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The Backfire Bomber Controversy

Backfire The Backfire can carry internal and external bombs, as well as cruise missiles, including anti-ship missiles. (credit: Dmitry Terekhov Wikimedia Commons) The Backfire bomber controversy by Dwayne A. Day Monday, December 22, 2025 On June 1, 2025, Ukrainian drones launched as part of Operation Spider’s Web destroyed at least four Tu-22M Backfire bombers and damaged at least one more during an attack at Belaya Air Base near Irkutsk. Drone video footage released later showed the swing-wing aircraft out in the open, burning, and within a day, satellite imagery revealed the wreckage of the medium-range bombers. Backfire A Backfire bomber in Russia about to be struck by a Ukrainian drone in June 2025. At least four Backfires were destroyed during the attack, and two others damaged. (credit: Wikimedia Commons) Backfire Backfire Backfire Satellite images from Maxar and Planet showing destroyed Backfire bombers. The exact number of Backfires remaining in the Russian air force is not publicly known, but is only a few dozen, probably less than 60. Approximately ten have been destroyed in the war against Ukraine. (credit: Maxar and Planet) The Backfire has been in service for many years, and more than 50 years ago, satellite photos of the bombers helped kick off a dispute within the US intelligence community. The controversy raged for years and had international implications, one of many times that CIA and military intelligence analysts clashed over the interpretation of intelligence data. The dispute was how much fuel the bomber could carry, which determined how far it could fly, and therefore whether it was a tactical or strategic bomber and subject to an international arms limitation treaty. American satellites played a major role in gathering data on the Backfire throughout the 1970s as this controversy raged. Like the earlier bomber and missile gaps of the late 1950s, as well as the 1960s disputes over the Soviet SA-5 surface-to-air missile, CIA analysts argued one set of data, whereas military officials took a far more alarmist position. Backfire The Tu-22M Backfire was a medium-range bomber first flown in the late 1960s and entered production in the 1970s. The CIA and USAF argued over the range of the bomber. It is still in service today, although the last one was built over 30 years ago. (credit: Alexander Beltyukov Wikimedia Commons) KAZAN-A Although not as famous in the West as the MiG-21, MiG-25 Foxbat, or MiG-29, the Backfire is one of the better known Soviet bombers, primarily due to the late Tom Clancy. Clancy’s novel Red Storm Rising, about a theoretical World War III, featured a notorious chapter, “The Dance of the Vampires,” where the Soviet air force undertook a clever raid on the US Navy involving Backfires, among other planes, and inflicted significant damage. In the 2002 movie The Sum of All Fears, based on a Clancy novel, a flight of Backfires causes major damage to the aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis, although Clancy said that the Navy only agreed to allow the ship to be filmed if the Backfires didn’t sink it in the movie. Backfire Backfire bombers preparing for takeoff. The Soviet Union built almost 500 Backfire bombers. They were split between medium-range bombing and naval strike roles. (credit: Alexander Beltyukov Wikimedia Commons) Unlike its larger and older brother, the Tu-95 Bear strategic bomber, which is ungainly and has propellers, the Backfire is sleek and dart-like, with swing-wings and engines that burn purple-blue flames—sometimes with a yellow plume from high-sulfur fuel—as it climbs from the runway at full power. The Backfire looks like a badass killer. Backfire The Backfire is impressive from almost any angle. Its two engines operating in afterburner are dramatic. (credit: Andrej Shmatko Wikimedia Commons) Backfire The Backfire is equipped with a tailgun for any adversary dumb enough to get behind the aircraft. (credit: Clemens Vasters Wikimedia Commons) The Tu-22M was developed by the Tupolev Design Bureau starting in the mid-1960s. Although it had the same initial designation as the Tu-22 Blinder medium-range bomber, this was a political ruse. Just as the American military has sometimes built almost entirely new aircraft with only a minor designation change over their predecessor to secure political approval and funding (see, for instance, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet), the Soviet military occasionally did the same. Although it also had swing wings, the Tu-22M was an entirely new aircraft compared to the Blinder. It was designed for two missions: medium-range bombing, and attacking American aircraft carriers. Backfire The Kazan aircraft production facility, seen in this 1972 US reconnaissance satellite photo, was responsible for many Cold War era bombers. Although it is still active today, its production rate is incredibly low. (credit: Harry Stranger) In August 1969, an American reconnaissance satellite spotted a new swing-wing bomber at Kazan Airframe Plant Gorbunov 22. The National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) designated this bomber as KAZAN-A, and it retained this designation for a couple of years until it gained the NATO designation Backfire. (For clarity, Backfire will be used hereafter.) Backfire The Kazan aircraft production facility where the first Backfire bomber was photographed by an American reconnaissance satellite in the late 1960s. In this 1973 satellite photo, at least one Backfire bomber is visible. (credit: Harry Stranger) In March 1970, a KH-4B CORONA satellite, mission 1109-1, again photographed the Kazan Airframe plant. A mission report indicated that the satellite photos did not reveal any of the bombers at that location or at the Ramenskoye flight test center near Moscow.[1] In June 1970, KH-4B CORONA mission 1111 was more successful: photography from the mission identified the probable third prototype Backfire, at the Kazan Airframe Plant. The other two Backfires were seen at Ramenskoye. Ramenskoye, known to the Russians as Zhukovsky, was the Soviet equivalent to Edwards Air Force Base, the location of flight tests of new military aircraft. Another aircraft was observed at Akhtubinsk flight test center in April 1971. These were all Backfire A models, although intelligence analysts did not know that they would soon see a new model that would result in A and B designations. In satellite photos that followed, the A models were only observed at training airfields, and none were ever observed at operational bases. Only seven were produced, according to an NPIC assessment, and by 1983 all of them were no longer flying and were on static display.[2] Backfire Backfire The Soviet Union's equivalent of Edwards Air Force base was Ramenskoye, outside Moscow. This is where much testing of the Backfire was conducted. In a 1980 U.S. reconnaissance satellite photo (top) several Backfires are visible. But fewer were at the facility in a 1982 satellite photo (bottom), probably because the aircraft was by then in full-scale production and fewer test flights were necessary. (credit: Harry Stranger) In November 1971, an American satellite photographed what was designated the Backfire B at Kazan. It had an increased wingspan and did not have enlarged pods like the Backfire A. These were originally thought to be landing gear pods, but were actually aerodynamic and were removed when it became clear they offered no benefits. In May 1972, a Backfire B was observed at Ramenskoye, and another at Akhtubinsk airfield in September 1972. It was not until April and May 1974 that the Backfire Bs were seen at the training bases of Ryazan/Dyagilevo Airfield and Nikolayev/Kulbakino Airfield[3] Backfire Tu-22M Backfire bombers deployed to Nikolayev airbase in Ukraine in 1980. The deployment of the aircraft to the western USSR was an indication that they were intended for medium-range missions attacking Europe, not strategic missions attacking the United States. This airfield in Ukraine was destroyed by Russia in 2022. (credit: Harry Stranger) A third version, designated the Backfire C, was first identified at Ramenskoye in August 1977 and then spotted at Kazan in April 1978. It had a modified nose and air intakes. The prototype was destroyed by a fire at Ramenskoye. Initial deployment to the training base at Ryazam/Dyagilevo occurred in March 1981.[4] Although the only released American satellite photos of Backfire bombers during this period come from CORONA and later HEXAGON reconnaissance satellites, the planes were almost certainly photographed by the much more powerful GAMBIT satellites. By the mid-1970s, GAMBIT images were providing resolution better than 30 centimeters on the ground, enabling photo-interpreters to make increasingly precise measurements of the objects they photographed such as the fuselage width of bombers. Planes like the Backfire could also be compared to other objects at the airfield, such as aircraft with precisely known dimensions, like the Tu-95 Bear. Based upon these images, and knowledge of aircraft engineering principles, it was possible to calculate how much internal volume of an aircraft would be available to hold fuel, generating an estimate for the maximum amount of fuel that could be carried. Based upon this estimate and assumptions about engine efficiency and flight profiles, it was possible to derive range estimates for the aircraft. But those calculations created controversy. Backfire This 1984 satellite photo shows engine testing of four Backfire bombers, visible where the snow has been blown away. Peak annual production of the bombers was about 30 aircraft per year, and total production was just under 500 aircraft by the time it ceased in the early 1990s. (credit: Harry Stranger) Satellites provided two main types of information about the Backfire during the 1970s—initially providing technical information the plane, and later, indications of how it was being deployed, whether to strategic airfields or to the periphery of Europe. Range estimates Arguments over the range of the Backfire started in 1971 and continued over many years. The issue became more acute by 1973, when the bomber was due to be included in a high-level National Intelligence Estimate. Although there was a range of estimates for how far the Backfire could fly, if the plane was equipped for aerial refueling, it could certainly reach targets within the continental United States.[5] However, unlike the United States Air Force, the Soviet Union had a very limited refueling fleet—not many tankers capable of refueling strategic aircraft. For the early 1970s, several US (and foreign) intelligence organizations generally agreed on the Backfire’s range. But by 1976 the issue had reached a boiling point within the US intelligence community. This was caused by a new, substantially lower, CIA estimate of the Backfire’s maximum range. The key figure who pushed the military’s longer range estimate was Major General George Keegan, the Air Force’s Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Keegan was a hard-core Cold Warrior who, like the fictional General “Buck” Turgidson in Dr. Strangelove, was always smelling a big fat commie rat. As New York Times reporter William Burrows later wrote, “George Keegan worries about the Russians and deeply mistrusts them. But he despises the CIA.”[6] The CIA was about to enrage him. Backfire Major General George Keegan was head of US Air Force Intelligence in the mid-1970s. He clashed with the CIA over many subjects, including the range of the Backfire bomber. He was wrong. (credit: Wikimedia Commons) By 1976, the CIA had engaged a still-classified organization to perform an estimate of the Backfire’s performance based upon the latest intelligence. The CIA had also hired aerospace contractor McDonnell Douglas to perform another analysis, although the contractor may have taken inputs developed by another office and did not generate their own. The CIA estimated that the bomber’s range was 2,222 kilometers (1,200 nautical miles), less than the previous estimate. The military, particularly the Air Force, objected to this conclusion. The CIA’s new range estimate was now substantially lower than previous estimates produced by North American Rockwell, General Dynamics, the Royal Air Force, and the Air Force’s Foreign Technology Division. This greatly annoyed Keegan, who wondered why all the other estimates were consistently higher, while the CIA’s was substantially lower. Keegan then wrote a letter to the CIA.[7] The CIA office responsible for overseeing the new analysis wrote a detailed response to Keegan’s letter. It noted that the previous estimates had all been based upon the same set of assumptions: that most of the available volume was reserved for fuel, the thrust characteristics of the engines were those of an uprated SST engine, and optimum takeoff and cruise aerodynamics applied. Those assumptions were not validated. However, new intelligence information had become available that changed those assumptions. Exactly what that new information was is unclear from the declassified report. However, the security markings on the report indicate that it contained intelligence derived from satellite imagery, as well as communications intelligence. The report also referred to the design of the Backfire’s landing gear, and because the gear would not be visible to satellites, this implies that the CIA had other photos of the aircraft, probably while it was landing or taking off. According to one source, the CIA even had access to flight test telemetry from the Backfire. A recently declassified document indicates that the SAVANT II satellite was collecting aircraft telemetry in early 1971, although it is not clear what kind of aircraft telemetry.