Defense Support Program Part 4

DSP The Defense Support Program missile warning satellites first started operating in 1971. They were equipped with an infrared telescope that scanned the Earth as the satellite spun in geosynchronous orbit. Several are still operational today, over two decades since the last launch. (credit: Northrop Grumman) The origins and evolution of the Defense Support Program (part 4): DSP forever? by Dwayne A. Day Monday, June 2, 2025 The first Defense Support Program satellite was launched in 1971, followed by 17 more during the next two and a half decades. They provided the United States with a key component of its missile warning system, and each of the satellites added capabilities and had increased lifetimes. The ground systems had also evolved to the point where the satellites could send data to mobile ground stations to provide localized warning of missile attack. The satellite mission had grown beyond simply providing warning of strategic missile attack to become part of various tactical missile defense systems. They also provided intelligence around the world, detecting explosions, fires, and other thermal events. But after two decades, the technology at the heart of DSP was no longer cutting edge. At the start of the decade when DSP was supposed to finally be replaced, all three components of the SBIRS program were delayed, and budgets were increasing. By 1996, the Air Force had signed a contract to develop the Space Based Infrared System-High, or SBIRS-High, planning for first launch in 2002 and the goal of completely replacing DSP with a much more capable system by 2010.[1] Things did not go to plan, and surprisingly, DSP remains operational even today, over two decades after the last operational satellite was launched. (See “The origins and evolution of the Defense Support Program (part 1): Infrared for missile warning”, The Space Review, August 22, 2022; “The origins and evolution of the Defense Support Program (part 2): DSP gets an upgrade,” September 6, 2022; and “The origins and evolution of the Defense Support Program (part 3): The hangar queens and DSP-1,” May 27, 2025.) DSP California governor Arnold Schwarzenegger during a visit to the DSP manufacturer. A satellite infrared sensor platform is in the background. (credit: Northrop Grumman) Post-Cold War DSP During the 1990s, the operational DSP stations were 37 degrees west (Atlantic), 10 degrees east (European), 69 degrees east (East or Indian) and 152 degrees west (Pacific). The backup station was 110 degrees east (East Indian). Which ground facilities controlled specific satellites is not totally clear, but the Buckley, Colorado, and Nurrungar, Australia, stations probably handled two each and the European ground station only one, although the European station may not have directly controlled the satellite, only relayed commands and data. Standard procedure during the ’90s was apparently to launch the newest satellite to replace the oldest in the operational constellation. The oldest was then shifted to the backup position over the East Indian Ocean, and the satellite it replaced was discarded, boosted to a graveyard orbit. By 1996, satellites 19, 20, 21, and 22 were all in storage, while number 23 was building. DSP 18 was launched on February 23, 1997, and there is some indication that this satellite was upgraded from the earlier versions and part of “Block 18.” DSP 19 was launched on April 9, 1999, but a failure of the Titan IV resulted in the satellite not reaching orbit. Because the Air Force had decided against building satellites 24 and 25, and had also signed a contract for DSP’s replacement, that meant that those remaining four DSP satellites were of increasing importance. Partly in anticipation of the new system, as well as a desire to further reduce costs, on October 12, 1999, the Overseas Ground Station—the Joint Defence Facility, Nurrungar—closed. The Relay Ground Station-Pacific, located at Pine Gap, Australia, served as a “bent pipe,” relaying data from the DSP satellites back to the Continental Ground Station at Buckley Air Force Base in Colorado, which controlled the satellite. Nurrungar had long been vulnerable to changes in US-Australian relations, and shutting it down removed one potential vulnerability to the United States’ missile warning network, although Pine Gap remained another weak link, and many years later gathered unwelcome attention as the subject of an Australian television series. A similar consolidation took place on the other side of the globe when the European Ground Station in Kapaun, Germany, closed at the end of September, and Menwith Hill in England began serving as the European Relay Station for the European DSP satellite. Buckley’s DSP station was also being replaced by the new SBIRS Mission Control Station, also at Buckley. By June 2001 it assumed control of DSP satellites and was fully operational by September, several years before the planned debut of the SBIRS satellites.[2] In 1999 there was increased concern within the US military about the impending end of the millennium, and what became known colloquially as “Y2K.” Many civilian and military computer systems had software that was not designed for the new year ending in “00,” and coders around the world furiously sought to update and patch software systems so that they would not crash. The US military even took the extraordinary action of inviting a Russian military delegation to attend the specially created Y2K data center at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, over the new year to monitor data flowing from American radar sites and satellites from around the world, including the time, position, and trajectory of any missile launched anywhere in the world. This was intended as insurance in case any Y2K software bugs indicated a missile launch was underway.