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Kazakhstan Space Strategy

Baikonur A new opportunity may be dawning for Kazakhstan in space beyond its role as a launch site. (credit: NASA/Bill Ingalls) Kazakhstan’s space strategy: can its high-tech assets propel it to Eurasia’s new broker? by Zhaslan Madiyev, Olaf J. Groth, and A.B. Sinchev Monday, January 26, 2026 Kazakhstan’s skies have long been a launchpad for the country’s dreams of advancement, and today, they may serve as a testing ground for a new model of regional cooperation. For decades, the country has balanced legacy connections with future-oriented ambitions. As space technology, advanced materials, robotics, and AI remake the global economy, Kazakhstan faces a rare opportunity: it can leverage its world-class infrastructure and growing innovation ecosystem to position itself as Eurasia’s “New Broker” of technological collaboration. Yet as it moves, Kazakhstan must navigate the delicate realities of its geography and history, including long-standing cooperation frameworks surrounding the Baikonur Cosmodrome. Each step forward must strengthen regional confidence and reinforce Kazakhstan’s position as a stable and constructive actor in the emerging space economy. Which future? Four scenarios for Kazakhstan in the global space economy of 2035 Kazakhstan inherited a significant part of the Soviet space infrastructure, yet it also has consistently positioned itself as a responsible global actor. It ratified all four foundational United Nations treaties on outer space: the 1967 Outer Space Treaty,[1] the 1968 Rescue Agreement,[2] the 1972 Liability Convention,[3] and the 1974 Registration Convention.[4] That reflects its long-standing commitment to peaceful and transparent use of space. These scenarios help clarify the choices Kazakhstan faces as it seeks to translate its technological potential into lasting economic and geopolitical value. Beyond outer space governance, Kazakhstan made historic decisions that reinforced its reputation as a trusted global partner by voluntarily renouncing its inherited nuclear arsenal and acceding to the key arms control treaties, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,[5] the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty,[6] the Biological Weapons Convention,[7] and the Chemical Weapons Convention.[8] Since the late 1990s, Kazakhstan has also expressed its intention to join the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). While it already observes the MTCR guidelines as a unilateral adherent, full membership requires consensus among participating states, a process that remains under review. In parallel, the country continues to modernize its export control and non-proliferation systems to align with international standards. Within this framework, limited sovereign launch capability has been shaped by legal and institutional factors, leading to a long-term lease arrangement with the Russian Federation over the Baikonur Cosmodrome, one of the world’s most advanced and enduring launch facilities. Despite limited direct operational control, Baikonur continues to serve as Kazakhstan’s primary strategic space asset, offering future opportunities for deeper national participation and diversification. The decisions taken today will define Kazakhstan’s trajectory for decades to come. Within our Disruption Futures framework, we outline four possible pathways, each illustrating how the country’s space infrastructure and allied innovation capacities could either be strategically mobilized or left underutilized. These scenarios are not predictions, but instruments for foresight: they help clarify the choices Kazakhstan faces as it seeks to translate its technological potential into lasting economic and geopolitical value. A. Eurasia’s new space broker Partner to all, master of its fate: innovation, agility, and integration Kazakhstan emerges as a multilateral anchor in Eurasia, balancing global partnerships through strategic alignment and innovation leadership. By reducing dependence on extractives and leading in green hydrogen, synthetic materials, and deeptech, it attracts diversified investment and trust. Flexible trade, capital access, and diplomatic agility reinforce its credibility as both a mediator and a hub for technology cooperation across regions. Throughout this process, Kazakhstan maintains a posture of balance and respect toward all its partners, ensuring that new initiatives strengthen rather than strain existing frameworks of cooperation. Building on its long-standing collaboration with Russia, the country expands effective partnerships with western space tech venture studios and incubators, NASA, SpaceX, Virgin Galactic, Blue Origin, and Silicon Valley startups. Joint ventures with Germany, UAE, South Korea, Japan, Australia, and Canada accelerate R&D in space robotics, microgravity materials, and AI-powered Earth observation, making Kazakhstan a critical supplier of tech and talent to lunar, Martian, and asteroid missions. Crucially, Kazakhstan’s actions remain grounded in multilateralism and transparency, ensuring that cooperation frameworks evolve inclusively and in line with established partnerships. Space-enabled climate services and secure satellite data corridors cement its reputation as a tech-savvy, neutral node in the Eurasian innovation web. Instead of merely hosting launches, Kazakhstan codes, builds, and leads: its engineers, data scientists, and roboticists embedded at the core of global missions and supply chains, contributing to a shared and stable future for the region. B. Peripheral space player Stability in a dependent framework: order without autonomy Kazakhstan maintains global integration through regulatory compliance, yet its strategic autonomy remains limited. Fiscal constraints and delayed reforms reinforce reliance on external financing, technology, and governance models. While technically stable, much of the innovation activity is externally led, resulting in modest domestic value creation. Investment flows narrow, and the national innovation agenda risks becoming subordinated to external priorities. The window to become an active broker of Eurasian space cooperation and high-tech value creation is narrow, because established space entrepreneurship ecosystems are increasingly driven by digital legacy startups with much shorter product and partnering cycles. Within this environment, Kazakhstan’s space assets operate primarily as platforms for foreign missions and joint programs. International companies, including agencies and private space tech enterprises from Russia, the United States, Europe, and Asia, utilize local integration facilities for launches, assembly, and testing, but most intellectual property, data, and value creation remain abroad. German, Korean, and Canadian ventures maintain advanced laboratories in Astana, yet local researchers participate mainly as contractors rather than full partners. While investment and technology continue to flow in, they do so with limited knowledge transfer and retention. Kazakhstan functions as a shared resource and operational hub, but not yet as an autonomous innovation power. C. Pawn in the great space game Exploited vulnerability: caught between powers In this trajectory, Kazakhstan faces growing exposure to external pressures within an increasingly fragmented global order. Slow reforms, short-term arrangements, and overreliance on external credit weaken institutional resilience and constrain long-term planning. What was once connective infrastructure risks turning into contested ground for influence and access. Kazakhstan’s space, robotics, and AI infrastructure becomes divided among competing foreign actors. Baikonur’s manifest is split: Chinese, Russian, and UAE projects take precedence, while American and allied ventures participate through limited or indirect joint arrangements. As uncertainty grows, companies such as SpaceX, Blue Origin, and German and Japanese robotics firms redirect higher-value R&D activities abroad, reducing local opportunities for scaling and innovation. Over time, the country’s infrastructure is viewed less as a co-creation platform and more as a transit or testing space. Satellites are launched, materials processed, and data exchanged, but knowledge retention and brand differentiation decline. The challenge in this scenario is not external pressure alone, but the erosion of confidence and coordination within domestic institutions—conditions that leave Kazakhstan reactive rather than strategic in shaping its technological future. D. Opportunistic space maverick Prospering at a price: strategic agility in a fractured order Kazakhstan emerges as a hyper-networked pivot state: strategically agile yet stretched. By hosting multiple global blocs through innovation enclaves and regulatory arbitrage, it becomes the “deeptech-innovation Switzerland” of Eurasia. Financial inflows surge, but governance capacity is tested by overlapping legal frameworks and competing policy priorities. Strategic ambiguity brings visibility, but at the cost of institutional coherence and domestic trust. In this scenario, Kazakhstan’s deeptech infrastructure becomes a “sandbox” for regional and global space-technology partners. Agencies and companies such as NASA, SpaceX, Virgin Galactic, and Blue Origin set up local partnerships, while robotics, AI, and materials startups from Silicon Valley, Berlin, Seoul, Dubai, and Tokyo operate innovation enclaves in Astana and Baikonur. Talent and capital flow in and out, but fragmented oversight and parallel governance cause IP disputes and uneven economic benefits. Kazakhstan becomes Eurasia’s primary testbed for frontier technologies: a country highly visible on the global stage, but challenged in consolidating a unified innovation ecosystem. The key tradeoff lies between openness and coherence: the capacity to attract diverse partners without diluting long-term strategic direction or national identity. Six steps: leveraging global partnerships and high-tech assets to become Eurasia’s new space broker The time to act is now. According to a collaborative report by McKinsey and the World Economic Forum, the global space economy is projected to grow from $630 billion to $1.8 trillion by 2035, driven by reduced costs, expanding satellite connectivity, and the commercialization of low Earth orbit.[9] Companies like SpaceX and its Starlink constellation have emerged as “game changers,” reshaping both the economics and geopolitics of space access. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan, with its established satellite programs, integration and testing facilities, skilled engineering base, and access to the Baikonur Cosmodrome, is well positioned to leverage this new frontier. But the window to become an active broker of Eurasian space cooperation and high-tech value creation is narrow, because established space entrepreneurship ecosystems are increasingly driven by digital legacy startups with much shorter product and partnering cycles. 1. Embrace full multilateralism and tech standard-setting As a first step, Kazakhstan should accelerate MTCR accession and join global alliances not just in classic space policy but in space tech, AI, robotics, and advanced materials, actively seeking partnerships with NASA, SpaceX, Virgin Galactic, Blue Origin, and Silicon Valley (NASA Ames Research Center), as well as with Germany’s DLR Institute of Space Systems, UAE’s Mohammed bin Rashid Space Centre, South Korea’s Korea Aerospace Research Institute, Japan’s JAXA Tsukuba Space Center, Australia’s CSIRO Space and Astronomy division, and Canada’s MDA Space. The objective is to position Kazakhstan as an active contributor to international standards and best practices in the evolving space economy. 2. Build a deeptech, space, and AI innovation hub Kazakhstan should transform its existing Baikonur assets as a kernel for entrepreneurial venturing, such as integration facilities and university research centers. Develop a similar roadmap for those becoming available to Astana in the coming decades. Both will give Kazakhstan the value-add leverage to evolve into Eurasia’s preeminent launchpad for robotics, microgravity materials science, and AI-enabled space systems that will be desirable for global partnerships. Co-develop next-generation space vehicles, planetary robotics, and data analytics platforms with leading international agencies and companies. Such partnerships should be guided by inclusivity, transparency, and mutual benefit - ensuring that Kazakhstan’s growing engagement complements existing cooperation arrangements and promotes broader regional stability. Lessons from historic international space collaboration can inform the development of these frameworks, emphasizing trust-building, shared standards, and sustainable innovation practices. 3. Make Kazakhstan Eurasia’s talent and R&D gateway Expand scholarship and research exchange with innovation powerhouses in the US, Europe, Asia, and elsewhere. Launch joint space-tech and AI accelerator programs with Silicon Valley (Plug and Play Tech Center) and allied countries. Attract top students and scientists through “innovation visas,” co-mentorship, and high-profile missions involving NASA, JAXA, DLR, and CSA.These talent flows should be managed transparently and inclusively, engaging regional partners, including Russia, as active participants in shared upskilling and capacity-building efforts. 4. Anchor digital and trade corridors with advanced tech Integrate AI and robotics into supply chain management, smart infrastructure, and resource monitoring, demonstrating the practical value of Kazakhstan’s space and materials science sectors. Use satellite-enabled, blockchain-secured data flows to serve as Eurasia’s neutral “trusted data corridor” between continents, leveraging secure protocols from various organizations. Blockchain and AI-enabled conditional data access, watermarking and forensics technologies will be of foundational importance in particular for collaboration with China, Ukraine and Russia. 5. Mediate and broker tech partnerships in a multipolar world Offer Kazakhstan as neutral territory for global standards-setting and testing. Convene summits for dual-use tech with NASA, ESA, UAE’s Mohammed bin Rashid Space Centre, Germany’s DLR, South Korea’s KARI, and Japan’s JAXA, among others. Champion responsible AI, IP protection, and space security frameworks, always clarifying Kazakhstan’s position as a “bridge” and not a wedge. However, it is of paramount importance to safeguard the reciprocal value-add in these relationships, such that sustained skill and capability building in and for Kazakhstan and wider Central Asia can be tracked. 6. Build institutional depth, resilience, and governance for tech-driven social trust Professionalize national agencies overseeing space, AI, and robotics. Develop transparent, accountable frameworks for the stewardship of tech assets and IP, as well as for and socially and environmentally sustainable critical minerals extraction and processing and energy supply, modeled on best practices from other agencies. Cultivate public trust in tech policy, ensuring equitable access to tech-driven prosperity and preventing the social fragmentation seen in the Maverick scenario. This will require transparent governance frameworks and accountability measures with international verification and certification measures. But this in turn will have a return in invested time and budgets, because international investors prize good governance and rule of law as a matter of derisking portfolios. The stakes and the opportunity The new Kazakh space era demands a deftness that is both diplomatic and technical. At the threshold of a new era, Kazakh engineers and policymakers look toward the Baikonur launch pads, recognizing that the country stands at a decisive intersection between legacy and future. The world’s new “space race” is as much about legal agility, institutional depth, and cross-cultural trust as about rockets and satellites. If Kazakhstan can translate its unique mix of assets—geography, infrastructure, credibility—into innovation leadership and diplomatic brokerage, it will not only shape its own future, but also help define Eurasia’s role in the global order. Yet this path requires balance and precision. Kazakhstan’s ascent must continue to emphasize cooperation, transparency, and mutual benefit, reinforcing trust among all its partners. The new Kazakh space era demands a deftness that is both diplomatic and technical. The window is closing. But the launchpad is ready. References Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated May 15, 1997 No. 104-1 On the Accession of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated May 15, 1997 No. 106-1 On the Accession of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space. Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated May 15, 1997 No. 107-I On the Accession of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects. Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated May 15, 1997 No. 108-1 On the Accession of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space. Resolution of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated December 13, 1993 No. 2593-XII On the Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated April 12, 2007 No. 243-III On the Ratification of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated May 7, 2007 No. 245-III On the Ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated June 24, 1999 No. 398-I On the Ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. McKinsey & Company and World Economic Forum (2023). Space: The $1.8 trillion opportunity for global economic growth. Retrieved from Space: The $1.8 trillion opportunity for global economic growth | McKinsey H.E. Zhaslan Madiyev is Deputy Prime Minister – Minister of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Development of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Zhaslan Madiev is a public official engaged in the development of digital technologies and innovation policy in Kazakhstan. His work focuses on strategic coordination of high-technology sectors, including space-related capabilities, with an emphasis on data, infrastructure, and international cooperation. He contributes to policy discussions at the intersection of technology, economic development, and global partnerships. Email: zhaslan.madiyev@mdai.gov.kz Olaf J Groth, PhD is a Professor of Practice at UC Berkeley Haas and UT Malaysia and CEO of Cambrian Futures and Cambrian Labs. He is an internationally recognized expert on AI, data, emerging tech, and the future economy, advising Fortune 100s, governments, and forums like WEF. Dr. Groth serves on the AI Council of President Tokayev in Kazakhstan, and on the expert panel of the AI Office for Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim. He’s the author of two books: Solomon’s Code: Humanity in a World of Thinking Machines, and The Great Remobilization: Strategies and Designs for a Smarter Global Future. Email: olaf.groth@berkeley.edu Mr. Askar Sinchev is Consultant to the Executive Office of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Askar Sinchev is a policy expert specializing in artificial intelligence, data governance, and digital public infrastructure. He contributes to national policy initiatives and engages in international discussions on the role of advanced technologies in economic development and global cooperation. Email: a.sinchev@akorda.kz