[8] Backfire Two SAVANT series signals intelligence satellites were flown by the United States in the late 1970s. SAVANT II reportedly intercepted telemetry signals from Soviet aircraft tests, possibly including early Backfire flights. There is some indication that the US intelligence community had intercepted telemetry from Backfire test flights. (credit: NRO) At times, Keegan’s arguments (obviously developed by his staff) seemed rather esoteric, such as the angle of rotation of the aircraft lifting off the runway and whether it could benefit from ground effect during takeoff. The CIA analysts believed that these issues had little effect upon the plane’s maximum range. Keegan also seemed to be committing one of the cardinal sins of intelligence by conflating capability with intent. Some of his writings argued that because in some circumstances the Backfire could be used strategically, the Soviets would use it strategically, even though there was no evidence of them planning to do so (for instance, by building up their in-flight refueling fleet). An intelligence officer summarized the problem: “The evidence is inconclusive, the range of uncertainties is large, the analytical methodologies involved are exceedingly complex, and the answers one gets are determined to a large extent by the assumptions with which one starts.” Keegan also alleged that the newer Backfire B model had greater range due to its larger wing and elimination of the pods. But the CIA referenced an unpublished NASA study indicating that the larger wing had greater drag, which negated those benefits. He further claimed that an increase in the size of the production plant indicated an increase in Backfire production, but the CIA responded that 20% more floor space at the factory did not automatically mean more bombers—that space could instead be allocated to post-production maintenance of completed aircraft. In August 1976, the Backfire controversy leaked to the press, generating unwanted attention for the CIA. Director of Central Intelligence George H.W. Bush wrote a letter to Brent Scowcroft, President Ford’s national security advisor, explaining the agency’s position and refuting General Keegan’s points.[9] Backfire George Bush was head of the CIA in 1976 when the dispute over the Backfire’s range became public. He agreed to the Team B intelligence exercise, which undercut the CIA's analytical authority. (credit: Wikimedia Commons) By mid-August, Keegan again complained to the CIA about its analysis, and recommended two aerospace executives to participate in an independent assessment of the CIA’s analysis. The CIA accepted this recommendation, but there was clearly animosity between the agency and General Keegan.[10] In response to Keegan’s latest complaint, an intelligence officer wrote an internal memo explaining the controversy. He noted that most of the intelligence community still believed that the Backfire was suited to a peripheral attack role, but that the Air Force was insisting that the Backfire was designed to perform a variety of missions, including intercontinental attack.[11] The aircraft’s overall appearance seemed to indicate that it was designed to perform supersonic dash and low-altitude penetration of heavily-defended areas, hence its swing wings and pointy shape compared to earlier Soviet bombers. The Air Force’s position was in part based upon the assumption that, if the plane flew at subsonic speeds at high altitude, it would have longer range. Also, all Backfire bombers seen up to that point had in-flight refueling probes, supporting the Air Force argument that the plane was intended to fly long distances. If it was staged closer to the United States and flew one-way missions, it could of course travel even further to attack the United States. Backfire Early Backfire bombers were equipped with refueling probes. This became a source of contention between the CIA and the US Air Force. If the plane was refueled, it could reach many targets in the United States. However, there was no indication that the Soviet Union was building up its meager fleet of refueling aircraft to support the Backfire. The Soviet Union, as part of a later arms control agreement, agreed to not equip the Backfire with refueling probes. (credit: Erik Gundersen Wikimedia Commons) It was still difficult to draw conclusions in part because the Backfire had only been in operational service since 1974, making it harder to determine Soviet intentions for the aircraft, although so far it had only been deployed for peripheral and naval strike roles. The intelligence officer, who worked for the US Navy, summarized the problem: “The evidence is inconclusive, the range of uncertainties is large, the analytical methodologies involved are exceedingly complex, and the answers one gets are determined to a large extent by the assumptions with which one starts.”[12] By October 1976, the CIA produced an internal memo explaining the timeline of how it had come to new conclusions about the Backfire, noting that other members of the intelligence community were already aware of the new analysis a year and a half earlier, in April 1975. The Backfire dispute had become public in recent months. The CIA Director had testified in front of Congress about the aircraft’s range several times before the CIA had conducted its reanalysis, and more recently articles appeared in the press alleging that “the intelligence was slanted to support administration policy.” [13] Backfire The range estimates produced by the CIA and other intelligence agencies in the late 1976 National Intelligence Estimate. The Backfire's actual range proved to be near the lower end of the CIA's estimate. (credit: CIA) National Intelligence Estimate NIE 11-3/8-76, produced in December 1976, included key judgments about current developments in Soviet programs. It stated that “Soviet intercontinental striking power would be increased if Backfire bombers were employed against the U.S. The Backfire is well suited to operations against land and sea targets on the Eurasian periphery using a variety of flight profiles, and it has some capability for operations against the U.S. on high-altitude subsonic profiles.” It continued: “The Defense Intelligence Agency, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, estimate that the Backfire has significant capabilities for operations against the U.S. without air-to-air refueling. The Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State estimate that it has marginal capabilities against the U.S. under the same conditions. With air-to-air refueling, the Backfire would have considerably increased capability for intercontinental operations, even in the case of the lowest performance estimate. In addition, the Backfire could be modified in various ways to improve its range.”[14] Backfire Range estimates for several Soviet bombers from the DoD publication Soviet Military Power. Without refueling, the Backfire could not reach much of the United States. The problem was that the Soviet Union did not have many tankers that could refuel a fleet of Backfires. (credit: Department of Defense) “We believe it is likely that Backfires will continue to be assigned to theater and naval missions and—with the exception of DIA, ERDA, Army, and Air Force—we believe it is correspondingly unlikely that they will be assigned to intercontinental missions. If the Soviets decided to assign any substantial number of Backfires to missions against the U.S., they almost certainly would upgrade the performance of the aircraft or deploy a force of compatible new tankers for their support. The Defense Intelligence Agency, the Energy Research and Development Administration, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, believe the available evidence on Backfire employment indicates only that peripheral and naval attack are its current primary missions. Since the Soviets could use the Backfire’s intercontinental capabilities at their initiative, these agencies believe that the Backfire clearly poses a threat to the U.S., even without the deployment of a compatible tanker force or the upgrading of the aircraft’s performance. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, further believes that a portion of the Backfire force will have missions against the contiguous U.S.”[15] The Central Intelligence Agency and State Department calculated the Backfire’s range as 3,525 to 4,150 nautical miles (6,528 to 7,686 kilometers) and therefore not a strategic weapon. The Air Force had determined its range at 5,400 nautical miles (10,001 kilometers), and therefore capable of reaching the continental United States. With refueling, the planes could fly significantly farther. In March 1977, the Director of Central Intelligence was due to appear on the television program “Face the Nation,” and there was the possibility that he might be asked about the Backfire, considering a recent newspaper column in The Washington Star that had raised the issue. The director was advised that the official United States position at the SALT negotiations was that the Backfire was comparable to the Bison heavy bomber and should be counted as a heavy bomber, and the CIA’s position on the revised range estimate had not been made public.[16] Counting bombers and Team B Soviet bombers had been a source of contention in the US intelligence community before. In the mid-1950s a controversy had arisen about how many strategic bombers the Soviet Union had. It took several years, and overflights of Soviet airfields by U-2 reconnaissance planes, before the CIA was able to prove that the numbers had been over-estimated.[17] The Cold War Team B experiment was viewed with alarm by many people within the intelligence community because it established a precedent that if somebody did not like the conclusions that the intelligence analysts were providing, they could simply pick their own panel of experts. Even before the late 1976 National Intelligence Estimate, a larger dispute about Soviet weapons capabilities had started raging inside the intelligence community. In May 1976, President Gerald Ford created what was known as the “Team B” project to appoint a group of outside experts to look at the same data that the CIA was looking at and provide an alternative interpretation. This had resulted from charges that the CIA had consistently underestimated Soviet weapons production. The Team B report was significantly more alarming than the CIA’s conclusions, estimating much greater Soviet weapons production and capabilities. Team B did not do its own estimates of the Backfire range. They simply compared the ranges produced by CIA and USAF. The Team B report had been intended to only be an exercise, but the report was leaked soon after Jimmy Carter became president, and it was used by various people to argue that the Soviet Union was a bigger threat and growing faster than the CIA had been assessing. This was used to justify a bigger US defense buildup. The Cold War Team B experiment was viewed with alarm by many people within the intelligence community because it established a precedent that if somebody did not like the conclusions that the intelligence analysts were providing, they could simply pick their own panel of experts and give them the same data to produce a result more to their liking. It undercut the CIA and made intelligence analysis more vulnerable to political manipulation. In retrospect, Team B’s report was highly inaccurate and the CIA’s estimates proved to be much closer to the reality. For example, Team B predicted that the Soviets would have 500 Backfire bombers by 1984. By 1983, NPIC determined that the Soviets produced 30.5 aircraft per year from July 15, 1982 to July 15, 1983, a production rate that was not high enough to produce hundreds of bombers in a short time.[18] Whereas Team B had predicted 500 Backfires by 1984, the actual number was 235, and just under 500 when production finally ceased in 1993. The numbers, and the range estimates, had increased importance because the United States and Soviet Union by the late 1970s were engaged in arms control limitation talks. If the Backfire was counted as an intercontinental bomber, then the Soviet Union had a much larger bomber force, especially if the United States also included the bombers that were clearly dedicated to naval attack. Ultimately, the two sides reached an agreement that the Backfire would not be counted as an intercontinental bomber as long as the Soviet Union agreed to not equip it for aerial refueling. Deep Black In his 1987 book Deep Black, about the development of American strategic reconnaissance, including then highly secret reconnaissance satellites, William Burrows wrote about the then-retired George Keegan. Keegan was, by his own admission, a hard-liner who had repeatedly warned about Soviet military capabilities and been largely ignored.