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Is The US Doing Enough o Engage China In Space Policy?

Tiangong spacewalk Chinese astronauts on a recent spacewalk outside the Tiangong space station. Should the US do more to work with China on topics like human spaceflight and exploration? (credit: Xinhua) Is the United States doing enough to engage with China on space policy? by Mariam Kvaratskhelia Monday, July 29, 2024 Bookmark and Share While Beijing has accused the United States of turning outer space into “a weapon and a battlefield,”[1] it has no less history of doing the same. China has been interested in counterspace capabilities for years now, developing multiple anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, such as ground-based directed energy weapons (DEWs), satellite jammers, and ASAT missiles targeting low-Earth orbit satellites. The principal goal of these endeavors remains “…asymmetrically disrupting U.S. space operations,”[2] and matching or surpassing the US capabilities in space, according to the Intelligence Community’s Annual Threat Assessment.[3] While some experts maintain that cooperation with China on space policy should be one of the priorities of the US government, I argue that the latter is doing enough in terms of engagement. Opportunities for cooperation with China are narrow for three principal reasons. First, there is no track record of substantial coordination on space issues with China, and therefore, no history of trust. Second, the US regulatory framework currently in place, namely the Wolf Amendment, already establishes an environment where engagement with China is limited. Third, it is unrealistic to expect that Sino-American cooperation on space policy will soothe general tensions existing between the two nations. The great power competition encompasses virtually every area of the national security policy; therefore, for space partnership with China to bear any tangible outcomes, it must be a part of a greater package of cooperation, not an isolated policy goal of its own. While some experts maintain that cooperation with China on space policy should be one of the priorities of the US government, I argue that the latter is doing enough in terms of engagement. There is a widespread tendency today to vouch for a closer Sino-American engagement on space issues based on the example of the Cold War Soviet-American partnership. The 1975 Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) is widely regarded as a “catalyst for East-West détente.”[4] Therefore, importing this line of thinking into a discussion about China implies that increased engagement on space issues with the latter will a priori result in a less tense strategic environment. This comparison is flawed for three main reasons. First, there is an argument to be made that during the fall of the Soviet Union, because the country was in a weak position, it was in its own interests to cooperate with the United States. The US, too, benefited from diverting Russian talent and money to shared projects like the International Space Station (ISS), as it meant that Soviets would not work on developing individual military capacities. Second, it must be kept in mind that despite the historical handshake of 1975, Moscow resumed testing ASAT weapons in space shortly afterwards, which more generally suggests that there is no direct correlation between joint projects and maintained trust. Third, the Apollo-Soyuz project set the stage for future space policy dynamics with Russia. This is why we have seen instances like Roscosmos-NASA collaboration even after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, despite the general hostility between two countries.[5] The same cannot be said for China: Beijing is not in a weak position, which means that any joint project that the US pursues with China can easily bite back. Additionally, there is no history of Sino-American cooperation on space issues, which in of itself is derived from a lack of trust between the two. China has a record of intellectual property (IP) theft since the 1990s, examples that include Hughes Electronics Corp., Loral Space & Communications, and Lockheed Martin Corp. scandals.[6] More recently, in 2019, a Chinese national was caught smuggling export-controlled components of US technology used in spacecraft.[7] Aside from IP theft, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been working on developing ASAT and precision strike capabilities for destroying satellites in low and geosynchronous orbits,[8] pointing at the fact that “Beijing conceives of outer space as a critical warfighting domain.”[9] Dean Cheng brilliantly notes that China prioritizes “deterrence through space” over “deterrence in space,”[10] which further highlights that, aside from wanting to establish leadership beyond terrestrial limits, Beijing is willing to use space for offensive as well as defensive purposes. All this, combined with China’s overall image as an authoritarian state, creates lack of trust on the part of the US, which is a reasonable ground to not pursue further engagement. The United States’ lack of trust is reflected in regulatory frameworks in place. The Wolf Amendment, introduced in 2011 by former Rep. Frank Wolf, prohibits NASA and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy from cooperating with China without prior authorization. This legislation was essentially a precautionary measure taken by the US Congress to mitigate growing risks of China’s IP theft. In one interview, Wolf noted that “China has more to learn from the U.S. than we have to learn from them... So any cooperation would mean they take from us, not that we take from them.”