[3] DSP The last DSP satellites were built in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Here one is being lifted. Note the solar panels folded up around the satellite bus. (credit: Northrop Grumman) SBIRS falters By the early 2000s, the SBIRS program was in trouble. The plan had been for a SBIRS-High constellation with satellites in geosynchronous orbit, augmented by sensors in highly elliptical orbit, followed by a 24-satellite constellation of SBIRS-Low satellites in low Earth orbit. SBIRS-High and SBIRS-HEO would make the first detections of launches, and SBIRS-Low satellites would provide more precise tracking to enable interception of missile warheads. But the Air Force began experiencing problems, setbacks, and cost overruns in all three programs. The Air Force certainly developed contingency plans in case a satellite degraded or failed entirely, but they never expected that DSP would have to shoulder the burden of missile warning for an additional decade. The first flight of a SBIRS-High satellite was delayed from 2002 to 2004, with the goal of having the constellation of four geosynchronous satellites in place by 2008.[4] In 2001, technical issues with the infrared payload for the highly elliptical satellites also delayed their deployment. SBIRS-Low was supposed to launch its first satellite by 2006 and its tenth by 2010, but that program also ran into numerous delays, and its cost ballooned to $23 billion.[5] At the start of the decade when DSP was supposed to finally be replaced, all three components of the SBIRS program were delayed, and budgets were increasing. Over the next few years, SBIRS-High continued to suffer major development problems, resulting in a launch slip from September 2004 to October 2006, and soon its costs had increased from the original $2.1 billion estimate to over $8 billion, and then to $9.9 billion.[6] In the 1980s and 1990s, the Air Force’s Milstar communications satellite program had been the poster child for military space procurement’s woes. Now it was replaced by SBIRS—until SBIRS was eventually supplanted by another program plagued by cost overruns and schedule delays. In 2006 the first SBIRS-HEO payload was finally launched, followed by the second in 2008 (with two more launched in 2014 and 2017.) Although these payloads replaced DSP-Augmentation payloads, not DSP satellites in geosynchronous orbit, they provided additional infrared warning and tracking capability, alleviating some concerns about the aging DSP constellation. It was not until May 2011 when the first SBIRS-High satellite finally launched, nine years after the original plan.[7] Throughout these extended delays, DSP and DSP-Augmentation (infrared sensors carried on classified payloads in highly elliptical orbits) served as the in-space missile warning systems. The Air Force certainly developed contingency plans in case a satellite degraded or failed entirely, but they never expected that DSP would have to shoulder the burden of missile warning for an additional decade. DSP A DSP satellite with one of its four solar panels in deployed position. The infrared telescope has not yet been installed on top of the satellite. (credit: Northrop Grumman) DSP soldiers on DSP 20 was launched on May 8, 2000, apparently becoming the Pacific satellite. DSP 21 was launched on August 6, 2001, becoming the eastern hemisphere satellite.[8] DSP 22, nicknamed “Eagle Eye,” was launched on February 14, 2004.[9] The final DSP satellite, number 23, was originally scheduled for launch in August 2005 atop the new Delta IV rocket. However, a test of the Delta IV in December 2004 was not fully successful. This and other issues prompted the DSP launch to be pushed back to April 2007. But in March of that year the fueling test of the rocket did not go as planned, and the launch was further pushed back to the summer, and then even further. Although DSP Flight 23’s launch delays were due to problems with the rocket, the delay may have also been intended to alleviate the major delays in launching SBIRS-High by extending the overall lifetime of the DSP constellation.[10] DSP Flight 23 was finally launched on November 11, 2007 from Florida.[11] Although the Air Force had sought to be extra careful with the launch of its last DSP, this satellite failed less than a year after launch. No clear reason for the failure was ever made public. (See “The ongoing saga of DSP Flight 23,” The Space Review, January 19, 2009.) A 24th satellite had been canceled. A full-size, structural test article was donated to the National Museum of the United States Air Force in 2010 and became part of a new display there in 2020. In 2011, the first SBIRS-High satellite was launched, followed by the second in 2013, the third in 2017, and the fourth in 2018. The standard DSP constellation was three primary satellites, meaning that DSP would have been required to operate at least one satellite until approximately 2018 when SBIRS-High was fully operational. SBIRS-High 5 and 6 were launched in 2021 and 2022 respectively. DSP A DSP satellite during a ground test. As of May 2025, three of these satellites are still operational, over two decades after launch. Their condition is classified, but they must serve some national security function. (credit: Northrop Grumman) DSP forever? It is not known what the Air Force’s plans for retiring the DSP program were as the service prepared to launch the last satellites in the 2000s. The DSP-1, or “Block 14,” satellites that entered service in 1989 were designed with a three-year minimum lifetime and a five-year goal. But an older satellite was retired in 1994 after ten years in service, indicating that the satellites were capable of significantly longer lifetimes. The last three DSP satellites to become operational were launched in 2000, 2001, and 2004 and, if they had nominal five- to ten-year lifetimes, they would have been retired probably around ten years after launch, and certainly after the replacement SBIRS satellites had become operational. Surprisingly, as of 2025 there are indications that those three DSP satellites remain operational. That may be due not only to the lateness of the SBRIS-High program, but also to a geopolitical change. In January 2007, China launched an anti-satellite weapon against one of its own satellites, generating substantial debris in low Earth orbit and causing significant controversy around the world. This may have prompted the Air Force to realize that constellations consisting of few satellites in geostationary orbit were potentially vulnerable. A relatively easy risk mitigation was to keep the DSP satellites operational instead of just replacing them by the new SBIRS satellites, assuming that they still retained some capability. At the very least, they increased the number of satellites that an adversary would have to target.