A History of Japan's Space Program

book cover Review: The Islands and the Stars by Jeff Foust Monday, January 26, 2026 The Islands and the Stars: A History of Japan’s Space Programs by Subodhana Wijeyeratne Stanford University Press, 2026 paperback, 352 pp., illus. ISBN 978-1-5036-4478-6 US$35 Japan’s space industry suffered a setback last month with an unusual—maybe unique—launch failure. An H3 rocket lifted off carrying the Michibiki 5 navigation satellite, but the upper stage malfunctioned and reentered within hours, presumably with the satellite still attached. A report last week said that pressure in the upper stage’s liquid hydrogen tank dropped, causing reduced thrust of the stage’s engine on the first burn and a failure to ignite on the second. That loss of pressure started when the payload fairing separated. Investigators believes a shock from the fairing separation damaged the satellite and its payload adaptor, which fell into the upper stage and damaged propellant lines, creating a leak. The satellite itself, it appears, never made it to space: images show it falling off the upper stage when it separated from the first stage. Japanese space efforts were spread out among many organizations and government agencies for decades. That incident highlights the uneven state of Japan’s space program today. It has struggled in space transportation, both with the H3 and the smaller Epsilon-S rocket that has been grounded since a 2022 failure, a problem that recently forced the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) to purchase two launches from Rocket Lab for tech demo smallsats. But it excels in other areas of space science and technology, such as the Hayabusa and Hayabusa2 missions that returned samples from asteroids before NASA’s OSIRIS-REx mission. Those challenges are explored in The Islands and the Stars, a new history of Japan’s space program. Or, rather, programs, as the book’s subtitle uses the plural for good reason: Japanese space efforts were spread out among many organizations and government agencies for decades. JAXA was formed only in 2003 to centralize civil space activities after problems in launch and other projects reached a breaking point. The book traces the history of Japanese space activities up to the creation of JAXA. There was interest in rocketry in Japan between the two world wars, as in other countries, but during World War II there were only a few rocket-related projects that did not get very far, unlike Germany. The book opens with an effort by Japan to import German expertise and equipment in advanced technologies, including rocketry, by submarine in 1944, but the sub was sunk by the US Navy before reaching Japan. The modern Japanese space program dates to the early 1950s with a project by Hideo Itokawa at the University of Tokyo that started with rockets the size of a pencil. This effort evolved over time into what ultimately became known as the Institute for Space and Astronautical Science (ISAS). Under Itokawa’s leadership, it developed larger rockets, including one that place Japan’s first satellite, Ohsumi, into orbit in 1970. Itokawa was also a promoter and proselytizer of space in the country; in effect, a Japanese von Braun, although one without the controversy over his World War II work (Itokawa designed military aircraft during the war.) By the time ISAS launched Ohsumi with its small solid-propellant rockets, though, there were disruptions to the Japanese space industry. ISAS had rejected proposals to import American technology for liquid-propellant rockets, preferring to develop propulsion systems domestically. Japanese telecommunications companies, though, wanted larger vehicles to launch communications satellites. That led to the creation of the National Space Development Agency, or NASDA, charged with importing that technology for larger vehicles as a step towards development of domestic liquid-propulsion technology. Wijeyeratne argues that many of the “trends and processes” leading up to the formation of JAXA in 2003 have continued afterwards, and events like the H3 failure (the second in seven flights) add weight to it. NASDA and ISAS went on separate paths, with ISAS eventually ending launch vehicle work to focus on space science missions while NASDA worked on the H-1 and H-2 rockets as well as other spacecraft missions. Wijeyeratne, a history professor at Purdue University, argues this reached a breaking point in the 1990s with a series of launch and satellite failures at a time when the Japanese economy, which had been growing rapidly though most of the postwar era, stagnated. The failure of an H-2 launch in 1999, carrying a Japanese weather satellite, was the last straw, resulting in reforms culminating in the formation of JAXA through the combination of ISAS, NASDA, and the National Aerospace Laboratory (although ISAS lives on as a unit within JAXA.) Wijeyeratne argues that many of the “trends and processes” leading up to the formation of JAXA in 2003 have continued afterwards, and events like the H3 failure (the second in seven flights) add weight to it. There are, though, changes in the last two decades in Japan’s space industry that suggest opening of new paths, like the formation of startups developing new spacecraft and launch vehicles similar to those in the US, but with support from the Japanese government (see “Japanese commercial firms as drivers of Japanese space policy,” The Space Review, January 12, 2026.) There are not many English-language histories of the Japanese space program, particularly those that approach the present day, so The Islands and the Stars is a welcome addition that provides insight into the development of programs and agencies. But at just over 200 pages, excluding references and other end matter, many readers may be left wanting more details about specific projects and people. There are also a few rough edges, like a claim that the European Space Agency, which, like Japan, was seeking to get into the commercial launch market in the 1980s, was spending 70% of its budget on launch at the time. ESA documents, like this 1985 annual report, show that ESA was only spending about 30% on launch. The H-2A also had a couple more commercial launches than the book gives it credit for, including for Inmarsat and Telesat, although the author is correct in concluding the vehicle failed to win much non-government business. JAXA is likely to recover from this latest H3 failure, and the vehicle may be flying again within months, albeit with a hit to its reputation. It also suggests, though, that the future of Japan’s space industry may need to be very different from its past for the country to remain a leading player. Jeff Foust (jeff@thespacereview.com) is the editor and publisher of The Space Review, and a senior staff writer with SpaceNews. He also operates the Spacetoday.net web site. Views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone.