[11] Of course the Wolf Amendment does not mean that there is no prospect at all of NASA working with Chinese counterparts; it simply means that the FBI would have to assess risks of sharing information with Chinese entities prior to authorizing. The space domain does not exist in a political vacuum. To borrow an example from the Cold War again, one can argue that space cooperation did not cause improvement of Soviet-American relations, but vice versa. There is a counterargument to be made based on these restrictions. Some argue that had China been more involved in these US-led international missions, it would have been deterred from establishing its own space station and/or building advanced space capabilities.[12,13] By creating such a polarized space policy environment, opponents say the US could even lose some of its allies and partners to China. But Chinese intentions have been clear to us from the beginning: they are aimed at challenging US leadership in space and achieving a “world-class status in all but a few space technology areas.”[14] It would be irrational to believe that more engagement with China would eradicate Beijing’s existing intentions, or that these intentions stem from a lack of engagement. The question, therefore, becomes: is China willing to cooperate to begin with? Its aggressive space policy and ambitions raise skeptical answers. Another question worthy of addressing involves the intended end goal of more engagement. Some forms of cooperation to deconflict space can be beneficial for short-term and micro-scale objectives, but hoping that it will ease the general animosity between China and the US is shortsighted and unreasonable. Aaron Bateman rightly notes that space activities are not “free of geopolitical machinations” and are “just another vehicle for promoting a state’s interest.”[15] In other words, the space domain does not exist in a political vacuum. To borrow an example from the Cold War again, one can argue that space cooperation did not cause improvement of Soviet-American relations, but vice versa. Competition is its own form of engagement too. The United States is doing enough to engage with China, and bringing space partnership at the forefront of the agenda would be devoid of meaning. In this discussion, it is important that we ask the following questions: Considering Chinese ambitions of becoming the leader in space exploration, is Beijing interested in space policy cooperation to begin with? Would it have to give up on its leadership aspirations and accept a power equilibrium with the US., or even a position of inferiority to the latter? What is either party gaining from this partnership? Taking into account China’s track record of intellectual property theft, in addition to its lack of history of cooperation with the US on space issues, how can the US trust Beijing with joint projects and information sharing? What is the overarching end goal of space policy cooperation, considering that improving broader geopolitical relationships requires addressing a bigger and more diverse set of military and non-military domains? Answering these questions helps draw a cost-benefit analysis, which in case of this paper’s argument skews more towards costs than benefits. The US must focus on advancing its own technological capabilities to ensure zero-sum competition in the years to come, while also eradicating any power vacuums that can potentially be filled by China. References Ed Browne, “China Accuses U.S. Of Turning Outer Space Into 'a Weapon and a Battlefield,'” Newsweek (July 2022). Oscar Glaese, “China’s Directed Energy Weapons and Counterspace Applications,” The Diplomat (June 2022). Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community” (February 2023). Andrew Jenks, “U.S.-Soviet Handshakes in Space and the Cold War Imaginary,” MIT Press Direct (May 2021). The Guardian, “Russians and American share spacecraft despite nations’ enmity over Ukraine” (September 2022). Vernon Loeb, “Lockheed Accused of Giving Data on Rockets to China,” Los Angeles Times (April 2000). Justin Rohrlich and Tim Fernholz, “China is trying to steal military space tech. The US is running stings to stop it,” Quartz (September 2019). U.S. Department of Defense, “2023 Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (2023). Christopher A. Ford, “Arms Control in Outer Space: History and Prospects,” Arms Control and International Security Papers 1, no. 12 (July 2020), 4. Dean Cheng, “Are we ready to meet the Chinese space challenge?” SpaceNews (July 2017). Jacqueline Feldscher, “Biden space advisers urge cooperation with China,” Politico (December 2020). Makena Young, “Bad Idea: The Wolf Amendment (Limiting Collaboration with China in Space)” Defense 360 (December 2019). Aaron Bateman, “The Prospects for United States–China Space Cooperation are Limited,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (June 2023). Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.” Aaron Bateman, “The Prospects for United States–China Space Cooperation are Limited.” Mariam Kvaratskhelia is a recent graduate of Georgetown University's Master of Science in Foreign Service (MSFS) program, specializing in transatlantic security, defense and nuclear strategy. She has more than eight years of experience in academic research, writing, and project management.