[12] DSP has a sophisticated infrared sensor that is the key to its entire mission and the sensor had been one of the primary lifetime limiters for the satellites—the Air Force apparently found a way to dramatically increase the lifetime of the sensor. In 2010, an Air Force official stated that the service had no plans to retire the DSP program. “The DSP program is in really good shape and we have no desire to take any of those systems offline as SBIRS comes into being,” said Colonel Chance Saltzman, 460th Operations Group commander at Buckley AFB, Colorado. Saltzman indicated that the Air Force was taking a long-term approach towards maintaining the satellites. “We are looking sub-system by sub-system and satellite by satellite to see if there are tactics we can employ to wring the most out of those satellites… We’re looking at all options,” he said.[13] By the mid-2010s, the Air Force had consolidated the ground segments for DSP and SBIRS HEO/GEO to a single site. Starting in fiscal year 2018, all Air Force "Missile Warning/Attack Assessment" activities were consolidated under the SBIRS moniker.[14] In June 2020, the US Defense Department awarded a $222.5 million life extension contract for DSP. Contracted work will continue up to March 31, 2030.[15] "Northrop Grumman Systems Corp., Azusa, California, has been awarded a $222,507,873 cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for the Defense Support Program (DSP) Operations, Mission Threat Analysis and Engineering Sustainment (DOMES). This contract provides on-orbit satellite and anomaly resolution support, root cause analysis, mission threat analysis, mission test bed and space awareness and global exploitation as key components of the lifetime extension of the DSP. Work will be performed in Azusa, California; Redondo Beach, California; Aurora, Colorado; and Colorado Springs, Colorado, and is expected to be completed March 31, 2030. Fiscal 2020 operations and maintenance funds in the amount of $18,000,000 is being obligated at the time of award. Space and Missile Systems Center, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, is the contracting activity." The Air Force’s Fiscal Year 2025 budget request, produced in February 2024, stated of the DSP program: "These ground-based systems work in conjunction with the space-based missile warning system, the Space-Based Infrared Systems (SBIRS), to provide assured missile warning. SBIRS currently employs Defense Support Program satellites to detect and track missiles through observation and processing of infrared energy emitted during the missile boost phase."[17] Other sources in 2024 still referred to DSP, indicating that it remained operational in some capacity: “In 2011, the Space Force began deploying the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS), a series of satellites and ground systems to detect and track the launch of adversary missiles. SBIRS satellites operate in geosynchronous (GEO) and highly elliptical orbits to observe missile launches worldwide. SBIRS is DOD’s replacement of the 1970s Defense Support Program satellites.” An undated photo surfaced in late 2024 showing an American general giving a talk at a meeting, accompanied by a slide that showed operational Space Force programs. A DSP satellite was included in the slide, along with several other programs that had similar legacies, such as Milstar and the Defense Support Communications System (DSCS). Communications satellites have demonstrated very long lives in geostationary orbit, but DSP has a sophisticated infrared sensor that is the key to its entire mission and the sensor had been one of the primary lifetime limiters for the satellites—the Air Force apparently found a way to dramatically increase the lifetime of the sensor. DSP not yet into the sunset At least three DSP satellites were still in operation in May 2025, fifty years after the first launch: DSP 20 (launched 2000) is still station keeping at 165.5° W DSP 21 (launched 2001) is still station keeping at 49.1° W DSP 22 (launched 2004) is still station keeping at 87.3° E The Space Force is now planning for new infrared warning and tracking systems to replace SBIRS, adopting a different approach that would distribute many more sensors in different orbits and moving away from a few large, expensive satellites in geosynchronous orbit. The history of SBIRS and its delays and cost overruns certainly haunts the architects of this new approach. To date, the Space Force has not announced the formal retirement of the DSP program, however, the youngest satellite was launched over 20 years ago. DSP won’t last forever, but it has been proven to be a tough bird. Next: Replacing DSP. Endnotes For a detailed history of the development of missile warning satellites, see: Jeffrey T. Richelson, America’s Space Sentinels: DSP Satellites and National Security (2nd edition), University Press of Kansas, 2012, p. 237. Ibid., p. 238; 248. Ibid., p. 239. Ibid., p. 243; 246. Ibid., p. 245. Ibid., pp. 253-254. Ibid., p. 268. Ibid., p. 238. Ibid., p. 249. Ibid., p. 249. “U.S. Air Force Delays Last DSP Launch Until Summer,” SpaceNews, March 21, 2007. Brian G. Chow, “Nuclear vulnerability: In-orbit bodyguards would help protect NC3 satellites from attacks,” SpaceNews, April 1, 2019. Arie Church, “DSP Warning Satellites Soldier On,” Air & Space Forces Magazine, October 29, 2010. Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, Fiscal 2023 Activities, NASA. “Defense Support Program (DSP),” Missile Threat, CSIS Missile Defense Project; Matthew Nelson, “Northrop Gets $223M Contract to Sustain Defense Support Program Satellites,” GovConWire, June 29, 2020. Contracts for June 26, 2020, Missile Defense Agency, U.S. Department of Defense. Fiscal Year (FY) 2025 Budget Estimates, February 2024, Operation and Maintenance, Space Force, Volume I. Defense Primer: Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3), Congressional Research Service, October 3, 2024. Dwayne Day can be reached at zirconic1@cox.net.