Buzz Aldrin, 96, Rescued And Moved To New L.A. Condo

EXCLUSIVE: Buzz Aldrin, 96, Rescued and Moved to New Condo in L.A. — Weeks After Radar Revealed 'Abandoned' Astronaut was 'Living in His Own Filth' By Rebecca Friedman, 15 hours ago Buzz Aldrin will die 'in a very nice place,' a source told Radar. MEGA; Aldrin Family Foundation/Facebook Prayers for Buzz Aldrin have been answered, as the Apollo 11 moon landing legend was rescued and moved to a new condo in Los Angeles — weeks after RadarOnline revealed how the ailing astronaut was "living in his own filth" and "abandoned" by his family. "He’s going to die in a very, very nice place," a source told Radar in a rare update on the 96-year-old's health after the Aldrin family took to Facebook to confirm the space hero was given a new place to live closer to his loved ones. Buzz Aldrin Saved by Family Buzz Aldrin celebrated his 96th birthday with family after they moved him from a 'horrible little apartment.' Aldrin Family Foundation/Facebook In a Facebook post shared to the Aldrin Family Foundation's profile, the former fighter pilot could be seen sporting a T-shirt from his famed Apollo mission while surrounded by his children, grandchildren and other relatives. Another image shows Aldrin enjoying some time relaxing outside at night — perhaps gazing at the stars above — as he saluted the camera while sporting a United States Space Force hat. Apollo Moon Landing Legend Turns 96 Buzz Aldrin's family shared fresh photos of the 96-year-old on his birthday. Aldrin Family Foundation/Facebook "Happy 96th Birthday to our dad, Buzz Aldrin! We had a delightful birthday celebration, surrounded by family at home. Thank you for all the well-wishes from around the globe. It made his day even more special. Dad is loving his new place, and we’re thrilled to have him close by to spend more time together. - Andy & Jan," the post's caption read. The insider informed Radar that the new condo is located in The San Fernando Valley section of Los Angeles. Buzz Aldrin Rescued After Pal's Desperate Plea Buzz Aldrin's friend Steve Barber was concerned about the conditions of the astronaut's former home. RadarOnline.com Steven Barber — a friend of Aldrin who issued a desperate plea to Donald Trump during an interview with Radarat the end of last year — was thrilled by the Aldrin family's update. "The story (on Radar) got it done. Buzz ended up in a beautiful condo. This guy is a national treasure — and because you ran the story, this happened. Had Radar not believed in the story, he’d still be sitting in a pile of s---," Barber confessed, feeling relieved Aldrin can spend his final days closer to family and in a more comfortable home. Just one month ago, Barber felt hopeless as he detailed the "horrific" conditions Aldrin was living in as he was left "abandoned" and "dying" in his bed all alone. The longtime pal of Aldrin provided a photo exclusively to Radar that was snapped during a recent visit with the beloved astronaut. In the picture, the elderly aeronautical engineer stared blankly at the camera while bedridden in a dingy L.A. apartment. He had been receiving oxygen support through his nose, sported a NASA T-shirt and leaned over on a small pillow as beverages and snacks rested on a table beside him for easy access since he reportedly has trouble moving on his own. "This is not the way that this man should be spending the last seconds of his life," Barber declared. "There's no family, there's nothing. It's about the saddest thing I've ever seen.This is not how the second man on the moon should leave the Earth for the last time. He's [part of] the first freaking crew to the moon."

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European Space Launch Startups Lift Off