Cleaning Up The Mess In LEO

Resurs model A model of the Resurs P1 satellite that broke up in low Earth orbit in June. (credit: Vitaly V. Kuzmin CC BY-SA 4.0) Cleaning up the mess in LEO by Jeff Foust Monday, July 29, 2024 Bookmark and Share For a moment, many in the space industry feared the worst. U.S. Space Command reported June 27 that a defunct Russian satellite, Resurs P1, had broken up in low Earth orbit the previous day. One company, LeoLabs, reported that its radars had detected at least 180 pieces of debris from the satellite. The event prompted International Space Station controllers to instruct crews to go into the “safe havens” of their docked spacecraft as a precaution; they were able to return to the station after an hour. The nature of the event led to some speculation that Resurs P1 was the target of a Russian antisatellite test, similar to Cosmos 1408 in November 2021. However, there were no statements from Russian officials or Western intelligence to indicate that any test had occurred. LeoLabs said a week after the event that, based on its analysis of the tracked debris, that the spacecraft suffered a “low intensity explosion” either from a collision with a small, untracked piece of debris or structural failure of the spacecraft itself. “The global space community is running out of time to gracefully transition from the current world of reliable LEO space operations to an environment where mission lifetimes are routinely curtailed due to orbital debris impacts,” McKnight warned. “Taking a look at how it broke up, it looks like a pretty typical satellite age-based failure,” said Dana Weigel, NASA ISS program manager, at a briefing Friday about the upcoming Crew-9 mission. NASA took “very conservative actions” in response to the breakup, including ordering the crews to the safe havens. “We pretty quickly got data and realized it wasn’t a big risk or threat for us.” While Resurs P1 itself appears to have caused little harm, it is a reminder of the growing challenges facing satellite operators in low Earth orbit. An increasing number of satellites, and debris, is in orbit, and both companies and agencies are increasingly sounding the alarm about this growth, with the need for both stricter rules about operations of satellites and efforts to remove some of the most hazardous debris. McKnight Darren McKnight of LeoLabs discusses the threat posed by debris in clusters in LEO at the Summit for Space Sustainablity. (credit: J. Foust) An “apocalyptic” warning One of those warnings came at the latest Summit for Space Sustainability, the annual conference organized by the Secure World Foundation and held earlier this month in Tokyo. That came in the form of an assessment by Darren McKnight, a senior technical fellow at LeoLabs, which he called “apocalyptic.” “The global space community is running out of time to gracefully transition from the current world of reliable LEO space operations to an environment where mission lifetimes are routinely curtailed due to orbital debris impacts,” he warned. That conclusion came from an assessment he did of debris in three clusters in LEO at altitudes of 775, 840, and 975 kilometers. Those clusters include large objects, like upper stages, that in some cases were abandoned in those orbits decades ago. “We've actually been running this experiment since the mid ’70s, mid ’80s,” he said. Each cluster has specific characteristics: the 775-kilometer cluster is the oldest, with a median year of objects being added being 1982. The 840-kilometer cluster has the most massive objects, with an average mass of 3,200 kilograms, while the 975-kilometer cluster has the most large objects, with 350. McKnight’s assessment concluded that there is a 7% chance of there having been a collision in the 775-kilometer cluster by 2024, 5% at the 840-kilometer cluster, but a whopping 26% chance in the 975-kilometer cluster. By 2039, that probability of a collision at 975 kilometers grows to 34%. There have been no collisions in those clusters yet, but his assessment shows it is a matter of time if no action is taken. “These are things that are not one in a million, one in a thousand. These are numbers that are measurable with percentage signs,” he concluded. Any collision between two large objects in those clusters would likely create thousands of pieces of debris large enough to be tracked, posing hazards for anyone trying to operate satellites in or near those orbits. “I’m not saying we’re going to have the Kessler Syndrome,” he said, referring to the runaway growth of debris that could render some orbits unusable, “but we do not have to have the Kessler Syndrome to have a concern that’s going to affect the space economy.” His presentation was the prelude for a panel at the conference about active debris removal. Several technology demonstration efforts are underway to show how it is possible to remove defunct satellites and upper stages from orbit, including the Commercial Removal of Debris Demonstration (CRD2) effort by the Japanese space agency JAXA. It awarded a contract to Astroscale for one ongoing mission, Active Debris Removal by Astroscale-Japan (ADRAS-J), to inspect the upper stage of an H-2A rocket left in LEO, to be followed by a second mission, also led by Astroscale, to deorbit it. But the challenges with active debris removal (ADR) remain as much financial and regulatory as they are technical, including who pays for debris removal and how to handle dangerous debris from other countries. “There is no global consensus on who is responsible and what needs to be removed from orbit,” said Aya Iwamoto, vice president of policy and government relations for Astroscale Japan. “This issue can be very tricky and sensitive sometimes, so I don’t see this issue being resolved any time soon.” “There is no global consensus on who is responsible and what needs to be removed from orbit,” said Iwamoto. “This issue can be very tricky and sensitive sometimes, so I don’t see this issue being resolved any time soon.” Both she and Toru Yamamoto, leader of the CRD2 program at JAXS, also noted the challenge of the business case