NASA's Future Is In Question

Isaacman Jared Isaacman was days away from being confirmed as NASA administrator, and taking on the largest budget cuts in the agency’s history, when the White House pulled his nomination May 31. (credit: NASA/Bill Ingalls) NASA’s future in the balance by Jeff Foust Monday, June 2, 2025 At the end of last week, the space community was gearing up for more bad news. While there was no formal announcement, NASA was widely expected to release more details about its fiscal year 2026 budget proposal. The White House had released top-level details in a “skinny” budget released in early May (see “Budget cuts and the fraying of international partnerships”, The Space Review, May 12, 2025), but NASA would go into details about how the cuts in the skinny budget would be implemented: which missions and programs would be cancelled or scaled back, and which few lucky ones would be increased. The release of the detailed budget would help illustrate the magnitude of the reductions to the space community as well as to members of Congress who, in the coming weeks and months will consider, or cast aside, the proposal as they craft appropriations bills. It was also shaping up to be the first major challenge for NASA incoming administrator—until it wasn’t. Deep cuts Normally NASA budget rollouts are events. In recent years, NASA administrators have given “State of NASA” speeches the day the budget is announced, with a briefing later in the day to discuss what was in, or cut from, the proposal. According to The Planetary Society, 41 individual projects, both standalone missions and contributions to other missions, are slated for termination in the 2026 budget proposal. This year was different. There was no “State of NASA” speech, no briefing, no press release, and not even a formal advisory in advance. Instead, at about 4 pm EDT on Friday the 30th, NASA posted the documents on its website with zero fanfare. Looking at the document, one can understand why NASA didn’t want to publicize it. The budget cancelled missions and programs right and left to achieve the $6 billion in cuts from the agency’s 2025 budget of about $24.9 billion. Those cuts were most visible in science. According to The Planetary Society, 41 individual projects, both standalone missions and contributions to other missions, are slated for termination in the 2026 budget proposal. They range from Mars Sample Return (MSR), the multibillion-dollar program that the skinny budget already disclosed would be canceled, to many ongoing missions in extended phases whose annual budgets are in the low millions of dollars each. “It’s generally pretty much what we expected,” Casey Dreier, chief of space policy at The Planetary Society, said in an interview shortly after the release of the budget. That was based on the overall budget reductions for science included in the skinny budget, which slashed science spending by 47% from 2025. The skinny budget had listed only two missions, MSR and Landsat Next, for termination (Landsat Next, the document said, would be restructured in some way to lower its costs, with work continuing another line item.) The detailed budget showed how far-reaching the proposed cuts were, Some of the missions slated for cancellation are large, like the Earth System Observatory line of missions, still largely in early phases of development. Also cancelled was the Astrophysics Probe program, also in its early phases now—NASA selected two concepts for further study last year—but which would have a full cost of about $1 billion. The budget, released almost four years after NASA selected two Venus missions in its latest Discovery program competition, DAVINCI and VERITAS, would cancel them both. It would also cancel NASA’s contribution to EnVision, a European Space Agency mission to Venus launching around the same time. However, small missions in development also got the axe, like the Compton Spectrometer and Imager as well as Ultraviolet Explorer missions in astrophysics. It also seeks to cancel NASA’s role in ESA’s Rosalind Franklin rover mission to Mars, where NASA offered to provide thrusters for the landing platform, radioisotope heating units and a launch to replace components that Roscosmos had provided. A wide range of missions already operating and in their extended phases would be terminated in the budget. The biggest of them is the Chandra X-Ray Observatory, which a year ago NASA was considering budget cuts that astronomers warned were tantamount to cancellation. The new budget simply zeroes out the budget for Chandra. The Hubble Space Telescope would continue, but with some modest funding cuts. The scale of those terminations surprised even Dreier. “I’d say some of the surprises were things like MAVEN, Juno, New Horizons; these really unique and arguably infrastructure-related assets,” he said. MAVEN, a Mars orbiter, is also used as a communications relay. Also terminated in the budget proposal is OSIRIS-APEX, the extension of the OSIRIS-REx asteroid sample return mission that will go to the asteroid Apophis just after its close Earth flyby in 2029. He was also surprised that the budget would effectively end NASA support of plutonium-238 production needed for radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs) and heating units. “The argument is that we no longer need a presence in the outer solar system, so we don’t need plutonium any more,” he said. A table tucked away in the back of the 462-page budget document notes that NASA has 17,391 civil servants in fiscal year 2025. In fiscal year 2026, that would fall by a third, to 11,853. There was one bit of good news for science in the budget. The Nancy Grace Roman Space Telescope, which leaked budget documents in April suggested would be terminated, is funded in the budget. However, it does do at a lower level than projected: $156.6 million for fiscal year 2025, versus a projected $376.5 million that NASA said last year the mission would need in 2026 as it worked towards a launch as soon as the fall of 2026. “NASA is actively evaluating cost-saving strategies and identifying schedule optimization opportunities to enable the mission to proceed with this reduced funding level,” the budget document said. But Dreier noted that the spacecraft is now nearly complete, with most of its overall budget already spent: “Cutting it in half and expecting to save money, that doesn’t make sense.” Many of the other reductions in the NASA budget had already been telegraphed in the skinny budget: ending SLS and Orion after Artemis 3, cancelling the