposal. Once the spacecraft runs out of fuel, and thus, the ability to perform collision avoidance maneuvers, the spacecraft is passivated and no longer operational. At this point, the spacecraft should be in an orbit such that the atmospheric disposal option takes no more than 25 years. (This discussion refers to LEO spacecraft, not GEO. The latter maneuver to a disposal orbit above GEO,) Mandating propulsive capabilities could significantly increase the costs of small satellites and severely challenge the continuation of science programs, or broader societal benefits from a satellite's data could justify an extended lifetime. Item number two involves a survivability analysis of the spacecraft components and design prior to launch. This can be accomplished using the ODPO’s Debris Assessment Software or other means to demonstrate the spacecraft components will adequately break up and disintegrate during reentry. The thermal ablative properties of materials used to build the spacecraft are a primary driver for survivability. Those items that do survive reentry are considered in the calculation of the human casualty risk. Item three refers to the use of a proven and reliable method of disposal to ensure the disposal process does not experience problems in the process of disposing of the spacecraft. In other words, an operator does not want to accidentally abandon a spacecraft in a populated orbit due to the failure of the disposal system. Who was involved in the creation of these standards and guidelines? The UN COPUOS consists of membership from several spacefaring and non-spacefaring nations. The IADC membership includes international governmental space agencies . The 2019 update of the ODMSP was accomplished in response to Space Policy Directive-3. The update was led by NASA and supported by relevant government agencies, including regulatory agencies. The higher-level UN COPUOS guidelines, Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, were informed by the more technical IADC guidelines with the intent of achieving global consensus. The IADC guidelines (UN A/AC.105/C.1/L.260. Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee space debris mitigation guidelines) were informed by the ODMSP and a number of other resources. What is the effectiveness of the 25-year rule? Why 25-years? The effectiveness of the 25-year rule is assessed (see figure below) for objects in LEO greater than 10 centimeters, a 90% postmission disposal (PMD) success rate, and simulated future explosions. The results presented below are based on a Monte Carlo analysis using the NASA LEGEND tool. Each curve presented below represents the average of 100 Monte Carlo runs. LEGEND models debris as small as one millimeter and is capable of both historical analysis and future projections. The historical simulations are used to validate the model and produce accurate future projections. Averages are used due to uncertainties in parameters such as future launch traffic, solar activity, explosions, collisions, etc. Launch traffic can change dramatically due to large constellations. Solar activity can influence the drag experienced by an object in LEO. Explosions can occur to improperly passivated spacecraft and manufacturing defects. Defunct satellites and/or debris further create collision opportunities. illustration Effects of deorbit lifetimes and success rates. The above figure provides varying levels of mitigation. As expected, no mitigation produces a significant projected increase to the number of objects in LEO over time. With increasing levels of mitigation (or shorter rules), the projected increase in the number of objects in LEO decreases. The relationship between the different simulated rules does not appear to be linear with the number of objects projected. A 2014 IADC study, using the DAMAGE model, concurred with the ODMSP 25-year rule. The IADC study cited that “very short times would involve a substantial increase in the de-orbit propellant requirement.” Both the IADC and ODMSP agreed that 25 years is a maximum timeframe and encouraged proactive steps by the satellite operator to pursue a PMD timeframe that is better than the 25-year rule. They both believed that 25 years was an adequate compromise between high mission cost for a short lifetime disposal (and, thus, effective PMD policy) and a low mission cost for a long lifetime (which increases collision risks). Alternative opinions on the 25-year rule The 2019 ODMSP update was not without controversy or disappointment. There were some opinions that the 25-year rule should be reduced to a 5-year rule. Keep in mind that the ODMSP are intended for government entities but have been globally recognized (albeit in a high level, qualitative form) and have also informed the development of regulations for commercial spacecraft licenses. The latter is a key piece to consider and reflects the intent of SPD-3’s direction to update the ODMSP to “promote efficient and effective space safety practices