Isar Spectrum The second Spectrum rocket built by Isar Aerospace is scheduled to launch as soon as January 21. (credit: Isar Aerospace) Liftoff for European launch startups by Jeff Foust Monday, January 19, 2026 It was a little after six o’clock on a Friday evening and the factory was quiet. A little too quiet, perhaps. “Where is everyone?” asked Stefan Brieschenk as he took a visitor on a tour. It was clear that, despite it being late on a Friday, he expected more people to be at work on the company’s rocket. There were, in fact, some people still working: installing cabling in the rocket’s first stage, assembling subsystems, putting equipment into test cells. This scene played out in a facility not in Southern California or Seattle, or Austin or Central Florida. Instead, it was in Augsburg, Germany, a short train ride northwest of Munich, where Rocket Factory Augsburg (RFA), whose chief operating officer is Brieschenk, is developing its RFA ONE small launch vehicle. “We set out to gather data primarily, and that is something that we have successfully achieved,” Isar CEO Daniel Metzler said after the first Spectrum launch. RFA is one of several European companies working to develop new launch vehicles intended to provide dedicated launches of small satellites and ensure European access to space, an issue highlighted by the “launcher crisis” a couple years ago when no European launch vehicles were in service that is now being further emphasized by geopolitics (see “The long recovery from a launcher crisis”, The Space Review, July 7, 2025). In July, the European Space Agency picked RFA and four other companies—Isar Aerospace, MaiaSpace, Orbex, and PLD Space—as “preselected challengers” for its European Launcher Challenge, a program to support those companies through launch contracts and funding to develop upgraded vehicles . It would be up to ESA’s member states to decide which companies to fund, and at what levels, at the agency’s ministerial conference in late November in Bremen, Germany. At the time, ESA officials expected member states to provide about €400 million (US$465 million) in funding: enough to fully fund two of the companies, perhaps, with partial support for one or two others. Instead, ESA members loosened their purse strings and provided more than €900 million, enough to fully fund all—or nearly all—of the five companies. Now it’s time for the companies to deliver. First (and second) to the pad So far, only one of the five companies participating in the European Launcher Challenge has attempted an orbital launch. Last March, Isar Aerospace performed the first launch of Spectrum from Andøya Spaceport in northern Norway. However, the vehicle malfunctioned shortly after liftoff, plummeting into waters adjacent to the launch pad less than a minute after liftoff (see “Europe’s launch challenge”, The Space Review, March 31, 2025.) That launch was billed as a test flight by the Munich-based company, with no customer payloads on board. “We set out to gather data primarily, and that is something that we have successfully achieved,” Isar CEO Daniel Metzler said at a briefing a few hours after that launch. Nearly six months later, the company was ready to explain what went wrong. At a briefing held on the sidelines of the World Space Business Week conference in Paris in mid-September, company executives said the main problem was a loss of attitude control of the rocket, which the company blamed on bending modes of the rocket at liftoff that had not been properly modeled. A second issue was a vent valve on the rocket that was left open, reducing pressures in a propellant tank; that was not directly linked to the failure but would have been an issue if the flight continued. “This flight test for Spectrum was a fully successful story for the company,” argued Alexandre Dalloneau, vice president of mission and launch operations at Isar, at that briefing, collecting essential data for vehicle development. Just as importantly, he added, was that it showed the vehicle’s flight termination system worked. “That’s a huge criterion for us to come back on the pad because we can guarantee a safe system if something goes wrong.” At the time, the company said it was planning a second Spectrum launch near the end of the year or early in 2026. Last Friday, the company announced a launch date for that second launch: no earlier than this Wednesday, January 21, at 9 pm local time (3 pm EST) from Andøya. This mission, unlike the first, will carry customer payloads: five cubesats from European companies and universities, selected as part of an ESA program, along with a hosted payload that will remain attached to the rocket. However, Isar still considers this mission, called “Onward and Upward,” to be a test flight. “We want to push our systems yet again to the limit to see what works and what needs further refining,” Metzler said on a call with reporters January 19 about the launch. The goal of the launch is to deliver those cubesats into a 500-kilometer polar orbit. “We’re a rocket company. Obviously, your goal is always to get to orbit,” he said. But for this flight, success is also collecting data about the vehicle for as long as it flies, through max-Q or maximum dynamic pressure on the first stage, stage separation, and second stage insertion into orbit. “We’re a rocket company. Obviously, your goal is always to get to orbit,” Metzler said. “For us, the goal is actually to make progress overall,” he said. “We want to test more systems. Testing more systems we will do with anything basically more than 30 seconds. Even up to that point we will test more systems. Anything that pushes further than flight one is good for us.” He said there is strong demand for Spectrum, with the vehicle sold out through 2028. He did not disclose how many launches that includes, but noted the company is planning three to four Spectrum flights this year and scaling up from there, with the long-term goal of producing as many as 40 rockets a year. While there is interest in Spectrum worldwide, Metzler cited strong European demand, including from governments. That included not just the European Launcher Challenge, where Isar secured more than €205 million at the ministerial, but also the German government, which plans to spend €35 billion on military space programs over the next five years. “Europe has finally realized how important launch is,” he said. “It’s a good sign for Europe, and we’re there to deliver.” RFA The RFA ONE rocket will launch from SaxaVord Spaceport in the Shetland Islands. (credit: RFA) RFA’s automotive approach For a time, it appeared that RFA would be the first of those European startups to attempt an orbital launch. In 2024, the company was testing its first RFA ONE rocket at SaxaVord Spaceport in the Shetland Islands, and by August it appeared the company was only weeks away from a first launch. Then disaster hit. During a static-fire test of the first stage, one of the engines in the booster had a fire in an oxygen pump, which spread to other engines. The fire engulfed the entire stage, which exploded. The company has been working to incorporate lessons learned from that incident as it builds a new first stage. (The upper stages of the rocket for that first launch were not installed on the first stage for that static fire test, and have been in storage.) The company had hoped to launch in 2025, but by November it was clear that would not happen. “We are now working towards the first launch. This will not happen this year but next year,” said Indulis Kalnins, CEO of RFA, during a panel at Space Tech Expo Europe in November. Kalnins, a former executive with German aerospace company OHB, which owns a majority stake in RFA, took over as CEO in April. He suggested he was focused on trying to mature the company as it moved into operations of RFA ONE. “We have a young team. We have over 300 people from 40 nations, and all of them are motivated,” he said. “But we need to grow up. We need to go into industrialization. We need to build rockets in serial production.” “We have a young team. We have over 300 people from 40 nations, and all of them are motivated,” Kalnins said. “But we need to grow up.” On a visit to RFA’s factory in Augsburg a few days after the conference, the new first stage, featuring engine and other improvements, was on the factory floor. The company has not announced a date for shipping the stage to SaxaVord for testing, or a launch date. However, the company already has a launch license from the UK Civil Aviation Authority. The company is, as Kalnins stated, already thinking about how to ramp up production of the rocket as well as improve performance. One notable aspect of its approach is that it has eschewed the vertical integration that some companies, like SpaceX, has pursued. Instead, it has cast a wide net for suppliers, seeking to have multiple sources for major components. Brieschenk said that included looking to the automotive industry for suppliers of some components rather than traditional aerospace ones. The approach they use, he said, involves looking for off-the-shelf components that come closest to meet their needs, then asking the suppliers if they can modify them to meet RFA’s requirements. The result, he said, is a component that might cost twice as much as the off-the-shelf item. But, he added, that is still far cheaper than what a traditional aerospace supplier can offer. PLD Space The first qualification model of PLD Space’s Miura 5 rocket. (credit: PLD Space) Engines and launch pads Isar Aerospace is, for now, the only one of the European launch startups to have attempted an orbital launch, but another company has flown higher. In October 2023, PLD Space launched its Miura 1 suborbital rocket from a Spanish military base. The rocket reached a peak altitude of 46 kilometers on the flight, which the company declared a success. The company has moved on to Miura 5, its orbital launch vehicle. On a November visit to its facility in an industrial park in Elche, Spain, near the coastal city of Alicante, a qualification model of Miura 5 was on the factory floor. That vehicle, not intended for flight, will instead be used for testing such as a wet dress rehearsal. Elsewhere in the factory, technicians were working on a second qualification model as well as hardware for the first flight model. One key driver for getting Miura 5 ready for its first launch is qualification of the vehicle’s engines, said Raúl Torres, co-founder and CEO of PLD Space, in an interview last fall. “That will go through the first quarter” of 2026, he said. “I think it's easier to do this in the US, because there are a lot of US rocket companies and people can jump from one to the other,” Torres said. “In Europe, there are not so many rocket companies.” The other key factor is development of the launch site for Miura 5 in French Guiana. The company announced last June an agreement with the French space agency CNES to operate from a launch site there formerly used by the Diamant rocket. CNES is converting that pad into a multi-user facility for small launch vehicles, with PLD Space the first to formally sign on to use the site. Building the launch site, he said, was just as difficult as building the rocket. “We’re in the middle of the jungle at a site that is humid, with a lot of water,” he said. “Doing the foundations for that is quite tricky, so it’s going to take more time than expected.” The company is still aiming for a first launch in 2026 of Miura 5. It is also planning to ramp up work on Miura Next, a family of larger launch vehicles. The company has grown to more than 400 employees, but Torres said one challenge has been attracting talent. “I think it's easier to do this in the US, because there are a lot of US rocket companies and people can jump from one to the other,” he said. “In Europe, there are not so many rocket companies. The mindset is different. You want to stay in your country, close to your family.” As a result, he estimated more three-quarters of the company's employees come from outside the space industry. “So, you need to teach, and that takes time,” he said. “It’s quite hard finding people with previous experience in rocket science.” MaiaSpace MaiaSpace CEO Yohann Leroy poses with a prototype of the company’s launcher at its factor in Vernon, France, in September. (credit: J. Foust) A different kind of launch startup Many European launch startups are just that: companies with entrepreneurial roots that bootstrapped themselves and raised venture capital. MaiaSpace, by contrast, was spun out of ArianeGroup, the aerospace and defense giant that is the prime contractor for the Ariane 6 as well as for French ballistic missiles. Those ties have given the company an advantage, at least among French launch startups. Others, like HyPrSpace and Latitude, expected MaiaSpace to be a shoo-in for the European Launcher Challenge because the French government planned to back just a single company in the program, picking the one with ties to the aerospace establishment. MaiaSpace still considers itself a startup. Most of the company’s engineers work in an office near Paris, but the company’s factory is west of Paris in Vernon, part of a larger ArianeGroup facility there. MaiaSpace is working on a new factory in Vernon set to begin operations in 2027, with a goal of producing 20 vehicles a year by the early 2030s. “The European Launcher Challenge is important for us,” said Yohann Leroy, CEO of MaiaSpace, during a visit to the Vernon factory in September. “Public support is essential.” Notably, while the European Launcher Challenge allowed companies to seek funding for launch contracts as well as development of enhanced launch versions, MaiaSpace was interested in only the former. “We want to stay within our logic, which is that we fund the development with private money,” he said. “We prefer public money to come as a result of the services we provide.” That development has been initially supported by a €125 million investment from ArianeGroup. That, though, is just a downpayment on the overall development cost of MaiaSpace’s launcher. “We want to stay within our logic, which is that we fund the development with private money,” Leroy said. “We prefer public money to come as a result of the services we provide.” “It’s a high single digit of hundreds of millions of euros for a project of our size,” he said, a figure that covers development costs as well as operating losses in the early years of operations of the vehicle. During the September visit, he said he was expecting another capital infusion of potentially several hundred million euros from ArianeGroup by the end of the year. “We are not like a standard startup who gets money from financial investors,” he said. “We get money from a strategic investor, which is ArianeGroup.” Neither ArianeGroup nor MaiaSpace have announced that additional investment, but MaiaSpace achieved another milestone last week. Paris-based satellite operator Eutelsat said it signed a multi-launch agreement with MaiaSpace to deploy some of its 440 OneWeb replenishment satellites being built by Airbus Defence and Space. The companies did not disclose terms of the deal but said those launches could begin as soon as 2027. “This agreement with an experienced and renowned satellite operator confirms that Maia is well-suited for deploying or replenishing satellite broadband constellations,” Leroy said in a statement. Orbex Orbex released this image in November of hardware for its Prime launch vehicle, although the company did not clarify if this was flight or test hardware. (credit: Orbex) Odd one out? At the ESA ministerial, MaiaSpace secured €184.2 million, slightly more than the €169 million it sought, almost all from France. Germany, which provided most of the funding Isar Aerospace received, also provided nearly all the €190.5 million RFA received. Spain fully funded PLD Space at €169 million. Then there is Orbex, the fifth pre-selected challenger. The company, based on Scotland with engine development facilities in Denmark, has been working for several years on its Prime small launcher. In 2018, it won funding from the UK Space Agency as part of plans to establish a launch site in northern Scotland. Development of Prime, though, had fallen years behind schedule. In December 2024, the company announced it was halting plans to develop that spaceport and would instead use SaxaVord Spaceport, with plans for a first launch there in 2025. But 2025 came and went without a launch, and with few updates on vehicle progress. While the United Kingdom was expected to be the champion and lead funder for Orbex through the European Launcher Challenge, much like France, Germany, and Spain did for their companies, the British government appeared to hedge its bets. While the government committed €144 million overall to the European Launcher Challenge, it provided only €21.7 million to Orbex. It assigned €10 million to RFA, which launches from SaxaVord, but the remaining €112.3 million was unallocated. “To get an anchor tenant in the European Space Agency for a European launch company is absolutely essential,” Bone said. “We are working with multiple partners to ensure this funding delivers our requirements for assured access to space and benefits U.K. taxpayers,” a UK Space Agency spokesperson said in early December. “Allocations to specific operators will be set out in due course.” Orbex, like the other companies, had been banking on getting European Launcher Challenge funding for launch contracts and vehicle development. “From an Orbex perspective, ELC was very welcome,” John Bone, Orbex’s chief commercial officer, said at Space Tech Expo Europe in November. “To get an anchor tenant in the European Space Agency for a European launch company is absolutely essential.” After the ministerial, the company said little about the UK’s decision not to immediately allocate more funding to it. “The most important thing is to see continued state backing for our industry, and we are delighted that remains in place,” the company stated, adding it was “digesting the details” from the ministerial. The UK government will soon have to decide what to do with its unallocated ELC funds. At a press conference earlier this month, Toni Tolker-Nielsen, ESA’s director of space transportation, said the UK needed to assign its unallocated funds to a program before ESA could start awarding contracts to the companies. “There’s no contracts without the UK taking a decision to allocate this money to a specific project,” he said. “That should happen in the coming two to three months.” How many survive As the ELC companies move forward on their vehicles, one overriding question remains: how many will survive? Even those that overcome technical and financial obstacles still need to find sufficient demand to close their business cases. That has proven difficult in the United States, where small launch vehicle startups found it difficult to compete with the low prices of SpaceX rideshare missions and the high launch cadence of Rocket Lab’s Electron. Most have either moved to larger vehicles, like Relativity Space abandoning the Terran 1 for the larger Terran R, or have pivoted to other markets, like ABL Space Systems’ move to missile defense. Others have gone out of business. There is similar skepticism in Europe. “I believe the market is not large enough for more than a maximum of two players to survive in Europe,” MaiaSpace’s Leroy said in September. He added he expected MaiaSpace to be one of those companies because of the higher performance of its rocket, which can place up to four tons into orbit. “I believe having a few hundred kilograms of performance makes no sense. You cannot build a profitable business.” Isar’s Metzler, though, thinks there is larger demand in Europe for small launch vehicles, driven in part by an increase in European military and other government spending and a desire to develop sovereign capabilities. “Launch is the smallest common denominator in the space industry,” he noted. “Everything you put up there and operate there has to go through launch.” “We could sell every rocket almost 20 times based on customer demand,” he added. “I can’t follow anyone saying there’s going to be too many rockets, especially out of Europe.” Jeff Foust (jeff@thespacereview.com) is the editor and publisher of The Space Review, and a senior staff writer with SpaceNews. He also operates the Spacetoday.net web site. Views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone.