[19] Keegan had raised the alarm about numerous Soviet strategic developments. Deep Black recounted his concern about vast underground leadership bunkers to enable the Soviet Union to fight and survive a nuclear war. By the late 1970s he was warning about Soviet space-based laser systems. In 1978, after retiring from the Air Force, Keegan appeared on the BBC Panorama program “The Real War in Space” where he warned about Soviet space weapons, and in retired life he was a strident hawk who publicly spoke about Soviet weapons development based upon his five years as head of Air Force intelligence. Keegan’s previous access to top secret intelligence seemingly gave him credibility, but his public appearances unnerved many people in the intelligence community who had been trained to not even speak the word “satellite.” Keegan believed that the military should have control of space reconnaissance assets and that military officers should be performing assessments of Soviet weapons capabilities. He did not believe that the CIA should be in control of the assets or making the assessments. Furthermore, Keegan believed that arms control agreements were having an insidious effect on the production of intelligence, by creating, in Burrows’ words “the misguided assumption that what must be seen will be seen.” Keegan’s adversary during the early 1970s had been Director of Central Intelligence William E. Colby. Colby had become the CIA’s third-ranking officer in 1971 after serving in clandestine roles in Southeast Asia. Upon arriving at the CIA’s Langley headquarters, he had been exposed for the first time to the new array of high-tech intelligence collection systems. “I went on a tour of the aerospace technology factories on the West Coast and there had my eyes opened to the veritable science-fiction world of space systems, radar, electronic sensors, infrared photography, and the ubiquitous computer, all able to gather intelligence from high in the sky to deep in the ocean with astounding accuracy and precision,” Colby wrote in his memoir. Colby was later fired by President Gerald Ford in November 1975 after cooperating too closely with congressional investigations of CIA activities. He was replaced by George Bush, who later agreed to the creation of Team B, and became embroiled in the Backfire controversy. Backfire William Colby was head of the CIA in the early 1970s and clashed with Major General Keegan over several intelligence issues. He was replaced by George Bush. (credit: Wikimedia Commons) Keegan’s belief that arms control negotiations skewed the intelligence collection was one that had been disputed within the strategic reconnaissance community since the late 1960s. The operators of American reconnaissance satellites believed that their primary mission was collecting intelligence on the Soviet strategic threat, and treaty monitoring was simply a subset of that activity, not a driver. In 1972, during discussions within the intelligence community about arms control and the need for new intelligence collection systems, an Air Force officer had pointed out that the intelligence collection itself was the most difficult challenge.[20] New intelligence requirements such as detecting Soviet Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicles, or mobile ICBMs were going to drive US intelligence collection whether or not they were banned by a treaty. The same would be true for other Soviet weapons developments. Colby had argued that point himself: “Verification is nothing more than the continuation of our normal intelligence process. We’re going to cover Soviet weaponry whether there’s a treaty between us or not; we have to in order to protect our country against surprise.”[21] The analysts Decades after the dispute, historians and reporters were still trying to make sense of it. According to Robert M. Clark in Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach, both the CIA and Air Force Intelligence employed separate contracting teams at McDonnell Douglas to produce analysis of the Backfire.[22] The two teams arrived at different range estimates, and Clark wrote that “Each side accused the other of slanting the evidence.” However, although there is evidence indicating that CIA employed McDonnell Douglas to produce analysis of the Backfire, there is no evidence that the Air Force did as well. Clark claimed that the Backfire analysis was an example of “premature closure” where previous predictions that the Soviet Union would develop a new intercontinental bomber led analysts to “cherry-pick” the evidence to support this view. “A serious consideration of Soviet systems designs and requirements, and of what the Soviets foresaw as threats at the time, would likely have led analysts to zero in more quickly on the Backfire’s mission of peripheral attack.” Other factors may have led to the longer range estimate. Clark also wrote that the case illustrated a common analysis problem of presenting the worst-case estimate. “A U.S. bomber of Backfire’s size and configuration could easily have had intercontinental range,” Clark wrote, although Soviet bombers were less fuel efficient. Backfire In 1977, Aviation Week and Space Technology published the first photo in the West of the Tu-22M bomber. This grainy photo and another one was used by aviation writer Bill Sweetman to produce a plan view of the aircraft and to estimate its fuel capacity and range. Sweetman’s estimate was within 8% of the actual fuel capacity of the aircraft. (credit: Aviation Week and Space Technology) In contrast, aviation writer Bill Sweetman offered an alternative explanation. In 2015, Sweetman recounted how, in the late 1970s, he and fellow aviation writer Doug Richardson at the British magazine Flight International had conducted their own analysis of the Backfire’s range. In early 1977, their rival publication Aviation Week & Space Technology had published a grainy photo of a Backfire in flight.[23] “The estimated basic dimensions had been published. So by enlarging and tracing the pic on the Flight artists’ Shufti Scope [a device that made it possible to draw 3D objects based upon a 2D image], and drawing a grid of lines parallel with the wingtip-to-wingtip line and the long axis, it was possible to construct a decent plan and side view. From there it was possible to estimate volume and fuel capacity,” Sweetman explained in a recent communication.[24] Backfire This drawing of the Backfire was produced by an artist at Flight International, a competing magazine with Aviation Week. Bill Sweetman and a colleague produced it using a "Shufti Scope," a device for converting a photographed object into a drawing. (credit: Flight International via Bill Sweetman) “What we had independently concluded was that (1) the thin outer wings didn't hold much fuel and (2) you could not extend the fuel tanks forward to the aft cockpit bulkhead, because then almost all the fuel would be ahead of the center of gravity and the shift as fuel burned would be impossible, particularly with the short tail arm.” They calculated that the Backfire carried 50 metric tons of fuel and therefore could not achieve the range claimed by the US Air Force. Sweetman also added: “When my colleague Charles Gilson (defence editor) was briefed by the UK Ministry of Defence and told that I was full of shit, he was shown a head-on pic that looked like a Backfire on approach. He was allowed to make a sketch that was quite helpful.” The article in Flight International also included new artwork of what the plane looked like from above. “Not long after we published our numbers, I got a call from a puzzled engineer at McDonnell Douglas, who wondered how we had hit the same numbers his team had. I told him about my calculator," Sweetman wrote in 2015. In 1992, after the end of the Cold War, Sweetman learned from a Tupolev fact sheet that the Tu-22M carried 54 tons of fuel—his calculations had been accurate within eight percent. Sweetman also found out from the McDonnell Douglas engineer that his team had been doing the analysis for the CIA and had come up with similar numbers. According to the engineer, Major General Keegan had threatened to interfere with McDonnell’s contract to supply the F-15 fighter to the Air Force unless the team changed its numbers. CEO Sanford “Sandy” McDonnell refused to buckle to Keegan’s pressure. Thus, while Clark may be correct that the longer Backfire range estimate was the result of “mirror imaging” and “worst-case estimation,” political pressure from the military was also a factor.[25] Sweetman concluded with a lesson: “Sometimes senior officers stretch the truth until it breaks. But the calculator tells no lies.” Backfire Backfire The F-14 Tomcat was built to protect American aircraft carrier battlegroups from attack by Soviet long-range strike aircraft like the Backfire. Equipped with AIM-54 Phoenix missiles, the goal was to shoot down attacking aircraft before they could launch their missiles. Here an F-14 escorts a Backfire during the Cold War. (credit: US Navy) In 1976, the Air Force had determined the Backfire’s range at 5,400 nautical miles (10,001 kilometers), a figure that the service had stood by for several years. The Central Intelligence Agency and State Department had calculated the Backfire’s range as 3,525 to 4,150 nautical miles (6,528 to 7,686 kilometers). After the end of the Cold War, the Backfire’s actual range became known: 3,700 nautical miles (6,800 kilometers, or 4,200 miles), or very close to the CIA’s lower-range estimate. The Backfire serves as a case study of what President Dwight D. Eisenhower had warned about: the military services would interpret intelligence data to their advantage, exaggerating Soviet capabilities to justify larger budgets and new weapons systems. As more Backfires entered service, satellite reconnaissance revealed where they were based and who operated them. It became clearer that they were not being deployed as strategic bombers, nor was the Soviet Union building up its fleet of aerial tankers. Many of the Backfires were devoted to maritime attack, carrying big missiles to try and sink American aircraft carriers, using the high speed that they were capable of. Other US satellites, like the Defense Support Program missile warning satellites, were used to track Backfires and their missiles—so-called “slow walker” targets—in order to warn the US Navy. The US Navy had F-14 Tomcat fighters with long range AIM-54 Phoenix missiles to try and shoot down Backfires before they could launch their missiles. Backfire A Ukrainian general looking at photos of a Russian airfield and overhead photos of bombers, including a Backfire with an X designating the most vulnerable spot for a drone attack. Ukraine had a Backfire in a museum that it could study. (credit: Wikimedia Commons) Hindsight The Backfire serves as a case study of what President Dwight D. Eisenhower had warned about when establishing the CIA’s role in overhead reconnaissance from aircraft and satellites: that the military services would interpret intelligence data to their advantage, exaggerating Soviet capabilities to justify larger budgets and new weapons systems. It was for this reason that Eisenhower wanted civilian control not only of intelligence interpretation, but also collection. Backfire In the 1990s, Ukraine agreed to scrap almost all of its approximately 60 Backfire bombers in return for U.S. guarantees that it would protect the country from Russian attack, a guarantee the United States reneged on. (credit: Defense Threat Reduction Agency) At the end of the Cold War, Ukraine had 60 Backfire bombers and destroyed almost all of them, preserving a few for a museum. Russia’s current inventory is unknown, but has clearly dwindled due to age, attrition, and warfare. Prior to Operation Spider’s Web, during over three years of war, Ukraine claims to have destroyed four other Backfires and damaged six more. The Russians, of course, dispute these numbers. The CIA probably has the best estimates. Additional reading on Team B: Richard Pipes, “Team B: The Reality Behind the Myth”. Commentary Magazine. 82 (4) (1986). William Burr and Svetlana Savranskaya, eds. “Previously Classified Interviews with Former Soviet Officials Reveal U.S. Strategic Intelligence Failure Over Decades”. Washington, DC, September 11, 2009. Anne Hessing Cah. “Team B: The trillion-dollar experiment”. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 49 (3) (April 1993). Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science, Inc.: 22–27. Thom Hartmann, ”Hyping Terror For Fun, Profit - And Power”. Commondreams.org. December 7, 2004 Melvin A. Goodman, “Righting the CIA,” The Baltimore Sun, November 19, 2004. Additional reading on the contemporary debate over Backfire numbers and range: Tad Szulc, “Soviet Said to Fly Big New Bomber,” The New York Times, September 5, 1971. Bernard Gwertzman, “Kissinger, After Senate Briefing, Calls Criticism of Arms Accord Surprising,” The New York Times, December 5, 1974. “New Soviet Bomber Reported in Service,” The New York Times, January 22, 1975. John W. Finney, “U.S. Says Soviet Deploys Bomber,” The New York Times, October 10, 1975. Leslie H. Gelb, “Pact With Soviet on Missile Curbs Reported in Peril,” The New York Times, October 16, 1975. Leslie H. Gelb, “Soviet Reaffirms Stand on Arms Limit,” The New York Times, November 8, 1975. Bernard Gwertzman, “Kissinger Voices Irritattion at Soviet on Arms Talks,” The New York Times, November 11, 1975. “President Finds Continued Snags in Arms Parleys,” The New York Times, November 27, 1975. Bernard Gwertzman, “Soviet Proposes Plan to Rexolve Arms Pact,” The New York Times, January 24, 1976. Christopher S. Wren, “Soviet Delay Seen on Arms Proposal,” The New York Times, March 22, 1976. Bernard Gertzman, “U.S.