Gateway, potentially reducing the size of crew on the International Space Station, and slashing many space technology programs. The skinny budget had hinted at new investments in Mars technology, and the budget does more than $1 billion for projects associated with human Mars exploration. That amount includes $200 million mission for “a near-term entry, descent, and landing demonstration for a human-class Mars lander” and another $200 million for commercial payload deliveries to Mars. The budget documents, though, provide few specifics about those new initiatives: the section on new Mars technology investments is less than a page. The budget includes $864 million for a new “Commercial Moon to Mars (M2M) Infrastructure and Transportation Program”. That would go towards developing a commercial system to replace SLS/Orion as well as early work on “a space suit appropriate for use by astronauts on the Martian surface.” The program will also fund lunar and Martian relay satellites and be the new home of the Commercial Lunar Payload Services program, currently hosted by NASA’s Science Mission Directorate. With all those cuts come job reductions. A table tucked away in the back of the 462-page budget document notes that NASA has 17,391 civil servants in fiscal year 2025. In fiscal year 2026, that would fall by a third, to 11,853. Some field centers would see even larger cuts: the Goddard Space Flight Center would lose nearly 50% of its civil servant workforce, while the Ames Research Center would lose nearly 40%. The document, though, says little about those cuts. It makes only passing references to “workforce impacts” and “workforce reshaping efforts” without discussing how they would be implemented. The budget proposal will likely face strong opposition from Congress. Some members, primarily Democrats, have criticized the budget. “This sick joke of a budget is a nonstarter,” Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-CA), ranking member of the House Science Committee, said in a statement Monday. “Republicans need to join Democrats in fighting for the programs they once supported, and their communities thrive on.” “We've heard from Republican offices that this is dead on arrival, absolutely deader than dead on arrival,” Dreier said. Isaacman out For about 24 hours, the budget proposal appeared to be the first major challenge for NASA’s expected next administrator, Jared Isaacman. Just before the Memorial Day holiday, Senate Majority Leader John Thune (R-SD) filed cloture on Isaacman’s nomination, a procedural move intended to set up a vote on the nomination this week. By the end of this week, most expected Isaacman to be sworn in. He would have faced strong questions about how much he supported this budget proposal, which would now be his. He had deflected questions about potential budget cuts during his confirmation process, stating that he was not involved in its development, but noted that a potential cut of neatly 50% to NASA science “does not appear to be an optimal outcome.” Did he still believe that now that he was running the agency and handed a budget with such a massive cut? “After a thorough review of prior associations, I am hereby withdrawing the nomination of Jared Isaacman to head NASA,” Trump announced. We won’t find out. While there had been no public issues that threatened his nomination, on Saturday afternoon Laura Loomer, a right-wing activist with some influence on the Trump Administration, posted that “Deep State operatives are trying to derail President Trump’s NASA Administrator pick” ahead of the confirmation vote, suggesting it was an effort to drive a wedge between Musk, who had lobbied for Isaacman to be nominated, and President Trump. Within hours, the White House confirmed that Isaacman was out. “It’s essential that the next leader of NASA is in complete alignment with President Trump’s America First agenda and a replacement will be announced directly by President Trump soon,” White House spokesperson Liz Huston said in a statement. That statement, though, gave no reason for why the White House was withdrawing the nomination, and even left open the chance that Isaacman had decided to withdraw. Trump provided a few more details later Saturday evening. “After a thorough review of prior associations, I am hereby withdrawing the nomination of Jared Isaacman to head NASA. I will soon announce a new Nominee who will be Mission aligned, and put America First in Space,” he stated. Those “prior associations” were not identified, but appear to be a reference to Isaacman’s past donations to Democratic candidates and party offices. Those donations, though, were publicly known for months, which led to speculation again that the decision was linked to fraying ties between Trump and Musk, as the latter exited his formal role in the administration just a day earlier. Whatever the reason, the decision leaves NASA without a permanent leader just as it faces the steepest budget cuts in its history. That has demoralized the agency’s workforce and sent shock waves of concern through the rest of the space community. Isaacman “ran into the kind of politics that is damaging our country. Republicans and Democrats supported him as the right guy at the right time for the top job at NASA, but it wasn’t enough,” said Sen. Mark Kelly (D-AZ), himself a former astronaut, in a post Monday. “It’s incredibly frustrating that this administration did this to him and his family but I know he’s not done yet and he has a lot left to offer space exploration and our nation.” Isaacman himself took the high road in his own online comments about the withdrawal, saying the six months since Trump announced his intent to nominate Isaacman “have been enlightening and, honestly, a bit thrilling.” He added, “I’ll always be grateful for this opportunity and cheering on our President and NASA as they lead us on the greatest adventure in human history.” But right now, few other people are cheering on NASA as the one-two punch of the budget cuts and withdrawn nomination create a dark mood unlike any seen at NASA outside of spaceflight tragedies. The agency’s future is at stake as it enters uncharted fiscal waters with no one at the helm. Jeff Foust (jeff@thespacereview.com) is the editor and publisher of The Space Review, and a senior staff writer with SpaceNews. He also operates the Spacetoday.net web site. Views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone. Note: we are now moderating comments. There will be a delay in posting comments and no guarantee that all submitted commen

What Future For SpaceX?