The PSLV-C62 Marks A Failure For India's Space Program

PSLV The PSLV rocket before the launch of the ill-fated PSLV-C62/EOS-N1 mission. (credit: ISRO) The PSLV-C62 failure marks a setback for India’s space ambitions by Ajey Lele Monday, January 19, 2026 On January 12, the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) experienced a setback when its PSLV-C62/EOS-N1 mission failed to reach the designated orbit. While the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) performed nominally during its first two stages, an anomaly occurred during the third stage of the launch. Notably, on the previous PSLV mission, C61, launched in May 2025, also failed to reach orbit because of a problem with the third stage. Since September 1993, there have been 64 PSLV launches and, among them, five missions have failed. Because the PSLV has built an excellent track record over the years, the recent failures represent a serious concern. Because the PSLV has built an excellent track record over the years, the recent failures represent a serious concern. The PSLV-C62/EOS-N1 mission had carried India’s EOS-N1 Earth observation satellite along with 15 co-passenger satellites from domestic and international customers. Interestingly, one of these satellites, Kestrel Initial Demonstrator (KID), a small-scale prototype of a reentry vehicle from Spanish startup Orbital Paradigm, beat the odds and managed to transmit some data. It is important to analyse the loss of this mission at the technological, commercial, and strategic level. ISRO has already established a fact-finding committee, the failure analysis committee, to identify the exact reasons behind this loss. Surprisingly, the fact-finding committee’s report on the loss of PSLV-C61 has not been placed in the public domain. As a result, there is little clarity on the specific lessons drawn from the 2025 failure and what corrective measures, if any, were implemented before undertaking the first PSLV mission of 2026. The PSLV is capable of placing multiple payloads into orbit. It is a four-stage rocket that uses solid- and liquid-propulsion systems alternately. The third stage uses solid propellant and produces a maximum thrust of 250 kilonewtons, and its burn duration is bit less than two minutes. According to some reports, during the PSLV-C61 mission, there was a pressure drop, which could have impacted the acceleration. This could have been caused by a possible manufacturing defect in some unit. During its latest flight, the mission did progress normally through the first two stages and most of the third stage. However, controllers detected increased disturbances near the end of the third stage burn, followed by a deviation in the flight path. During the third stage, the rocket is largely operating on pre-programmed guidance and inertial navigation. Hence, the failure could be caused by problems with hardware, materials, ignition, or control systems. The KID payload of Orbital Paradigm survived the PSLV-C62 launch failure. According to reports, there was a transmission of flight data for 190 seconds despite the launch vehicle’s third-stage anomaly. According to ISRO, KID was to be the last co-passenger to be injected (connected with the fourth stage of the rocket) into the orbit, after which it was slated to re-enter the Earth’s atmosphere towards splashdown in the South Pacific Ocean. Importantly, KID, a 25-kilogram football-sized space capsule, endured forces beyond design limits and returned partial telemetry. The company said various key systems like separation, power supply, and data transmission worked properly even under degraded conditions and after reentry. Their initial analysis suggests that four of the five planned mission milestones were achieved, though in an unexpected, off-nominal way. However, because customer data could not be delivered, the company is not declaring the mission as a success. However, the main EOS-N1 payload and the other 14 payloads were lost. There were five payloads from an Indian startup, Dhruva Space, which was co-partnering with university students. The satellites were meant for technology demonstrations, including running large AI models directly on the satellite. Another Indian start-up, OrbitAID Aerospace, had a satellite designed to perform an on-orbit satellite refuelling experiment. There was one more satellite for another Indian agency. A company from Brazil, AlltoSpace, had five payloads that included IoT sensors for collection of data on agriculture and some other purposes. There was also a satellite for Nepal University. India has been launching satellites for foreign organizations since 1999, when the first satellite was launched for Germany. India has launched 434 satellites for 36 countries so far. Importantly, until now all ISRO carrying missions foreign payloads had been successful. Recently, ISRO developed another vehicle for launching payloads of up to 500 kilograms to LEO, called Small Satellite Launch Vehicle (SSLV). It was designed to support future commercial interests. Today, India’s share in the global space market is only about 2–3%, but the country aims to raise this to around 8–9% in the coming years. Given ISRO’s previously unblemished record in providing launch services to foreign customers, many clients worldwide had been keen to work with them. Will the failure of PSLV-C62 erode the confidence of such customers? It may be too early to draw such a conclusion, but ISRO will certainly need to tighten its processes and demonstrate renewed reliability quickly. From an Indian perspective, the back-to-back PSLV failures have also affected military preparedness. ISRO’s first mission failure of 2026 was not only a setback for the space agency, but also for Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). The mission’s primary payload, EOS-N1, was a DRDO-developed hyperspectral Earth imaging satellite intended to meet specific surveillance and infrastructure-monitoring requirements. As India’s first such strategic satellite, it was envisioned to provide near real-time intelligence for national security needs. It is worth noting that ISRO had earlier launched the Hyperspectral Imaging Satellite (HySIS) in 2018, primarily for civilian applications. From an Indian perspective, the back-to-back PSLV failures have also affected military preparedness. India’s neighborhood has become increasingly disturbed because of a combination of persistent border disputes and internal political instability in nearby states. India’s unresolved tensions with Pakistan and China, coupled with recent military operations such as Operation Sindoor (May 7-10 of last year), underline the increasingly contested security environment. The persistent border violations and sustained infrastructure buildups by adversaries along India’s international borders demonstrate the value of timely and reliable satellite imagery to support strategic assessments. India is aware that China has successfully launched Pakistan’s first hyperspectral imaging satellite on October 19, 2025, called HS-1 (Hyperspectral Satellite-1). Pakistani officials have mentioned that the satellite data would be supporting major infrastructure initiatives having geostrategic significance, such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) linking Xinjiang to Gwadar Port. Pakistan also called the satellite’s deployment a pivotal step towards deepening strategic partnership with China. It is known that China had provided Pakistan with real-time support from space-based systems for military use during India's Operation Sindoor. During the May 2025 PSLV-C61 mission, India lost the Earth observation satellite EOS-09, also known as RISAT-1B. It was intended to be the seventh satellite in India’s RISAT series. The satellite’s primary payload was a synthetic aperture radar (SAR), which has significant defense utility as it enables imaging at both day and night as well as under adverse weather conditions. Unfortunately, over the past five years, two other ISRO missions involving strategic payloads also encountered setbacks. The GSLV-F10/EOS-03 mission failed in August 2021, resulting in the loss of EOS-03, a next-generation Earth-observation satellite. More recently, the GSLV-F15 mission in January 2025, which was ISRO’s 100th rocket launch from the Sriharikota spaceport, was only a partial success: the launch vehicle’s performance was precise, but the navigation satellite NVS-02 could not be maneuvered into its designated geostationary orbit. It can be said that, in the domain of space, failure is inevitable. On December 22, 2025, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) experienced a failure of its H3 launch vehicle, while it was carrying a navigation satellite. This failure has also come as a shock to JAXA since the previous five H3 launches were all successful. By the end of 2025, China’s ambition to operationalize reusable launch vehicles encountered setbacks, with two back-to-back missions failing to recover the first-stage booster despite successful launches. This is the nature of the space business. The back-to-back failures will momentarily derail ISRO’s space ambitions, with some projected timelines for future missions likely to slip further. ISRO will need to learn from recent failures and move on. Ajey Lele is Deputy Director General at MP-IDSA, New Delhi, India and the views expressed are personal.