with U.S. industry and internationally. ” Whether the disposal time frame is best set at 5 or 25 years remains a topic of debate and perspectives. As an alternative and proactive effort, a group of non-governmental entities, called the Space Safety Coalition, voluntarily stated their intent to strive for a five-year disposal timeframe for those spacecraft with chemical or electric propulsion. The group also raised the probability of successful disposal from 90% to 95%. Whether the disposal time frame is best set at 5 or 25 years remains a topic of debate and perspectives. Intuitively, five years seems like the logical choice if your only concern is the sustainability of the space environment. However, if you are considering mission requirements and the cost to build to stricter requirements, then operators may reconsider whether or not to build a satellite. If your concern is the growing popularity of large constellations (as opposed to one or two satellites), then separate requirements can be applied to the large constellations. This is the approach the updated ODMSP pursued in response to SPD-3’s direct requirement to address large constellations. (Although NASA led the ODMSP update, NASA does not have experience building or operating large constellations. The large constellation focus was included in the ODMSP update, because the ODMSP is historically used by the FCC to regulate non-governmental satellites. Thus, although the ODMSP only applies to governmental satellites, the update was created with the understanding that the regulatory agencies would likely implement the updated ODMSP as license requirements for non-governmental satellites.) Can we do better than 25 years? A shorter disposal timeframe will likely encourage future technologies. Under present-day technology, satellites will have shorter operational lifetimes if they use their fuel for a faster disposal. This will result in more maneuvering (versus a gradual decay) out of orbit. The reduced operational time in orbit could lead to more replenishment of satellites and, thus, increased launch activity. The increased traffic going into and out of orbit may involve more spacecraft maneuvering which can challenge current collision avoidance capabilities and operators. This suggests the need for more sensors (in orbit and ground) with the goal towards achieving continuous custody. This also suggests the need for automation and efficiency to reduce the manual effort involved with mitigating close approaches. Additionally, the operator community will need to work together to develop effective and efficient means of communication and coordination for the increased congestion in orbit. This series of steps are just some of the advances and maturation that could occur with a push towards shorter disposal timeframes. The ideal approach is for a spacecraft to be removed immediately upon mission end so as to minimize the risk of collisions and explosions. However, the tradeoffs to these advances are likely in the form of increased cost, which may disincentivize the development of some satellites. What remains unclear, and is a potential future area of study, are the mission requirement and cost implications to pursuing the ideal approach. How might a higher standard impact future satellite operators and launch vehicle development? Could new technologies and approaches be developed in response? For both the launch vehicle and the spacecraft there will be cost implications. A 2021 paper cited a list of top 50 most concerning objects in LEO. This list of concerning objects includes 39 rocket bodies, which are derelict objects in an uncontrolled state with high mass. The primary factors used to create the list were “mass, encounter rates, orbital lifetime, and proximity to operational satellites.” (It is worth noting is that “concerning” objects can also include small, untrackable debris. Differing perspectives exist on whether high mass, trackable objects that could produce a lot of debris are more concerning than mission ending, untrackable debris. The ability to track an object creates an opportunity to avoid the object and, thus, reduce collision consequences to impacted satellites and the environment. However, high mass objects could result in the creation of more debris, whether trackable or not. This would have a significant impact on the environment. Both perspectives have merit and pursue the same goal of a sustainable environment. Ultimately, measurement of both parameters, trackability and mass, will present a more accurate assessment of the environment.) NASA’s reputation for technical rigor presents an opportunity to study the individual cases without concern for neglect of details or a lack of competence in the assessments leading to decision making. Legacy launch vehicles release debris in orbit and are estimated to cost $300–500 million to upgrade. Drag devices may allow spacecraft to maximize use of their fuel while maintaining reasonable decay time