-Soviet Arms Talks are Deadlocked,” The New York Times, April 11, 1976. “U.S. Says Russia is Arming More Missiles With MIRV’s.” The New York Times, July 30, 1976. David Binder, “U.S. Aide Accuses Soviet on New Missile,” The New York Times, September 1, 1976. John W. Finney, “Air Force Rebuilds its Bomber Defense,” The New York Times, November 21, 1976. “Arms Talks Stalled Since March,” The New York Times, January 25, 1977. Bernard Gwertzman, “A New SALT Pact: The Last 10 Percent is the Most Difficult,” The New York Times, January 30, 1977. Hedrick Smith, “Vance is Expected to Sound Out Soviet on Key Cuts in Strategic Arms,” The New York Times, March 17, 1977. “U.S.-Soviet Proposals on Arms Cuts,” The New York Times, March 31, 1977. Drew Middleton, “Three Arms Development Options Seen for Carter,” The New York Times, April 1, 1977. “Technical Issue in Arms Proposal Stirs Controversy in Washington,” The New York Times, May 3, 1977. Bernard Weinraub, “Russia’s Backfire Bomber; Red Threat or a Red Herring?” The New York Times, May 7, 1978. References The Russians referred to the area as Zhukovsky. National Photographic Interpretation Center, “Backfire Production From 1969 to Mid-1983, USSR,” August 1983, p. 1. Although the exact date of the first observation remains classified, the report indicates on page 5 that the first observation was in August 1969. The two reconnaissance missions active during this period were CORONA mission 1107 early in the month, and GAMBIT mission 4323, late in the month. National Photographic Interpretation Center, “Backfire Production From 1969 to Mid-1983, USSR,” August 1983, pp. 1-2. National Photographic Interpretation Center, “Backfire Production From 1969 to Mid-1983, USSR,” August 1983, p. 4. Major General George J. Keegan, Jr., Assistant Chief of Staff (Intelligence), to William E. Colby, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, October 9. 1973. CIA-RDP80R000800140031-1 Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security, Random House, 1987, p. 8. Ernest J. Zellmer, Associate Deputy Director for Science and Technology, Memorandum for Director, “OWI Comments on General Keegan’s Message re Backfire Analysis,” August 6, 1976, with attached: “Comments on Air Force Review of CIA Backfire Analysis,” August 5, 1976. CIA-RDP79M09467A0025080017-9. Brig. Gen. Lew Allen, Jr., to DNRO (Dr. McLucas), “Quarterly Program Review for January 1, 1971 through March 31, 1971,” May 20, 1971. C05098695 Director of Central Intelligence George Bush, to Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, “CIA Analysis of Backfire,” August 11, 1976. CIA-RDP79M00467A002500080015-1. The press leak is mentioned in a cover memo. Director of Central Intelligence George Bush, to Major General George J. Keegan, Jr., Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, “BACKFIRE,” August 24, 1976. CIA-RDP79M00467A002500080012-4. [Deleted], USN, PAID, Memorandum for Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community, “BACKFIRE,” August 17, 1976, CIA-RDP83M00171R000700330002-3 [Deleted], USN, PAID, Memorandum for Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community, “BACKFIRE,” August 17, 1976, CIA-RDP83M00171R000700330002-3 [Deleted], National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs, Memorandum for the Director, “The Soviet Backfire Bomber: A Chronology of CIA’s Reanalysis,” October 13, 1976, CIA-RDP79M0067A002500070008-9. Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXV, Department of State, 2014, pp. 789-790. Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXV, Department of State, 2014, pp. 789-790. Howard Stoertz, Jr., National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs, Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence, “Suggested Response to Possible Questions about Backfire Performance on ‘Face the Nation,’” March 18, 1977, CIA-RDP80M01048A001100200023-5 CIA Memorandum for the Intelligence Advisory Committee, “Validity of Heavy Bomber Estimate in NIE 11-4-57.” CIA-RDP61-00549R000200010002-1 National Photographic Interpretation Center, “Backfire Production From 1969 to Mid-1983, USSR,” August 1983, p. 5. Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security, Random House, 1987, p. 8. Brigadier General David D. Bradburn, Note for General Allen, “SALT and NRP Systems,” October 16, 1972, with attached: Major Harold S. Coyle, Jr., Memorandum for General Bradburn, “SALT and System Improvements,” October 11, 1972, and: Brigadier General David D. Bradburn, Note for SS-5, Major Coyle, “SALT and System Improvements,” October 16, 1972. Deep Black, p. 14. Robert M. Clark, Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach, Fifth Edition, 2016, pp. 159-161. “Production Backfire Flies From USSR,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, January 3, 1977, p. 21. Bill Sweetman message to author, July 6, 2025. https://www.smithsonianmag.com/air-space-magazine/though-a-glass-darkly-bill-sweetman-technically-speaking-column-180957300/ Dwayne Day is interested in hearing from anybody involved in the controversy over the Backfire bomber during the 1970s. He can be reached at zirconic1@cox.net. Note: we are now moderating comments. There will be a delay in posting comments and no guarantee that all submitted comments will be posted.

The Artemis Accords At Age 5 Years

Artemis Accords Representatives of 39 nations who have signed the Artemis Accords met at the International Astronautical Congress in Sydney in September. (credit: NASA/Max van Otterdyk) The Artemis Accords at five by Jeff Foust Monday, December 22, 2025 At an event in Washington earlier this month, government and industry officials celebrated the fifth anniversary of the Artemis Accords, now endorsed by 59 nations. Or is 60? The uncertainty is linked to Latvia, which is in something of a liminal state when it comes to the Accords. The Latvian government announced in October that it would sign the Accords, seeing it as a step towards being a bigger player in the global space community. “We are proud to become part of a group of nations committed to exploring and using space responsibly and sustainably,” Dace Melbārde, Latvia’s minister for education and science, said in a statement on a government website about the Accords. “This is now an environment that has to have norms and standards and rules, and that’s what we’ve done,” said Kshatriya. “It’s a bulwark against chaos.” However, Latvia hasn’t yet actually signed the Accords, and thus in the eyes of NASA and the State Department, which jointly oversee the document outlining best practices for sustainable space exploration, isn’t yet part of the Artemis Accords family. “We’re now up to 59 countries,” said Valda Vikmanis, director of the Office of Outer Space Affairs at the State Department, during one panel at the event at the Meridian International Center. (A signing ceremony is planned for early next year.) On the side that the Accords has 60 members? Captain Pike and a cake. “When we started our journey on this show, there were only nine signatories, and now there are 60, which is just amazing,” said Anson Mount, the actor who plays Christopher Pike on “Star Trek: Strange New Works,” singing the praises of the Accords in a video shown at the event that had been recorded on the set of the Enterprise bridge. (The name “Artemis Accords” was inspired from Star Trek’s Khitomer Accords, the peace treaty between the Federation and the Klingon Empire.) The cake, meanwhile, was decorated with the flags of the countries that have joined the Accords: 60 of them, as it turned out. “It’s a legally binding cake,” quipped Mike Gold, president of civil and international space at Redwire who helped lead the development of the Accords when he was at NASA. Whether the Accords has 59 or 60 countries as members for now, those at the event did agree that the Accords has been a success in lining up support for rules and norms of behavior building upon the Outer Space Treaty and other international agreements, but not articulated in detail before. “This is now an environment that has to have norms and standards and rules, and that’s what we’ve done,” said NASA associate administrator Amit Kshatriya in a keynote at the event, discussing the rapidly increasing number of launches and satellites in orbit over the last several years. “It’s a bulwark against chaos.” The Artemis Accords came out of the broader Artemis lunar exploration effort started in the first Trump administration. “You can’t get the Artemis Accords without Artemis, and really that began by saying that America will return to the Moon,” said Gold. Gabriel Swiney, a space lawyer at the State Department at the time, recalled negotiating an agreement with Japan for contributions to the Gateway. The Japanese noted that agreement didn’t extend to broader issues of going to the Moon together. “We do need to bring our values your values and norms of behavior with you, but we hadn’t actually figured out what that means,” he said, noting the lack of details in the Outer Space Treaty. “We needed something to bridge that gap between the treaty and mission planning. So that is what drove the Accords and the content of the Accords.” “The Artemis Accords is a set of principles and not just a written document. I think we should execute,” Kaneko said. That idea gained support at NASA, including from the agency’s administrator at the time, Jim Bridenstine, as well as the White House. “I don’t believe it's just our astronauts that we send into space. I don’t believe it is just our robots that we send into space. It’s our values that we send into space,” said Scott Pace, who was executive secretary of the National Space Council in the first Trump administration. The Accords, he said, became the “obvious complement” to the Artemis exploration strategy that would bring in international and commercial partners. Despite that support, there were a lot of people within the US government skeptical the Artemis Accords could be feasible, Swiney said. “We had some hard conversations with people saying, ‘You’re going to cause negative reaction, you’re going to cause blowback,’” he recalled. By contrast, he said there was an “incredible appetite” among potential signatories for something like the Artemis Accords. “Don’t you want to be part of shaping the future of humanity going to Moon?” Some countries, like Japan, got on board quickly. Yosuke Kaneko of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said his government first heard about planning for the Accords in 2019, and became one of the first eight countries announced as signatories in October 2020. “Anyone who is familiar with government processes know that’s a laser-fast timeline,” he said. The Accords today That initial group of eight has now grown to 59 (or 60). From an outsider’s perspective, many of the announcements about the Accords focus on which countries have signed on, giving it something of a stamp-collecting vibe: who has signed, but not what they’re doing. “The Artemis Accords is a set of principles and not just a written document. I think we should execute,” Kaneko said. “Japan and all of the other countries are responsible to execute what was written in the Artemis Accords and accumulate the good practices because, in the end, these will become the normal behaviors on the lunar surface.” Part of that includes fleshing out some of the principles in the Accords. At the International Astronautical Congress in Sydney, Australia, in September, representatives of 39 of the then-56 signatories met to discuss progress on implementing aspects of the Accords. One topic was the article about deconfliction of space activities, including setting up “safety zones” around such activities as a means of avoiding harmful interference. “A safety zone is not well defined,” said Ahmad Belhoul Al Falasi, a UAE government minister who chairs the board of the UAE Space Agency, at a press conference following the meeting. The UAE was one of the co-chairs of the meeting alongside Australia and the United States. One issue, he said, is how large should a safety zone be. “A second point is, what is considered harmful interference?” Other topics at that meeting included open sharing of scientific data, another Accords provision, as well as mitigating orbital debris, a particular concern around the Moon where there are fewer stable orbits and no atmosphere to help deorbit debris. “Preserving lunar orbits and keeping them sustainable for exploration for all countries was an ongoing focus,” said Enrico Palermo, head of the Australian Space Agency, at the press conference. The current signatories also discussed how to bring in more countries to the Accords. One issue, they said, is explaining the relevance of the Accords to countries with limited space activities, including some who have already signed. “Some members are trying to find their value add for the Accords,” Al Falasi said. An upcoming workshop in Peru, he added, will explore how to ensure all signatories can actively participate in discussions. “We want to have a very well-defined way that enables these countries to contribute.” At the Meridian event, Vikmanis said the Accords has been useful in discussions about the use of space resources. One of the provisions of the Accords endorses the utilization of space resources and does not consider it national appropriation, which is forbidden in the Outer Space Treaty. The Accords, said