Falcon 9 launch A Falcon 9 lifts off May 30 from Cape Canaveral carrying a GPS 3 satellite. (credit: SpaceX) What future for SpaceX? Is Elon Musk’s company as promising as it seems? by Claude Lafleur Monday, June 2, 2025 The least we can say is that in less than ten years, SpaceX, founded in 2002 by Elon Musk, has transformed the space domain. It now dominates space activities worldwide. By the numbers Over the past ten years, SpaceX has sent into space nearly three-quarters of all spacecraft launched worldwide (Table 1), while nearly a third of all rockets launched have been its own (Table 2). Since 2020, SpaceX has carried out the majority of launches, now sending more than 80% of all spacecraft. table Table 1: Spacecraft launched, 2016–2025 (as of May 31, 2025) table Table 2: Rocket launched, 2016–2025 (as of May 31, 2025) Since 2019, SpaceX has been launching the largest constellation of satellites in orbit, with 8,400 Starlink satellites launched to date as part of a communications network that could include up to 34,400 satellites. These 8,400 satellites alone represent more than a third of all spacecraft launched since 1957 (some 22,300 in total). It goes without saying that SpaceX arouses as much passion, speculation, dreams as it does doubts. Because the Falcon’s first stage is normally recovered after each flight and reused about 20 times, SpaceX is able to offer launches at unbeatable prices. What's more, it organizes group launches, during which dozens of satellites—sometimes more than a hundred—are launched simultaneously. To date, SpaceX has organized 13 Transporter missions and three Bandwagon missions that have lofted more than 1,100 satellites. Such launches allow young companies and organizations with limited resources to access space. In doing so, SpaceX opens space to a host of new users. Meanwhile, SpaceX is developing the most powerful rocket ever, Starship. In 2022, Elon Musk stated that a single Starship could place as much mass into orbit in a year as anything launched since 1957. “The total mass to orbit to date is around 15,000 to 16,000 tons,” he said on February 10, 2022. “The mass per Starship, just after one year of launching, if it launched three times a day, would be equal to all the mass we’ve orbit today. That’s for one Starship launching three times a day for a year. Now, if you have ten Starships…,” he added.[1] And of course, Elon Musk dreams of landing a million people on Mars, establishing the first space settlement, claiming SpaceX will soon be ready for such launches. It goes without saying that SpaceX arouses as much passion, speculation, dreams as it does doubts. These doubts are largely because we know nothing about the company's financial strength. Are Falcon 9 launches and Starlink operations profitable? Will Starship ever be profitable? And where will the funds required to colonize Mars come from? SpaceX is principally owned by Elon Musk, although a limited number of investors have the privilege of owning shares in the company. Since SpaceX is not publicly traded, its financial situation is largely unknown. Given the company's remarkable achievements, who wouldn't dream of owning a few shares in SpaceX? As The Wall Street Journal recently argued: “In the second half of 2024, SpaceX’s valuation grew 67%. Overall, the company’s shares have increased nearly 30-fold between 2015—when SpaceX was valued at $12 billion—and last December, when its valuation hit $350 billion, putting it on par with the likes of Oracle and Coca-Cola.”[2] “As it has grown to become one of the largest companies in the U.S.”, the article continued, “it has remained one of the most secretive, with its finances hidden from all but a small group of investors and insiders. Most people with stakes in SpaceX have no clue how much money the company makes or loses. Remaining private also allows SpaceX to escape the scrutiny of the stock market.” But is SpaceX truly profitable and viable in the long term? While the company's finances remain opaque, analyzing the facts and doing some simple math can help us gain a clearer picture. Are Falcon 9 operations profitable? Since 2010, SpaceX has launched nearly 500 Falcon 9 rockets, including 132 last year and more than 50 already this year, with a success rate of over 99%. SpaceX sometimes conducts three launches in less than 24 hours, while most of the rocket's first stages are recovered and reused. This is a performance that no one can match. To date, SpaceX has conducted about 200 commercial launches, primarily for NASA and the Department of Defense, in addition to more than 250 launches of its Starlink satellites. Of course, there are no figures on the costs and profits generated by these launches. One could hypothesize that profits from commercial launches finance those of Starlink. However, from 2023, two-thirds of Falcon 9 launches are used to put SpaceX's Starlink satellites into orbit (Table 3). table Table 3: Starlink Launches by Falcon 9 (as of May 31, 2025). It is therefore reasonable to estimate that the profits generated by commercial launches do not cover the cost of Starlink launches. To do so, the profits generated by each commercial launch would have to be twice the launch costs. Therefore, the Falcon 9 rocket operation, as extraordinary as it is, is undoubtedly unprofitable, given the large number of launches required by Starlink. And everything suggests that this will remain the case as long as Falcon 9s are used to orbit the Starlink fleet. Is Starlink profitable? On January 16, 2015, Elon Musk announced a global satellite Internet network which will eventually include some 4,000 satellites in low Earth orbit and an initial service within five years. “The goal will be to have the majority of long-distance Internet traffic go over this network and about 10 percent of local consumer and business traffic,” said Musk.[3] This is Starlink’s weakness: the large number of satellites that need to be continually replaced. He explained that his company is entering the satellite business in part because there is more money associated with it than with space launch services. “This is intended to be a significant amount of revenue and to help fund a city on Mars,” he said. “Looking at the long term, what’s needed to create a city on Mars? Well, one thing’s for sure—a lot of money. So, we need things that will generate a lot of money.” By the time SpaceX launched its first batch of Starlink satellites, on May 24, 2019, it was stated that this Internet constellation would ultimately feature 12,000 satellites.[4] It could even reach as much as 34,400 satellites. As of the end of May, more than 8,800 Starlink satellites were launched by more than 250 Falcon 9 rockets. But that doesn’t mean that two-thirds of the initial 12,000 Starlink network are in place, since, as Jonathan McDowell reports, "the median Starlink operational lifetime [is] 5.3 years."