frames in LEO. These devices will need to be high reliability, otherwise they risk a mission ending failure due to accidental deployment. A better understanding of the impacts and consequences may educate opinions on the appropriate balance for disposal timeframes. Below is a review of multiple NASA spacecraft that were decommissioned while in Earth orbit. NASA spacecraft were chosen for the large amount of publicly available information, avoiding the need for concern over proprietary or otherwise sensitive information that might occur with commercial or defense spacecraft. Furthermore, NASA’s reputation for technical rigor presents an opportunity to study the individual cases without concern for neglect of details or a lack of competence in the assessments leading to decision making. The scope of this effort is spacecraft in LEO. The sample of case studies will allow the observation of any patterns between spacecraft, but also permit the clarification of individual findings regarding any unique aspects. The research question under consideration is “What are the obstacles to ODMSP compliance?” This explanatory study will assess the decision making process, the decisions made, and the effect of those decisions. illustration Image source: NASA Case Study: EO-1 NASA’s Earth Observing-1 (or EO-1) satellite was launched November 2000 from Vandenberg Air Force Base on a Delta II rocket . In 2011, EO-1 reached “critical fuel levels and suspended orbital maintenance, beginning a slow decline in orbital altitude. A small fuel reserve was used for debris avoidance maneuvers…” Multiple senior review panels assessed the scientific value and availability of funding for operations. The 2011 Senior Review panel specifically cited EO-1’s instruments as providing a “gap-fill between Landsat 7 and LDCM (Landsat 8), gap-fill for ASTER SWIR bands ” and “prototyping for HyspIRI.” The satellite was in good health and “predicted to function through 2015.” These parameters ultimately led to a decommissioning date in late 2016 due to the degraded orbit reducing the value of the science. On March 30, 2017, EO-1 was “transitioned into a permanently safed configuration with fully emptied propellant tanks and drained batteries. NASA forecasts the satellite’s re-entry for 2056…” Below is a schedule of tasks leading up to passivation of the spacecraft: illustration Image source: NASA How does this relate to the postmission disposal practices? EO-1 will remain in LEO for greater than 25 years beyond mission completion. At the time of design and launch, the solar activity estimates predicted an orbit decay design within the 25 years of postmission completion. However, updated solar cycle information increased the time frame originally estimated. This information was not known until well into the lifetime of the spacecraft. Estimating the impact of drag (which is influenced by solar activity) on a LEO satellite is part of the design process—something which typically occurs decades in advance of the satellite disposal. In this situation, the updated estimates meant that the satellite would experience less drag than originally expected at the time of design and will remain in orbit longer. Once the new estimate of the decay time frame was known, nothing could be done to accelerate the satellite’s demise. Instead, NASA made the most of the situation by continuing operations for as long as possible. This allowed more science data to be collected and accommodated the need for any collision avoidance maneuvers until passivated. What’s the takeaway from this case study? Space weather is challenging to predict, especially far into the future. Considering the lengthy design, build, and fly process for a satellite, the space weather predictions will have limited accuracy in the crucial design phase. The design of a maneuverable (propulsive) satellite involves estimating the fuel necessary to maintain orbit and mission (i.e. science) location, as well as the fuel reserve necessary for postmission disposal. In other words, the low atmospheric drag experienced in LEO requires the occasional reboost of the satellite to maintain the stringent requirements for science needs. Fuel for collision avoidance maneuvers must also be estimated for the lifetime of the satellite. All of these fuel estimates are based on predicted solar activity levels that can influence the amount of drag experienced by each object in LEO. Further complicating the situation is the satellite area exposed along the velocity vector influences the amount of drag each object experiences. This means that different objects can experience different levels of drag. As our understanding of space weather improves, the process of designing a satellite and estimating lifetimes will also improve. illustration Image source: NASA Case Study: TRMM The Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission (TRMM) was launched in November 1997 from Tanegashima Island on NASDA’s H-II rocket. The TRMM mission