Vikmanis, “has really illustrated, to many people, the power of US space diplomacy but also, equally, the power of space diplomacy in general.” “There’s no question that we need to be able to extract lunar resources to sustain a human presence on the lunar surface and to go on to Mars. That’s not under debate. The question is, how do we do that responsibly?” she said. “The Accords has provided us with a very good forum in which to have this discussion.” That includes advancing those discussions elsewhere, such as the UN’s Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. “One of the things about the Accords,” she added, “is that it has really illustrated, to many people, the power of US space diplomacy but also, equally, the power of space diplomacy in general for advancing these discussions.” Artemis Accords cake A cake at a Meridian International Center event in December marking the fifth anniversary of the Artemis Accords, with 60 countries displayed. (credit: J. Foust) Looking ahead The Accords, like the rest of the Artemis effort, survived the transition from the first Trump administration to the Biden administration. The Accords arguably thrived during that time, going from nine to more than 50 signatories during that time. “I saw what doors it opened for NASA and the US across the world,” said Alicia Brown, executive director of the Commercial Space Federation and head of legislative affairs for NASA when Bill Nelson was administrator. “Sen. Nelson would talk about going across the world and he would get meetings that others in the US government weren’t able to get, because of the NASA meatball and because he had something to offer them that was easy for them to sign up and increase our partnership.” The Accords appear to have also survived the shift to the second Trump administration. While the pace of new signatories slowed for much of the year, three countries—Hungary, Malaysia, and the Philippines—all signed the Accords in October, along with Latvia’s announcement of its intent to sign. “When I took this job, I had a number of people say, ‘I wonder how the administration is going to support the Artemis Accords,’” said Kathleen Karika, a senior advisor at NASA who joined the agency earlier this year. She said the administration is supporting the Accords and looking to making them more substantial. “The Accords are just a great tool across the board,” she said. “The Accords are about having countries that are like-minded joining us.” “We had hoped, in our wildest dreams, that this would take off and become more of a global thing,” Swiney said of the Accords, “but that was a really big reach goal.” “By expanding and implementing the Accords, the United States and our fellow signatories are pushing back against the aggressive use of outer space and are working together to shape space activities in a way that benefits all,” said John Thompson, senior bureau official at the State Department’s Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, in a closing keynote. “The principles of the Accords matter more than ever,” he added. “We must not only continue to expand the Accords by securing new signatories, we must also actively use this community to keep space safe and open.” “The lesson I’ve learned is that you can be really ambitious,” said Swiney, now at the Office of Space Commerce. When drafting the Accords, he said he was prepared to be satisfied with just that initial group of eight countries. “We had hoped, in our wildest dreams, that this would take off and become more of a global thing,” he said, “but that was a really big reach goal.” At the end of the two-hour event, the promised “legally binding” cake was rolled out. Sure enough, there were 60 flags on it, neatly arrayed in five rows of 12 flags each. Latvia was included in the lower right corner, late additions alongside Hungary, Malaysia and the Philippines. The panelists then posed for pictures with the cake and ceremoniously cut into it. Someone then said, “Cut Latvia first.” Jeff Foust (jeff@thespacereview.com) is the editor and publisher of The Space Review, and a senior staff writer with SpaceNews. He also operates the Spacetoday.net web site. Views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone.

State-Owned Enterprises And Commercial Space In China

Starlink A Long March 4B lifts off earlier this month. It is built by one of several Chinese state-owned enterprises in the space industry. (credit: Xinhua) State-owned enterprises and commercial space in China by Owen Chbani Monday, December 22, 2025 Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the United States Government. Although it is convenient to adapt American conceptions of “new space” commercial entities pitted against “traditional” aerospace primes to the Chinese aerospace landscape,[1] Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) play a much different role in their commercial ecosystem. China has had a long history of state-owned commercial space activities, beginning in 1990 with the launch of AsiaSat-1 by the China Great Wall Industries Corporation. China’s experiment with commercial space activities began in 1986 as a way to sell launches to foreign and domestic customers. Since the 2014 Document 60, which opened the space sector to private investment, China has seen an explosion of private space enterprises alongside the large SOEs. This paper aims to explore the evolving role of SOEs in China’s space ecosystem and argue that SOEs have been critical to the formation of the nascent commercial space sector. Chinese SOEs contribute to the success of commercial space firms through: (1) talent attraction and centralization acting as “hubs” that commercial firms cluster around; (2) conducting fundamental and applied R&D; and (3) providing financing and technology to commercial firms. Major SOEs in the Space Sector Although China has more than 150,000 SOEs, only 96 are administered directly by the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Council (SASAC).[2] The two primary “space” SOEs, China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) and China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC), employ hundreds of thousands of employees between them, with dozens of subsidiaries.[3,4] CASC retains the majority of space technology capabilities, responsible for implementing the Tiangong program, the lunar program, as well as most of the Long March vehicles. CASIC is primarily a defense contractor, responsible for developing missiles for the PLA, but retains experience in solid launch vehicles, anti-satellite weapons, microsatellites, and electronics.[5] Other SOEs participate in space activities but do not lead major programs. Unlike the United States, where most civil space exploration is centralized at NASA, China has a trilateral structure with the Chinese National Space Agency (CNSA), Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), and China Manned Spaceflight Agency (CMSA). The CMSA reports to the Central Military Commission (CMC), unlike the civilian State Council, which the CNSA reports to. While the CNSA oversees most civil space efforts, the CAS sets its own priorities and develops science missions independently. The CMSA develops, operates, and oversees China’s human spaceflight programs, including Tiangong, Shenzhou, and the lunar program. All three work closely with SOEs to develop much of the hardware needed. org chart Figure 1: Selected Chinese state-owned and governmental space organizations[6] Commercial space in China 1986–2014 China’s experiment with commercial space activities began in 1986 as a way to sell launches to foreign and domestic customers through the China Great Wall Industries Corporation (GWIC)—a subsidiary of CASC—at a time when global launch capacity was constrained post-Challenger.[7] The success of this effort was immediately apparent, with China launching 27 satellites by 2000, bringing in billions in foreign currency.[8] Chinese SOEs pursued joint ventures with foreign companies as part of a strategy to attain foreign technology in exchange for access to Chinese markets. In one instance, Chinese SOEs, including CASC and CAST, formed China Galileo Industries to partner with the EU on the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) constellation Galileo. China Galileo Industries participated in the transfer of critical GNSS technologies, including atomic clocks, to China. When it became clear that China was pursuing an independent BeiDou GNSS constellation, the relationship quickly fell apart.[9] In the 2000s, Chinese SOEs exported 17 satellites as “turnkey” solutions to developing nations through GWIC; GWIC procured and provided launch, satellite, financing, and insurance services as a one-stop shop to countries by working through the appropriate SOEs.[10] However, by the early 2010s, provincial and local governments acknowledged the financial difficulties associated with a state-driven growth model, and they turned to market forces and commercial investments to continue pursuing their interests. From this shift came the 2014 State Council’s Guiding Opinions on Innovating Investment and Financing Mechanisms in Key Areas (Document 60), is widely credited with kicking off the commercial space industry in China. In the document, the government recognizes the new role government spending will play in “guiding and driving” commercial investment in socially important areas.[11] While it became clear that China was pursuing a market-forward approach to space development, it is also important to define what the implementation of market forces looks like within the Chinese system. Document 60 also joined a flurry of guidelines and laws in 2014 that aimed to promote public-private partnerships, demonstrating that the Chinese were beginning to experiment with their potential to bring market forces to bear through pilot programs and establishing a “leading group” of senior members of the CPC.[12] Only one paragraph of the document mentions the commercial space industry, highlighting remote sensing technologies and satellite navigation. Launch vehicles receive only a passing mention, with no mention of satellite communications. This document, along with the 12th five-year plan, would shape the implementation of market-enabling reforms in China’s space sector. The 2015-2025 National Medium- to Long-Term Civilian Space Infrastructure Development Plan began to implement market reforms, as well as lay out a comprehensive plan for priorities, which would help anchor later commercial investments. The Plan identified three primary areas: satellite remote sensing, satellite communications and broadcasting, and satellite navigation and positioning.[13] It also outlined four principles of development, which include two specifically calling out the role private actors would play in achieving the goals of the plan: 1. Innovation-driven, autonomous development: The Plan calls for “independent innovation” as well as linking technical R&D to business applications, critical steps for enabling a commercial sector by allowing it to leverage existing R&D efforts while giving space for exploration of fields not currently considered by ministries. 2. Government guidance, open development: This section explicitly calls out the role of government in insisting on “top-level planning and overall coordinated management” while establishing mechanisms to promote sharing and industrialization of civil space infrastructure. In a strong message, the Plan “Give[s] free rein to the decisive role of the market in the allocation of resources” in support of a concerted push towards achieving an “open development plan” involving stakeholders across government, private, and social sectors.[14] While it became clear that China was pursuing a market-forward approach to space development, it is also important to define what the implementation of market forces looks like within the Chinese system. In 2015, clear guidance on SOEs was issued, calling for their continued reform towards market-based systems, claiming that “The market entity status of some enterprises has not yet been truly established”.[15] The document continued on to segment SOEs based on the markets they participated in, ranging from established markets with clear market-driven competition where “State-owned capital can hold absolute control, relative control, or a minority stake,” to SOEs in industries “related to national security and the lifeline of the national economy,” which “should maintain the controlling position of state-owned capital and support non-state-owned capital participation.”[16] This represents a clear direction towards the aerospace SOEs, which have continued to position themselves as critical partners to the Chinese government’s space ambitions and smaller commercial firms. China’s government’s latest 2021 white paper on space activities expressly calls out the need for SOEs to engage in “the transfer and transformation of space technologies” to commercial actors, as well as an ecosystem where “large, small, and medium-sized enterprises advance in an integrated way.” This concept pairs with SOE reforms to establish a framework for the commercialization of China’s space sector. China will likely maintain SOEs like CASC and CASIC as providers of infrastructure and space technologies critical to national goals, while simultaneously encouraging them to selectively apply market-based principles when beneficial. Simultaneously, large SOEs and state enterprises will play a key role in anchoring and supporting the commercial space industry, which will be allowed to commercialize technologies and products for societal development. While these commercial firms may compete with SOEs in certain sectors, it is clear that the Chinese government wishes to retain SOE control over critical services and space technologies. A key example of this is the “commercial” procurement of China’s next-generation cargo spacecraft. The two winners, Innovation Academy for Microsatellites of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (IAMCAS) and the Chengdu Aircraft Design and Research Institute under the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), are government-run and SOE-run, respectively.