The Late Great Martin Caidin

Caidin Martin Caidin, who died in 1997, was a prolific aviation and space author. (credit: Wikipedia) A hell of a character: the late, great, Martin Caidin by Dwayne A. Day Monday, January 19, 2026 There was a time when novelists—not all of them, but some of them—were larger than life versions of the characters they wrote: hard-drinking, cigar-chomping manly men who tried to out macho their literary rivals. They treated their typewriters as weapons and had reputations that were legendary. Hemmingway and Norman Mailer were the epitome of that stereotype. Although he was a much less capable writer, Martin Caidin was cut from that mold. He deserves a biography, he is getting a documentary, and he currently has a small museum exhibit at the Sands Space History Museum just outside the gate of Cape Canaveral Space Force Station in Florida. Caidin was an author, screenwriter, and an authority on aviation. And he was also a bit of a weirdo. Martin Caidin was born in 1927 and died of thyroid cancer in 1997 at the age of 69, leaving behind a wife, two daughters, and three grandchildren. He began writing in the 1950s and then started writing fiction a few years later. He was one of those people who could crank out books and articles like a machine. He wrote more than 50 fiction and non-fiction books (one source claims as many as 80), and more than 1,000 magazine articles during his lifetime. His most famous successful book was Cyborg, the novel that formed the basis of The Six Million Dollar Man television franchise. In some ways Caidin was typical of the authors who wrote for men’s magazines in the 1950s and 1960s, stories illustrated with shirtless heroes fighting off Nazis—or tigers—while a buxom damsel hid behind them. Caidin primarily wrote about flying, aviation and planes, spaceflight and astronauts, and current and near-term science fiction. He was nowhere near as talented as Norman Mailer or the other literary greats, but he was damn prolific. Caidin was an author, screenwriter, and an authority on aviation. He was also a pilot and bought and restored a 1936 Junkers Ju 52 airplane. Later in life he became a talk show host. And he was also a bit of a weirdo. Caidin Caidin's book Cyborg inspired the 1970s television show The Six-Million Dollar Man. (credit: Universal Television) Have typewriter, will fly Martin Caidin was one of several authors, like Willy Ley, whose name became attached to the early space age because they were all over that topic. If you were looking for books on aviation and spaceflight in the 1960s, Caidin’s name appeared on the spines of many of them, and his articles popped up in many magazines. He lived near Cape Canaveral and wrote books about astronauts and pilots. He was for a while enamored of stories involving humans merged with machines and set in the present day. Caidin’s writing career started in the mid-1950s with Jets, Rockets and Guided Missiles, and Rockets Beyond the Earth. In 1954 he published Worlds in Space. The book proposed a future of space exploration that included a space station and a colony on the Moon, as well as journeys to the planets. He did not think that a space station would be militarily useful and focused on its scientific value. At that time, before there were real satellites, writing realistically about satellites was essentially writing science fiction. He knew he was speculating about spaceflight but acknowledged that it was hard not to speculate about a technology that was on the edge of literally taking off. Caidin’s book was reviewed by the New York Times, a major achievement by a young author. Caidin Caidin's original draft for his most popular book, Cyborg. (credit: author) Throughout the 1960s Caidin wrote non-fiction books, primarily about airplanes, and began to expand into fiction, including spaceflight. He wrote Cyborg in 1972, and within a year it became the basis of the television movie The Six Million Dollar Man. He wrote three sequels: Operation Nuke, High Crystal, and Cyborg IV. He reportedly witnessed the crash of the M2-F-2 lifting body aircraft that was featured at the beginning of the TV show. Caidin Caidin's book Marooned inspired a movie by the same name. (credit: Columbia Pictures) Astronauts were the protagonists in many of Caidin’s novels, although fully developed characters were not his forte. His 1964 novel Marooned was about American astronauts who become stranded in space and NASA's attempt to rescue them. In 1969, the book was adapted into a movie of the same name. Caidin also revised his earlier novel as a movie novelization, changing the focus from the Mercury program of the original to the then-current Apollo program. Caidin Notes for Caidin's manuscript The Cape, about saboteurs blowing up a Saturn V rocket in the Vehicle Assembly Building. (credit: Glen Swanson) Another 1970s Caidin novel, The Cape, featured terrorists blowing up a Saturn V rocket inside the giant Vehicle Assembly Building. Caidin knew that the rocket would not be fueled in the VAB, so he concocted a plot by which it was loaded with propellants when it went boom. Caidin also wrote a novel about the Soviets beating the United States to the Moon, and also Four Came Back, about a space station. He also wrote about artificial intelligence in the form of a supercomputer that seeks to take over the planet. One of his favorite books that he wrote was called Exit Earth, about a space ark leaving the Earth. Caidin also played in other authors’ sandboxes. He wrote Buck Rogers: A Life in the Future, an adaptation of the pulp fiction and comic strip character, and an Indiana Jones tie-in novel. He wrote the movie novelization for The Final Countdown, about the then-new aircraft carrier USS Nimitz traveling back in time to just before the Pearl Harbor attack. (Nimitz is now being decommissioned.) Although he was too young to serve in World War II, Caidin wrote many books about pilots and planes during the war, including Flying Forts, Thunderbolt!, and Fork-Tailed Devil: The P-38. He wrote a book about the C-130 Hercules, and helped write autobiographies, including cosmonaut Gherman Titov’s I Am Eagle!, and Saburo Sakai’s Samurai!. He also wrote the Man-In-Space Dictionary, Man Into Space, Vanguard!, Spaceport U.S.A., and Rendezvous in Space. Caidin’s audience was male and he undoubtedly had a substantial teenage boy fandom enamored with his flying tales. He also worked to get young people into aviation. Caidin Caidin was the author of at least fifty books on a wide variety of aviation and space subjects. (credit: author) The author has wings Caidin wasn’t just a writer: he had experience with many of the topics he wrote about. In 1961 he was one of the pilots of a formation flight of B-17s across the Atlantic Ocean. He turned that into a book called Everything But the Flak. He worked as a pilot for a movie and used his pilot connections to spend time in military aircraft. If he was alive today, Caidin would undoubtedly have a YouTube channel and a podcast. In the mid-1980s he hosted a confrontational television talk show. The biggest contributor to his reputation as a larger-than-life character was a pre-World War II German transport plane. Caidin bought and restored a Junkers Ju 52 aircraft and named it Iron Annie. In November 1981, Caidin was flying the plane when 19 people walked on one of its wings, setting a world record. In 1984, he sold Iron Annie to Lufthansa, which renamed it Tempelhof after a Berlin airport. The plane continues to fly for the airline for special flights. Of course, Caidin turned his experiences restoring the plane and flying it into several more books. Moving things with his brain In the 1970s, paranormal stories were popular and there was a mass market for books about UFOs, extraterrestrials, ghosts, Bigfoot, and the Bermuda Triangle. In 1975 Caidin wrote a Bermuda Triangle novel Three Corners To Nowhere. But although he was a purveyor of what some called “engineering fiction,” with a heavy emphasis on technology, Caidin also eventually claimed that he had telekinetic powers, and could move objects with his mind. Whether this was just Caidin telling tall tales for publicity, or if he truly believed he could do it, is unclear, but he refused to prove it to a public skeptic. If he was alive today, Caidin would undoubtedly have a YouTube channel and a podcast. In the mid-1980s he hosted a confrontational television talk show. This was an emerging trend at the time, with CNN’s Crossfire, The Morton Downey Jr. Show in the late 1980s, and perfected by Jerry Springer in the 1990s. Caidin’s unique twist was that he went after far-right organizations such as the head of the Jewish Defense League, the head of the American Nazi Party, and other far-right spokespeople. These confrontational shows were a double-edged sword, however: Caidin was not just talking with people he disagreed with, he was giving fringe hate-mongers a platform to espouse their views when they would otherwise have trouble gaining media attention. A spokesman for the Aryan Nations hate group would almost never be able to get on television unless he was arrested, but Caidin gave him airtime. That issue is current in today’s politics, but a major difference is that today it is much easier for fringe characters to reach mass audiences than it was when Caidin hosted his show. Caidin Caidin Caidin Caidin Caidin Caidin The Sands Space History Center in Florida currently has a display about Martin Caidin, who lived nearby and regularly wrote about about aviation and space subjects, both fiction and non-fiction. (credit: Dwayne Day) Have cigar, will travel Martin Caidin was known for haunting the bars and hangars around Cape Canaveral—he met his fourth wife, Dee-Dee, when she came up to him in his regular booth in the famed Bernard’s Surf bar in Cocoa Beach to argue with him about the ending of one of his books. But nobody has fully chronicled the story of the man himself. How did he treat his family and friends? He was prolific, but what did his editors think of him? Did he miss deadlines, bounce checks, tell lewd jokes? How much of his public persona was real vs. invented? How many of his non-fiction stories were true vs. exaggerations to sell books? Hopefully, the upcoming documentary will shed more light on him. The Sands Space History Center display is small and devoted primarily to his works rather than the man. But hopefully it may inspire somebody to dig deeper about the crazy, cigar-chomping guy who wrote about spaceflight and aviation in the ’50s, ’60s, ’70s, and ’80s, and flew a German transport plane with people walking on the wing. Dwayne Day can be reached at zirconic1@cox.net.