was known early on to be a valuable data source for disaster efforts. "The data were being heavily used for tropical cyclone monitoring and forecasting," said TRMM Project Scientist Scott Braun at Goddard. "It was being used for flood detection and monitoring. It was also used for drought monitoring, disease monitoring — where diseases are most prevalent in areas of heavy precipitation and flooding.” As a result of the valuable social contribution from the TRMM spacecraft, NASA approved a mission extension in 2001. The mission extension allowed for the orbit to be raised slightly to 402.5 kilometers. This orbit allowed the mission to continue, while minimizing fuel consumption, and extending the mission. In 2005, NASA again reviewed the status of the TRMM mission and determined the spacecraft was healthy, the mission continued to be a valuable social contribution, and operating costs were adequate. The 2005 review resulted in another mission extension until the satellite ran out of fuel. “Rationale was that TRMM, through its hurricane tracking and other capabilities, had the potential to save lives, out-weighing the risk of human casualty from uncontrolled reentry.” As part of the 2005 review, TRMM’s ODMSP compliance was considered. TRMM was in a low 350-kilometer circular orbit where atmospheric drag requires regular reboosts. At this orbit, the spacecraft was low enough to minimize on orbit collision risk. However, the use of the fuel for mission extension meant that an uncontrolled (versus controlled) reentry was necessary. The TRMM spacecraft had a dry mass of 2,630 kilograms and was estimated to have 12 pieces (with a total mass of 112 kilograms) survive reentry to the surface of the Earth. The human casualty risk was estimated as 1 in 4,200, which is slightly higher than the ODMSP risk. NASA decided to waive the controlled reentry requirement in favor of extending the mission and utilizing an uncontrolled reentry. The issue here was not the amount of time the satellite would take to decay from orbit. At such a low altitude, atmospheric drag provides a natural cleansing process and (solar activity withstanding) will remove the satellite from orbit within a reasonable period of time. In the case of TRMM, NASA needed to consider the risk of an uncontrolled reentry against that of mission extension. The replacement satellite for TRMM was the Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) mission which was planned to launch in 2010 (at the time of analysis) and ultimately launched in 2014. Thus, NASA was considering the human casualty risk of an uncontrolled reentry against that of the lives saved from TRMM’s data (and future GPM data) for disaster support. “Rationale was that TRMM, through its hurricane tracking and other capabilities, had the potential to save lives, out-weighing the risk of human casualty from uncontrolled reentry.” illustration TRMM represents a situation where the science data provided a social value that was deemed greater than the level of risk exceeding the ODMSP. As the orbit decayed, the satellite’s reentry was closely monitored. TRMM ultimately reentered in June 2015 without any issue. illustration Image source: NASA Case Study: Van Allen Probes NASA’s Van Allen Probes were launched in August 2012 from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station . This unique mission consists of two satellites in highly elliptical Earth orbits exploring the Van Allen radiation belts. The mission was extended in 2017 and then ended operations in 2019 . In February 2019, shortly before decommissioning, the satellites executed a well-coordinated perigee-lowering campaign intended to decay the orbit of the satellites within 15 years of decommissioning. The campaign was designed around the limited thruster performance capability and consisted of a series of maneuvers over two weeks. Although complying with the 25-year postmission disposal rule, a 2021 NASA inspector general report cites this mission as being an explosive risk due to the inability to disconnect and drain the battery sources. “Originally, the mission planned to reserve sufficient fuel in order to lower the spacecraft to an orbit that would enable reentry within 5 months and in which the spacecraft could be reoriented so that its solar arrays would be away from the Sun preventing recharging of the batteries. However, the subsequent mission extension led to insufficient fuel to lower the spacecraft’s orbit per the original plan and disconnect the solar array from the battery. Instead, the batteries will continue to recharge which could eventually result in an explosion and creation of additional orbital debris. ” This situation highlights how both postmission disposal and passivation contribute a challenging, but valuable role to sustainment of the orbital environment. illustration Image source: NASA Case Study: Terra The Terra mission was launched December 1999 on an Atlas-Centaur IIAS launch vehicle from Vandenberg Air Force