[17] This makes it clear that China’s commercial sector will remain largely quasi-governmental; however, attempts at venture-backed innovation have been explicitly encouraged. Premier Li Qiang specifically called out the promise of commercial aerospace efforts in the 2025 work report, as well as the importance of supporting “unicorn enterprises and gazelle enterprises.”[18] Unicorn companies are private entities with valuations over $1 billion, while gazelles are startups with rapidly growing revenues and valuations at $100 million,[19] highlighting the importance of these companies demonstrates an awareness that much of China’s innovation across sectors depends on stimulating a diverse base of commercial innovation. The following section will identify the role SOEs play in building and supporting that commercial ecosystem. Provincial and local policy efforts to stimulate a commercial space industry Chinese innovation policy is uniquely decentralized, with national policy guiding provincial actions while most funding is disbursed by provincial and local governments. This has led to a proliferation of commercial space “action plans” by provinces across China. These plans set detailed goals for the development of local industries, universities, and investment funds. This decentralized approach has led many commercial space enterprises to decentralize operations, to capture as much government support as possible, giving rise to the national landscape seen today.[20] SOEs as anchors for commercial hubs Several scholars point to several hubs in China’s commercial space ecosystem as a key facet of its space landscape. Most notably, Beijing has attracted more than 200 commercial space ventures through a combination of factors. Both CASC and CASIC are headquartered in the region, providing a large talent base for commercial firms to engage.[21] Chinese firms and provinces both specifically pursue a strategy of “agglomeration,” which seeks to maximize knowledge spillovers, access to talent, infrastructure, government support, and suppliers. These hubs are “anchored” by SOEs, which build infrastructure and talent bases that attract commercial firms.[22] In many cases, CASC and CASIC are directly enlisted by local provinces to establish hubs, with Xi’an’s National Civil Aerospace Industrial Base a direct cooperation between local governments and CASC.[23] Wuhan has engaged with CASIC to construct the Wuhan Aerospace Base, and SAST has partnered with Ningbo to develop a commercial spaceport and industrial base in the region.[24] Without strong intellectual property protection laws and governmental R&D freely available to the commercial industry, brain-drain from leading SOEs enables commercial firms to innovate without massive investments in human capital and R&D. Beyond infrastructure, a key factor in the success of commercial firms is their access to talent. A prominent case study of commercial firms benefiting from SOE-developed talent is Zhang Xiaoping’s 2018 departure from the Xi’an Aerospace Propulsion Institute, a CASC subsidiary, to DeepBlue Aerospace. After his departure, the SOE claimed that he was “poached” and that his absence would severely impact lunar lander development efforts.[25] This brought wider attention to the issue of commercial firms poaching talent from SOEs, with an official claiming that several commercial space startups have set up headquarters nearby, explicitly aiming to poach talent from his company, offering wages three to five times higher.[26] Additionally, almost all employees at key Chinese startups like iSpace come from SOEs like CASC and CASIC.[27] Without strong intellectual property protection laws and governmental R&D freely available to the commercial industry (ex. NASA), brain-drain from leading SOEs enables commercial firms to innovate without massive investments in human capital and R&D. CASC responded to the incident by stating it aims to “build a commercial aerospace community.”[28] In 2019, CASC delivered a keynote at the Commercial Aerospace Summit Forum titled: “Model Innovation, Openness, Win-Win Cooperation, and Joint Development of Commercial Aerospace.”[29] The keynote showed CASC was implementing rocket designs specifically for small satellites, constellations, and tailored inclinations, all desired by commercial industry. In addition, CASC committed to continued exploration of “new models of commercial aerospace,” as well as “establish a commercial aerospace industry chain,” showing that it sought to build commercial capabilities in partnership with a broader ecosystem, embracing the role of SOEs as anchors for commercial space hubs. SOEs as R&D engines for innovation As alluded to previously, SOEs play a critical role in China’s innovation ecosystem, linking universities, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and commercial firms. CASC and its subsidiaries have inked several deals with universities and the Chinese Academy of Sciences to develop R&D capacity in service of innovation. A 2012 CASC agreement with the CAS highlighted a history of collaboration ranging from DongFangHong-1, China’s first satellite, to “manned spaceflight and lunar exploration.” The agreement aims to deepen collaboration on basic research, talent maturation, and specific areas including electronics, ground stations, and materials.[30] A 2016 agreement between Tsinghua University and CASC highlighted the need for resource sharing, technology transfer mechanisms, and talent training programs, as well as collaborative research across a broad range of aerospace technologies.[31] Most notably, in 2010, CASC spent 500 million yuan (about $70 million) to create the Harbin Institute of Technology Aerospace Science and Technology Innovation Research Institute, China’s largest aerospace research institute at the time.[32] Harbin Institute of Technology is one of the “Seven Sons of National Defense” run directly by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, spends almost 2 billion yuan (about $300 million) on defense R&D, and sends over 20% of its graduates to CASC, CASIC, and AVIC.[33] CASC has more than 20 agreements with universities across the nation.[34] SOEs also operate independent research laboratories, integrated within China’s broader laboratory system. Two main categories exist: State Key Laboratories (SKLs) and Defense S&T State Key Laboratories (DSTKLs). While the vast majority are overseen by the Ministry of Education, the Chinese Academy of Science, and various other government ministries, a few are overseen by CASC and other large SOEs. CASC supervises 15 SKLs, as well as 16 national engineering research centers, which help apply the basic research developed at SKLs to physical systems, acting as the backbone of the nation’s innovation system. Looking to encourage a broader innovation ecosystem, MIIT, CASC, and CASIC have partnered to host China Aerospace Innovation & Entrepreneurship Competitions across the country aimed at improving the commercialization of innovative research and products from smaller firms and universities in service of the “space dream” outlined by Xi Jinping.[35] Winning teams are rewarded with prizes, as well as attention from SOEs, investors, and the government. This innovation is diffused through various mechanism, including the talent rotation mentioned earlier, as well as formal mechanisms such as a “matchmaking” conference hosted by the Cangzhou local government, which invited CASC, CASIC, local universities, and more than 200 enterprises from the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region to discuss potential cooperation between the large SOEs and private firms to build a “new model of integrated development of aerospace technology” in the region.[36] CASC’s “Technology Transfer Base” in Cangzhou seeks to build upon these efforts by converting the “advanced technologies” developed by “Manned spaceflight, lunar exploration, the launch of the Gaofen series of satellites” into “‘new engines’ for the high-quality development of local economies.”[37] Additionally, the local Aerospace Industrial Park hosts consultants from SOEs to aid in project management and investment evaluation.[38] SOEs as backers for commercial space ventures SOEs support commercial enterprises in two ways: either by creating commercial subsidiaries aimed at commercial operations subject to market forces or by backing existing commercial enterprises through capital investments. CASIC’s Wuhan-based ExPace subsidiary is one of the first quasi-commercial entities in China’s commercial space landscape. Founded in 2016 to market the Kuaizhou series of launch vehicles, directly based on the DF-21 missile,[39] it represented a classic attempt by SOEs to commercialize operations through passing on operations to a commercial entity. The first launch of the KZ-1A rocket would be a satellite developed by CASIC itself.[40] Alongside mention of ExPace, CASIC’s Chairman, Gao Hongwei, emphasized CASIC's role in “vigorously promoting the development of the commercial aerospace industry.” [41] An unwillingness to allow commercial enterprises to take on critical facets of the civil and military programs will prevent commercial firms from ever reaching the scale necessary to conduct significant levels of R&D, as well as to benefit from economies of scale. China Rocket represents CASC’s attempt at commercialization by allowing commercial procurement of the Long March series of rockets developed by CALT. In addition to being a simple operator and vendor, mirroring CGWIC’s business in the 1980s and 1990s, China Rocket has also developed the Jielong series of rockets, funded purely through “social capital” to serve commercial small satellite constellation needs.[42] In addition, vendors were selected on the basis of cost competition, allowing a much cheaper development process. While ExPace seeks to market a civilian conversion of existing military hardware, China Rocket’s internal development of the Jielong rocket represents a much more fulsome attempt to adapt to market demands, although it aims to complement the existing Long March series rather than offer a commercial alternative. CASC’s investment arm, China Aerospace Investment Holdings (CAIH), has described industrial investment as critical to stimulating a commercial spaceflight industry.[43] It directly calls out the importance of fundraising to SpaceX’s success, which at the time had undergone 46 rounds of financing at a valuation of $130 billion. CAIH has supported CASC’s commercial subsidiaries, including China Rocket and Liquid Rocket Engine. It also seeks to invest in small and medium enterprises under the mantra, “Invest early, invest in small businesses, invest in technology.”[44] Through its support, CAIH seeks to build a diverse and robust supply chain, benefitting CASC, as well as commercial space enterprises across the nation. Importantly, CAIH recognizes the challenges in funding ambitious technical projects, which it describes as needing financial support that understands their “long cycle and high risk” nature. CAIH also identifies the well-known valley of death, from patent to commercial product, and aims to support promising startups through this “perilous leap.”[45] CAIH participates as a Limited Partner (LP) in various venture capital funds aimed at supporting commercial enterprises in: aerospace information technology,[46] military aerospace technology,[47] and satellite technology applications.[48] This integration of venture capital and industrial capacity creates a powerful alignment of incentives for broader supply chain support, with benefits to commercial spaceflight enterprises, yet it remains to be seen if CAIH will continue to support CASC commercial subsidiaries at the expense of a truly competitive market. Despite this, China Rocket and Liquid Rocket Engine do provide key enabling technologies to China’s commercial sector, helping companies avoid R&D costs by providing launch and propulsion technology at market-competitive prices. Conclusion SOEs play a massive, and understudied, role in shaping China’s commercial ecosystem. Through deep partnerships with local governments and universities, they form the backbone of China’s commercial space clusters. SOEs are also critical links in the “triple-helix” innovation system among industry, academia, and government, and their well-trained personnel bring critical know-how to commercial enterprises. Finally, they provide key financing to commercial subsidiaries, which develop products and services that help enable industry-wide innovation, while simultaneously investing in commercial space enterprises and ensuring robust supply chains, which benefits all participants. Existing literature also demonstrates the potential for SOEs to act as effective complements to private enterprises in R&D heavy industries, although this requires careful policy oversight and autonomy to be effective.