[5] In addition to the satellites that have already completed their useful life, there are those that missed their launch or failed prematurely. Thus, as of January 1, 2025, there were already 735 Starlink out of service.[6] The fact is that implementing a network of 12,000 satellites is proving to be a colossal undertaking, with SpaceX failing to deliver 2,000 new satellites per year. (In 2022, it launched 1,722 Starlinks, 1,983 in 2023, and 1,981 in 2024.) At SpaceX's current pace, it would take more than six years to orbit its fleet of 12,000 satellites and 17 years for a constellation of 34,400 satellites, not counting those that will reach the end of their life in the meantime and those lost for various reasons. This is Starlink’s weakness: the large number of satellites that need to be continually replaced. This is the major difference compared to traditional communication satellite networks placed in geostationary orbit. The latter only require a few satellites to serve the entire world and they have a lifespan of 15 to 20 years. A company therefore only has to place a limited number of such satellites and has a decade or more to recoup its investment. Whereas with constellations of thousands of satellites in low orbit, they must be constantly replaced. But these satellites cost much less than traditional GEO satellites. In the case of Starlink, however, it is not known how much each satellite costs. Fortunately, in May 2024, Quilty Space, a market research and consulting firm, estimates that the latest Starlink V2 mini version carries a price tag of $800,000. They project that future individual V3s will cost roughly $1.2 million.[7] This means that the total cost of the 2,000 satellites launched each year is around $2 billion, not including launch costs. Added to these costs are the operation of a fleet of thousands of Starlinks and other operating costs, as well as the distribution and service of hundreds of thousands of ground terminals and other hardware. How much does it cost to keep a fleet of thousands of satellites operational? And how much do Starlink services bring in? According to another forecast released in December 2024 by Quilty Space, “Starlink is projected to reach $11.8 billion in revenue next year. This represents a substantial increase from the estimated $7.7 billion in revenue for 2024. The 2025 revenue projection includes $7.5 billion from consumer services, $1.3 billion in hardware sales, and $3 billion from U.S. government contracts.”[8] These are big numbers, big projections. However, if we project a constellation of 34,400 satellites that must be replaced every 5.3 years, SpaceX will have to triple or even quadruple its current launch rate, and therefore launch between 6,000 and 8,000 satellites per year. Assuming that each satellite costs $1.2 million plus, say, $800,000 to launch each one,[9] we can argue that it will cost $12 to $16 billion just to maintain the Starlink fleet, plus all other operating costs, year after year after year. So one might wonder whether the Starlink network will be a major source of funding for Elon Musk's Martian ambitions, or rather a bottomless financial pit? There will be a Starship On September 29, 2016, Elon Musk announced the development of a large new launch vehicle and a reusable spacecraft that could be ready to take 100 people to Mars as soon as the mid-2020s. This “Interplanetary Transport System,” he said, will uses 42 Raptor engines in its first stage, generating a liftoff thrust of 28.6 million pounds-force, or more than three and a half times times that of a Saturn V.[10] A month later, Musk revealed that the vehicle is known internally as the “Big F***king Rocket”, or BFR.[11] It later was rebranded the “Big Falcon Rocket” and then, more appropriately, Starship.[12] On September 28, 2019, Musk said Starship test flights would start as soon as one to two months and reach orbit in as little as six months. “This is going to sound totally nuts, but I think we want to try to reach orbit in less than six months,” Musk said, a schedule he estimates to be “accurate to within a few months.” Musk added that the first flights with people on board could come as soon as 2020.[13] As always, things didn't happen that quickly. The first Starship launch didn't take place until 2023, and the nine test flights conducted to date have yielded only mixed results, as illustrated in Table 4. table Table 4: SpaceX’s Starship test flights consist of five main phases: launch, Super Heavy (SH) first stage flight, its end (sea fall or recovery), Starship second stage flight, and its end (sea fall or recovery). This table summarizes the success or failure of each of these phases. In 2024, Elon Musk clarified that more than 3,000 people work daily at Starbase, where he’s been building more than $3 billion in infrastructure since 2014, and currently spending $1.1 billion annually.[14] This shows the scale of the Starship project. And if we consider its ambition to be able to place as much payload into orbit as everything launched to date, we have to ask ourselves, will we really need such a launcher? The history of powerful rockets—from Saturn V to Falcon Heavy, including Titan IV-Centaur and Delta Heavy—shows that such a need is rare. Thus, Saturn V was only been used 13 times and Delta Heavy nine times. The case of the Falcon Heavy, the most powerful rocket currently available, is particularly interesting. Launched for the first time in 2019, this rocket has only been used 11 times (mainly for the Department of Defense) as show in Table 5. Curiously, SpaceX does not use it to launch its Starlinks. table Table 5. Falcon Heavy; only one of two are launched each year. Why don't we use the powerful rockets we have? The short answer is we don't really need them, since medium-power rockets like Ariane 6 and Falcon 9 are perfectly adequate. In fact, the use of powerful rockets has several disadvantages. For example, launching many satellites at the same time poses the same logistical problem as super-jumbo jets capable of carrying a thousand passengers. Will they all be ready in time? Then, let’s not forget that not all satellites are placed in the same orbit in terms of altitude, inclination, solar angle, timings, and so on. In short, if we only use the Falcon Heavy once or twice a year, we will have even less need for Starship. There's also the risk of putting all your eggs in one basket. Suppose you charter a Starship to transport dozens of communications, weather, and military satellites into geostationary orbit at once, but the rocket misfires. You'd then incur a monumental loss. It's better to risk losing one every now and then than to risk everything at once. Finally, any space cargo is very expensive; a satellite weighing a few tons is worth tens of millions of dollars. This means that a 100-ton payload