Base. Terra is a flagship mission that is currently flying an extended mission due to the highly desirable contribution of the mission’s science data (discussed below in the Senior Review section). In 2020, Terra performed its last inclination adjust maneuver ; a stationkeeping maneuver that maintains the satellites mean local time equatorial crossing (for science data quality). The mission orbit was lowered in 2022 to reduce potential close approaches with other satellites in the Earth Sciences Constellation . Maneuvers will continue for the purpose of avoiding debris. Once all of the fuel is expended, the satellite will passivate and continue an orbital decay to an uncontrolled reentry. The predominant challenge appears to be the use of limited fuel capacity for the continuation of science versus lowering the orbit of the satellite for disposal and reentry. A 2021 NASA inspector general report expressed concern over the Terra spacecraft’s ODMSP compliance indicating the “…Terra spacecraft, a 10,000 pound satellite observatory … is scheduled to be decommissioned in 2026. Terra will not be able to deorbit within 25 years, its batteries cannot be disconnected, and the propellant system cannot be depressurized, increasing the possibility for a debris-generating explosive event. Furthermore, Terra is expected to be in orbit for 50 years after the end of its mission, also increasing the likelihood of collision with other objects in orbit.” The public information available on Terra decommissioning dates varies and suggests uncertainty in orbital lifetime estimates. A variety of presentations exist that indicate many options were considered for both the ODMSP compliance and the maximization of science. Studies were accomplished to estimate risk during uncontrolled reentry, fuel usage, time remaining on orbit, etc. These presentations demonstrate the dynamic nature of operations and the challenges in precisely estimating time on orbit. Terra’s significant contributions resulted in another mission extension from the 2020 Earth Science Senior Review. The review highlighted the uncertainties surrounding Terra’s time on orbit and encouraged more deliberate analysis of the predicted orbit and impacts to science. illustration Image source: NASA Case Study: QuikSCAT NASA’s Quick Scatterometer (QuikSCAT) satellite was launched June 1999 on a Titan II vehicle from Vandenberg Air Force Base. A 2011 Earth Science Senior Review Panel extended the QuikSCAT mission due to the strong national interest of the science data and fulfillment of NASA’s ocean winds science objectives . The panel did note concerns about the spacecraft’s technical health stating “the QuikSCAT spacecraft is approaching 12 years in operation (design life was three years), has suffered several faults and degraded components, and seems unlikely to survive the next several years without incurring a mission-ending failure. There is no trending data or component health analysis presented to support the assertion that this 12-year old spacecraft is capable of operating through a 2-year mission extension. There is a risk that the spacecraft will be unable to achieve the planned decommissioning orbit.” However, the addendum (included in the report) indicated the benefits outweighed the risks: “Although the QuikSCAT spacecraft has suffered several faults and degraded components (other than scatterometer's antenna spin mechanism) and may incur a mission-ending failure, it is also probable that the spacecraft can operated at this level for the next 2 years; therefore the Senior Review panel feels that this is a worthwhile risk.” QuikSCAT continued to operate until its decommissioning in 2018 , many years after the difficult decision made by the 2011 Earth Science Senior Review Panel. According to the 2021 NASA inspector general report, the spacecraft will significantly exceed the 25-year disposal timeframe and is not fully passivated. Many of the satellites studied were launched shortly before the establishment of ODMSP. However, NASA continues to consider the ODMSP and to pursue efforts to minimize risks to the sustainment of the orbital environment. The predominant challenge appears to be the use of limited fuel capacity for the continuation of science versus lowering the orbit of the satellite for disposal and reentry. A look at the Senior Review process, in the second part of this essay, can provide insight into the assessment of a mission’s science value and the decision of whether to extend a mission. Disclaimer: the views expressed in this paper are solely those of the authors, not of NASA or of the Federal Government. Dr. Marissa Herron is currently a Senior Space Policy Analyst with NASA. She previously served as the Program Executive for the Sustainable Land Imaging (Landsat) Program. She has over 20 years of experience as a NASA Aerospace Engineer in space situational awareness, mission operations, and flight dynamics analysis for human spaceflight and robotic missions.