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NASA Is Selling A Brand-New Moon Rover

NASA is selling a brand-new Moon rover Never used, one previous owner VIPER moon rover. Photograph: NASA Sep 25th 2024 Save Share Give Listen to this story. Enjoy more audio and podcasts on iOS or Android. NASA HAS big plans for the Moon. By the end of the decade, it wants to send humans back to the lunar surface. Before then, though, it intends to send probes to look for ice at its south pole. This ice carries enormous scientific value. It could shed light on how Earth acquired its liquid water; it is also ripe for conversion into rocket propellant. Scientists were, therefore, left somewhat confused in July when the agency abruptly cancelled its almost-complete Volatiles Investigating Polar Exploration Rover (VIPER), a craft designed to look for this ice, and offered it to commercial companies instead. “It’s all a bit weird,” says Benjamin Fernando, a planetary scientist at Johns Hopkins University. The rover, roughly the size of a Fiat 500, has already been built. It is undergoing final testing at NASA’s Johnson Space Centre in Houston ahead of a planned launch next year on a SpaceX Falcon Heavy rocket, carried by a lander built by Astrobotic, a Pennsylvania-based firm, that NASA has already paid for. In recent years, such outsourcing has been characteristic of NASA’s new approach to lunar exploration, in which it buys landers and launchers off private companies rather than building its own. Never before, though, has the agency given an almost-complete mission to a private company. One of VIPER’s main instruments is a drill, built to dig for ice up to a metre beneath the lunar surface. VIPER was designed to deploy this drill in some of the craters at the Moon’s south pole, which, because of the configuration of the lunar orbit, never see direct sunlight. Temperatures at the floor of these craters do not rise above -160°C, and it is here that previous spacecraft have seen hints of ice. If a rover delivers hard proof, however, upcoming human lunar missions could then extract the ice, possibly splitting off its hydrogen atoms to make rocket fuel. Eventually, says NASA, the Moon could become a refuelling stop for human missions farther into the Solar System. Lofty goals. Also, unsurprisingly, not cheap. According to NASA, the VIPER project has cost $433m so far, well above its initial budget of $250m, which is more than the agency—with many other missions to fund—says it can afford. What NASA proposes, instead, is that a commercial company takes command of VIPER. In exchange, it would have to pay for the rover’s final tests; find a way to land it on the Moon (possibly with a different lander); and then perform its original scientific mission. Any new owner would still be expected to reveal any findings made with the rover, but they could also use the opportunity to further their own lunar ambitions. Eleven companies have thus far submitted proposals. “There’s growing interest in commercial companies doing their own scientific missions,” says Laura Forczyk, founder of the Georgia-based space consulting firm Astralytical. One of the companies known to have expressed interest is Houston-based Intuitive Machines, which is already under contract with NASA to develop a lunar communications network, among other projects. It was also the first private company to achieve a partially successful lunar landing (its craft tipped over), in February 2024. Another interested party, ORBITBeyond, based in New Jersey, has also been selected by NASA as a contractor for potential future Moon missions. The companies’ exact plans for VIPER remain unclear. Given the sunk costs, NASA is expected to save only $84m from VIPER’s cancellation. Congress must approve NASA’s request to cancel the rover before it does so, with a decision expected in the coming months. “We want a more detailed assessment,” says a spokesperson for the House Science, Space, and Technology Committee. “One of our biggest concerns is how cancelling VIPER will impact our competitiveness with China,” they add, given China’s own ambitions to prospect for ice at the Moon’s south pole. Other missions might experience a similar fate as NASA, and other government agencies, face increasingly tight budgets. For those with deep enough pockets, though, there are bargains to be had. ■ Curious about the world? To enjoy our mind-expanding science coverage, sign up to Simply Science, our weekly subscriber-only newsletter.

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U.S. Satellites Hunted The Most Powerful Soviet Warships

Kirov The Kirov-class battlecruisers that began entering service in 1980 were the most powerful surface warships afloat, equipped with large anti-ship missiles mounted in launch cells below deck, along with anti-aircraft missiles and guns. This is the second ship of the class, Frunze. (credit: DOD) HEXAGON vs. Kirov: American satellite reconnaissance and the Soviet Union’s most powerful warship by Dwayne A. Day Monday, September 23, 2024 Bookmark and Share In early 1974, American reconnaissance satellites spotted something unusual on a large shipway at a Leningrad shipyard—the first signs of a new major surface warship. Over the next several years they photographed the ship as it took shape, noting that it would be the Soviet Union’s first nuclear-powered warship. The ship launched in late 1977, sliding down the ramp into the Neva River, where it was moored for additional work. The US intelligence community designated it BALCOM-1, for Baltic Combatant, and it was the largest surface combatant in the world at that time, bigger than any American cruiser. High-resolution reconnaissance images showed that it had large hatches on its bow covering what were obviously big missiles, and intelligence analysts determined that it was intended to attack American aircraft carriers. Other hatches concealed anti-aircraft missiles. The ship’s pagoda-like superstructure was covered with numerous radar and communications antennas. Eventually, the US intelligence community determined that the ship was named Kirov. The first detection of Kirov, and most of the assessments of its construction and the assembly of its three successors, was conducted by American imagery satellites. These were initially HEXAGON and GAMBIT film-return satellites, and beginning in late 1976, they were joined by the KH-11 KENNEN near-real-time electro-optical satellite. Although some declassified American intelligence reports on this period of Soviet naval development have been available since 2010, only recently have the HEXAGON reconnaissance satellite images that contributed to those reports become available. They now allow the public to see what the American intelligence community was seeing during this significant Soviet naval buildup of the late 1970s, when the Soviet naval threat was growing substantially. Kirov Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) was the Soviet Union's major naval base on the Baltic. The base supported conventional submarines and surface warships. In this February 1972 HEXAGON satellite photo, numerous Soviet submarines and ships are in port. The ice has been partially cleared to permit the vessels to move. Nearby, Leningrad was the location of a major shipyard. Big Bird In February 1972, the second HEXAGON reconnaissance satellite launched, known as mission 1202, photographed Leningrad—now St. Petersburg—on a rare cloud-free winter’s day. Leningrad was the Soviet Union’s major naval port on the Baltic Sea. The large shipyard facilities as well as the naval base were clearly visible, as were the narrow channels carved through the ice to permit vessels to transit. Numerous warships were in port, with submarines moored, as well as in drydock. The HEXAGON had only entered service in summer 1971, and it was an important new intelligence asset for the United States. It was the size of a school bus and had earned the nickname “Big Bird” from those who knew little of its characteristics other than its size. Its two powerful cameras could photograph a massive amount of territory in each sweep over the Earth, and each image could be enlarged many times to reveal details down to approximately half a meter or less on the ground. A single camera sweep could cover the distance between Washington, DC, and Columbus, Ohio, with sufficient detail to spot every vehicle on every street in both cities and identify if they were car or truck. A single HEXAGON mission would photograph the entire Soviet landmass in a few weeks, with the goal of revealing any significant changes since the last mission, such as new missile silos, the deployment of bombers, or the construction of new ships. It took time for the satellite to fill each of its four reentry vehicles before sending it to the ground, and the photographs were often a week or more old before they were looked at by photo-interpreters. But they contained so much data that it was a challenge to analyze everything they photographed behind the Iron Curtain. Kirov In early 1974, American satellites spotted a large surface combatant under construction at the major shipyard in Leningrad. The shape of the hull and machinery spaces indicated that it was a warship and not a cargo ship or ice breaker. Although only the bow and forward section had been constructed, it was clear that this would be a massive vessel. In April 1974, HEXAGON mission 1208 photographed Leningrad and revealed that one of the oldest shipyards in the Soviet Union, which had built battleships and submarines, was now working on a large new combatant. The ship’s bow was clearly visible, along with other equipment along the shipway, some of which was required for sliding the ship into the water upon partial completion. By July 1975, HEXAGON mission 1210 photographed the shipyard, revealing even further progress on the large combatant, with more of the hull taking shape. Kirov As American satellites kept watch, the construction of the new combatant took shape. Here the bow is partially obscured by cranes. American intelligence analysts concluded that the ship would be nuclear-powered, possibly by observing the reactor components arriving at the shipyard. In February 1978, the US Navy’s highest-ranking officer, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James L. Holloway, confirmed in front of Congress—in a rather oblique way—that the ship had recently been launched.[1] At the time, American satellite reconnaissance was highly classified, and Holloway was not about to reveal his sources. Satellite reconnaissance was also highly reliable, unlike human sources. In late 1979, the New York Times reported that the Soviet Union was developing a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, which had been “rumored for months.” This was based upon a comment the head of the Soviet Navy reportedly made to an American admiral. That claim proved to be wishful thinking by both Soviet and American admirals, never reality.