that a Starship could carry could reach a billion dollars. However, we don't have the financial capacity to launch such expensive payloads frequently. In short, if we only use the Falcon Heavy once or twice a year, we will have even less need for Starship. The commercial profitability of this space giant is expected to be even lower than that of the Falcon Heavy. But, Elon Musk tells us, Starships are designed to send a million people to Mars. The SpaceX boss even hopes to establish a colony within a few decades. Fine. But who will foot the bill? The passengers? Musk himself? Governments? Who else? Moreover, sending Starship to Mars poses serious challenges. We can't just fly to our neighboring planet whenever we want. We must wait for Earth and Mars to align properly, the Martian windows that open for a few weeks every 26 months. Now, with 100 people per trip, we would need to launch 10,000 Starships. Let's say we want to get this million people cohort to Mars by the end of the century, so in 70 years. We would then have 32 Martian windows. This means that we would need to launch more than 300 Starships during each Martian window of a few weeks. Right now, we are impressed when SpaceX launches three Falcon 9s in 24 hours, or more than a dozen a month. We'll be equally impressed if Elon Musk's company manages to complete 175 to 180 Falcon 9 launches this year, as it intends to. So, imagine launching 300 Starships during the Martian window of 2031 and so on. Imagine 30,000 passengers converging on Cape Canaveral for their flight. Imagine 300 spacecraft cruising simultaneously toward Mars. References Elon Musk’s Full Speech - Starship Update 2022, YouTube, at about 11 minutes. Susan Pulliam, Corrie Driebusch and Becky Peterson, A Side Hustle for Friends of Musk: Selling Access to Stakes in His Private Companies, The Wall Street Journal, April 24, 2025. Peter B. de Selding, SpaceX To Build 4,000 Broadband Satellites in Seattle, SpaceNews, January 19, 2015. Caleb Henry, SpaceX launches 60 Starlink satellites, begins constellation buildout, SpaceNews, May 23, 2019. ‪Jonathan McDowell ‬on Bluesky, February 25, 2025.‬‬‬‬ Will Robinson-Smith, SpaceX launches first dedicated Starlink mission of 2025, Spaceflight Now, January 6, 2025. Note: the author reported that “as of Jan. 2, 2025, SpaceX has 6,895 Starlink satellites currently on orbit”, and there were 7630 Starlinks launched between 2019 and Dec. 31, 2024. Sandra Erwin, Starlink soars: SpaceX’s satellite internet surprises analysts with $6.6 billion revenue projection, SpaceNews, May 9, 2024. Sandra Erwin, Starlink set to hit $11.8 billion revenue in 2025, boosted by military contracts, SpaceNews, December 16, 2024. It could also be estimated that a Falcon 9 launch, which places between 22 and 29 Starlinks, costs between $40 and $50 million. The launch cost of each satellite would therefore be closer to $2 million. Such an estimate would bring the cost of maintaining a fleet of 34,400 Starlinks at $20 billion per year. Jeff Foust, SpaceX’s Mars plans call for massive 42-engine reusable rocket, SpaceNews, September 27, 2016. Jeff Foust, Musk offers more details about Mars mission architecture, SpaceNews, October 23, 2016. Jeff Foust, FCC license application sheds light on SpaceX vehicle testing plans, SpaceNews, November 23, 2018. Jeff Foust, Musk vows to accelerate Starship development, SpaceNews, September 29, 2019. Jeff Foust, SpaceX nears next Starship test flight as Starbase expansion continues, SpaceNews, May 21, 2024. The author wishes to thank Philippe Garneau for his valuable collaboration. Claude Lafleur is a French-Canadian science reporter who has been covering space activities for forty years. He produces the podcast “Voyage dans l'espace” and publishes statistics and summaries on BlueSky. He can be reached at claude-lafleur1@videotron.ca. Note: we are now moderating comments. 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Some Fascinating Comments on Insects

nsects that live in the Himalayas at high altitudes and low temperatures to microorganisms that flourish in hydrothermal vents on the ocean floor and feed on chemical energy. We explored, via our models, whether they may survive in the Martian subsurface or in Europa’s oceans. We also investigated if marine bacteria that produce oxygen in Earth’s oceans could potentially survive on known extrasolar planets. Although comprehensive and detailed, this approach makes important simplifications. For example, it does not yet model how life may shape the planet, nor does it account for the full array of nutrients organisms may need. These simplifications are by design. In most of the environments we currently study, we know too little about the conditions to meaningfully attempt such models, except for some solar system bodies, such as Saturn’s moon Enceladus. The quantitative habitability framework allows my team to answer questions like whether astrobiologists might be interested in a subsurface location on Mars, given the available data, or whether astronomers should turn their telescopes to planet A or planet B while searching for life. Our framework is available as an open-source computer model, which astrobiologists can now readily use and further develop to help with current and future projects. If scientists do detect a potential signature of life, this approach can help assess if the environment where it is detected can actually support the type of life that leads to the signature detected. Our next steps will be to build a database of terrestrial organisms that live in extreme environments and represent the limits of life. To this data, we can also add models for hypothetical alien life. By integrating those into the quantitative habitability framework, we will be able to work out scenarios, interpret new data coming from other worlds and guide the search for signatures of life beyond Earth—in our solar system and beyond. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article. Daniel Apai is serving as Associate Dean for Research and Professor of Astronomy and Planetary Sciences at The University of Arizona. His research focuses on extrasolar planet discovery and characterization, including studies of planetary atmospheres, planet formation, and planetary habitability. Daniel is Principal Investigator of the Alien Earths team, a large interdisciplinary NASA-funded research group exploring how habitable exoplanets form. He also leads Project EDEN, a search for habitable worlds around the closest star; and the Nautilus Space Observatory concept, a project to develop a powerful new type of space telescopes to enable surveys of extrasolar planets for signatures of life. Note: we are now moderating comments. There will be a delay in posting comments and no guarantee that all submitted comments will be posted.

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