[49] However, SOEs have been subject to numerous reforms and directives, out of a recognition that they have failed to evolve into agile, market-oriented organizations. An unwillingness to allow commercial enterprises to take on critical facets of the civil and military programs will prevent commercial firms from ever reaching the scale necessary to conduct significant levels of R&D, as well as to benefit from economies of scale. China’s megaconstellation landscape is dominated by two companies, China SatNet and Shanghai SpaceCom (SSST). Both have about 100 satellites on orbit, far behind western companies: SpaceX’s Starlink has more than 9,000; OneWeb has about 650, and Amazon Leo has 180. Their deployment has been hamstrung by technical issues and launcher shortages,[50,51] demonstrating the challenges China’s space ecosystem is facing in scaling to match western capabilities. Additionally, China SatNet is an SOE, while SSST is a private enterprise, but effectively backed by the Shanghai government and Chinese Academy of Science.[52] This structural exclusion of Chinese commercial firms from high-value, high-scale activities has led to much smaller headcounts compared to similar American firms. Figure 2 demonstrates this imbalance. Figure 2: Headcounts of Chinese Firms and American Counterparts Chinese Firms American Firms GalaxySpace(700) [53] SpaceX (13,000) [54] Orienspace (70) [55] Blue Origin (10,000) [56] ChangGuang Satellite (587) [57] Rocket Lab (2,100) [58] Deep Blue Aerospace (200) [59] Relativity Space (2,000) [60] iSpace (200) [61] Planet (970) [62] These smaller firms represent a minuscule fraction of the Chinese aerospace workforce, making large-scale R&D and innovation difficult. More than 3,500 employees are working on SpaceX’s Starship program in South Texas alone, and this is before the program has reached operational levels.[63] It remains to be seen if Chinese firms can effectively match the innovations in launch and satellite technology that have revolutionized the space industry in the United States, yet it is becoming increasingly clear that SOEs will play a critical role in Chinese efforts to build a globally competitive commercial space industry. References https://eastasiaforum.org/2021/05/05/can-chinas-commercial-space-sector-achieve-lift-off/ https://www.state.gov/report/custom/bf839f4338 https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/china/casic.htm https://spacenews.com/china-outlines-intense-period-for-human-spaceflight-robotic-exploration-and-satellite-constellations/ https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-05/China_Space_and_Counterspace_Activities.pdf https://www.state.gov/report/custom/bf839f4338 https://www.upi.com/Archives/1986/05/19/China-offering-commercial-satellite-launch-services/2742516859200/ Pg 5-6, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep13661?seq=11 https://www.reuters.com/article/business/media-telecom/special-report-in-satellite-tech-race-china-hitched-a-ride-from-europe-idUSL4N0JJ0J3/ https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964623000413 https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2014-11/26/content_9260.htm https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/public-private-partnerships-china.pdf Pg 5, CSET, National Medium- to Long-Term Civilian Space Infrastructure Development Plan (2015-2025) Pg 4-5, CSET, National Medium- to Long-Term Civilian Space Infrastructure Development Plan (2015-2025) https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2015-09/13/content_2930440.htm https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2015-09/13/content_2930440.htm https://english.news.cn/20241107/0b40225340884ea996fb65ad0df1fa04/c.html https://www.chinaiplawupdate.com/2025/03/premier-li-qiang-delivers-chinas-2025-work-report-strengthen-the-protection-of-intellectual-property/ https://www.scmp.com/economy/economic-indicators/article/3272676/what-are-chinas-gazelle-enterprises-and-how-do-they-differ-unicorns?module=perpetual_scroll_0&pgtype=article https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14777622.2025.2569311 Pg 37, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/Conference-2020/CASI%20Conference%20China%20Space%20Narrative.pdf https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14777622.2025.2569311#abstract https://en.shaanxi.gov.cn/business/dz/ndz/201708/t20170820_1594620.html https://spacenews.com/ningbo-wenchang-to-construct-chinese-commercial-spaceports/ https://gs.ifeng.com/a/20180928/6915655_0.shtml https://news.jstv.com/a/20180927/1538042436197.shtml https://gs.ifeng.com/a/20180928/6915655_0.shtml https://gs.ifeng.com/a/20180928/6915655_0.shtml https://www.spacechina.com/n25/n2018089/n2018151/c2792961/content.html https://www.cas.cn/xw/zyxw/yw/201207/t20120703_3608589.shtml https://www.cast.cn/3g/news/4210 https://chicago.china-consulate.gov.cn/chn/ywsz/kj/202508/t20250807_11684245.htm https://unitracker.aspi.org.au/universities/harbin-institute-of-technology https://www.spacechina.com/n25/n1991299/n1991343/index.html https://tech.sina.cn/d/tk/2019-04-24/detail-ihvhiewr7930844.d.html https://www.cangzhou.gov.cn/cangzhou/c100079/202009/6db883060ee2472daecf60aa5fff62a5.shtml https://www.imsilkroad.com/news/p/387180.html https://www.imsilkroad.com/news/p/387180.html Pg. 38, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/Conference-2020/CASI%20Conference%20China%20Space%20Narrative.pdf https://web.archive.org/web/20201204225826/http://www.parabolicarc.com/2017/12/20/expace-raises-182-million-small-satellite-launchers/ https://www.cnsa.gov.cn/n6758823/n6758838/c6808256/content.html https://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/china/jielong-1.htm https://www.spacechina.com/n25/n2018089/n2018151/c4085673/content.html https://www.spacechina.com/n25/n2018089/n2018151/c4085673/content.html https://www.spacechina.com/n25/n2018089/n2018151/c4085673/content.html https://investincq.com//index.php?c=content&a=show&id=478market-competitive1 https://www.sastind.gov.cn/n10086200/n10086344/c10202775/content.html https://www.jiemian.com/article/2095095.html Link to source https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3319163/has-qianfan-satellite-network-chinas-starlink-rival-run-trouble https://www.china-in-space.com/p/shanghai-backed-qianfan-constellation https://spacenews.com/shanghai-firm-behind-g60-megaconstellation-raises-943-million/ https://paper.people.com.cn/rmrbhwb/pc/content/202504/08/content_30066419.html https://www.forbes.com/companies/spacex/ https://pitchbook.com/profiles/company/467659-63?utm_source=chatgpt.com#overview https://www.space.com/space-exploration/private-spaceflight/jeff-bezos-blue-origin-laying-off-1-000-employees-reports https://pitchbook.com/profiles/company/340754-86 https://stockanalysis.com/stocks/rklb/employees/ https://pitchbook.com/profiles/company/266267-08 https://www.relativityspace.com/about https://pitchbook.com/profiles/company/230465-17 https://stockanalysis.com/stocks/rklb/employees/ https://builtin.com/articles/starbase-spacex-elon-musk#:~:text=Summary:,site%20for%20its%20Starship%20program. Owen Chbani is a master’s student at George Washington University’s Space Policy Institute. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the United States Government.

The Huntsville, Alabama Space Museum 2

USSRC Huntsville and the Final Frontier (part 2) by Dwayne A. Day, photographs by James Kruggel Monday, December 22, 2025 In 2008, the US Space and Rocket Center opened a major new addition, The Davidson Center. It is filled with a Saturn V rocket and various artifacts and displays associated with its development and missions. These include rocket engines, instruments, wind tunnel models, a flown Apollo Command Module, and many others, such as the gravesites of squirrel monkey Miss Baker and her husband, Big George. A recent visit to the museum revealed all that it has to offer (see “Huntsville and the Final Frontier,” The Space Review, December 15, 2025.) USSRC USSRC USSRC USSRC USSRC USSRC USSRC USSRC USSRC USSRC USSRC USSRC USSRC USSRC USSRC USSRC USSRC USSRC USSRC USSRC USSRC USSRC USSRC USSRC USSRC USSRC USSRC USSRC USSRC USSRC USSRC USSRC USSRC USSRC USSRC USSRC USSRC USSRC USSRC USSRC USSRC USSRC USSRC USSRC USSRC USSRC USSRC Dwayne Day can be reached at zirconic1@cox.net. Note: we are now moderating comments. There will be a delay in posting comments and no guarantee that all submitted comments will be posted.

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NASA's Dream Chaser Space Plane Is Finally Completed After 18 Years

NASA’s Dream Chaser Space Plane Is Finally Completed after 18 years of development By Zane Clark, 3 days ago Sierra Nevada Corporation’s Dream Chaser spacecraft sits on the runway at NASA’s Armstrong Flight Research Center during ground testing - NASA photo by Ken Ulbrich (Public Domain), via Wikimedia Commons Dream Chaser, the vehicle that has been likened to a miniature version of NASA’s space shuttle, continues to reach major milestones despite its uncertain future. Sierra Space, the company behind the currently uncrewed space plane, is planning for a launch to low Earth orbit in Q4 of 2026. Technical Milestones In response to questions from NASASpaceflight.com, Sierra Space says that everything continues to proceed for the first flight of Tenacity, the company’s cargo vehicle designed to launch atop a United Launch Alliance Vulcan rocket. The company has successfully completed key technical milestones in its development, including the finalization of the electrical system build, and Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) and Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) testing at Kennedy Space Center. These tests were completed at the Space Systems Processing Facility (SSPF) at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC). In a press release, the company outlined more of the testing progress of Dream Chaser communications systems, actively testing the telemetry and distribution commands between the spacecraft and the company’s mission control in Louisville, Colorado. This was tested using NASA’s Tracking Data and Relay Satellite System, a set of satellites in orbit around the Earth used for low and medium Earth orbit communications. Program History There have been many questions about the future of Dream Chaser. In 2008, Sierra Nevada Corporation (now Sierra Space) acquired the design and pitched it for NASA’s Commercial Crew Development (CCDev) program, securing funding through phases 1 and 2, as well as the Commercial Crew Integrated Capability (CCiCap) stage. Despite these early investments, Dream Chaser was ultimately passed over in 2014 when NASA selected SpaceX’s Crew Dragon and Boeing’s Starliner for crewed missions to the ISS. Sierra Nevada protested the decision with the U.S. Government Accountability Office but lost the appeal. The vehicle was selected as part of NASA’s Commercial Resupply Services 2 (CRS 2) contract, which included SpaceX’s Cargo Dragon and Northrop Grumman’s Cygnus, to resupply the International Space Station (ISS). Sierra Space were given seven flights to the ISS, with the first scheduled for 2021 and later postponed multiple times. Contract Amendment and Future Plans However, questions remained with crewed flights to the ISS set to end in 2030 followed shortly thereafter by the deorbiting of what will then be a 30-plus-year-old station. Following a joint evaluation, NASA and Sierra Space mutually agreed to amend the CRS-2 contract removing the requirement of seven guaranteed flights, as well as changing Tenacity‘s first flight to a free-flying orbital test away from the station. When asked about plans for the space vehicle beyond supplying the ISS, the company stated it is looking into other options. The contract modification allows them to explore the spaceplane’s unique capabilities to meet the needs of diverse mission profiles, including emerging and existential threats and national security priorities that align with their acceleration into the Defense Tech market. Testing and Landing Plans The first flight will see the vehicle return for a landing on a runway at the Vandenberg Space Force Base in California, a variation of the originally discussed landings at the Launch and Landing Facility (LLF), formerly the Shuttle Landing Facility, at KSC. Despite that, much of the ground testing has been going on at the LLF, including tow testing. This saw a Freightliner Cascadia truck tow Tenacity at high speeds to simulate critical dynamics and validating autonomous navigational parameters during runway landing operations. The teams also simulated safing the vehicle as they would after a landing and removing time-sensitive payloads. Despite reported issues with propulsion systems on the vehicle, Sierra Space says they have full trust in their thrusters. Sierra Space’s innovative Tri-mode thrusters have completed an extensive qualification and acceptance test program at their Badger Propulsion Test Facility, located in North Freedom, Wisconsin. Second Vehicle on Hold A second Dream Chaser vehicle, Reverence, was seen being built when NASASpaceflight.com was granted access to the company’s facilities in 2023. The company now says its future is questionable. Dream Chaser Reverence production is on hold as the team focuses on Dream Chaser Tenacity’s first mission and test flow would depend on any future customer requirements. Still remaining for Tenacity will be a hot-fire test, integrated hardware and software testing, as well as its final round of acoustic testing, the latter of which is scheduled for December 2025. The team feels they are prepared for the updated free flight and are confident in their teams and vehicle. 417