[2] Kirov The new combatant was launched in 1977 and by April 1978 was moored in the Neva River, still containing winter ice. The ship's deck is covered with construction equipment. The bridge and central superstructure are visible. In April 1978, HEXAGON mission 1214 photographed Leningrad. By now the ship was moored in the Neva River, its hull surrounded by the last of the winter ice. Although the image resolution was not great, it was clear that the ship was still only partially complete, with equipment strewn across its deck. Only in the next year would the remaining construction equipment be removed, revealing the ship’s unique topside, with most of its weapons concealed by hatches, and the wide array of antennas on its superstructure. The ship was over twice the displacement of the largest US Navy nuclear-powered cruiser. Kirov In July 1980, a HEXAGON satellite photographed Leningrad and the entrance to the Bay of Finland. Each HEXAGON photograph covered a huge amount of territory and could be enlarged to reveal details to a resolution of about 0.3 meters at best. This single image captured the Kirov in the bay, the naval base, and the shipyard, where a second Kirov was already under construction. That ship would be named Frunze. (larger version) The Frunze takes shape After focusing on the Kirov, over the next several years American satellites continued to photograph the shipyard at Leningrad and by the latter half of 1978 they revealed the construction of a second ship similar to Kirov. In July 1980, HEXAGON mission 1216 photographed a large ship with the same hull dimensions as Kirov under assembly. But the HEXAGON’s ability to photograph large amounts of territory in a single image meant that not only did it photograph the new ship—eventually named Frunze—but also the Kirov, moored in the Bay of Finland. The Soviet battlecruiser was surrounded by a fleet of small security ships, indicating that he (Soviet warships were referred to as “he” in Russian) was now undergoing sea trials. In October, the Kirov was spotted by NATO patrol planes north of the Norwegian coast. They photographed it as well, and photos of the large warship were finally publicly released.[3] Kirov Kirov The Kirov was undergoing sea trials in summer 1980, but did not sail beyond Soviet waters until October. It conducted live fire weapons tests late in the year. Here it is moored in July 1980, surrounded by many small support and security vessels. A December 1980 report by the CIA’s National Foreign Intelligence Center on the status of Soviet shipbuilding stated that the Kirov had conducted sea trials earlier in the year and by late 1980 was beginning weapons tests. It also stated that the CIA believed that the second ship, still under construction, would be launched in 1981 and would be the last of this type built by the Soviet Union. The report declared that “the information and judgments presented in this publication were derived principally from analysis of imagery.”[4] Kirov Kirov The Soviet naval base at Leningrad supported numerous conventionally powered submarines as well as surface ships. It also had multiple dry-docks for servicing the ships. Here it was photographed by a HEXAGON satellite in July 1980. The report provided some indications of how the photo-interpreters assessed Soviet shipbuilding. They measured the length and beams of ships under construction, but also studied the arrangement of major structural bulkheads and machinery space openings. This undoubtedly required the higher-resolution GAMBIT satellites because the HEXAGON, and even the KENNEN, could not provide as much detail as the exquisite photographs produced by GAMBIT. In addition, analysts also kept track of how long it took to assemble a ship, as well as how much time passed between the launching of a ship and the start of construction of the next ship in the yard. An extended delay in the start of new construction could indicate that a new class of ship was being built. Kirov While the Kirov was beginning sea trials in July 1980, the second ship in the class, eventually named Frunze, was under construction at the Leningrad shipyard. The ships had a helicopter hangar and variable depth sonar at the stern. The construction of the Kirov and its follow-ons played a major role in the United States Navy bringing its Iowa-class battleships back into service during the Reagan defense buildup of the 1980s. The Reagan administration proposed reactivating the battleships within a month of entering office. In April 1981, Naval Reserve Captain David J. Kenney, who was described as “a specialist in Soviet naval operations,” wrote an op-ed for the New York Times where he described the Kirov as “a brilliantly realized combat design. Exotic missiles, helicopters, heavy conventional guns, and extensive antisubmarine armaments complete the most dazzling array of naval gadgetry ever brought to sea in one hull.” He also predicted that “by the mid-1980s, the Soviet Navy will undoubtedly operate nuclear carriers,” which it never did.[5] Kirov Puget Sound Naval Shipyard at Bremerton, Washington, in June 1982 was undertaking an overhaul of one of the US Navy’s large aircraft carriers. Four retired World War II-era Essex-class carriers, including USS Hornet, were stored there, as was the battleship USS Missouri, seen at left. Missouri and her three sister ships would soon be brought back into service, equipped with cruise missiles. This was in part the Reagan administration's response to the Soviet Kirovs. The Ural In March 1983, American photo-interpreters reported that a “probable major combatant was under construction” at the shipyard again, and stated that it had “an incomplete length of 169 meters and a beam of 30 meters.” They previously suspected that this was a logistics support ship, but by March had concluded that “the compartmentation of this ship is more indicative of a combatant.” The amidships section of the ship had been completed up to the main deck level and there was a possible helicopter deck and elevator aft, just like with Kirov.[6] Kirov During 1981-1983, a surface combatant with a beam two meters wider than the Kirov was under construction at Leningrad. This ship was launched in 1983 and was identified as a nuclear-powered communications and space tracking ship, eventually named Ural. It was moored in the river so its large antennas could be installed. A third Kirov was under construction by July 1984, when a HEXAGON satellite took this photo. But the photo-interpreters noted that “although numerous similarities exist between this ship and the two Kirov CGN [nuclear-powered guided missile cruisers], this unit cannot be identified as a Kirov CGN. The distinctive Kirov bottom plate was not observed during early construction stages, and the beam of this ship is two meters wider than the maximum beam of the Kirov CGN.” Kirov The Ural communications ship in the Neva River in July 1984. Final construction on this ship dragged on for years, and it never entered service in its intended role. The Soviet Union spent considerable resources on what proved to be a useless vessel. The declassified 1983 cable on this new ship demonstrates just how good American satellite intelligence collection and interpretation was by this time. The ship’s dimensions were accurately measured while under construction—it was indeed two meters wider than the Kirov—and it was not a logistics ship. Instead, as construction continued, American reconnaissance satellites photographed it and revealed that it supported several large antennas, much bigger than carried by previous combatants. It was assessed to be a nuclear-powered communications and satellite tracking ship. Limited declassified records do not indicate when and how American analysts determined that the vessel was nuclear-powered. But other declassified records about Soviet submarine construction state that American satellites spotted components for nuclear reactor containment vessels at an assembly yard, and presumably there were also similar indications at the Leningrad yard. Kirov A rare ground-level image of the launching of the Ural in 1983. Few good photos of the Kirovs or Ural under construction have been released. This photo shows how the ships slid into the river. They were then moored nearby for fitting out. Kalinin In July 1984, the last successful HEXAGON mission, number 1219, photographed the shipyard again, revealing another large combatant under construction. This one was nearly identical to the first two Kirov battlecruisers, indicating that the Soviet Union was continuing to build these large warships. That ship was eventually launched in 1988 and named Kalinin. Also moored nearby was the large communications ship that had previously been built in the shipyard. It was still undergoing construction. It was named Ural. No more recent reconnaissance satellite photos of the Kirovs under construction have been declassified. To date, no GAMBIT images, which would show the ships in much greater detail, have been released. They would provide indications of just how much the US intelligence community knew about the interiors of the ships. KENNEN undoubtedly also photographed the Soviet shipyards, but KENNEN’s main strength was its timeliness, not its resolution. Eventually a fourth and final Kirov was launched. All four of the ships were renamed after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the first two were scrapped. Kalinin, renamed Admiral Nakhimov, is undergoing a lengthy refurbishment and is expected to eventually replace the only operational ship, Peter Velikiy, which will probably be scrapped due to its high operating costs. As the United States continues to declassify information from the last decade of the Cold War, it will be possible to piece together what the US intelligence community knew about the dawn of the age of these massive and powerful ships. References Bernard Weinraub, “Soviet Said to Launch First Nuclear Surface Warship,” The New York Times, February 8, 1978, p. A7. Richard Halloran, “Soviet Navy Building Its First Nuclear-Powered Carrier Other Developments Cited,” The New York Times, December 17, 1979, p. A9. “Soviet Nuclear Cruiser Sails to Join Northern Fleet,” The New York Times, October 2, 1980, p. A7. “Status of Soviet Construction Programs for Major Surface Combatants, December 1980,” National Foreign Intelligence Center, Central Intelligence Agency, February 1981. CREST CIA-RDP81T00380R000100500001-7 David J. Kenney, “The Soviet Naval Threat,” The New York Times, April 5, 1981, Section 4, p. 21. “Probable Combatant Under Construction, Leningrad Shipyard Baltic Ordzhonikid 189, USSR,” National Photographic Interpretation Center, Priority Exploitation Group (NPIC/PEG), March, 1981. CREST CIA-RDP89-00121R000200500004-2 Note: Special thanks to Harry Stranger for acquiring the Cold War satellite images. His website is https://spacefromspace.com/. Dwayne Day can be reached at zirconic1@cox.net.

The Isle Of Wright And Aerospace

Isle of Wight The Isle of Wight photographed from the International Space Station. Two key rocketry locations: Saunders-Roe factory in East Cowes, on right-hand side of notch at top center of island; High Down test site, on southern coast at far left. (credit: Chris Hadfield) Isle of Wight aerospace: flying boats, rocket interceptors, hovercraft, and launch vehicles (part 1) by Trevor Williams Monday, September 23, 2024 Bookmark and Share The Isle of Wight lies just off the south coast of the English mainland, near the naval port of Portsmouth and the commercial port of Southampton. Cruise ships pass to the north of it, up the Solent strait, on the way to their Southampton terminals. The 390-square-kilometer island, about two-thirds of which is farmland and with a population of around 140,000, has about 90 kilometers of attractive coastline ranging from chalk cliffs to beaches. It became a popular holiday destination in the 19th century following the example of Queen Victoria, who enjoyed holidaying there. In addition, a significant amount of industry has taken place on the Isle of Wight, notably in the field of shipbuilding: over two thousand smaller vessels such as destroyers, frigates, minesweepers, and lifeboats were built there from the 19th century up to the 1960s [1, p. 18]. This then led, via flying boats, to a succession of inventive aerospace designs by the Saunders-Roe company, including the hovercraft and the Black Arrow launch vehicle. Unfortunately, none experienced long-term success, for reasons that will be discussed in this two-part article. The aviation industry in post-war Britain The post-war period was a difficult time for Britain. The national economy had suffered greatly during the war, leaving the country with a large amount of war damage to repair while nearly bankrupt and dependent on Marshall Plan aid for several years. As one reflection of this, the wartime rationing of food was not entirely lifted until 1954. The aircraft industry also had specific problems to deal with: in addition to the transition from piston engines to jets, there was the switch from wartime to peacetime aircraft production. The latter meant that the number of aircraft and aero engine companies in existence was too large to be viable in the long-term, and amalgamation was pushed by the government. Unsurprisingly given its maritime heritage, Saunders-Roe focused up through World War II primarily on the development of flying boats and seaplanes. It then had several extremely varied projects. Despite these handicaps, many excellent aircraft designs were produced in Britain during the late 1940s and 1950s. One example was the English Electric Canberra, which first flew in 1949 and entered service with the Royal Air Force in 1951. It was subsequently built under license in the US (a rarity) by the Glenn L. Martin Company as the B-57, entering service with the USAF in 1954. Three of the WB-57 variants of this aircraft, with a ceiling of over 60,000 feet (18,000 meters), are still flying for NASA. Another outstanding aircraft was the Avro Vulcan strategic bomber, which first flew in 1952. This tailless delta wing aircraft was found to have a very small radar cross-section, having by coincidence been designed to be stealthy before that was even a known objective. The English Electric Lightning (first flight 1954) was an interceptor that could exceed Mach 2: it was designed to defend the airfields of the Vulcan bombers. Two other notable aircraft were the Hawker Hunter (first flight 1951), a transonic swept-wing jet fighter, and the Folland Gnat (first flight 1955), originally designed as a small, lightweight fighter, but which came into its own as a trainer. planes English Electric Canberra, Avro Vulcan and English Electric Lightning. (credits: RAF, Creative Commons and RAF Museum, resp.) Future military aircraft developments were severely curtailed because of the White Paper on future defense policy that was released by the government in April 1957.[2] This essentially stated that the day of piloted fighters and bombers was over: future warfare would be conducted solely using missiles. Several promising aircraft developments, some of which had already reached the prototype stage, were cancelled, and the Lightning barely survived: it was to be used to deter Soviet supersonic bombers until the British missile force was fully operational. In addition, the document forced the reorganization of the aerospace industry by dictating that the many existing companies should be merged to form a few larger ones: only these amalgamated firms would then be eligible to compete for new contracts. This led to the creation of the merged British Aircraft Corporation and Hawker Siddeley companies in 1960, and Westland Helicopters in 1961. One smaller company that was strongly affected by the 1957 White Paper was Saunders-Roe, based in East Cowes on the Isle of Wight. This firm was formed in 1929 when aviation pioneer Alliott Verdon Roe bought a controlling interest in the S.E. Saunders shipbuilding and aircraft company.[3, p. 171] Unsurprisingly given its maritime heritage, Saunders-Roe focused up through World War II primarily on the development of flying boats and seaplanes. It then had several extremely varied projects, and finally served as the prime contractor for the Black Arrow orbital launch vehicle. Saunders-Roe Princess flying boat: 1946–1954 Saunders-Roe’s flying boat work culminated in the SR.45 Princess flying boat, the design of which was started immediately after the war. The Princess was a massive vessel and is still the largest all-metal flying boat ever built: its length was 148 feet (45 meters), wingspan 220 feet (67 meters) and all-up weight 330,000 pounds (150,000 kilograms)[4, p. 28]. This size is broadly comparable to that of a Boeing 767, but a major distinction was that the Princess would have only carried 105 passengers, in a two-deck layout, since the thinking was that it would have to provide comparable luxury to that of an ocean liner. The Princess was powered by ten Bristol Proteus turboprop engines. The Princess seaplane nearly played a supporting role in the Apollo program. Development of this engine encountered many problems, which in turn delayed the development of the aircraft. It first flew on August 22, 1952, but by then the airline that had been the target customer, BOAC, had decided that the economics were not favorable. Consequently, although the first prototype Princess successfully flew 97 hours over 46 test flights up to May 27, 1954, and two other prototypes were largely completed, all three were put in storage: they were “cocooned” to prevent corrosion in the sea air, in the hope that future alternative applications would appear. At one point, the US Navy was reportedly [4, p. 52] interested in converting the Princess for use as a testbed for nuclear propulsion. In addition, Saunders-Roe submitted a proposal to the government in September 1957 [4, p. 52] to convert the Princess to a landplane version powered by six Rolls-Royce Tyne turboprops, but this did not proceed beyond studies. planes Princess outside Saunders-Roe Columbine hangar, East Cowes, and taxiing on the Solent. (credits: Ian Dunster and San Diego Air & Space Mus., resp.) A related application nearly led to the Princess playing a supporting role in the Apollo program. Aerospace Lines Inc. (ASI) operated the Pregnant Guppy [5], which entered service in May 1963: this was a greatly modified version of the Boeing 377 Stratocruiser airliner. The 377 fuselage had a “double-bubble” cross-section, with a smaller arc at the bottom (containing a passenger lounge and cargo section) connecting to a wider arc at the top (containing the main passenger deck). In the Pregnant Guppy, a larger arc replaced much of the original upper arc, giving a “triple-bubble” cross-section with a usable cargo diameter of 20 feet (6.1 meters). This allowed the aircraft to carry such outsized cargo for NASA as Gemini-Titan stages with a diameter of 10 feet (3 meters), F-1 engines, the Pegasus spacecraft, and the S-IV second stage of the Saturn I, which had a diameter of 18 feet (5.5 meters). However, it was not able to carry the S-IVB (used as the third stage of the Saturn V and the second stage of the Saturn IB), which had a diameter of 21 feet 8 inches (6.6 meters). Consequently, Aero Spacelines developed the larger Super Guppy, with an internal diameter of 25 feet (7.6 meters), which entered service in December 1965 and was used to carry numerous payloads for NASA, including the S-IVB and the Apollo spacecraft. However, this aircraft was still too small to carry either the S-IC first stage or S-II second stage of the Saturn V, both of which had a diameter of 33 feet (10.1 meters). The company therefore researched large aircraft that could potentially be stretched to achieve this diameter, and became interested in the Princess prototypes.[6, p. 314][7] Their concept appears to have been based on the possible landplane version, but expanded to give an interior with a height of 38 feet (11.6 meters) and a width of 37 feet (11.3 meters), and a payload mass of 200,000 pounds (91,000 kilograms)[7]: this would have allowed it to transport the S-II stage but not the S-IC. The figure below, from[5], is presumed to show this stretched Princess: note the characteristic dihedral of the tailplanes and the six turboprops. The price was estimated to be $15–18 million for one aircraft. All three Princesses were purchased on behalf of ASI by a third party,[8] and negotiations began[9] for Aero Spacelines to purchase at least two of them for its own use. Unfortunately though, it was found that the cocooning process had not sufficiently protected the airframes, and extensive corrosion had occurred. Consequently, the sale fell through and the Princess prototypes were instead broken up in 1967, bringing the era of large flying boats finally to an end. planes Super Guppy and S-IVB stage; possible stretched version of Princess for transport of S-II stage. (credits: NASA and AllAboutGuppys.com, resp.) Saunders-Roe jet/rocket-powered interceptors: 1952–1959 Overlapping with the test flying of the Princess was the start of development of a quite different type of aircraft, the SR.53: this was a supersonic interceptor powered by a combination of jet and rocket propulsion. Six companies competed for the contract to build this aircraft. Saunders-Roe eventually won it, even though the government had initially not invited them to propose, as it seemed far from the company’s usual flying boat projects. (Their experience developing and flying the SR.A/1 jet-powered seaplane fighter between 1947 and 1951 appears not to have been taken into account.) The SR.53 was designed to use a de Havilland Spectre rocket engine to propel it to an interception with enemy bombers at high speed (specifically, at up to Mach 2.2), analogous to the German Me 163 Komet in World War II. The Spectre had a maximum thrust of 8,000 pounds-force (35.6 kilonewtons), and was throttleable down to 10%. The onboard propellant allowed the rocket to burn at full thrust for only a handful of minutes; in order to avoid having to glide back to base, the SR.53 was also equipped with an Armstrong Siddeley Viper turbojet, of maximum thrust 2,700 pounds-force (12.0 kilonewtons). This aircraft had very impressive performance, which the two prototypes demonstrated over 56 flights totaling 17.5 hours between May 16, 1957, and October 20, 1959. One reason why the SR.53 was preferred in the selection process was that, unlike its competitors, the Spectre rocket made use of the kerosene/high-test peroxide (HTP) propellant combination.[10, p. 61] This combination was quite prevalent in early British rocketry, and will be seen later to have been used for the Black Arrow launcher. A key advantage is that HTP is storable at room temperature, unlike the alternative liquid oxygen: this was felt to be a key advantage for application to an operational aircraft, for instance preventing the formation of ice on the aircraft. There is also less risk of fire with HTP: the Royal Navy was very concerned about the risk of oxygen-fed fires onboard an aircraft carrier.[10, p. 61] In addition, HTP decomposes in the presence of a catalyst into a high-temperature mixture of steam and oxygen that then spontaneously ignites with the kerosene, so no igniter is required. The downside of this simplicity is that kerosene/HTP has a specific impulse around 9% lower than that of kerosene/oxygen. Depending on the application, this tradeoff can be worth making. A the time it was developed, the SR.177 was an extremely impressive aircraft, and its cancellation was a significant missed opportunity for Saunders-Roe, and for British aerospace in general. Development of a follow-on aircraft, the SR.177, was also started in September 1955: this was larger than the SR.53 and, unlike it, had an onboard radar, avoiding the need to be vectored to the target from the ground. It was also equipped with a higher-performance turbojet, the de Havilland Gyron Junior, which improved the performance of the aircraft by allowing the initial climb to be carried out under jet power. The uprated Spectre rocket engine, with 10,000 pounds-force (44.5 kilonewtons) maximum thrust, was then only required for the high-speed sprint towards the target. Mockups of the SR.177 were constructed and the Royal Air Force, Royal Navy, and German Defense Ministry all expressed considerable interest in it.[6, pp. 63, 66] However, the 1957 White Paper that advocated the use of missiles rather than piloted aircraft brought British government support for this project to an end, which then also led to the withdrawal of German interest. Combined turbojet and rocket propulsion would not be as attractive these days, as similar performance could be obtained using a turbojet alone if equipped with a modern afterburner. However, at the time it was developed, the SR.177 was an extremely impressive aircraft, and its cancellation was a significant missed opportunity for Saunders-Roe, and for British aerospace in general. planes SR.53 and SR.177 jet/rocket interceptors. (credits: Alan Wilson and Emoscopes, resp.) Saunders-Roe hovercraft: 1957–1966 (then as British Hovercraft Corporation) One additional project produced by Saunders-Roe was the hovercraft. This came from the work of the inventor Christopher Cockerell,[11] which he first demonstrated by means of an experiment involving two nested tin cans connected to a blower. In 1953 he then built and tested a small-scale model hovercraft, 2.5 feet (0.76 meters) long and weighing 5 pounds (2.3 kilograms), which gave encouraging results. The involvement of Saunders-Roe began when they received an eight-month classified contract in August 1957 to check out Cockerell’s results; the cancellation of the SR.177 meant that the company had a team of engineers available for this work. Their testing did indeed confirm Cockerell’s conclusions. At this point no military applications had been identified for the hovercraft, so Saunders-Roe submitted a proposal to the National Research Development Corporation (NRDC) in September 1958 to investigate its uses for civil applications. This led to the construction of the first hovercraft, the SR.N1 (Saunders-Roe Nautical 1): this was 30.3 feet (9.2 meters) long, 17.2 feet (5.2 meters) wide, weighed 6,600 pounds (3,000 kilogra,s), had a cruising speed of about 20 knots (10 meters per second) and carried a crew of two. Its first untethered hover took place on June 7, 1959, and it was presented to the press in East Cowes on June 11. SR.N1 then crossed the English Channel on July 25, 1959, with its regular crew and Cockerell onboard as an observer: this was the 50th anniversary of Louis Bleriot’s first crossing of the Channel by airplane. SR.N1 was then operated for four years and made valuable contributions to hovercraft design, for instance showing the improvement in performance produced by using a skirt to retain the air under the vehicle. hovercraft First hovercraft, SR.N1, 1959. (credit: James’ hovercraft website.) Hovercraft development at Saunders-Roe culminated in the SR.N4 Mountbatten class vehicles (Lord Louis Mountbatten was an early hovercraft supporter). These large hovercraft, 184 feet (56.1 meters) long by 78 feet (23.8 meters) wide and with a gross weight of 319 tons (290,000 kilograms), were in cross-Channel service between 1968 and 2000. The stretched Mk. 3 version, examples of which were The Princess Margaret and The Princess Anne, could carry 418 passengers and 60 cars at speeds of 40–60 knots (21–31 meters per second). This was much faster than the competing car ferries, but ferries could carry far more cars. In the end the hovercraft could not compete with them, and both struggled against the Eurotunnel, which opened in 1994. hovercraft SR.N4 Mountbatten class hovercraft, 1967. (credit: James’ hovercraft website.) The hovercraft was initially so novel a concept that it was not even clear what to call it: an article in Aviation Week & Space Technology in April 1959 [12] referred to the SR.N1 as a “ducted fan vehicle”, while in Profiles of the Future [13, p. 55], originally published in 1962, Arthur C. Clarke called hovercraft Ground Effect Machines (GEMs). Clarke is, for good reason, famed for his predictions, including of the geosynchronous communication satellite. On the subject of hovercraft, however, he wrote [13, p. 58]: Today’s turnpikes might well last for generations without any further maintenance, if they had to carry only air-supported vehicles; the concrete could crack and become covered with moss – it would not matter in the least. There will clearly be enormous savings in road costs – amounting to billions a year – once we have abolished the wheel. But there will be a very difficult transition period before the characteristic road sign of the 1990s becomes universal: NO WHEELED VEHICLES ALLOWED ON THIS HIGHWAY ... This fits with what Yogi Berra is supposed to have said: “It’s tough to make predictions, especially about the future”. But Clarke was not alone in expecting the hovercraft to revolutionize travel. Several factors prevented this: one was the high noise they generated, and another the challenges of controlling them. Piloting one is more reminiscent of flying a plane than of driving a car, for instance requiring crabbing into crosswinds; in addition, traveling on slopes presents special challenges. Training to operate a hovercraft would therefore be much more difficult than passing a driving test. Today, the sole remaining year-round scheduled passenger hovercraft service in the world is that between Southsea on the English south coast and Ryde on the Isle of Wight. This seems somehow fitting. hovercraft Present day Isle of Wight: Columbine hangar, East Cowes, 2019; Southsea-Ryde hovercraft ferry, 2018. (Credits: author.) Following this disappointment, the snakebit Saunders-Roe ceased to exist as an independent company: part merged with Westland Aircraft, and part became the British Hovercraft Corporation before finally also merging with Westland, which was in turn itself taken over by GKN in 1994. However, before its demise, Saunders-Roe had one last major part to play, this time in the development of British missiles and orbital launch vehicles. That is the subject of Part 2 of this article. References Made on the Isle of Wight, D.L. Williams, The History Press, 2016. Defence: Outline of Future Policy, Command Paper 124, Secretary of State for Defence, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London, April 1957. British Built Aircraft, Volume 2: South West & Central Southern England, R. Smith, The History Press, 2003. The Saunders-Roe Princess Flying Boat Project, B. Worthy, Solent Aeromarine Enterprises, 2003. All About Guppys Stages to Saturn: A Technological History of the Apollo/Saturn Launch Vehicles, R.E. Bilstein, The NASA History Series, SP-4206, 1980. “Aero Spacelines Seeks Princess Flying Boat”, Aviation Week & Space Technology, Nov. 18, 1963, p. 31. “U.K. Government Sells Princess Flying Boats”, Aviation Week & Space Technology, Jan. 13, 1964, p. 38. “Aero Spacelines Seeking Options to buy Saunders-Roe Flying Boats”, Aviation Week & Space Technology, Jan. 20, 1964, p. 34. Project Cancelled: British Aircraft that Never Flew, D. Wood, Bobbs-Merrill, 1975. On a Cushion of Air: The Story of Hoverlloyd and the Cross-Channel Hovercraft, R. Paine and R. Syms, Kindle, 2012. “Saunders-Roe Studies Ducted Fan Vehicle”, Aviation Week & Space Technology, Apr. 27, 1959, pp. 32-33. Profiles of the Future, A.C. Clarke, Pan Books Ltd., 1973 (revised). Trevor Williams in an orbital dynamicist who grew up following the Apollo missions, and has long been fascinated by space history. He tries to fit in a day-trip to the Isle of Wight whenever visiting England.

What Will Happen When We Have A Hostage Crisis In Space?

Orbital Reef Development of commercial space stations like Orbital Reef (above) could open up new possibilities for “threat actors” to attack and create the first space hostage crisis. (credit: Blue Origin) What will happen in the first space hostage crisis? by JD Cole, Marc Feldman, and Hugh Taylor Monday, September 23, 2024 Bookmark and Share Hostage taking for profit is as old as humanity. More than 2,000 years ago, Julius Caesar was kidnapped for ransom by pirates. Now, with plans for hotels in space, space tourism, and space as a corporate work environment, a reasonable person might wonder: what will happen when there is a hostage crisis in space? It may seem far-fetched, but the problem is imminent. Each advance in space travel and commerce exposes an attack surface for kidnapping and ransom. The space sector is anticipating the deployment of private space stations from Axiom and space tourism platforms like Space Perspective’s balloons. A host of large corporations are investigating the extraction of mineral wealth from asteroids and the Moon. All are vulnerable to malicious actors intent on taking hostages. It may seem far-fetched, but the problem is imminent. Each advance in space travel and commerce exposes an attack surface for kidnapping and ransom. This article explores how such a scenario might unfold, analyzing if and how the US government will be able to mount an effective response. Perhaps we can take inspiration from Caesar, who tracked down his kidnappers and personally killed them. The current outlook does not inspire confidence, but the reality is that no one has been tasked with solving this problem. The good news is that there is time to figure out the best ways to mitigate the risk of hostage taking in space. Potential threat actors Who might take hostages in space? One likely candidate would be criminal gangs or cartels who have extensive experience in kidnapping wealthy people in Latin America. Can criminal groups afford to get into space? While many experts say that space is too complex and expensive for criminals, our answer is “Yes.” Cartels and other malicious actors could hijack existing space assets rather than build their own. The attack might be remote in nature, too, which obviates the need for actual space travel. However, we also believe these groups are not that far away from building their own space assets if they so choose. These groups, particularly the Sinaloa and CJNG cartels, have extensive international networks. According to Vanda Felbab-Brown of the Brookings Institution, the major cartels have sophisticated foreign policies of their own, which in some cases may be more compelling than those of sovereign nations. Other potential threat actors include violent nonstate actors like Hezbollah, which is backed by Iran and might pursue space piracy and hostage taking for profit or political ends. Alternatively criminal/terrorist entities may undertake a space hostage attack behalf of sovereign nation like China, North Korea, or Russia, which may be seeking a plausibly deniable method to disrupt US commercial or military space activities. Cybercrime offers a present-day example of this mode of stealth warfare. Criminal gangs in Russia appear to be engaging in ransomware attacks on US targets at the behest of the Russian government. Clear attribution is difficult to establish, and that’s the point, but expert consensus in the defense and intelligence community (IC) is that this type of relationship exists between sovereign nations and criminal organizations. Space hostage scenarios One can imagine many space hostage scenarios and comparable threats. Possibilities include: Space pirates taking remote control of life support systems in a space hotel or space tourism craft and threating to kill all the passengers unless a hefty ransom is paid. Space pirates physically hijacking a spacecraft or boarding a space station and taking the crew hostage. Space pirates hijacking a space transport and ransoming its valuable cargo. Space pirates planting a bomb on a space station or space craft and threatening to detonate it if a ransom is not paid. Likely US government responses What will happen when the pirates make their demands known, possibly through world media? Consider that a space hostage crisis would be a Pearl Harbor-like event. It would be unprecedented and lacking in obvious solutions. It would be an attack against the United States, but one in which there are no relevant treaties or laws to rely upon in its resolution. Based on personal, insider experience with governance handling of crisis situations, we anticipate three responses to such a historic event: 1. Denial Government agencies will likely deny the existence of the attack as they attempt to obtain as much information as they can. Concurrently, they will try to contain the story by declining to comment about it to the press. During this time, the president will demand information and solutions from the Pentagon and IC. 2. Acceptance At this stage, the government will understand that the problem they have is one of the most serious situations they have ever faced. They will quickly and aggressively seek solutions to have the space hostages released. The government’s choices at this time are stark, however. They can choose to pay the ransom or do nothing and let the hostages be killed. 3. Paralysis The government’s response will then likely devolve into paralysis. A space hostage crisis presents a toxic political football, a unique opportunity for “CYA” behavior which backs the President into an untenable corner. While the government has many protocols and well-trained and experienced forces for dealing with high-profile hostage incidents, they are not suited to a hostage crisis in space. Presently, there is no entity in the US government or private sector that is capable of dealing with a space hostage situation. To highlight several deficiencies, among many others: The FBI hostage rescue team is unable to operate in space. The FBI hostage negotiation team will have no time to attempt to draw out the negotiations with the space pirates due to the constraints of the space environment, e.g., limited oxygen in life support systems may create a negotiation window of just two or three days. The CIA and other IC agencies have no kinetic space capabilities suited to this mission. Nor does the IC see such a scenario as being within their purview in general. The United States Space Force is not set up to handle a hostage rescue mission at this time. NASA lacks the capabilities to address a hostage crisis, as it is not in their mandate and budget. Jurisdictional confusion and disputes could further exacerbate the paralysis. Possible remedies In the aftermath of an unsuccessful attempt to rescue space hostages, there will likely be a scramble in Congress to address whatever deficiencies that have been revealed in the operation. With the purse strings in hand, Congress might pass laws that appear to address the problem. The UN might join in, as well, with multiple countries vying for their version of an anti-piracy treaty in space. However, without proper analysis and planning, a rush to legislate might simply drive further suboptimal outcomes. Any viable solution should require the military, diplomatic entities, space industry players, and the IC to operate in unison, which seldom happens. It is essential to begin a planning process that incorporates creative thinking and practical analysis of the issues connected with the new phenomenon of space piracy. We need to take the time to think through the interlocking issues connected with space piracy, and to establish counter-piracy policies and protocols. Any viable solution should require the military, diplomatic entities, space industry players, and the IC to operate in unison, which seldom happens. It will also need a good amount of political, diplomatic, and financial infrastructure. This is a lot easier said than done, but stakeholders might agree that space hostage taking presents a good opportunity for private and public sectors to work in unison. Below are a few approaches we believe will be necessary to consider when formulating a comprehensive approach to successfully countering space piracy, particularly with regard to hostage taking. Responsibilities of space platform operators The owners/operators of commercial and government space platforms must take responsibility for securing their operations. These include, but are not limited to, space stations, tourism platforms, rockets, spacecraft, space cargo vehicles habitation/work enclaves on asteroids, lunar surfaces, and other planetary environments. The defense of space assets should actually begin before they are even built. Industry stakeholders and government partners would be wise to agree now on secure design principles that build strong controls and countermeasures into space assets. Some of this is already in progress, such as with the National Institute of Standards (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework Profile for Hybrid Satellite Networks (HSNs). Much additional work needs to be done on this front. Current regulations affecting the design and construction of aircraft could provide a template to follow. In deployment, just as all private businesses and organizations utilize a host of methods to secure their places of operations, space operators must take appropriate measures that will protect their human and non-human assets, which represent substantial investments. The optimal approach would be a “defense in depth” model that defines and enforces security policies across the complete space ecosystem, from ground stations to space vehicles, and back to Earth. Defense of space operations should include the use of the most advanced technologies, from AI-driven cyberdetection and response systems to the establishment of state-of-the-art cryptographic codes to control access for all incoming and outgoing space craft, i.e., a spacecraft will not be permitted to dock if it cannot present a unique access code, comparable to the way a digital device gains permission to connect with a computer network. The operationalization of these ideas would require the development and deployment of specially trained space security teams. As with cybersecurity, successful space security will be the result of a well-choreographed interplay between technology, people, and processes. Success will also depend on well-designed inter-operation between private security systems and relevant government agencies tasked with space security. The role of financial institutions in mitigating risk in space Space is already a big business, but it is on the verge of significant growth. Financial institutions like investment banks will expect to have a say in how space industry players secure the assets they are funding. Insurance companies may similarly insist on certain safeguards to mitigate their exposure to risk from malicious actors. Just as marine insurance carriers may require coverage for acts of piracy for certain cargoes and routes, so too will space insurers likely demand policy add-ons for piracy and hostage events. For example, in this new space piracy environment, insurance companies that underwrite space assets will need to recalibrate how they define risk and adjust premiums to reflect the realities of space piracy. This process will almost certainly involve some trials and painful errors, which is what happened when the insurance industry first introduced cyber insurance. To protect their downsides, insurance companies will probably insist that policy holders have auditable security plans in place to protect their assets from space piracy. Possible changes to the structure of the United States Space Force The Space Force is not currently structured to interdict a space hostage situation. Its operations and intelligence capabilities at present do not appear to be configured to adequately identify, respond, prevent, and mitigate space piracy and/other active threats from non-state actors in space. A space hostage crisis is a near certainty at some point in the future, but the government and space industry are not currently capable of handling such an incident. This is not a criticism, but rather an observation about the Space Force’s structure and budget. Its focus has been to protect the United States from sovereign nations like China and Russia, which are interfering with the space interests of the United States by jamming satellites and so forth. The Space Force could develop an anti-piracy capability. There are many paths to success, but the best approach may involve establishing a dedicated entity within the service that is designed to deal on a comprehensive basis with threats from space piracy. This new entity could be called the Space Security Agency (SSA). It could be placed in either the operational or intelligence commands of the Space Force. The SSA could be a standalone operation with the goal of preventing: The use of space as a platform for irregular attacks on the US, e.g., hostage-taking or acts of war perpetrated by deniable criminal organizations. Irregular attacks from space on US allies. Attacks on space assets, including those owned by corporations. Realizing these objectives would involve the SSA: Gathering intelligence from a broad range of sources, including open source (OSINT), human (HUMINT), and cyber, along with integrative analysis from other IC sectors. Having to have authority to remove irregular threat assets from space, e.g., rogue satellites that do not appear to be controlled by nation states, but which still pose a threat to the US. Having the authority to interdict hostile irregular forces on the ground, but which threaten US space assets, e.g., militarized criminal gangs in Africa that threaten ground stations. Taking the lead in developing unique space weaponry suited to mitigating irregular threats. A further idea would be to foster the development of private space military organizations (PSMOs), which would resemble today’s private military operations. PSMOs could work under the guidance of the SSA, but not be formally part of the SSA. This will permit extreme secrecy of the PSMO’s operations. Conclusion A space hostage crisis is a near certainty at some point in the future, but the government and space industry are not currently capable of handling such an incident. Until workable capabilities for rapid, safe rescue are developed, the only option would be to pay the ransom to the pirates and hope for the best. Possible remedies start with more unified intelligence gathering and interagency cooperation for incident response. Changes to existing force structures are also essential for mitigating this threat. Space hostage taking presents a technical challenge to resolve, but also one with distinct political and human dimensions. With time and focus, we can do this right. JD Cole is a retired intelligence analyst. Marc Feldman and Hugh Taylor are the co-founders of The Center for the Study of Space Crime, Piracy, and Governance and co-authors of the upcoming book Space Piracy: Preparing for a Criminal Crisis in Orbit. (Wiley, 2025)

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Still Waiting For Liftoff From the U.K.

RFA fire The first stage of the RFA ONE rocket burning in a static-fire test that went awry in August at SaxaVord Spaceport. (credit: RFA) Still waiting for liftoff in the UK by Jeff Foust Monday, September 16, 2024 Bookmark and Share Tucked away in a corner of one of the sprawling exhibit halls at the Farnborough International Airshow in July was the show’s “Space Zone,” a collection of booths of space companies. That included Lockheed Martin, which showed off its role in space in the United Kingdom with displays that included a scale model of an ABL Space Systems RS1 rocket that featured the logos of both Lockheed Martin and the UK Space Agency. “If anybody tells you in this industry when a launch is going to be,” Hammond said, “they’re lying to you because there are a lot of speed bumps.” The model was a representation of a planned launch of a “UK Pathfinder” mission by Lockheed for the agency using the RS1. At Farnborough six years earlier, the UK government announced a contract to Lockheed to conduct a launch from a spaceport in the country as part of the government’s initiative to foster a domestic launch capability. Lockheed later selected ABL, a launch startup that Lockheed had both awarded contracts to and invested in, to carry out the mission, which after many delays was projected for 2025. The timing of the display, though, was unfortunate. On the first day of the air show, ABL announced that its second RS1 rocket had suffered “irrecoverable damage” in a fire on its launch pad in Alaska during tests ahead of a launch there. ABL, in a statement about a month later, said that fuel leaking from engines fed a fire that broke out under the vehicle during an aborted static-fire test. The pad at the Pacific Spaceport Complex – Alaska on Kodiak Island did not have its own water supply, and water tanks there ran out without extinguishing the fire. The flames, now unchecked, destroyed the rocket. The incident was the latest setback in the UK effort to become a launching state. Since the rollout of the initiative at Farnborough in 2018, which included funding to both Lockheed Martin and startup Orbex and selection of a site in northern Scotland for a spaceport (see “British launch plans finally lift off”, The Space Review, July 23, 2018), the effort suffered problems ranging from vehicle development delays to launch and business failures. By 2024, the planned UK Pathfinder launch was no longer expected to be a pathfinder. It would not be the first orbital launch attempt from the country: in January 2023, Virgin Orbit conducted a mission of its LauncherOne air-launch system from Spaceport Cornwall in southwestern England. That launch, though, failed to reach orbit, and three months later Virgin Orbit filed for bankruptcy, to be liquidated soon thereafter. It was also no longer expected to be the first vertical launch from the UK. At Farnborough, the focus was on German company Rocket Factory Augsburg (RFA), whose RFA ONE rocket was undergoing final testing at SaxaVord Spaceport in the Shetland Islands. “Everything is gearing up very much for the next steps in our journey to space,” declared Scott Hammond, deputy chief executive and operations director of SaxaVord Spaceport, during a presentation at Farnborough. RFA had already performed some static-fire tests of the rocket’s first stage at the spaceport and, he said, would soon resume them, this time with all nine of the engines in the stage. If all went well, he suggested, the inaugural RFA ONE launch could take place as soon as September, although he offered some caution. “If anybody tells you in this industry when a launch is going to be,” he said, “they’re lying to you because there are a lot of speed bumps.” The spaceport, and RFA, hit a major speed bump weeks later. In a static-fire test at the pad August 19, a fire broke out on the pad as one of the nine Helix engines appeared to explode. The entire stage itself was soon destroyed. In a statement several days later, Stefan Brieschenk, co-founder and chief operating officer of RFA, said that a fire likely broke out in an oxygen pump in one engine, a “very unusual” failure mode not seen in previous engine tests that vehicle and pad systems were not designed to contain. “It appears that everything that followed thereafter was simply not sized for this extensive damage from this oxygen fire in the turbopump,” he concluded. “We wanted to launch within the next few weeks and months,” he said, but that schedule is on indefinite hold as it investigates the failure and builds a new first stage. He added that the launch pad infrastructure largely escaped damage. Orbex has still not gotten to the launch pad—or completed that launch pad. The company is making progress on Sutherland Spaceport, the northern Scotland site picked by the UK government in 2018. “We expect the spaceport to be ready in early spring of next year,” Phil Chambers, CEO of Orbex, said at Farnborough. “The key thing for that first mission was always going to be exercising, stress testing, our ability to license, and Virgin Orbit definitely did a lot of stress-testing of that process,” Archer said. The company had not offered many public updates about its progress on its Prime small launch vehicle in recent months but had gone through a series of executive changes since last year. Chambers, who took over as CEO early this year, said he expected that the company to be ready for a first launch attempt some time next year, but did not a more specific date other than a desire to avoid poor weather conditions in the winter there. “But I do want it to be 2025,” he added. He said the company is planning to raise another round of funding for a factory that will allow it to scale up production of Prime. “We can probably handmake about three or four a year” with its current facilities, he said; a new one would allow production to grow to 24 per year. It’s unclear if there is demand for 24 launches a year of Prime, a vehicle capable of placing up to 180 kilograms in orbit. Rocket Lab’s Electron, in a similar performance class, has done ten launches so far this year (an eleventh is scheduled for this week) and the company has said issues with customers have prevented it from doing more. RS1 model A model of ABL’s RS1 rocket, in livery for the UK Pathfinder launch, on display at the Farnborough International Airshow in July. (credit: J. Foust) Several factors have played a role in the struggles that the UK has seen trying to develop a launch industry. “Covid threw a spanner in everyone’s works,” said Matthew Archer, director of launch at the UK Space Agency, in an interview at Farnborough. “For most of our companies, they lost 18 months to two years in their overall production schedule, mostly because of Covid.” Companies have also struggled to raise money, which he said is linked to a broader contraction in space industry investment in the last couple of years as interest rates rose; at the same time, space insurers suffered major losses that made it harder for companies to secure coverage. However, there has been progress in other areas, like launch regulations that Virgin Orbit was able to successfully navigate to win approval for its launch. “The key thing for that first mission was always going to be exercising, stress testing, our ability to license, and Virgin Orbit definitely did a lot of stress-testing of that process,” Archer said. Commercial launches are regulated in the UK by the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). “Virgin Orbit’s mission didn’t do what it hoped it would do, but for us it assured that entire system does work from end to end,” said Colin Macleod, head of UK space regulation at the CAA. He added that four companies have “plausible ambitions” to launch from the UK in the next 18 months. Archer said that, in hindsight, he might have taken a different approach to supporting launch from the UK. “We deliberately picked a range of spaceports and providers on the basis that we knew that not all of them would succeed,” he said. “I would probably targeted more on specific spaceports” like SaxaVord and Sutherland. “We might have done more to de-risk some of those programs.” “Sometimes I worry that the politicians want to see success straight away and, if not, they lose interest,” Hammond warned. It's unclear how much additional support the UK government might provide for launch. The air show took place just weeks after the Labour party won parliamentary elections. While industry officials were gratified that Peter Kyle, the new minister whose portfolio includes space, made his first speech since taking the post at Farnborough, the government has offered few details about how it might approach space issues. SaxaVord’s Hammond said he was concerned in general that launch failures might cause a loss of support. “This is a test flight, and it is an iterative process: we learn as we go along,” he said, setting expectations for the expected first flight of RFA ONE. “Sometimes I worry that the politicians want to see success straight away and, if not, they lose interest.” RFA plans to return to SaxaVord and make another launch attempt, some time next year. The future is less certain for ABL and the UK Pathfinder launch: in late August, ABL announced it was laying off an unspecified number of employees as part of efforts to cut costs. The company had already been working to trim its costs without layoffs, wrote CEO Harry O’Hanley in an email to employees. “Through these efforts, we were able to get onto a good glidepath, but the recent staticfire issue knocked us from it.” That announcement gave few details about the schedule for RS1, though. The reorganization and layoffs would “reset the cost structure of the business to be sustainable in any environment,” he wrote, including one that has turned far less hospitable than what companies and agencies on both side the Atlantic expected six years ago. Jeff Foust (jeff@thespacereview.com) is the editor and publisher of The Space Review, and a senior staff writer with SpaceNews. He also operates the Spacetoday.net web site. Views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone. Note: we are now moderating comments. There will be a delay in posting comments and no guarantee that all submitted comments will be posted.

Launching Space Missions From Australia

Arnhem Space Centre A technology safeguards agreement between the US and Australia provides new opportunities for facilities like Australia’s Arnhem Space Centre to host American launches. (credit: Equatorial Launch Australia) Navigating new frontiers: Assessing the opportunity for US entities to launch and return space missions in Australia by Brett Loubert, Byron Riessen, Arthur Anglin, and Adrian Young Monday, September 16, 2024 Bookmark and Share Spaceflight has never been more common than it is now. If satellite demand remains strong and the frequency of launches continues to accelerate, so too will the need for increased capacity at spaceports. To date, US launch demand has largely been filled by domestic spaceports. Going forward, there may be new options abroad. Similarly, potential increases in payload return operations could also create new opportunities for international spaceports. Australia, specifically, is an interesting candidate for both launch and return operations. Following the 2023 announcement of the US-Australia Technology Safeguards Agreement (TSA), industry voices included both optimism and open questions about the presence of demand for US companies to use Australian spaceports.[1] Now that the TSA has been ratified by both nations,[2] it is worth examining the prevailing drivers and key barriers that stakeholders may encounter on the journey to extend US launch and return vehicles to Australian soil. Rising demand for spaceport services The global space industry landscape has experienced significant changes over the past decade, marked by new and innovative spacecraft, an exponential growth in the number of active satellites, and increased commercial activity across the space value chain. Perhaps one of the most visible signs of industry growth is the resulting uptick in launch activity. In 2023, a record-breaking 219 orbital launches were completed, a dramatic increase compared to the 82 launches in 2013.[3] If satellite demand remains strong and the frequency of launches continues to accelerate, so too will the need for increased capacity at spaceports. While the awesome footage of rockets thundering into space has quickly become common, it wouldn’t be possible without spaceports. Like airports and seaports serve other modes of transportation, spaceports comprise the necessary infrastructure and operations for space vehicles to access and, in some cases, return from space. Spaceports support a range of important functions such as payload integration, vehicle testing, fueling, communications, and launch.[4] Looking ahead, plans for new and expanded satellite constellations, particularly in telecommunications and Earth observation, are poised to drive launch demand even higher.[5] The market for in-space servicing, assembly, and manufacturing (ISAM) is also forecasted to grow in the coming decade, which could increase demand for both launch and payload return services. As these in-space activities and services increase, the strain on spaceport infrastructure will likely follow.[6] The United States currently leads the world in the number of orbital launches per year, tallying nearly as many as all other countries combined in 2023, as shown in the chart below. This feat was enabled in part by decades of investment from the government and private sector entities to build a robust US launch infrastructure. Spaceports at Cape Canaveral in Florida and Vandenberg Space Force Base in California have been able to support the bulk of launches to date and, as the pace picks up, some launch providers are making use of a growing network of private and public/private facilities all the way from Virginia to Alaska.[7] chart Global Orbital Launch Attempts in 2023 by Country. Source: Krebs, Gunter D., “Orbital Launches of 2023”. Gunter’s Space Page. Retrieved August 5, 2024. To help keep pace with the upward-trending demand, a new opportunity for US launch providers may be emerging overseas. Australia now hosts several spaceport providers with noteworthy potential in the rapidly evolving landscape of global space exploration and commerce. While still maturing, particularly for orbital missions, these facilities could provide an option for new US-based space companies to build out their launch and return infrastructure or for established operators to expand. Even if these dynamics play out and US firms seek capacity at spaceports abroad, the question arises: why Australia? There are several factors unique to Australia that make it an interesting prospect. Until recently, the regulatory environment between the US and Australia was complex, particularly with respect to maintaining control of technologies like rockets and spacecraft with national security implications. In July 2024, however, the US-Australia Technology Safeguards Agreement (TSA) was fully ratified, establishing a clearer legal framework for US entities seeking to launch or return space assets in Australia. The TSA aims to streamline the regulatory processes and remove barriers while safeguarding sensitive technology. The sections that follow explore the opportunity for US companies to operate from Australian spaceports by focusing on three key questions: What are the dynamics shaping the opportunity for US space companies to launch and return at Australian spaceports? What will companies in both countries need to navigate regarding the regulatory requirements of the TSA? What else needs to be done to ready the Australian spaceport market to host US launch and return operations? A launchpad for growth? Dynamics shaping the opportunity for US space companies to launch and return at Australian spaceports Current demand for US rocket launches from Australia appears limited due to entrenched investment in domestic facilities. However, if the launch market continues growing into the 2030s, it may become attractive for US launch companies to establish an international network of spaceports. Some of the potential benefits of international expansion include: Greater agility enabled by diversified supply chains and redundant infrastructure Less congestion at existing spaceports (especially those with multiple tenants) Flexible access to different orbital regimes Closer proximity to regional demand hubs for launch customers/payloads Even if these dynamics play out and US firms seek capacity at spaceports abroad, the question arises: why Australia? There are several factors unique to Australia that make it an interesting prospect. The continent offers access to polar, sun-synchronous, equatorial, and a range of mid-inclination orbits. Its geography, characterized by vast, uninhabited landscapes and less air and sea traffic than Cape Canaveral and Vandenberg, opens a broad window of trajectories for launch, reentry, and landing. Furthermore, Australia is a close US partner and ally, and the TSA now makes it more accessible for US companies to conduct launch and return operations in Australia. Collaboration on defense and intelligence US firms may become well-positioned to capitalize on strategic dynamics that could become increasingly significant over the next decade. Most notable is the alliance between the US and Australia. The countries’ collaboration in intelligence and defense is demonstrated through the Five Eyes alliance and the AUKUS security partnership, respectively.[8] While these agreements lack specific pillars for space launch, they have promising implications for future collaboration in the space domain. For example, the US Space Force’s Commercial Space Strategy emphasizes “diversification” and a “hybrid space architecture,” which could include leveraging international partnerships.[9] While specifics are nascent, allied launch capabilities for defense and intelligence missions could provide a strategic benefit to both countries’ defense capabilities as well as the commercial space industry that supports their missions. Commercial payloads for international markets US launch companies may be unlikely to use spaceports abroad as primary launch sites for payloads manufactured in the US – the cost and complexity of logistics would likely outweigh most benefits. However, the business case changes for payloads originating elsewhere. For example, customers with satellites built in the Asia-Pacific region (including Australia) might streamline logistics and minimize costs when launching or returning in Australia versus the US. Further, Japanese satellite operators may benefit from more permissive and less costly regulatory environment compared to domestic launches. In any case, US operators would likely need a clear and consistent signal of regional demand to justify expansion for commercial customers. Future payload return missions Australia presents several distinct advantages as a destination for payload return, particularly when compared to established space-faring regions like the US and Europe. Australia’s sparsely populated landscape enables safer land-based returns, plausibly reducing both risk and cost. Less crowded airspace also makes for simpler clearance. Adding Australia as a payload return destination for US space firms may also increase agility or enable a higher overall cadence for return missions because overflights are out of phase compared to the US. These factors could be valuable over the next decade if commercial space stations come online as planned. For example, in-space manufacturing of pharmaceuticals is a commonly cited application for future space stations and would require reliable and efficient transport to ground-based logistics networks.[10] Cleared for liftoff? Navigating regulatory requirements of the TSA The US-Australia TSA mandates strict controls over the handling of sensitive items including products, equipment, tools, software, and technology that is classified as military or dual-use in the USA and Australia. While the TSA presents a positive move toward both countries approving space launch activities, companies will still need to obtain the appropriate export authorizations from both countries. Companies also need to implement adequate controls to comply with export regulations. Below are some of the basic considerations for companies: Establish secure facilities within Australian spaceports to prevent unauthorized access to controlled items and ensure compliance with both Australian and US regulations. Implement comprehensive export controls compliance programs that focus on having the appropriate processes, systems, and controls in place to manage the export and transfer including access to controlled items Define data security measures including encrypted communication systems, secure data storage solutions, and access controls that align with the stringent requirements of the TSA Have knowledgeable and trained personnel to ensure that people involved in handling sensitive items are properly vetted and trained on the regulatory requirement and compliance protocols Define clear governance structures that establish clear rules of engagement between relevant individuals and organizations in the US and Australia, including roles and responsibilities, communication protocols, and accountability measures Streamlining the systems and processes used to meet TSA requirements—and ensuring compatibility between related Australian and US regulatory frameworks—may reduce administrative cost and risk. Doing so may be a promising strategy for Australian spaceports to attract business from US launch providers. All systems go? Considerations for readying the Australian spaceport market to host US launch and return operations. It is plausible that with continued growth in the space industry, particularly in scenarios with a strong global customer base for commercial launch services and increased US-Australia collaboration in defense and intelligence space missions, US firms could seek to expand launch and return operations to Australian spaceports. Of course, preparing the Australian spaceport market will likely take time and investment. At a minimum, this involves the continued development of essential spaceport infrastructure to support launch and return operations. However, making Australia an attractive destination for US firms may entail further steps to strengthen the overall space industry with support from the Australian government and the entire commercial space enterprise. Infrastructure needs for launch and return For Australian spaceports to be a viable destination, they need adequate facilities. The infrastructure requirements for launch and return missions are unique, a factor that may influence the strategic choices and timing for development as spaceport operators court prospective customers. Having the infrastructure to operate is, of course, a necessity. But “if you build it, they will come” is an unlikely strategy for success. Launch infrastructure, particularly for orbital flights, is extremely costly. It starts with reliable access to essential resources like water, common propellants, telecommunications, ground support equipment, safety systems, and a transporter/erector. These can often be used to support multiple customers. However, elements closer to the vehicle often cannot. Many launch providers seem to favor bespoke components for much of the launch complex, due to the added flexibility and control they offer over multi-use pads. The resulting cost to build a dedicated launch site can range from tens of millions of US dollars for a small-lift vehicle to one billion dollars or more for heavy-lift vehicles. Co-investment strategies between government entities and commercial players across the value chain—including the spaceport, the launch and/or return operator(s), and possibly downstream customers—may be needed to fulfil these substantial capital needs. Supporting return missions may be less capital-intensive, but still requires a few key infrastructure components. Nearby payload processing facilities are needed, and they may have unique security, environmental, and scientific requirements. In addition to clean rooms and laboratories, these facilities may also need to support rapid packaging, shipping, and integration with international transportation networks. Building strength across the Australian space enterprise Having the infrastructure to operate is, of course, a necessity. But “if you build it, they will come” is an unlikely strategy for success. A host of supporting capabilities and conditions will also need to be in place across the broader space industry ecosystem for Australia’s spaceports to be a viable business proposition for US firms. A strong demand signal for payloads (to launch or return) is of utmost importance. Without it, potential investors—whether launch companies or otherwise—may see too much risk to commit the funding needed to expand operations or build new facilities. To be successful, Australian spaceports will need to prove out the presence of sustainable demand. And, for the cost structure to warrant operations in Australia, domestic and regional payloads (including Australian government payloads) will likely need to be part of the mix. Another component of a strong space industry ecosystem is local engineering talent and manufacturing capability. The ability to build, operate, and maintain space vehicles and their associated components is not only indicative of a well-rounded ecosystem but also a key part of a competitive cost structure. For example, a launch provider with a reusable upper stage would be unlikely to find economies of scale if refurbishment and reuse involved shipping hardware elsewhere in the world. To capture the opportunity, Australia’s spaceports would likely need to meet several conditions that are missing today. Finally, sustained policy and funding support from the Australian governmental is seen as a key ingredient for the country’s space industry. Unfortunately, recent budget cuts could undermine the creation of sovereign space capabilities[11] and make it harder for the Australian space industry to secure funding.[12] As a result, some US launch providers may approach opportunities in Australia more cautiously. Conclusion Over the past five years, global orbital launches have doubled, primarily driven by the increased deployment of medium and small lift vehicles, with the US leading in launch numbers. Whether it's satellite communication, in-space or on-orbit Servicing, Assembly and Manufacturing (ISAM/OSAM), Earth Observation, or exploration missions, the need for in-space capabilities continues to increase.[13] Amidst this growth, Australian spaceports have a significant opportunity to support the necessary facilities and services for launch and return activities. To capture the opportunity, however, Australia’s spaceports would likely need to meet several conditions that are missing today. Developing new infrastructure, broadening capabilities across the Australian space industry ecosystem, and building systems to comply with the TSA and other regulations are critical steps in the journey. Recognizing these needs, stakeholders and key space service providers may need to navigate significant uncertainties to capitalize on the industry's long-term potential. But by understanding the key drivers and challenges shaping prospects for US-Australia collaboration in launch and landing on in Australia, stakeholders can position themselves to harness the opportunities presented by this rapidly evolving landscape. About this article This article contains general information only and Deloitte is not, by means of this article, rendering accounting, business, financial, investment, legal, tax, or other professional advice or services. This article is not a substitute for such professional advice or services, nor should it be used as the basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified professional adviser. Deloitte shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person who relies on this article. As used in this article, “Deloitte” means Deloitte Consulting LLP, a subsidiary of Deloitte LLP. Please see www.deloitte.com/us/about for a detailed description of our legal structure. Endnotes Foust, Jeff. “New agreement enables U.S. launches from Australian spaceports,” October 27, 2023 Australian Space Agency, “Technology Safeguards Agreement: Everything you need to know about the TSA,” retrieved August 9, 2024 Krebs, Gunter D. “Chronology of Space Launches,” Retrieved July 2024 Deloitte, “Spaceports of the Future,” May 2023 Fortune Business Insights, “Space Launch Services Market,” May 2022 Deloitte, “The commercialization of low Earth orbit | Volume 5,” Spring 2023 Deloitte, “Spaceports of the Future,” May 2023 Blaxland, John. “Revealing Secrets About Deep Australia-UK-US Intelligence Connections,” May 17, 2024 United States Space Force, “US Space Force Commercial Space Strategy,” April 2024 Deloitte, “The commercialization of low Earth orbit | Volume 4,” Fall, 2022 Australian Academy of Science, “Statement regarding June 2023 cuts to Australian space programs,” July 13, 2023 Daly, Nadia. “Experts warn Australia’s space industry ‘in limbo’ after axing of key programs,” August 3, 2023 World Economic Forum, “Space: The $1.8 Trillion Opportunity for Global Economic Growth,” April 2024 Brett Loubert leads Deloitte’s US Space practice with over 20 years of experience working with leaders in the defense, national security, and civilian sectors to engineer, modernize, and operate IT systems and services. Byron Riessen leads Deloitte’s Australia Space practice with 25+ years of experience in shaping and accelerating the development of entrepreneurial high growth tech organizations. Arthur Anglin is a Specialist Leader in Deloitte’s US Space practice, where he leads research related to space technology’s applications and benefits for humanity. Adrian Young is a Director in Deloitte’s Australia Space practice who specializes in the commercialization of space technology and applications. Note: we are now moderating comments. There will be a delay in posting comments and no guarantee that all submitted comments

Framing THhe Success Of Polaris Dawn

spacewalk Jared Isaacman emerges from the Crew Dragon hatch on the first commercial spacewalk September 12 during the Polaris Dawn mission. (credit: SpaceX) Framing the success of the Polaris Dawn mission by Ajey Lele Monday, September 16, 2024 Bookmark and Share Frame one: Spacewalk and commercial success Walking in space is a dream. It was the Soviet cosmonaut Alexei Leonov who went through a process of “living a dream” for around 12 minutes when he undertook a spacewalk on March 18, 1965. Since then, a few hundred humans have undertaken walks in space, and 12 individuals have also walked on the lunar surface. Almost six decades after the first spacewalk, on September 12, two private astronauts conducted the first-ever commercial spacewalk. This happened during SpaceX’s Polaris Dawn mission. This mission is a collaboration between SpaceX and Jared Isaacman, an American billionaire entrepreneur. Isaacman performed the spacewalk with Sarah Gillis, an engineer from the SpaceX. This mission has busted the myth that only the astronauts from state-supported space missions can undertake spacewalks. The 41-year-old Isaacman is a qualified pilot and is known to be flight-qualified in multiple military jet aircraft. He holds a world record for circumnavigating the globe in a light jet. In September 2021 he went to space as commander of the Inspiration4 mission, also flown by SpaceX. This was the first all-civilian spaceflight to orbit. This indicates that apart from his finances, he also had other essential qualifications to undertake such a challenging mission. Few specific details about his training process for undertaking a spacewalk are known. The International Space Station (ISS) was set up in 2000 and since then about 270 spacewalks (aka extravehicular activities, or EVAs) have been conducted by the astronauts and cosmonauts at the station. So far, Chinese taikonauts have successfully carried out 16 spacewalks. The first Chinese spacewalk which lasted for around 19 minutes was conducted on September 27, 2008 during Shenzhou-7 mission. The ISS and Tiangong space station are located around an altitude of 400 kilometers above the Earth’s surface. However, the Dragon capsule was located as high as 740 kilometers. There could have been some different sets of challenges, such as radiation exposure, associated with undertaking a spacewalk for the first time around these altitudes. An important goal of the Polaris Dawn mission was to test and learn more about the requirements for advanced spacesuits. These new versions of spacesuits would play a role towards deciding about the requirements of suits required for travel and stay on Moon and Mars. The successful operation further reinforces that space travel is no longer the exclusive province of professional astronauts working at governmental space agencies like NASA. This mission has busted the myth that only the astronauts from state-supported space missions can undertake spacewalks. During the last few years, private space travel has become a reality and now it appears that private individuals can also undertake spacewalks if they can fulfill some financial, physical, and training requirements necessary for such missions. It is important to celebrate the success of Jared Isaacman and his crew. This should not be viewed only with the narrow prism of commercial success, but there could be some important scientific findings for future space travels, which could be useful for both government and private space missions. Frame two: Mount Everest and copious commercialisation Mount Everest, with an elevation of 8,848.86 meters about sea level, is Earth’s highest mountain above sea level. It is in the Himalayan ranges and the China-Nepal border runs across its summit point. Tenzing Norgay and Sir Edmund Hillary were the first climbers to climb this world’s tallest mountain on May 29, 1953. Conquering this tallest peak demands both physical and mental strength and a considerable amount of mountaineering experience. This expedition is expensive and, by some estimates, could cost around $75,000. There are two main climbing routes for Mount Everest, one from the southeast ridge from Nepal and other from the north ridge from Tibet. So far, close to 7,000 people have climbed Mount Everest and reached the summit. More than 330 climbers have died during the expedition on Mount Everest and close to 200 bodies remain on the mountain, since their recovery back to foothills is unmanageable. Richard Bass, an American businessman and mountaineer, took a guided expedition to Mount Everest during 1985 and with this began the era of Everest summit commercialization. There is a long story about how this process of commercialization has evolved mainly over the last three to four decades. It contributes significantly towards Nepal’s tourism revenue. For some years now, many climbers have been hiring a “full-service package.” Services provider companies are providing everything from assistance to get permits to medical facilities to connecting with a trained and experienced mountaineer guide, providing porter services, and catering for meal requirements. Some such packages are known to cost around $200,000. Eventually, it all depends on the nature of services hired by a group or an individual. It is becoming increasingly evident that in some cases, more than the spirit of adventure and love for exploring nature, the journey has become more about exhibitionist attitude, essentially for the consumption of social media. Mostly, the attitude has been, “since I have money, I can even reach Everest!” It is more about millionaires and billionaires looking for new thrills. Presently around 600 people reach the top of Everest per season. Along with them, there are porters and guides too. In addition, almost 500 per day visit Everest base camp. During the trek towards the peak, the climber meets many “co-travellers.” They are forced to walk in a single file and at times it becomes difficult to stand on the Everest top due to overcrowding. Over the years, the entire region in general and Mount Everest in particular is getting increasingly polluted. In 1991, a Pollution Control Committee was established; however, it appears that their efforts are insufficient mainly owing to the burden of so many people trying to reach the summit within a very short span of time. The experiences of the commercialization of Mount Everest, and interest in Antarctic resources, could provide lessons for space. Today, Mount Everest is accumulating a lot of garbage, leading to contamination of the entire region and the local watershed. According to some estimates, every individual is responsible for generating around eight kilograms of trash, which mostly gets left on the mountain. From cracked tents to abandoned food containers and packages, and from empty oxygen cylinders to broken mountaineering equipment to human waste, many things litter the mountain heights on a regular basis. Also, extreme cold temperatures ensure that no decay of the garbage happens. Every fresh snowfall covers the garbage, eventually leading to the accumulation of piles of garbage. Frame three: Antarctica, resources are not up for grab The Antarctic Treaty entered into force in 1961 and, according to treaty provisions, the Antarctic continent should remain a demilitarized zone and should be preserved only for scientific research. The place cannot have any military bases and nuclear testing and the disposal of radioactive waste is prohibited. Mining in Antarctica is banned ad infinitum by the Protocol on Environmental Protection (the Madrid Protocol, 1998). There are overlapping claims to territory on this continent by few states; however, the treaty survived possibly since all these years, the process has remained dynamic with debates and advancing some additional conventions and other legal protocols. Since 1960, the domain of technology has evolved significantly and has made Antarctica much more accessible. More states are showing interests in the affairs of Antarctica. From fisheries and minerals, some states are found probing a bit deep to understand if they can somehow manage their quest for resources by investing in this region, possibly by exploiting some loopholes in treaty mechanism. It is important to note that any mining activity will disturb the ecological balance of the Antarctic region. Frame Four: Connecting the dots in an implicit way The success of the Polaris Dawn mission needs to be celebrated. During the last few years, the private sector has leapfrogged in the space domain. The recent accomplishment could open doors for the private sector to play an important role in various human space programs. States are going to increase their dependence on the private sector while undertaking various ambitious space projects. The private sector could play a major role in regards to on-orbit servicing, space situational awareness, space debris removal technologies, and developing the structures for space traffic management. They have already made some significant investments towards Moon and Mars missions. Commercialization of spacewalks could become a reality in near future and space tourists would also be offered opportunities to undertake spacewalks. The experiences of the commercialization of Mount Everest, and interest in Antarctic resources, could provide lessons for space. Space is an inherently inhospitable and hazardous environment and same is the case of Himalayan ranges and particularly the site of Mount Everest. Nevertheless, issues associated with the garbage on Everest and debris in space are not comparable. However, there could be some indirect learnings from the Everest experience. On the other hand, the Antarctica experience communicates the strengths of treaty mechanisms. Currently, the world has no plan in regards to the management of planetary resources. Unfortunately, in regards to space security, the possibility of major states agreeing on any legally binding and rule-based mechanism looks unlikely. There is now a need to understand the aspects of space security in connection with the growth happening in the private space sector. Mostly this growth remains unchecked from a security standpoint. It is said that no appropriate theory of space power has evolved so far. However, that should not stop us learning from the environment and the story of Mount Everest should be viewed in that context. Ajey Lele is Deputy Director General at MP-IDSA, New Delhi, India and the views expressed are personal.