Russian Counter Space Capabilities

Cosmos 2589 launch The launch of Cosmos 2589, a spacecraft with a likely counterpsace mission. (credit: Russian MoD) The successful development of Russia’s counterspace activities in LEO and GEO by Matthew Mowthorpe and Markos Trichas Monday, January 19, 2026 Russia has continued to develop its arsenal of counterspace capabilities. This has been undertaken often under the guise of developing experimental space systems. This research and development once in orbit and successfully proven has become operational. This includes co-orbital ASAT (Nivelir) systems described as space domain awareness and space-based situational systems. Soviet history has shown Russia capable of developing multiple classes of orbital ASAT systems. As will be shown in the analysis of orbital regime, maneuverability, and actions, there is a strong likelihood that Russia is developing multiple kinetic interceptor types of co-orbital ASATs. However, for simplicity in this article, we shall refer to all co-orbital ASATs with some sort of kinetic intercept capability as “Nivelir” class satellites. Soviet history has shown Russia capable of developing multiple classes of orbital ASAT systems. There is a strong likelihood that Russia is developing multiple kinetic interceptor types of co-orbital ASATs. Russia recently successfully developed a Nivelir ASAT capability in GEO. Alongside this has been ground-based ASAT development, most notably the successful interception in November 2021 against a Russian defunct satellite. This was seen by some observers as a warning to the US and NATO allies, prior to the invasion of Ukraine, not to interfere with Russia’s military attack. Other Russian counterspace systems, such as the potential deployment in 2022 of a nuclear weapon, have signalled Russian intent to overcome US megaconstellations such as Starlink. This article analyses these offensive ASAT capabilities, along with directed energy weapons and electronic warfare both from space- and ground-based ASATs. Direct-ascent assets Besides the highly advanced co-orbital assets, Russia has been developing highly capable direct-ascent systems. Direct-ascent systems are ground-based systems, often mobile, which include a ground-to-space missile designed to intercept a target satellite. Such a Russian system, named Nudol, has been tested around ten times with varying levels of success. Almaz-Antey, whose principal role is active space defense technologies, has pitched the system as valuable for holding US LEO assets at risk.[1] Nudol is a TEL-based system composed of the 14A042 Nudol rocket, 14P078 command and control system, and 14TS031 radar. In November 2021, Russia successfully intercepted one of its own satellites in LEO, using Nudol. The operational capability of NUDOL is up to 850 kilometers. It is likely, given successful testing, Nudol is operational. Russian co-orbital ASAT development: Nivelir On December 25, 2013, three small satellites were launched into LEO that looked like a routine Rodnik satcom activity. The Russian Ministry of Defense publicly announced the three satellites—Cosmos 2488, 2489, and 2490—had successfully separated from the upper stage. However, a fourth payload, Cosmos 2491, was catalogued by the US military. Cosmos 2491 remained dormant until the end of 2019, in LEO at an altitude of 1,500 kilometers. Cosmos 2491 was identified by NASA as a secretive Russian satellite which performed orbital rendezvous and inspection maneuvers. On May 23, 2014, during another Rodnik mission, three military satellites were declared by the Russian government: Cosmos 2496, 2497, and 2498. Like the 2013 launch, a fourth payload was identified, Cosmos 2499.They performed a similar maneuverers to the previous satellites. In 2015, three Gonets-M satellites were launched and openly declared as Gonets M11-M13, along with a classified military payload, Cosmos 2504.[2] After a period of inactivity, on March 27, 2017, Cosmos 2504 lowered its orbit and passed within two kilometers of a piece of Chinese debris from the 2007 ASAT test. On June 23, 2017, Cosmos 2519 was launched, which Russian officials included “a space platform which can carry different variants of payloads”[3] It made a series of small maneuvers in late July and August. On August 23, 2017, a small satellite designated Cosmos 2521 separated from Cosmos 2519. Cosmos 2521 was declared by Russian officials as “intended for the inspection of the condition of a Russian satellite.”[4] On October 30, Cosmos 2523, another small satellite, separated from Cosmos 2521. Cosmos 2523 was released at a velocity of 27 meters per second. At this speed, it appears likely that Cosmos 2523 could be a projectile and part of an ASAT mission. Throughout March, April, and June 2018, Cosmos 2519 and 2521 conducted several rendezvous and proximity operations (RPOs) of each other.[5] On November 25, 2019, Russia launched Cosmos 2542, which was likely the second satellite in the Nivelir series. On December 6, Cosmos 2542 released a sub-satellite, Cosmos 2453, which remained within two kilometers of Cosmos 2542 for three days before it conducted a series of maneuvers to raise its apogee to 590 kilometers by December 16. These maneuvers suggest that Cosmos 2453 moved to where it could observe a US intelligence satellite, USA 245. Cosmos 2453 came within 20 kilometers of USA 245 several times in January 2020. This proximity sparked concerns from US Space Command. In June 2020, Cosmos 2543 maneuverer to come within 60 kilometers of Cosmos 2535. On July 15, like the first Nivelir, a small piece of debris separated from Cosmos 2543 at a relative velocity between 140 to 186 meters per second. It is likely this is a similar event to Cosmos 2523 in October 2017, which was the first of Russia’s Nivelir test program. Both the US and UK Space Commands called on Russia to desist their testing of the system.[6] Cosmos 2589 may achieve GEOin April. This is of significance as it represents the first time Russia will have an ASAT capability in GEO using Nivelir. On August 1, 2022, a Russian Soyuz 2.1v launch vehicle placed a mysterious satellite, dubbed Cosmos 2558 (2022-089A, 53323) into LEO. The launch timing and initial orbit appeared to coincide with the orbital plane of USA 326, a classified NRO imagery satellite that was launched in February 2022. Analysis suggested that the orbits of Cosmos 2558 and USA 326 were very similar in inclination and would periodically come within 60 to 70 kilometers in altitude of each other. On August 18, 2022, USSPACECOM released a statement condemning Russia for this action, calling the activities of Cosmos 2558 “dangerous and irresponsible behavior.” Further analysis confirmed that, as of September 2022, Cosmos 2558 had altered its orbit to continue to match the orbital plane of USA 326, although it is not in an actual proximity orbit. It is unclear whether Cosmos 2558 is related to Cosmos 2535 or Cosmos 2542. It is highly likely that Cosmos 2576 launched on May 16, 2024, is part of the Nivelir ASAT program. It is the fourth in the series of co-orbital ASAT testing satellites, like those condemned by both the US and UK Space Commands previously. Recent Cosmos 2588 Nivelir ASAT activity On 26 June 2025 Russia released a subsatellite from Cosmos 2558 what was called Object C (64627).[7] Russia maneuvered Object C twice between July 6 and 20. On July 8-10, Object C decreased its average altitude 16 kilometers, then on July 10-11 increased Object C’s altitude 33.7 kilometers.[8] Object C, as of July 20, had an average altitude of 453.3 kilometers, whilst Cosmos 2558 had not maneuvered since mid-April 2025 and was losing average altitude and, as of Jul 20, was down to 449.4 kilometers.[9] Object C’s orbital maneuvers put it at a closest point of approach with USA 326 on July 19 of 58 kilometers.[10] Prior to this the closest point of approach was about 76 kilometers. Open-source speculation is that Cosmos 2558 and Object C are part of the Nivelir program[11] and that Object C was mirroring similar behavior to Cosmos 2542 and 2543, which came within 20 kilometers of USA 245 in January 2020.[12] Between September 6 and 9, Cosmos 2588 raised its orbit by about 6.4 kilometers, remaining nearly coplanar with USA 338.[13] The closes point of approach is less than 100 kilometers every four days. Cosmos 2589 and 2590 assessed Nivelir HEO proximity operations On June 23, 2025, Cosmos 2589 (64467) was launched into a highly elliptical orbit (HEO) with an apogee of 51,200 kilometers and perigee of 20,374 kilometers. On June 26, Cosmos 2589 released a subsatellite, Object D (64527), and conducted maneuvering with Cosmos 2589. It is suspected that Cosmos 2589 is a Nivelir inspection satellite and has a counterspace capability. Analysis of Cosmos 2589 and Object D Cosmos 2589 and Object D continued to perform orbital manoeuvres between July 21 and August 2.[14] An observable maneuver from Cosmos 2589 was on July 7 with ranges between Object D varying between 100 kilometers on July 22 and less than 1 kilometers on July 27. At their closest approach they were less than one kilometer apart for more than hours, from about 1800 to 2223 UTC.[15] On August 1, the two satellites separated to beyond 60 kilometer, then rendezvoused to less than 10 kilometers. On about August 3, Object D maneuvered, ending the proximity operations, or proxops, with Cosmos 2589.[16] On August 16, the two satellites were 55 to 130 kilometers apart. Between August 20 and 27, Object D made small maneuvers, resuming proxops with Cosmos 2589.[17] It is assessed that Object D made the majority of the maneuvers, and closes point of approach was less than 15 kilometers. On 18-19 July 2025 Cosmos 2589 and Object D conducted a close approach of less than five kilometers, some reports that it could have been less than one kilometer.[18] Object D was registered in September 2025 as Cosmos 2590.[19] Cosmos 2589 and Cosmos 2590 continue to perform operations. Their orbital parameters are separated by 6 to 15 kilometers.[20] Cosmos 2590 is performing the bulk of the maneuvers while Cosmos 2589 likely did not perform any maneuvers in August and September. The last reported clear maneuver was July 8.[21] Cosmos 2590 maneuvered several times between September 29 and October 9. Cosmos 2589 and 2590 had proxops of seven kilometers on October 1 at 1016 UTC.[22] Following this, the two satellites separated and, as of October 10, they are more than 200 kilometers apart. After months of operating in proximity with one another Cosmos 2589 and Cosmos 2590 appear to be heading their separate ways. Cosmos 2589 began conducting maneuvers to circularize its orbit on November 19.[23] Once Cosmos 2589’s orbit has been circularized, the satellite will have finally joined the geosynchronous belt. From the orbital projections below, assuming that Cosmos 2589 maintains its current circularizing maneuvers, it will achieve GEO on April 21, 2026. This is of significance as it represents the first time Russia will have an ASAT capability in GEO using Nivelir. Electronic warfare (EW) at space targets and from space Russia demonstrated its GPS jamming capability during the Russian 2017 Zapad military exercise[24] and during a NATO exercise, when Norway determined Russia was responsible for jamming GPS signals in the Kola Peninsula during Exercise Trident Juncture.[25] The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in April 2021 identified in Ukraine an increase in GPS jamming by Russian or pro-Russian forces. On April 6, 2021, a Special Monitoring Mission long-range UAV was unable to take off from a Ukrainian airbase in Stepanivka due to GPS signal interference. In addition, Russian jamming of GPS signals in Ukraine has been detected by US forces in the region. On the February 24, 2022, a cyberattack against a commercial satellite network belonging to the US company Viasat not only had an impact on Ukrainian military actors but also damaged the terminals of civilian customers across Europe and affected thousands of wind turbines in Germany. Tens of thousands of satellite modems had their internet service knocked out after being flooded with traffic along with destructive commands to overwrite key data. This highlights the wider impact that cyberattacks can have on the satellite industry. Jamming of satellite communications “Traditional” satcom jamming is another counterspace area where Russia have invested significant effort. The R-330Zh “Zhitel” mobile jammer is reported to able to jam commercial Inmarsat and Iridium receivers within a tactical local area. The TsNII research institute has declared that Tirada-2S was under development and will be used to conduct uplink jamming of comsats.[26] It is likely Tirada-2S is currently in service. Another system under development is Bylina-MM, which is designed to suppress the on-board transponders on comsats such as Milstar, Skynet, and Italsat.[27] Another key project in Russia’s EW program is TOBOL, designated 14Ts227 with a project infrastructure code of 8282. Indications about the goals of Tobol suggest that the site would have an array of ground-based antennas that would pick up and jam what are called unauthorized signals sent to satellites or relayed via satellites to the ground. Vladimir M. Vatutin, who heads a department within Russian Space Systems and is identified as TOBOL’s chief designer, has coauthored several papers and patents related to the protection of satellites from electronic attack. One such patent describes an array of ground-based antennas that would be used to pick up and jam unauthorized signals sent to satellites relayed via satellites to the ground.[28] In another scenario, unauthorized signals downlinked from a satellite to the ground would be identified by monitoring stations, following which the tropospheric stations would transmit jamming signals that would reach receivers after being reflected off the troposphere and cancel out the effects of the unauthorized signals.[29] Another paper co-authored by Vatutin discussed the possibility of using EW techniques to prevent both optical and radar reconnaissance satellites from sending images to data relay satellites as they fly over. This reflects growing interest in the use of EW systems to counter foreign reconnaissance assets. Finally, the Krashuka-4 mobile EW system, designed to counter airborne early warning and control and other airborne radar, has an effective range of 300 kilometers. Due to its range and power, it is also effective against LEO synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imaging satellites. Directed energy weapons Russia has a long history of research in high-energy laser physics. Directed energy weapons (DEW) damage a target with highly focused energy without a solid projectile. Russia revived its old Soviet Airborne Laser system in 2012, called Sokol-Echelon. The Russian ABL was designed to counter space-based reconnaissance assets in the infrared part of the spectrum, dazzling rather than destroying. The laser type selected was a carbon monoxide laser. In mid-2018 a court document declared that the MOD had decided to cancel the project in late 2017; however, contracts signed as part of the project continue to appear on the Russia’s government procurement website afterwards. Reporting has suggested that Ukraine had destroyed the airfield which contained the Russian ABL system which would indicate that Russia no longer has such a capability.[30] What is clear is any detonation in LEO of a Russian nuclear weapon in space would have an indiscriminate effect on satellites in LEO for a significant period of time. Russia is upgrading its Krona optical surveillance system in North Caucasus with laser dazzling capabilities. The Krona complex historically included ground-based radars and optical telescopes for tracking, identifying, and characterizing space objects. Under a project codenamed Kalina for the Ministry of Defense, its goal was the creation of a channel for the suppression of electro-optical systems of satellites using solid-state lasers. Russia is also planning to develop a laser with a range of 40,000 kilometers to attack early warning satellites in geosynchronous orbit. Russian pursues nuclear weapons in space US officials stated in February 2024 that Russia was pursuing the development of a space-based ASAT weapon equipped with a nuclear device. Clarification came from the White House National Security Council spokesman John Kirby that it was “not an active capability that’s been deployed.”[31] Further details were not provided, but he did confirm it was “related to an anti-satellite weapon that Russia is developing.” This action would be in clear breach of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits the deployment of weapons of mass destruction in space. The Russia satellite referred to is Cosmos 2553, was launched February 5, 2022. The Russian Ministry of Defense referred to it as a “technological satellite equipped with newly developed on-board instruments and systems in order test them in conditions of radiation and heavy particle charged particles.”[32] This is likely a cover story for Cosmos 2553’s likely nuclear mission. It was launched into an orbit of 1,987 by 1,995 kilometers with an inclination of 67 degrees. The detonation of a nuclear weapon in LEO, and the subsequent nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects, could render that orbital regime unusable for up to a year if not longer. US intelligence agencies have assessed that Cosmos 2553 was a practice test run for putting a nuclear weapon into orbit.[33] The Russian development of a nuclear weapon in orbit in space is seen as the only effective way of countering a megaconstellation such as Starlink or the US Space Development Agency’s Proliferated Space Warfighting Architecture. What is clear is any detonation in LEO of a Russian nuclear weapon in space would have an indiscriminate effect on satellites in LEO for a significant period of time. Summary of Russian Counterspace Activities Launch Date Country Satellite System 25/12/2013 Russia Cosmos 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491 Nivelir ASAT development 5/2023 Russia Cosmos 2496, 24907, 2498, 2499 Nivelir ASAT development 23/6/2019 Russia Cosmos 2519, 2520, 2521, 2523 Nivelir ASAT development 10/7/2019 Russia Cosmos 2542, 2543 Nivelir ASAT development 5/2/2022 Russia Cosmos 2533, 2558 Nivelir ASAT development 16/5/2024 Russia Cosmos 2576 Nivelir ASAT development 5/2/2025 Russia Cosmos-2581, 2582, 2583 Nivelir ASAT development 6/2025 Russia Cosmos 2558 & Object 64627 Nivelir ASAT development 6/2025 Russia Cosmos 2589 Nivelir ASAT development in GEO predicted 21 Apr 26 7/2025 Russia Cosmos 2590 (Object) Nivelir ASAT development 21/10/2022 Russia Cosmos 2561 and Cosmos 2562 RF Directed Energy RF ASAT[34] 15/11/2021 Russia Nudol Direct Ascent ASAT 5/2/2022 Russia Cosmos 2553 Nuclear ASAT Table of Russian Counterspace Activities compiled from various sources including Secure World Counterspace, Final Frontier Flash, ISR University and STK predicted orbital analysis. References Weeden & Samson, 2021. Weeden, B., and V. Samson. Global Counterspace Capabilities, April 2021, 67 Weeden, B. "Dancing in the Dark Redux: Recent Rendezvous and Proximity Operations in Space." The Space Review, October 5, 2015. "Soyuz-2-1v Launches a Secret Satellite." RussianSpaceWeb. "Soyuz-2-1v Launches a Secret Satellite." RussianSpaceWeb. Weeden, B., and V. Samson. Global Counterspace Capabilities, April 2021, 70. The Guardian, 2020. "Britain and US Accuse Russia of Launching 'Weapon' in Space." The Guardian, July 23, 2020. Russia Update: Cosmos 2558 & Object C, Issue 125 issue 125 - ISR University, ISR Integrity Flash, 21 July 2025 Russia Update: Cosmos 2558 & Object C, Issue 125 issue 125 - ISR University, ISR Integrity Flash, 21 July 2025 Russia Update: Cosmos 2558 & Object C, Issue 125 issue 125 - ISR University, ISR Integrity Flash, 21 July 2025 Speculation KH-11 optical satellite Stephen Clark, “It’s hunting season in orbit as Russia’s killer satellites mystify skywatchers”, ArsTechnica.com, 11 July 2025 Matthew Mowthorpe, The Russian Space Threat and a Defence Against it with Guardian Satellites, 13 June 2022, The Space Review. In July 2020 a piece of debris separated from Cosmos 2543 at a relative velocity 140 to 186 meters per second, similar to the Russian Nivelir event in of Cosmos 2523 in October 2017. Russia Maneuvers Cosmos 2588, 14 Sep 25, Flash ISR University Russia: Cosmos 2589 and Obj C 21 Jul-1 Aug, 4 Aug ISR University Flash Russia: Cosmos 2589 and Obj C 21 Jul-1 Aug, 4 Aug ISR University Flash Russia Update: Cosmos 2589 & Object C, 18 Aug 25, ISR University Flash Russia: Object C Renews RPO with Cosmos 2589, 30 Aug 25, USR University Flash issue 125 - ISR University, ISR Integrity Flash, 21 July 2025 Russia: Cosmos 2589 & Cosmos 2590 (Object C) Update, ISR Integrity Flash, 14 Sep 2025 Russia: Cosmos 2589 & Cosmos 2590 (Object C) Update, ISR Integrity Flash, 14 Sep 2025 Russia: Cosmos 2589 & Cosmos 2590 (Object C) Update, ISR Integrity Flash, 14 Sep 2025 Russia: Cosmos 2589 and 2590 Update, USR Integrity Flash, 13 Oct 2025 Cosmos 2589 Moving to GEO, Update, ISR Integrity Flash , 8 Dec 2025 The War Zone, 2019 "Russia Jammed Phones and GPS in Northern Europe During Massive Military Drills." The War Zone, 2019. Episkopos, 2021. Episkopos, M. "GPS Jamming: Can NATO Defeat This Russian Weapon in the Arctic?" National Interest, March 3, 2021. Hendrickx, 2020. Hendrickx, B. "Russia Gears Up for Electronic Warfare in Space (Part 2)." The Space Review, November 2, 2020. Weeden & Samson, 2021 Hendrickx, 2020. Hendrickx, B. "Russia Gears Up for Electronic Warfare in Space (Part 2)." The Space Review, November 2, 2020. Hendrickx, 2020. Hendrickx, B. "Russia Gears Up for Electronic Warfare in Space (Part 2)." The Space Review, November 2, 2020. Dwayne A. Day, “Burning Falcon: the death of a Russian laser ASAT plane”, Space Review, 1 December 2025. BreakingDefense, 2024 Hitchens, T. "Local Russian GPS Jamming in Ukraine Hasn’t Affected US Support Ops, So Far." Breaking Defense, March 1, 2022. Final Frontier Flash." ISR University, February 13, 2022. Hendrickx, B. "Russian Research on Space Nukes and Alternative Counterspace Weapons Part 1." The Space Review, May 13, 2024. For further details see “Russian and Chinese development of radiofrequency directed energy weapons (RF DEW) for counterspace”, The Space Review, 12 May 2025. The author would like to thank Bart Hendrickx for his comments in connection with the article. Professor Markos Trichas is Director National Security and Defence Space BAE Systems Digital Intelligence. He was previously Head of UK National Eyes Only Space programs at Airbus Defence and Space UK. He was at Airbus for 10 years. Prior of joining Airbus he worked at Harvard CFA/NASA CXC, STFC RAL, and Imperial College London. He holds a PhD in Astrophysics from Imperial College London. Dr. Matthew Mowthorpe currently works in the National Security and Defence Space BAE Systems Digital Intelligence. Prior to this, he worked at as Space Threats Team Lead at the UK National Eyes Only Space Programs at Airbus Defence and Space UK. Additionally he worked at the Ministry of Defence for nearly two decades, where he managed the Space Team examining threats to and from Space. Dr Mowthorpe has published in numerous journals on the weaponization of space and notably published the book The Militarization and Weaponization of Space published by Rowman and Little in the US. The views expressed in the article are personal ones.

Book Review: Apollos Anew

book covers Apollos anew by Dwayne A. Day Monday, January 19, 2026 Many aspects of American space history have been extensively covered by historians. There are dozens of books about the Mercury and Gemini programs, and dozens more about the Apollo program. There are books about the missions themselves, astronaut biographies and autobiographies, official histories and technical histories. There are numerous documentaries and podcasts. Thus, it is almost impossible to produce something that is unique and new and adds substantively to what has already come before. In 2019, for the 50th anniversary of the Apollo 11 landing, the BBC World Service produced the amazing podcast “13 Minutes to the Moon…” which told the story of the final minutes before the landing so well, with so much detail, that it reshaped the listener’s understanding of what happened. That podcast proved that we could still be surprised. And now somebody else has done it again, this time visually. J.L. Pickering, John Bisney, and Ed Hengeveld have recently published Apollo 1 in Photographs, Apollo 7 in Photographs, and Apollo 8 in Photographs, and demonstrated that it is still possible to do something new and clever that can reshape our understanding of the Apollo program. These books will amaze you. Even if you have read everything about Apollo, watched everything about Apollo, listened to everything about Apollo, stood underneath all three Saturn Vs, and seen all of the spacecraft, you will still have your brain expanded by these books. book interior Each volume is hundreds of pages thick, and each page contains two or more photos from the mission: many hundreds of photos per book, and I guarantee that you have seen no more than a dozen of them. You may have seen a photo of the Apollo 8 astronauts standing outside with their rocket in the background, but it’s always been the same photograph. The authors have now included multiple photos from that publicity shoot, some of them with the astronauts smiling, others with them looking bored, or borderline annoyed. Looking at them, you realize that it must have been awkward for those guys to stand there and pose, when what they really probably wanted to do was spend more time in the simulator. book interior But it’s not just that they are new or have never been published before. These photos also reveal things you have never thought about or even knew existed. There are photos of hardware being tested and assembled, astronauts training for many different phases of their missions, and equipment being moved to the Cape prior to launch. Even if you are aware that atop every Apollo Command Module there was a Launch Escape System, you almost certainly never wondered how that piece of emergency equipment was assembled or placed atop the rocket. Now there are photos of that sequence of events and, looking at them, you realize that there were people assigned to that particular piece of equipment that could save the astronauts if the rocket blew up. It probably never occurred to you that long before Apollo 8 roared off its pad, construction workers installed water pipes throughout that pad and performed tests pumping millions of liters through those pipes to suppress the noise from the Saturn V’s rocket engines. Now there are photos of those tests. book interior There are revelatory photos in these books but also depressing ones. There are multiple photos of the funeral service for the Apollo 1 astronauts—both the West Point funeral and the Arlington Cemetery service. Nothing like that has probably been published since early 1967. Seeing them is not quite as impactful today as the event was when it happened, but they do make us understand the reality a little better. book interior A photograph is a single point in time. But because these books contain so many photographs, you start to change your mindset. You start to view these missions not just as a single event, but years of work by hundreds of thousands of people who got up, went to work, and methodically built the machines that flew to the Moon, or the astronauts who spent day after day after year training and meeting and training and studying, all leading up to a mission that lasted only a few days. For just a brief moment, you can begin to understand that Apollo was not simply an event, or series of events, but an experience, a life, for those who were involved in it. book interior The reproduction quality is excellent and the paper quality, although not at the level of super-expensive Taschen art books, is also very good. The authors have plans to publish a book for each of the remaining Apollo missions. Personally, I’m more interested in some of the later missions than the earlier ones. The late Apollo missions gathered far less media interest but were much more complicated. I hope that these early issues are successful and we eventually get to see all of them. The authors have truly advanced the history of Apollo a great deal with this work. Dwayne Day has read everything about Apollo, watched everything about Apollo, listened to everything about Apollo, stood underneath all three Saturn Vs, and seen (almost) all of the spacecraft. He can be reached at zirconic1@cox.net.