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Space X And Orbital Data Centers

Starlink SpaceX may leverage its Starlink constellation to branch out into orbital data centers, something that may require billions of dollars of capital but could tap in even larger markets. (credit: spaceX) SpaceX, orbital data centers, and the journey to Mars by Jeff Foust Monday, December 15, 2025 In May 2018, CNBC interviewed SpaceX president and chief operating officer Gwynne Shotwell when the network placed the company atop its “Disruptor 50” list of private companies, ahead of Uber, Airbnb, and Lyft. At the time the company was valued at $28 billion and was just starting to demonstrate the potential of booster reuse to lower its costs, paving the way for the Starlink constellation. “We can’t go public until we’re flying regularly to Mars,” Shotwell said in 2018. In the interview, Shotwell was asked when the company might consider going public. Not for a long time, she responded, because the company was focused on company founder Elon Musk’s goal of Mars. “Getting people to Mars, it’s a big job. It’s going to take years,” she said, saying the company was “picky” about who it wanted to invest in it. “We want investors with patience as well as excitement about what we’re trying to do.” “We actually don’t talk too much about going public right now,” she said. “We can’t go public until we’re flying regularly to Mars.” A lot has changed since then: SpaceX has become the dominant launch provider, performing more orbital launches than the rest of the world combined. Starlink has become the revenue-generating machine hoped for years ago, with millions of customers worldwide. Crew Dragon has become a lifeline for the International Space Station as its competitor in the commercial crew program, Boeing’s Starliner, has stumbled. But, the company hasn’t reached Mars yet, with people or with cargo (at the time of Shotwell’s interview, the company wanted to start sending people in 2024 in what is now known as Starship.) And yet, it is looking increasingly likely that SpaceX will go public as soon as next year before the company's goal of human Mars missions. Reports earlier this month first indicated that SpaceX was considering an IPO, perhaps in the second half of next year. It was not the first time since Shotwell’s 2018 interview that the idea of SpaceX going public had come up, perhaps by spinning out Starlink into a standalone, public company while keeping the rest of SpaceX private. Those talks, though, never appeared to gain momentum. This time, though, the discussions were about an IPO for the entire company, and gained momentum. On Friday, in a message to SpaceX employees, the company’s chief financial officer, Bret Johnsen, confirmed the company was laying the groundwork for an IPO. Johnsen wrote that “we are preparing the company for a possible IPO in 2026. Whether it actually happens, when it happens, and at what valuation are still highly uncertain.” An IPO, he said, would provide SpaceX with “a significant amount of capital that enables us to ramp Starship to an insane flight rate, deploy AI data centers in space, build Moonbase Alpha and send uncrewed and crewed missions to Mars.” It's clear something has changed significantly at SpaceX about an IPO, even as the company continued to do well privately. Johnsen’s comments about an IPO came in a message about the company’s latest “tender offer,” where it allows insiders like employees to sell stock, providing them with liquidity outside of the public market. The latest tender offer doubled the price of SpaceX shares, giving the company a valuation of about $800 billion. An IPO, Johnsen said, would provide SpaceX with “a significant amount of capital that enables us to ramp Starship to an insane flight rate, deploy AI data centers in space, build Moonbase Alpha and send uncrewed and crewed missions to Mars.” “For the last several years, there was this idea floated that SpaceX wouldn’t IPO until they make it to Mars or that potentially, upon hitting a certain customer milestone, maybe Starlink would spin off,” said Andrew Chanin, co-founder and CEO of ProcureAM, which manages the Procure Space ETF, an exchange-traded fund focused on space industry companies. “And it now seems like that story is possibly changing.” He and others have speculated the change has to do less with Starship or Moon and Mars missions than with the other item Johnsen mentioned: orbital data centers. It is a concept that has gained public traction only in the last several months given the sharply growing demand for data centers to support AI companies as well as the challenges terrestrial data centers face, particularly with power. Musk has been among those talking up orbital data centers, just in the last couple of months, linking them to the company’s Starlink constellation. “Satellites with localized AI compute, where just the results are beamed back from low-latency, sun-synchronous orbit, will be the lowest cost way to generate AI bitstreams in <3 years,” he wrote on X earlier this month. “And by far the fastest way to scale within 4 years, because easy sources of electrical power are already hard to find on Earth,” he added. “1 megaton/year of satellites with 100kW per satellite yields 100GW of AI added per year with no operating or maintenance cost, connecting via high-bandwidth lasers to the Starlink constellation.” The rush to build orbital data centers Musk is not alone in his interest in orbital data centers. “These giant training clusters, those will be better built in space, because we have solar power there, 24/7,” Jeff Bezos said of AI computing in an onstage interview at Italian Tech Week in October. “We will be able to beat the cost of terrestrial data centers in space in the next couple of decades.” Blue Origin, his space company, has reportedly been looking into orbital data centers in the last year. Meanwhile, Google recently announced it would work with Planet, which operates a constellation of imaging satellites, on a test to fly Google AI processors on a Planet satellite as a prototype of orbital data centers. Sundar Pichai, Google’s CEO, said in a TV interview described the Suncatcher project as one of the company’s “moonshots.” “There’s no doubt to me that, a decade or so away, we’ll be viewing it as a more normal way to build data centers,” he said. “Suncatcher is really exciting. I do think it's a very viable project long term,” Will Marshall, CEO of Planet, said in a company earnings call last week, noting that for now Suncatcher is only an R&D program. “I see a huge market opportunity here. I do in the long run.” The concept had led others in the technology field to at least consider getting into the space industry. Orbital data centers may be one reason former Google CEO Eric Schmidt, a prominent voice on AI topics, elected to invest in and become CEO of launch startup Relativity Space earlier this year, although both he and the company have been quiet about their plans. “The race for artificial general intelligence is fundamentally a race for compute capacity, and by extension, energy,” said Bhatt. Sam Altman, the CEO of OpenAI, explored invested in Stoke Space, another launch startup, the Wall Street Journal reported earlier this month, as part of his interest orbital data centers. That could have involved billions of dollars of investment to take a majority stake in the company. The talks broke off, and when Stoke Space announced a $510 million funding round in October, Altman was not among the investors listed as participating in the round. The concept of orbital data centers faces many challenges, such as the ability for advanced AI processors to operate in a radiation environment in low Earth orbit much higher than on the ground, as well as the need for large solar panels and radiators to both generate the power they will need and to eliminate the excess heat. Some think those challenges can be overcome, while others see them as being, at the very least, expensive and potentially uneconomical to do so. The split is evident in an industry one might consider adjacent to orbital data centers: space-based solar power, which also requires large arrays to generate power. Last week, Aetherflux, one startup that raised $50 million earlier this year to advance work on space solar power satellites, said it planned to develop data center nodes called “Galactic Brain” that would start launching in 2027. “The race for artificial general intelligence is fundamentally a race for compute capacity, and by extension, energy,” Baiju Bhatt, founder and CEO of Aetherflux, said in a statement. “Galactic Brain puts the sunlight next to the silicon and skips the power grid entirely.” Another space-based solar power startup, Overview Energy, exited from stealth the next day to announce its plans, including a test of beaming energy from a moving aircraft to a ground receiver using a near-infrared laser. The company plans to launch a test satellite in 2028 and start commercial spacecraft as soon as 2030. Overview, unlike Aetherflux, isn’t interested in orbital data centers. In an interview, company founder and CEO Marc Berte said it made more sense to leave the data centers on the ground and use the satellites to beam power to them, addressing the power grid concerns of terrestrial data centers. “The real question should be not where you put the GPUs. The real question should be, where do you put the energy?” he said. Data centers in space will require frequent upgrades to update their processors, something straightforward to do on the ground but complex in space, short of simply launching a new data center spacecraft. “Put the thing that doesn’t need the maintenance and can last for a long time in space,” he said. “Put the energy part into space as opposed to putting the processing part in space.” Industry effects If SpaceX does go forward with an IPO, it could raise by some estimates $20–30 billion dollars and value the company at $1.5 trillion. Analysts think that SpaceX should have no problem attracting buyers should it go public. “A SpaceX IPO in 2026 would be a seismic event for the space economy,” said Boggett. “We hear interest from investors on a regular basis looking for access to the stock,” ProcureAM’s Chainin said. “This is something many retail and institutional investors have been interested in for a while.” Could that interest, though, take attention, and money, away from other companies in the space sector? Would investors prefer to put their money into SpaceX, a leader in many parts of the space industry, versus other companies in the sector, be they publicly traded or still raising capital privately? “A SpaceX IPO in 2026 would be a seismic event for the space economy,” wrote Mark Boggett, CEO of Seraphim Space, a fund that invests in space companies. The funds would “give SpaceX the firepower to accelerate its operations in infrastructure, connectivity, and AI-powered services.” He argued that a SpaceX IPO could jumpstart the industry, providing additional opportunities for others in the field. “That level of activity will create unprecedented opportunities across the broader space economy, from in-orbit servicing, satellite constellations, data analytics, to global security and sustainability solutions,” he stated. “It’s about backing the infrastructure and services that will define the next industrial revolution that we believe will result in many more giant space businesses like SpaceX being created over the forthcoming decade and beyond.” Chanin held similar views. He noted that many companies in the industry have benefited from the increased space access SpaceX offers with its frequent launches, which would continue and likely even accelerate with Starship. “There’s a lot of need for various technologies, some that SpaceX may have no interest in building out,” he added. “That will potentially create opportunities for other space companies.” The strategy SpaceX appears to be pursuing offers significant risks and rewards. If SpaceX is able to tap into what today seems like an insatiable demand for AI computing, that could further turbocharge the company and its finances beyond what Starlink has done. Financing human Mars missions becomes much less of a challenge. But, if the AI boom goes bust for any reason, that could drag down SpaceX if it does make a big bet on orbital data centers, and with it other parts of the space industry. Mars might recede into the distance. SpaceX might no longer need to stay private to be able to go to Mars; instead, it could be necessary to go public to tap into the resources to enable that vision. However, it may still need, as Shotwell put it seven and a half years ago, “investors with patience as well as excitement about what we’re trying to do.” Jeff Foust (jeff@thespacereview.com) is the editor and publisher of The Space Review, and a senior staff writer with SpaceNews. He also operates the Spacetoday.net web site. Views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone.