A Swift Effort To Boost The Prospects for Satellite Servicing.

Swift reboost Northrop Grumman’s L-1011 aircraft, Stargazer, takes off from Wallops Flight Facility in Virginia June 18 carrying a Pegasus XL spacecraft with the Link servicing spacecraft. (credit: NASA/Jeanette Kazmierczak) A swift effort to boost the prospects for satellite servicing by Jeff Foust Monday, June 29, 2026 On Tuesday evening local time, the last operational L-1011 aircraft will take off from Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific Ocean. After flying to the south, the plane will enter a racetrack pattern and, on a southeastern leg, release a Pegasus XL rocket. The launch is likely the last for the Pegasus, which first flew in 1990. “This is the last mission that we have on contract today,” Wes Collier, vice president of launch systems at Northrop Grumman, said at a briefing about the launch earlier this month. “We gave them a really good price,” Northrop’s Kurt Eberly said last November of the Pegasus launch contract for the reboost mission. If so, it marks the conclusion of an extended goodbye for the air-launched rocket. In its heyday in the latter half of the 1990s, Pegasus launched five to six times a year, carrying a mix of commercial and US government payloads. The upcoming launch will be the first in five years for the rocket and only the sixth in the last 15. Should this be the final Pegasus, though, the rocket will go out with an exclamation point. The rocket’s payload is Link, a spacecraft developed by satellite servicing startup Katalyst Space Technologies with a daring mission: attach itself to a NASA spacecraft in a decaying orbit and boost it to a higher altitude. The NASA spacecraft is the Neil Gehrels Swift Observatory, or Swift, a gamma-ray telescope launched in 2004. Swift itself is in good condition, its instruments able to detect and quickly monitor gamma-ray bursts, but its low Earth orbit has been decaying because of atmospheric drag enhanced by the current peak in solar activity. With no ability to raise its orbit itself, Swift could reenter as soon as late this year. Swift’s unusual orbit led Katalyst to select Pegasus to launch the 425-kilogram Link spacecraft. Swift was launched into an orbit with an inclination of about 21 degrees, allowing it to avoid a feature of the Earth’s magnetic field called the South Atlantic Anomaly that would have interfered with its observations. That limited the opportunities for launching it: rideshare missions to Sun-synchronous or mid-inclination orbits were not an option, for example. Katalyst said it selected Pegasus because that vehicle could reach the desired orbit and because it has the “reliability and schedule capability” needed for this time-sensitive launch, Kieran Wilson, principal investigator for Link at Katalyst, said in November, when the companies announced the launch contract. Price was also a factor: the Pegasus, reportedly built for another customer and in storage, was far cheaper than buying a dedicated Falcon 9 launch. “We gave them a really good price,” Northrop’s Kurt Eberly said last November, without disclosing the price. Swift reboost The Link spacecraft being integrated with its Pegasus XL launch vehicle. (credit: NASA/Ron Beard) A swift mission to save Swift But the novelty of the launch pales in comparison to the unique nature of the mission and how NASA pursued it. Last August, NASA announced it awarded study contracts to Katalyst Space as well as Cambrian Works to study mission concepts for reboosting Swift, while asking another company, Starfish Space, to examine how it could repurpose another mission it was developing to raise Swift’s orbit. “I have to be honest, no one thought it was going to be possible. No one thought we would get as far as we’ve already gotten today,” said Domagal-Goldman. In late September, NASA said it selected Katalyst Space to develop the Swift reboost mission, awarding the company a $30 million contract through the agency’s Small Business Innovation Research. Katalyst planned to repurpose a technology demonstration spacecraft called Link already in development to raise Swift’s orbit. Time, NASA emphasized, was of the essence: the reboost mission needed to launch before Swift’s orbit decayed to an altitude of about 300 kilometers. Below that, NASA believed the drag would be too much for the reboost mission and its electric thrusters to counter. Katalyst said it would be ready to launch around the middle of 2026, several months before Swift dipped that low. However, early this year, new models of Swift’s orbital decay raised alarms. Instead of reaching the 300-kilometer threshold some time in the fall of 2026, the models suggested that the spacecraft might fall that low as soon as May, before Katalyst’s mission would be ready to launch. “With this news in hand, we had to do something about it,” said Jamie Kennea, a research professor at Penn State University and head of Swift’s science operations team, at a National Academies meeting in March. What the project did was reorient the spacecraft to minimize drag, a move that slowed the orbital decay but also required shutting down most of its science instruments. That bought the time the reboost needed, with models showing by March that Swift would not reach the 300-kilometer threshold until at least August. “We’re really maximizing our chances here,” Kennea said. The project wanted to maximize its changes given what seemed like inevitable delays. Link, after all, would have approach and then grapple a satellite not designed for servicing, then raise its orbit. In addition, Link would be Katalyst’s first spacecraft. (In 2025, Katalyst acquired Atomos Space, which flew a satellite servicing tech demo mission in 2024 that suffered several technical problems, such as communications.) Surely, there would be issues. However, by April Link was at the Goddard Space Flight Center for environmental testing, which it completed successfully in early May. After a trip back to Katalyst’s Colorado facilities for final work, the spacecraft was shipped to Wallops Flight Facility in Virginia, where Northop integrated it with the Pegasus rocket, and the rocket with its L-1011 carrier aircraft. Completing Link within a month of its schedule—early this year the mission had a nominal launch date of June 1—was something NASA celebrated at the pre-launch briefing earlier this month. “I have to be honest, no one thought it was going to be possible. No one thought we would get as far as we’ve already gotten today,” said Shawn Domagal-Goldman, director of NASA’s astrophysics division. “No one thought y’all would get here.” The achievement, he added, was more than technical. “People didn’t think the agency itself could bureaucratically do something this fast, and yet we did.” There is still, though, the actual boost mission to execute. That work will begin about 13 minutes after launch, when Link separates from the Pegasus upper stage and begins its commissioning process. That will take about two weeks, followed by two to three weeks to approach Swift. “We still have to get spacecraft on orbit. We still have to operate the spacecraft there successfully, and as we’ve all seen before, that’s a very challenging thing to do,” Katalyst’s Wilson said at the prelaunch briefing. “We’re confident that as long as we have a spacecraft that can function at a fundamental level, that gives us the freedom and flexibility to work through any issues that we find during rendezvous and the more challenging dynamical operations.” “I feel like this is going to be a phoenix-from-the-ashes situation where the mission starts anew,” Kennea said. Swift is not designed for servicing, but Wilson said it helps that the spacecraft is still working well. “Swift is an unprepared but cooperative partner in the rendezvous,” he said, able to reorient itself to help Link survey the spacecraft and identify the best locations for the robotic arms to try and grapple. “We’ll be moving through a bunch of maneuvers as a tandem team between the Swift mission ops and the Link mission ops teams to perform those inspections at various ranges.” Link has three robotic arms, but the reboost can work even if only one arm is able to attach to Swift. His biggest concern is the state of Swift’s multi-layer insulation, or MLI, which he says has likely degraded based on the experience with Hubble, where astronauts on servicing missions reported that the flexible MLI has turned brittle, complicating work. “It’s likely that there are torn-off pieces of MLI on the spacecraft, that some things are no longer in the position that they were originally, or that the blankets have degraded to some degree, that makes it more challenging to capture,” he said. “That’s why we have multiple options for locations to capture, a very versatile approach, and a very flexible team. If Link is able to grapple Swift, it will use its Hall Effect thrusters to raise their orbit over the next three months to an altitude of 550 to 600 kilometers, close to Swift’s original orbit. Link will then detach and use its remaining xenon propellant to lower its orbit and speed up its reentry. Brad Cenko, principal investigator for Swift, said his mission will then work to quickly restore normal science operations. “In the best-case scenario, Swift could start resuming observations as early as the fall of this year, but we’ll have to play it by ear somewhat and see how all the various steps in the chain are going to go,” he said. “I feel like this is going to be a phoenix-from-the-ashes situation where the mission starts anew,” Kennea said in March. Swift reboost An illustration of the Link spacecraft grappling the Swift spacecraft to reboost it. (credit: Katalyst Space) Future servicing options NASA has often described the Swift reboost mission as a “high-risk, high-reward” project. It is high risk in the sense that it is a complex, novel mission by a young company. Yet, if the reboost mission fails, little is lost beyond a few months of science that Swift could have performed if NASA made no effort to slow its descent, as well as the $30 million spent on the mission. (The agency has emphasized Swift’s reentry doesn’t pose a hazard to people on the ground.) By contrast, NASA spent more than $1 billion on a satellite servicing demo mission, OSAM-1, that was cancelled in 2024 before launching. The high reward comes, in the near term, from the additional science Swift can do. “Last year Swift received five requests from the community to follow up newly discovered sources each and every day,” said Cenko. “That’s more annual community requests than any other NASA facility but JWST.” He added that Swift, originally launched to study gamma-ray bursts, has evolved into a more general astrophysics mission, using its additional X-ray and ultraviolet instruments. “We call these our different eras for the Swift mission,” he said, deadpan. In the longer term, a higher reward comes from demonstrating the ability to reboost and perhaps perform other servicing. Several companies are pursing work to reboost, repair, and refuel spacecraft, and a successful Swift reboost mission could help Katalyst’s prospects in the market. It also raises the question of how NASA might use the technology. “We didn’t want to set the precedent that anything that comes out of orbit has to be boosted,” Domagal-Goldman said at the prelaunch briefing. It made sense for Swift, he stated, because of its scientific utility, and with no plans for a successor for the foreseeable future. “This is an observatory with unique capabilities for astrophysics,” he said. “So we decided, yeah, we want to go save this one this time because of how special it is.” “We are open to a reboost of Hubble,” Domagal-Goldman said. “We have to first figure out how we’re going to bring down the operations costs.” He didn’t discuss how NASA might decide what future spacecraft would be worthy or reboost or servicing, but one other astrophysics mission comes to mind: Hubble. That venerable space telescope remains in high demand among astronomers, but its orbit is also decaying, with models indicating it could reenter in the first half of the 2030s. At an advisory committee meeting in early June, Domagal-Goldman left the door open for a Hubble reboost mission. “These reboost things are now not just available to us as an agency, but the costs are lower than I think I anticipated,” he said. “That does make that return on investment more enticing.” One issue he raised, though, was not the cost of the mission but of Hubble itself. NASA spent $98.8 million on Hubble in fiscal year 2025, second only to the James Webb Space Telescope among astrophysics missions. He said that operating cost would need to decrease for a reboost mission to be viable. “We are open to a reboost of Hubble,” he said. “So, we have to first figure out how we’re going to bring down the operations costs.” NASA is dealing more broadly with the costs of extended missions across its science portfolio. In recent months, agency officials hinted at potential changes to how it supports extended missions, which could include ending some missions and force others to find ways to reduce their costs to free up money for new missions. Domagal-Goldman did not say how much Hubble’s operating costs would need to be reduced for the agency to support a reboost effort. Katalyst’s Wilson added at the briefing that Link would be too small to reboost Hubble. “Hubble is a much larger spacecraft and require something with far more propellant capacity,” he said. Link, though, could provide both technical and programmatic proof of the value of reboosting satellites, enabling future missions like saving Hubble. All that on the final flight of the Pegasus rocket. Unless it’s not the final flight. “We certainly are open to follow-on contracts or new opportunities for Pegasus,” said Northrop’s Collier, noting the L-1011 plane was still in good shape. “We think that it’s a great system for future responsive launch opportunities.” Maybe another spacecraft will urgently need a reboost mission. Jeff Foust (jeff@thespacereview.com) is the editor and publisher of The Space Review, and a senior staff writer with SpaceNews. He also operates the Spacetoday.net web site. Views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone.

Addressing Space Debris

debris Approaches used to limit the production of greenhouse gases could also be used to address orbital debris. (credit: ESA/Spacejunk3D, LLC) Security and sustainability in space: a proposed cap-and-trade model for orbital debris mitigation by Isha Gupta Monday, June 29, 2026 On February 10, 2009, Iridium 33 and Cosmos 2251 collided in low Earth orbit (LEO), creating 1,800 debris fragments.[1] Collateral from the American and Russian satellites spread over multiple planes over the course of one year, threatening existing space infrastructure [Figure 1]. Following the initial collision, debris multiplied from additional impacts with other debris. This single collision demonstrates the exponential threat debris can have on critical infrastructure that is essential to daily life and national security. debris Figure 1: Debris paths of Iridium 33 and Cosmos 2251 from moment of collision to one year after collision.[2] The growing presence of debris also contributes to the risk of Kessler Syndrome, where a critical mass of debris leads to cascading collisions and renders orbits no longer viable.[3] Its effects go beyond the physical satellites, impacting crisis management capabilities and security stability. As space is a shared domain, it is important to take collective action transcending sovereignty concerns. Countries rely on space for military operations, economic systems, and civil society needs. As countries advance space-based infrastructure over time, the threat and impact of debris will undoubtedly grow. debris Figure 2: Depiction of inactive satellites, rocket bodies, and debris in orbit.[4] Existing legal frameworks do not adequately address debris mitigation but do offer a base for policy. While liability exists through launching states responsibility clauses in the Outer Space Treaty (OST), enforcement is weak due to voluntary participation. The US, European Union, and India have gone beyond international structures to implement domestic regulatory measures in an effort to mitigate debris production by its own space agencies. However, regulations are not binding for commercial entities and are not widespread for all spacefaring nations. Approaches to addressing debris are therefore reactive. While states are legally bound to the impact of debris, they lack incentives to proactively mitigate it. Compliance, at a global scale, is also lower than necessary. Despite action by specific countries, governance regulations have failed to frame debris as an important enough issue to adequately address. A binding, market-based cap-and-trade system would offer a scalable solution to orbital debris that preserves critical infrastructure and national security in cislunar space. Debris can, therefore, be categorized as a market failure, contributing to negative externalities, the tragedy of the commons problem, and free-riding. Launching costs and decisions do not reflect both the fiscal and social costs of debris creation. This highlights the need for an alternate approach to debris mitigation and the opportunity for a market-based incentive model. A binding, market-based cap-and-trade system would offer a scalable solution to orbital debris that preserves critical infrastructure and national security in cislunar space. This article evaluates the threat of orbital debris, assessing it as a market failure. It draws specifically from the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) by comparing emissions and orbital debris from the perspective of policy solutions. It then proposes a four-phase cap-and-trade model alongside steps for implementation, addressing political, legal, and strategic challenges. As reliance on space infrastructure and the threat of orbital debris simultaneously grow, it is instrumental that governments and commercial entities take action to protect cislunar space in the long-term. Background The OST of 1967 and the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) are the two international structures guiding debris mitigation. The OST is a binding treaty governing the activities of states in space. Article VI of the OST requires state parties to “bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space [...] by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities.”[5] It infers that governments are responsible for actions in space by both national space agencies and by commercial entities. Building on this, Article VII attributes damages in space to launching states, stating that launching states are “internationally liable for damage to another state party.”[6] The OST provides a framework for activities in space, deeming states as liable for any damages towards other parties. So, debris created in orbit is the responsibility of launching states and the OST holds them liable for any damage caused to other state parties. In 2010, UNOOSA’s Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) published its space debris mitigation guidelines, which urges member states to voluntarily implement measures to mitigate debris. It includes seven guidelines: Limit debris released during normal operations Minimize potential for breakups in operational phases Limit the probability of accidental collision in orbit Avoid intentional destruction and other harmful activities Minimize potential for post-mission break-ups resulting from stored energy Limit the long-term presence of spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages in the low-Earth orbit (LEO) region after the end of their mission Limit the long-term interference of spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages with the geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO) region after the end of their mission.[7] While these guidelines are not binding, they provide states with general mitigation goals that target debris creation phenomena. The US, EU, and India have all established national debris mitigation techniques that build on the UN COPUOS guidelines. Primarily, the US Space Force’s Joint Space Operations Center operates the US Space Surveillance Network, which is the most advanced debris tracking system, and holds a catalog of objects in orbit.[8] In addition to its tracking capabilities, the US established its own Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices in 2001, which aims to limit the generation of long-lived debris during operations. These practices are mandatory for federal space missions and included updates in 2019 which improved “quantitative limits on debris released during normal operations, a probability limit on accidental explosions, probability limits on accidental collisions with large and small debris, and a reliability threshold for successful post-mission disposal.”[9] These practices have helped NASA’s compliance rate for end-of-mission disposal within 25 years reach 96% during the 2010s, well above the global compliance rate.[10] ESA introduced its Zero Debris Approach in 2023, which is the agency’s broad goal to significantly limit debris production in orbit by 2030. It is mandated for the agency itself and includes eight recommendations: guarantee successful disposal, improve orbital clearance, avoid in-orbit collisions, avoid internal break-ups, prevent intentional release of space debris, improve on-ground casualty risk assessment, guarantee dark and quiet skies, and adapt recommendations beyond the protected regions.[11] Alongside the approach, ESA established joint targets through the Zero Debris Charter, a non-binding pledge for the broader space sector (see Figure 3). It outlines specific commitments to limiting debris production and satellite casualty risks while promoting information sharing and data access.[12] debris Figure 3: Zero Debris Charter Jointly Defined Targets.[13] India aims to achieve debris free space missions by 2030. In 2024, the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) announced that one of its satellite missions “practically left zero debris in orbit” after its rocket stage was lowered to burn up in Earth’s atmosphere.[14] This technique is part of India’s initiative to achieve debris-free space missions by 2030 for all governmental and non-governmental actors.[15] India has encouraged other countries to join its initiative in the collective interest of all spacefaring nations. Debris mitigation techniques set by state governments have built on international voluntary guidelines, reflecting orbital debris as a policy priority. However, there are no economic incentives or market mechanisms set by states to promote debris mitigation. Cap-and-trade models The proposed cap-and-trade model here draws from the EU ETS to use market mechanisms as a tool for debris mitigation. The EU ETS is a cap-and-trade model that requires businesses to pay for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Through its four phases, it aims to reduce emissions while simultaneously financing a green transition by capping emissions allowances and allowing businesses to trade allowances. The EU ETS began in 2005 with mostly free allowances and an established non-compliance fee.[16] The subsequent phases reduced free allowance allocations, broadened the types of emissions capped, and increased the non-compliance penalty. The system is now in phase four, which will last until 2030.[17] Applying a cap-and-trade model to orbital debris through offset credits is a market-based approach to mitigating debris, protecting national security, and maintaining peaceful uses of outer space. As the longest standing climate cap-and-trade system, the EU ETS “helped bring down emissions from European power and industry plants by approximately 47%, from 2023 levels compared to 2005 levels.”[18] Additionally, it has raised over €175 billion since 2013.[19] Shares from ETS revenues feed into the Innovation Fund and Modernization Fund, supporting low-carbon innovation and the EU’s energy transition.[20] The EU ETS has proven to be successful in using market mechanisms to reduce emissions and raise funds for energy innovation, inspiring its applicability to orbital debris. Analysis Applying a cap-and-trade model to orbital debris through offset credits is a market-based approach to mitigating debris, protecting national security, and maintaining peaceful uses of outer space. Modeling by space agencies including NASA demonstrates that actors must remove five to ten large debris objects, such as inoperative satellites, annually to prevent debris collisions that cause exponential growth.[21] However, current international voluntary structures are inefficient. Modeling from the ESA depicts Earth’s orbits in 2209 if voluntary structures persist versus if states implement more stringent space debris mitigation frameworks (Figure 4). There is a clear difference between the continuation of current efforts as opposed to implementing binding measures and maintaining healthy orbits. debris Figure 4: Debris comparison.[22] Additionally, the global compliance rate for end-of-mission disposal “has only averaged between 20% to 30%, much lower than the 90% required to slow the rate at which debris is generated.”[23] With voluntary guidelines, states don’t meet the necessary debris mitigation requirements to protect orbits. As it is in the collective interest of all spacefaring nations to participate, it is important that mitigation efforts are widespread and binding. Orbital debris as a market failure Space is a common domain since no country can claim sovereignty, leaving debris to be a collective issue. Orbits are vulnerable to the tragedy of the commons as it is a shared resource system, but countries prioritize their own benefit, deeming orbital debris as a negative externality. For example, satellites provide private benefits but contribute to collective risks. Alternatively, mitigation efforts by certain states can lead to the free-rider problem where actors benefit from debris mitigation without paying for it. This problem “cannot be overcome unless agreements are binding and there are incentives and disincentives that induce the parties to take actions that yield socially efficient outcomes.”[24] Since state-specific priorities to maintain clean orbits don’t align with collective interests, orbital debris can also be seen as a market failure. Since state-specific priorities to maintain clean orbits don’t align with collective interests, orbital debris can also be seen as a market failure. Even though launching states are responsible for debris, it can harm the infrastructure of other states. This cost is a known risk but is generally not reflected in operating budgets or decisions, contributing to collective risk. Each state and commercial entity has its own threshold for risk in a cost-benefit analysis.[25] Once that threshold is reached, spacefaring actors will attribute too much risk to operating in orbit due to debris, which threatens existing reliance on space infrastructure. Applicability of a cap-and-trade model A cap-and-trade model provides an alternative to the current models of national regulation, seen with the US, EU, and India. These regulations impede innovation and therefore national competitiveness in space.[26] A cap-and-trade model, on the other hand, still incentivizes innovation through debris collection and mitigation techniques while boosting economic activity. So, this market incentivizing mechanism offers a more beneficial approach to regulation. Specifically, it incentivizes commercial entities to drive innovative mitigation techniques and trade credits. Rather than relying on state space agencies, which are vulnerable to bureaucratic timelines, the model incentivizes companies to collect and deter debris. With a growing commercial space sector, it also capitalizes on commercial contributions to economic activity and growth. The cap-and-trade model simultaneously leverages commercial capabilities while benefiting national security infrastructure in space. A cap-and-trade model is particularly relevant because of similarities between emissions and debris. Both are vulnerable to market failures such as the tragedy of the commons, free-riding, and negative externalities. Emissions and debris are also accumulative issues, building up long-term damage over time. They aren’t national issues constrained by sovereignty but contribute to global spillovers. Like emissions, debris can be measured or estimated through the US Space Surveillance Network. A cap-and-trade model also adjusts to the proportional presence of different countries in space. While emissions allowances are adjusted for companies based on their contribution to pollution, debris allowances can also be adjusted for companies or states based on their cislunar presence. Proposed model The proposed cap-and-trade model is assumed to be a binding network with three main components: credits, trade, and caps (see Figure 5). In this context, credits pertain to debris production. Countries receive credits to produce a specific amount of debris. This differs from allowances, which are directly provided by the managing organization but are also for debris production. Allowances are typically provided to small or medium companies and emerging spacefaring nations. Model Components Credits Provided to launching states for domestic allocation Trade Allowed for space agencies and commercial entities Caps Placed on launching states Figure 5: Components of the proposed cap-and-trade model. While launching states receive credits, individual entities have the liberty to trade them. In compliance with OST covering launching state responsibility, debris production credits are provided to launching states because debris falls under their legal responsibility. However, since commercial entities grow their presence in space, they will likely be the actors contributing to debris and can adapt to regulation on a quicker timeline than state agencies. As states distribute credits to agencies and private actors, they can then trade credits, incentivizing them to create debris mitigation mechanisms and drive innovation. States can also generate credits through active debris removal, deorbit compliance, on-orbit servicing that hinders debris creation, and other prevention initiatives. These measures are adaptable to each country’s space sector. For example, the Wolf Amendment prohibits NASA from bilaterally engaging with the Chinese government, so NASA would likely be prohibited from trading credits with China. This model, though, allows US private sector space companies to still trade credits with China. China’s space sector is largely made up of the China National Space Administration (CNSA) and state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The Chinese government, in this case, would receive credits to distribute to the CNSA and SOEs, which are all allowed to trade. For emerging spacefaring nations who only have a national space agency or some private sector companies, either actor would still be able to trade credits. Overall, states would be incentivized to promote commercial companies to trade credits rather than just their state agencies because they are able to both drive and adapt mitigation techniques faster than governments. The model prioritizes financial incentives and focuses on debris-creating states, proportionally influencing them to minimize creation for collective benefit. This model also allows state governments to develop their own national strategies for participation in the cap-and-trade system. Where the US would likely keep its free-market model to allow commercial entities to drive innovation, China would likely implement a government-driven strategy to align mitigation techniques between CNSA and its SOEs. States can also organize national strategies in the interest of national security “because satellites and rocket technology are proprietary, and nations and firms want to protect their military and trade” priorities.[27] Caps are a restriction on the number of debris pieces produced. Caps are placed on launching states since debris is legally associated with them through the OST. Actors in space should have debris mitigation plans, but unintentional debris creation is realistic. So, caps account for uncontrollable debris creation while pushing for preventative measures like debris removal, on-orbit servicing, or reusable launch vehicles. States that go over debris caps will face a non-compliance fee that gradually increases over phases. As state governments are responsible for the fee, they can either implement domestic regulations or a reflective fee for private actors. The model prioritizes financial incentives and focuses on debris-creating states, proportionally influencing them to minimize creation for collective benefit. It leads to a decline in overall debris risk through existing capabilities and technological development. Debris-creating states can buy credits from smaller spacefaring nations, providing them with funding to develop their own space programs. Additionally, non-compliance fees on excess debris go into a collective fund for remediation research or mitigation efforts. This model also benefits actors that prioritize debris removal. Those that “do not contribute to offsets will have no influence over the selection of debris removal targets,” meaning that states must take initiative to remove high-risk debris that threaten their constellations.[28] It also promotes a circular economy model, contributing to space sustainability efforts. The model advocates for reusable and recyclable satellites, spacecraft, and infrastructure. Integrating modular or interoperable components could significantly reduce debris. This predominantly applies to rocket fragmentations and payload fragmentations which are the largest contributors to orbital debris.[29] States and commercial entities should move towards a circular economy with reusable components, therefore mitigating debris.[30] American company SpaceX has demonstrated the feasibility of reusable rocket components through its Falcon 9 rocket, which significantly reduces environmental impacts of space launches and saves costs.[31] This also will likely facilitate private sector competition and investment to develop the space economy. As companies produce sustainable rocket components, implement debris prevention initiatives, or trade credits, they engage in competition and contribute to economic growth. Phases debris Figure 6: Phases of the proposed cap-and-trade model. Building off the EU ETS, the proposed model has four phases, shown in Figure 6. Each phase increases caps, reduced allowances, and increases non-compliance fees. Standard credits are provided to each country, and additional credits can be earned through debris mitigation measures or compliance. The end of a phase requires re-evaluation and adjustments over time. Additionally, states are required to submit annual reports for debris mitigation. Debris is verified and tracked through the US Space Surveillance System because it is the most advanced debris tracking system available. To account for the adoption and implementation timeline of the model, the first phase begins in 2030. Phase One lasts from 2030 to 2040. The EU ETS is at differing increment levels, varying from two to nine years. [32] However, adaptations in space require longer timelines for planning and costs, so each phase is set for ten years with room for adjustments. Credits will be provided to each country while allowances, which are not tradable, are provided to medium and small companies as well as companies from emerging spacefaring nations. These allowances are provided to not inhibit participation in space from small countries or companies, encouraging them to still participate in the space economy. The first phase also establishes a non-compliance fee of $100 per ten-centimeter debris since ten centimeters is the minimum amount to track measurable debris. Considering credits distributed and allowances provided, the non-compliance fee is expected to only impact countries with major space companies. Additionally, $100 is an estimated amount to deter these countries and companies from contributing to debris. The goals of Phase One are to establish a price for debris through the non-compliance fee, encourage trade through credits, not dissuade emerging spacefaring nations from participating in the space sector, and establish verification and reporting mechanisms. Phase Two builds on Phase One, going from 2040 to 2050. It retains the same operations of credits, trade, reporting, and verification. The second phase restricts allowances to small companies and those from emerging spacefaring nations. It also increases the non-compliance fee to $150 per ten-centimeter debris. Phase Three continues from 2050 to 2060. It further restricts allowances to 10% of small space companies and emerging spacefaring nations. This assumes that common debris mitigation techniques will develop within the next 25 years, and there will likely be a greater number of small space companies operating for specific objects. Therefore, it is reasonable to exponentially reduce allowances provided to just 10% of small companies. The third phase also increases the non-compliance penalty to $175 per ten-centimeter debris. Finally, Phase Four runs from 2060 to 2070. It restricts allowances to 5% of small space companies and emerging spacefaring nations. It also increases the non-compliance penalty to $200 per ten-centimeter debris. The four phases influence a gradual decline in debris production. They focus on inhibiting large debris-producing entities while welcoming small companies and continuously engaging emerging spacefaring nations. Implementation plan Instituting an orbital debris offset system will require coordination between domestic actions, through Congress and the Executive Branch, and international actions, through the Artemis Accords and the UN. The US should lead the creation and implementation of the cap-and-trade model through NASA because the US has the greatest footprint in space. Additionally, the model will rely on the US Space Surveillance Network, making the US a key stakeholder in maintaining the model. Caps will also likely have the greatest effect on major US space companies, putting the US in the most prominent position to drive global adoption of the model. Domestically, the US government will likely require approval from Congress to both lead and adopt the proposed model. Although significant political, diplomatic, and legal challenges may limit the creation of a formal system, its prioritization of economic tools and security preservation is favorable for adoption. The relevant congressional committees to consider when proposing this model include the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee and the House Space, Science, and Technology Committee. Approval from Congress, specifically through the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, would provide direction and funds for the executive branch to structure an orbital debris cap-and-trade system. Considering its relevance to space, NASA is likely the best agency to lead US involvement in this offset system. However, the Department of Treasury, Department of Commerce, Department of State, Department of Defense, Department of Transportation, and Department of Energy are also relevant agencies for participation. Specifically, Commerce would lead on market regulations, the Pentagon would ensure security for American presence in space, and the State Department would lead international collaboration through the model. Interagency coordination on this matter is essential through both the National Security Council and the National Space Council. Through US leadership, the cap-and-trade model can become binding through existing institutions. International coordination should begin with the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) is a group of space agencies from 13 major spacefaring nations.[33] The intergovernmental forum exchanges research on space debris, reviews cooperation, and discusses mitigation strategies.[34] The IADC is the ideal organization to formulate the details of a space debris cap-and-trade model that is agreeable for all 13 nations. It also provides a more informal setting that can analyze input from commercial actors, as compared to a multilateral organization. Next, the model should turn to UN COPUOS, which would further refine it through its more than 100 member states. This would bring in perspectives from both spacefaring nations and emerging spacefaring nations. UN COPUOS would lead the facilitation and drafting of a resolution. It would also govern the cap-and-trade model itself as the most unbiased and largest multilateral space organization. The cap-and-trade model resolution would then move to the UN General Assembly (UNGA), which has 193 member states. The model is unlikely to pass as a binding resolution and can face more challenges going through the UN Security Council (UNSC). So, it is more likely to pass as a non-binding resolution through the UNGA, which would require a simple majority vote.[35] This would likely garner more support from all states while looking towards spacefaring nations for ratification. Finally, the space debris cap-and-trade model would become binding through domestic ratification, following a similar process to the OST. Since the model would have been discussed and developed by the IADC, it would likely already have support from the 13 IADC member agencies. So, the major spacefaring nations would be expected to fulfill domestic ratification. Since it also would go through the UN COPUOS, other emerging spacefaring nations would likely agree to ratification as well following their own input to the resolution. This allows the model to be implemented for relevant nations while not impeding on all nations through the UNSC resolution. Finally, a critical mass of ratification would then incentivize other nations to participate in the cap-and-trade model in the best interest of orbits as a collective good. Rebuttal Although significant political, diplomatic, and legal challenges may limit the creation of a formal system, its prioritization of economic tools and security preservation is favorable for adoption. Those with alternative perspectives may argue that the US is unlikely to establish a cap-and-trade model with no existing domestic system. While members of Congress have proposed climate-focused models, they never gained traction for adoption. However, cap-and-trade for GHGs is a highly politicized topic associated with climate change issues. The threat of orbital debris is directly tied to national security, which is a largely bipartisan topic. Since the commercial space sector is dominated by American companies, it does not diminish the competitive advantage for these companies. It, instead, offers an opportunity for technological innovation and potential profits based on orbital debris mitigation strategies while simultaneously protecting space-based infrastructure. Second, administration priorities shift often in the US with presidential elections every four years. Some value space but not sustainability while others do not, leaving debris deprioritized or risking the reversal of ratification for the model. However, debris is an interdisciplinary topic that contributes to the issues of oscillating administrations, including the economy, sustainability, and national security. Additionally, binding participation for the US would require congressional approval. So, ratification and prioritization would depend on Congress rather than shifting views of administrations, providing stability to US commitment to debris mitigation. The proposed model represents a shift from reactive to proactive space governance. It also sets a precedent for the use of economic tools in space and identifies major advancements of the space economy. Third, some may argue that it is unlikely for countries, specifically US adversaries, to sign on to an agreement for a novel economic system, especially for a sector that the US dominates. However, these countries have a similar stake in national security infrastructure based in space, particularly China and Russia. It is also in their best interest to protect their critical infrastructure, military capabilities, and intelligence collection services. For China, it promotes development opportunities for their SOEs and opens avenues for private sector investment. Since credits are proportional to large spacefaring nations, commercial entities are incentivized to base operations or launches out of larger countries. It is therefore beneficial for spacefaring nations to adopt the cap-and-trade model, leading to development for their space sectors. Fourth, launching states that are also developing countries could be disproportionately affected as they are responsible for debris but do not necessarily benefit from domestic production of space materials. Countries like Brazil are hubs for launches from foreign space agencies. However, this incentivizes these countries to act on their legal responsibility. Whether they include provisions on agreements with foreign space agencies or push for domestic contribution from foreign commercial entities, countries like Brazil can take advantage of the model to boost their domestic economy. Conclusion A cap-and-trade model offers an incentive-based solution to orbital debris, which is an accumulative, long-term issue. With current mitigation strategies, debris would grow exponentially. Intervention is essential and a market-based structure provides economic opportunities while simultaneously reducing debris in cislunar space. While it poses an immediate threat to national security, it will also lead to long-term degradation of Earth’s orbital environment. Debris is a governance and market failure, requiring economic incentive structures and technological innovation. The proposed cap-and-trade model internalizes the cost of debris while incentivizing mitigation and removal. It remains compliant with the OST by placing caps on launching states and promotes private sector innovation by allowing commercial entities to trade credits. The model pulls from the EU ETS as both emissions and debris invoke accumulative harm, are measurable, and contribute to global spillovers. The market mechanisms applied from the EU ETS align economic rationale with security priorities. The model consists of four phases that reduce allowances and increase non-compliance penalties over time. It relies on the US Space Surveillance Network for tracking and verification while requiring annual mitigation plans from each country. The model also refrains from deterring participation in the space sector by small and medium companies as well as emerging spacefaring nations. The proposed model represents a shift from reactive to proactive space governance, prioritizing the protection of critical infrastructure in space. It also sets a precedent for the use of economic tools in space and identifies major advancements of the space economy. While it creates an independent economic structure, it also has broader implications for the circular space economy, sustainability in cislunar space, commercialization, and peaceful uses of outer space. A failure to take collective, binding action on debris risks major societal and security implications for the world. Orbital debris mitigation is not just about limiting access to space but preserving it. A cap-and-trade mode offers a choice to deliberatively and proactively govern orbital debris mitigation as opposed to the risk of irreversible damage. Endnotes NASA, “The Collision of Iridium 33 and Cosmos 2251: The Shape of Things to Come,” NASA, October 16, 2009, 4. NASA, “The Collision of Iridium 33 and Cosmos 2251: The Shape of Things to Come,” 3-4. NASA, “Micrometeoroids and Orbital Debris (MMOD),” June 14, 2016. “Privateer Wayfinder,” accessed December 17, 2025. “Outer Space Treaty,” United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 1967. “Outer Space Treaty.” “Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,” United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 2010, 2–4. “Space Debris 101,” Aerospace Corporation, November 13, 2025. “U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices,” NASA, 2019, 1. “NASA’S Efforts to Mitigate the Risks Posed by Orbital Debris,” NASA, January 27, 2021, 3. “ESA’s Zero Debris Approach,” ESA, accessed December 17, 2025. “Zero Debris Charter,” ESA, n.d., 2. “Zero Debris Charter,” 2. Sharmila Kuthunur, “India Aims to Achieve ‘Debris-Free’ Space Missions by 2030,” Space, accessed December 17, 2025. “India’s Intent on Debris-Free Space Missions,” ISRO, accessed December 17, 2025. “Development of EU ETS (2005-2020) - Climate Action,” European Commission, accessed December 17, 2025. “Start of Phase 4 of the EU ETS in 2021,” European Commission, accessed December 17, 2025. “About the EU ETS - Climate Action,” European Commission, accessed December 17, 2025. European Commission, “About the EU ETS - Climate Action.” European Commission, “About the EU ETS - Climate Action.” Brian Weeden, “How America Can Become a Leader in Cleaning Up Space,” SpaceNews, February 16, 2022; Boer Deng, “Dodgeball in Space,” Slate, November 13, 2014. “Analysis and Prediction,” ESA, accessed December 17, 2025. “NASA’S Efforts to Mitigate the Risks Posed by Orbital Debris,” 3. Nodie Adilov et al., “Climate Change Policy as a Guide for Orbital Debris Policy,” London School of Economics and Political Science, accessed December 17, 2025. Shriya Yarlagadda, “Sustainability in Space Infrastructure: Interview with Charity Weeden,” Harvard International Review, April 27, 2022. Nodir Adilov et al., Understanding the Economics of Orbital Pollution Through the Lens of Terrestrial Climate Change, June 2, 2021, 15. Adilov et al., Understanding the Economics of Orbital Pollution Through the Lens of Terrestrial Climate Change, 16. Proc. 9th European Conference on Space Debris, Bonn, Germany, 1–4 April 2025, published by the ESA Space Debris Office Editors: S. Lemmens, T. Flohrer & F. Schmitz, (http://conference.sdo.esoc.esa.int, April 2025) ESA DISCOS Database, “DISCOSweb.” Moriba Jah, “Space Environmentalism: Toward a Circular Economy Approach for Orbital Space,” National Academies, accessed December 17, 2025. Jah, “Space Environmentalism.” European Commission, “Development of EU ETS (2005-2020) - Climate Action.” “Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee,” IADC, accessed December 17, 2025. IADC, “Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee.” “United Nations General Assembly Rules of Procedure,” United Nations General Assembly, United Nations, accessed December 17, 2025. Isha Gupta is a Master of Science in Foreign Service Candidate at Georgetown University.

The Last Days Of The Iranian Tomcats

Iran F-14 Iran received 79 F-14 Tomcats from the United States before the revolution created an adversarial relationship between the countries. Iran sought to maintain the aircraft as long as possible in the following decades, and the United States monitored their dwindling fleet using reconnaissance satellites and other methods. (credit: S.M.J. Tabib via Wikimedia Commons) The last days of the Persian Cats by Dwayne A. Day and Harry Stranger Monday, June 29, 2026 In Top Gun: Maverick, the hot shot hero saves the day by stealing an F-14 Tomcat, taking out some baddies, and then landing on an aircraft carrier. The movie never states who he stole the Tomcat from, but the only other country that flew them was Iran. In the 1970s, Iran was a close ally of the United States and was supplied with some of the latest and most sophisticated American weapons, including the cutting-edge F-14 Tomcat interceptor aircraft and its highly-capable, long-range Phoenix missile. In May 1978, an American HEXAGON reconnaissance satellite overflew the major Iranian airbase at Isfahan and photographed many of the brand-new Iranian aircraft parked on the ramp. Forty-eight years later, American and other reconnaissance satellites photographed the last of the ancient Persian Cats as they were destroyed at that same airbase, primarily by Israeli airstrikes. The last of the Tomcats are gone. Iran F-14 An American HEXAGON reconnaissance satellite photographed twenty-two F-14 Tomcats at Isfahan airbase in 1978 (two not visible in this photo). Iran ultimately took delivery of 79 out of 80 aircraft ordered. Iranian pilots were trained in the United States. (credit: Harry Stranger) Fighter diplomacy The Soviet Union began exporting its formidable interceptor/reconnaissance MiG-25 Foxbat by the early 1970s. This prompted the Imperial Iranian Air Force to seek an advanced fighter that could intercept the Foxbat. In 1972, President Richard Nixon offered Iran the latest in American military technology. The IIAF evaluated the F-14 and the McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle. In January 1974, Iran placed an order for 30 F-14s and 424 AIM-54 Phoenix missiles. This order was later increased to a total of 80 Tomcats and 714 Phoenix missiles as well as spare parts and replacement engines for ten years. In the 1970s, Iran was a close ally of the United States and was supplied with some of the latest and most sophisticated American weapons, including the cutting-edge F-14 Tomcat. Iran already operated American F-4 Phantoms, but the F-14 was a brand new, top-line aircraft, one of the most sophisticated in the world. It had been designed to protect US Navy aircraft carriers from Soviet long-range strike aircraft. The Phoenix was intended to hit Badger and Backfire bombers with their Phoenixes before the bombers could launch their anti-ship missiles. At the same time that the United States agreed to sell them to Iran, the Iranians also ordered several sophisticated air defense destroyers. The destroyers never entered Iranian service but eventually served in the US Navy as the Kidd-class, jokingly referred to by some in the Navy as the “ayatollah-class.” The first F-14 arrived in Iran in January 1976. More were delivered in following years as the US Navy trained Iranian crews. The aircraft were initially based at Isfahan. Eventually, the United States delivered 79 aircraft to Iran. On May 4, 1978, an American HEXAGON reconnaissance satellite overflew Iran and photographed the Tomcat base at Isfahan. Twenty-two F-14A Tomcats were visible on that day: 20 of them parked together and two others nearby. Other less-capable American-built combat aircraft were also visible in the satellite photo. Iran F-14 A HEXAGON satellite photographed several Tomcats at the Shiraz airbase in 1980. (credit: Harry Stranger) Trial by fire In 1979, the Shah was overthrown. The air force was renamed the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF). Many Iranian F-14 pilots were imprisoned or removed from flying out of concern about their loyalty to the new regime. But in 1980 war broke out with Iraq, and the F-14s were pressed into service defending against Iraqi air attacks. In 1980, an Iranian F-14 shot down an Iraqi Mil Mi-25 helicopter for its first air-to-air kill during the Iran-Iraq War. Aviation historian Tom Cooper, who has written several books about Iranian Tomcats, claims that Iranian F-14s scored at least 50 air-to-air victories in the first six months of the war against Iraqi MiG-21s, MiG-23s, and some Su-20s/22s. According to Cooper, during the same period, only one Iranian F-14 suffered damage after being hit by debris from a nearby MiG-21 that exploded. Eventually, the Iranians claimed that the Tomcats destroyed at least 160 Iraqi aircraft (55 confirmed) and suffered 16 losses, including seven to accidents. Aging cats The United States closely monitored the Iran-Iraq war using all available intelligence systems. Satellites overflew the area and photographed both sides’ military facilities, including the numbers of aircraft such as the F-14s parked at their bases. The United States military was certainly interested in how many Iranian Tomcats remained operational. The primary photo-reconnaissance satellite used during this time was the KH-11 KENNEN, which returned digital imagery within a short time of taking its photos and could photograph targets nearly daily. But the KENNEN had a relatively small field of view. The HEXAGON, which used film, could photograph much larger areas during each pass over Iran. The Iranian maintainers resorted to cannibalizing some aircraft to keep others flying, and managed to purchase parts on the black market. In July 1980, a HEXAGON photographed the airbase at Shiraz, where three Tomcats were visible parked outside. In January 1984, a HEXAGON satellite overflew Isfahan again and photographed the base, which by this time had many reinforced aircraft shelters. Eleven F-14 Tomcats were visible parked outside their shelters. Presumably many more were inside. Iran F-14 A HEXAGON satellite took this photo of the Isfahan airbase in 1984. Numerous Tomcats were spotted outside their hardened shelters. The Tomcat proved highly capable in Iran’s war with Iraq, but its numbers dwindled. American satellites kept track of their numbers. (credit: Harry Stranger) In September 1984, the CIA produced a report on the status of Iran’s Air Force. The report’s title was telling: “Frustrations of a Former Power,” concluding that it was a shadow of the force it had been during the Shah’s reign. Only 65 to 80 F-4, F-5, and F-14 fighter aircraft were considered fully operational, compared to more than 400 during the Shah. Iran had started the war with 76 F-14 Tomcats and had lost six in combat by the time of the report. But of the remaining 70, only 10 to 15 were considered operational, split between Isfahan and Shiraz air bases. The CIA noted that in September 1980, the operational readiness rate for the complicated interceptor was only 40%, lower than the simpler F-4s and F-5s. The fighters were supported by a dozen 707 and 747 tanker aircraft. Iran F-14 A 1984 CIA report estimated the size of the Iranian air force after several years of war and American sanctions. It was far smaller than it had been before the 1979 revolution. (credit: CIA) The report stated, “The clerical regime distrusts the Air Force more than the Army or Navy in part because it was the Shah’s favorite service and because most pilots are well educated, US-trained, and have middle- or upper-class backgrounds. Political leaders control the Air Force by attaching ‘political advisers’ to airbases, by bribing key officers with consumer goods, and by playing on the rivalry between officers and technicians.” After the war, the Tomcat continued in service in the IRIAF. It remained the most capable aircraft in the Iranian arsenal. When it worked, the Tomcat’s powerful radar enabled it to detect and track aircraft at long range, and guide other aircraft to intercept them. But over time the aircraft suffered maintenance problems as well as corrosion in the humid air of the Persian Gulf, and their numbers dwindled. Because the United States and Iran were adversaries, the United States refused to sell spare parts to support Iranian aircraft. The Iranian maintainers resorted to cannibalizing some aircraft to keep others flying, and managed to purchase parts on the black market. Iran F-14 Tomcats outside their shelters at Isfahan in 1984. (credit: Harry Stranger) Throughout the 1980s, 1990s, and into the 2000s, the number of operational Iranian F-14s dwindled. Although it was claimed that at times Iran had two to three dozen flyable aircraft, few of these were fully mission capable, and the supply of Phoenix missiles was apparently exhausted by the war. In 2022, Babak Tagvhee wrote a detailed history of Iranian efforts to keep the aircraft flying and the challenges they faced, which included not only time and the elements, but also funding. Iran F-14 Throughout the 1990s and into the 21st century, there were estimates that Iran had about two dozen flyable F-14 Tomcats, although fewer were fully mission capable. They were kept flying through extensive maintenance, like owning a classic automobile. Iran also sought to upgrade them, but no photos have been released of modified cockpits. (credit: Shahram Sharifi via Wikimedia Commons) Last days of the Cat Grumman, which built the Tomcat, had a long history of building naval aircraft that could withstand the pounding of a carrier landing, earning the nickname “Grumman Ironworks.” The Tomcat was no exception: it was a tough aircraft. But it was also maintenance intensive, and the Navy had not invested in proposed upgrades throughout the 1990s. The US Navy retired the plane in 2006. But the Iranians, without viable alternatives, continued flying them. They kept the remaining Tomcats in the air through extensive maintenance and overhaul work, like keeping a classic automobile running through loving care and constant attention. American satellites continued to photograph Iranian air bases, noting which aircraft moved and which ones stayed in the same location for months or years. Iran F-14 As the US Navy introduced more Tomcats to the fleet in the 1970s it also had to upgrade its aircraft carriers to support them. Here a US Navy aircraft carrier was spotted by a HEXAGON reconnaissance satellite in 1977 with its deck filled with Tomcats. (credit: Harry Stranger) On June 16, 2025, the Israel Defense Forces released video footage showing a pair of F-14s were destroyed in air strikes against Iran. On June 21, 2025, the IDF released video footage showing another three F-14s being destroyed by airstrikes. This was prior to the current war against Iran started in February 2026. Iran F-14 Several F-14 Tomcats were destroyed at Isfahan in March 2026 by Israeli airstrikes. One estimate is that by this time Iran had only ten F-14s left. (credit: Vantor) Tom Cooper claimed that prior to the 2026 Iran war the IRIAF had a total of ten operational Tomcats. On March 9, 2026, satellite imagery from Vantor showed at least eight destroyed F-14s in Isfahan as a result of Israeli airstrikes. Cooper claims that some of these aircraft were actually wooden decoys. Isfahan is the same airbase photographed by the HEXAGON satellite in 1978. Iran F-14 Before and after satellite photos of Isfahan showing F-14s and other aircraft including F-4 Phantoms destroyed in March 2026. (credit: Vantor) If there are any Persian Tomcats left, hopefully Maverick can sneak into the country and steal one. Iran F-14 The US Navy operated the Tomcat until 2006. Here an F-14 is seen flying over the Middle East. (credit: US Navy) Dwayne Day spends too much time in the Danger Zone and thinks that the only thing cooler than Marverick in an F-14 Tomcat is a Tyrannosaur flying an F-14 Tomcat. He can be reached at zirconic1@cox.net. Harry Stranger’s website is https://spacefromspace.com/.

The Many Missions Of The Air Force's Special Projects Office

SAFSP memorial In May 2026, at the National Museum of the United States Air Force, a monument was dedicated to the people who worked for the Secretary of the Air Force Office of Special Projects, or SAFSP, often referred to as “special projects.” SAFSP managed and operated highly classified intelligence satellite programs during the Cold War. (credit: JPII) Deep Black on the West Coast (part 3): The many missions of the Air Force’s Special Projects office by Dwayne A. Day Monday, June 29, 2026 On May 15, 2026, a ceremony was held on the grounds of the National Museum of the United States Air Force in Dayton, Ohio, to dedicate a monument to the people who worked for a secretive organization on the West Coast. The Secretary of the Air Force Office of Special Projects, or SAFSP, often referred to as “special projects,” was a key component of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), which itself was highly classified and not formally declassified until 1992. (See “Deep Black on the West Coast: honoring the Secretary of the Air Force Office of Special Projects and the Star Catchers,” The Space Review, May 18, 2026, and “Deep Black on the West Coast (part 2): Honoring the Air Force Special Processing Facility.”, May 26, 2026.) The monument is extensive, covering many aspects of the Air Force’s involvement in highly classified intelligence satellite programs during the Cold War. The people who worked for SAFSP over many decades took pride in their mission, but could not talk about it. The Air Force had a long history of overlooking its personnel who worked on space programs. For several decades after World War II, the “bomber mafia” ran the Air Force, until Vietnam elevated the “fighter mafia” to the highest ranks. There was never really a “space mafia” in the Air Force: the officers, enlisted, and civilians working on space programs were often ignored and unacknowledged. For those working on top secret compartmentalized programs, it was even worse, because they could not even say what they worked on. Their service records often had blank spots. The NRO generally took care of their own, but spending years working at SAFSP was not a good way to make general. They mostly took solace in knowing that they were responsible for a highly important mission. SAFSP oversaw many activities that are represented in the monument. They include controlling satellites in orbit, recovering satellite payloads that returned to Earth using both aircraft and ships, and processing film and photographic materials. They also interacted with Air Force organizations responsible for launching the satellites. The monument rightfully mentions the maintainers who kept the recovery aircraft at a high readiness rate. The monument refers to several declassified programs such as CORONA, GAMBIT, HEXAGON, JUMPSEAT, and the low Earth orbit signals intelligence satellites. It also includes a blank space for a future program when it is declassified. The most likely program to be represented there is the KH-11 KENNEN reconnaissance satellite. It is also possible that the monument may someday mention the QUASAR Satellite Data System relay satellite, although that program operated under an unusual management arrangement, between black (classified) and white (unclassified) worlds. It will probably be a long time before some other programs and the people who worked on them receive their due recognition. Here are additional photos of the new monument showing more of its features honoring the men and women of SAFSP. SAFSP memorial SAFSP memorial SAFSP memorial SAFSP memorial SAFSP memorial SAFSP memorial SAFSP memorial SAFSP memorial SAFSP memorial SAFSP memorial SAFSP memorial SAFSP memorial SAFSP memorial SAFSP memorial SAFSP memorial SAFSP memorial SAFSP memorial SAFSP memorial SAFSP memorial Special thanks to JPII for the images. Dwayne Day is interested in hearing from people who worked for SAFSP during the Cold War who can share what it was like to work for the secretive organization. He can be reached at zirconic1@cox.net.

SpaceX's Raptor 4.0 Is A Marvel!

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lX-Df_8yqbE