for ADR despite its importance. Yamamoto said on the panel that he doubted there was a sufficient market for debris removal alone for companies. “I think that the ADR mission should be preferably carried out by private on-orbit servicing companies” that do ADR along with other services, he concluded—the approach Astroscale is taking with other lines of business focused on satellite servicing and life extension. “National programs are very important to get started,” said Chuck Dickey, former deputy general counsel at Lockheed Martin Space and now principal at Three Country Trusted Broker, on the panel, citing CRD2 and a similar project supported by the UK Space Agency. But, he added, “we really need to figure out a way to cooperate to actually make a significant reduction in overall risk.” ADRAS-J A Japanese H-2A upper stage as seen in June by Astroscale’s ADRAS-J spacecraft, a precursor to a debris removal mission. (credit: Astroscale) ESA’s assessment This month also saw the release of the annual report on the space environment by ESA. The report noted there are now 35,000 objects in orbit at least ten centimeters across, the usual threshold for tracking. Of those, a little more than 9,000 are active satellites, with the rest being debris. There has been an “exponential growth” in active satellites in the last few years, said Tim Flohrer of ESA’s space debris office during a panel discussion at the COSPAR Scientific Assembly earlier in the month, just before the release of the report. Debris is also growing, but also (fortunately) not at exponential rates. The increase in both active satellites and debris is becoming a challenge for satellite operators, he said, particularly in orbits above 500 kilometers as the number of satellites there grows. “There is a lot of operational burden because handling a close approach with an active object is very much different than handling a close approach with a piece of debris,” Flohrer said, requiring coordination with the other operator. “The highest costs that are not planned in mission operations after the launch is collision avoidance.” “The extrapolation of the current changing use of orbits and launch traffic, combined with continued fragmentations and limited post mission disposal success rate could lead to a cascade of collision events over the next centuries,” the ESA report concluded. The report does show some signs of improvement in efforts to adhere to orbital debris mitigation guidelines, such as deorbiting spacecraft no more than 25 years after the end of their missions. For example, the fraction of rocket bodies like upper stages that perform a controlled reentry has increased from 10% to 60% in the last decade, the report noted. Those changes are welcomed, but ESA argues are not sufficient. “Whereas adoption of, and compliance to, space debris mitigation practices at a global level is noted as slowly increasing, it is of importance to note that the successful implementation is still at a too low level to ensure a sustainable environment in the long-run,” the report states (emphasis in original.) Steps like the increase in rocket body reentries, it noted, was linked to launches that are themselves deploying large constellations. “The extrapolation of the current changing use of orbits and launch traffic, combined with continued fragmentations and limited post mission disposal success rate could lead to a cascade of collision events over the next centuries,” the ESA report concluded. “Based on these findings, among others, there is a growing consensus that stricter space debris mitigation practices need to be implemented globally, and, eventually, remediation might need to be considered.” Zero Debris Charter signing Representatives of a dozen European countries signed the Zero Debris Charter at an event in Brussels in May. (credit: ESA) Zero debris (sorta) ESA has fashioned itself as a leader in space sustainability through its annual report and other measures. That includes spearheading an initiative called the Zero Debris Charter, which calls on signatories to become “debris-neutral” or not leave any debris in orbit by 2030. In May, ESA announced that 12 countries, all either full ESA members or otherwise associated with it, had signed the charter. That was followed in June by 41 companies and organizations. “The Zero Debris Charter signals Europe’s unwavering commitment to be a global leader on space debris mitigation and remediation, fostering collective action of a large community of space actors from all around the world,” said Quentin Verspieren, space safety program coordinator at ESA, in a statement. While ESA is leading the charter, the agency emphasizes that the charter is not ESA’s alone. “This charter is often perceived as an ESA charter, but it is not,” said Holger Krag, head of ESA’s space safety office, at the Summit for Space Sustainability. “It’s a community document established by several players from international organizations, nongovernment organizations, industry, and space agencies.” He said the charter is designed to push signatories to a greater level of space debris compliance that required by existing national laws. “The charter is in recognition of the situation we are in that the existing laws and guidelines are not sufficiently focused,” he explained. “Being an operator ourselves—ESA is an operator of 28 spacecraft—we know that this is not because of ignorance, it’s because of the fact that it is technically difficult to retire a mission, passivate it, and dispose it safely after five or ten years of operations.” The requirements of the charter won’t take effect immediately, Krag said. “We cannot ask for requirements that are not technically fulfillable.” The charter itself is a two-page document, but one with technical requirements for signatories to follow, such as requiring that space objects should be removed from orbit at the end of their missions with a 99% probability of success. “It’s in line with space law and international guidelines, but it goes beyond,” he said. When ESA announced the first set of countries to sign the charter, it raised questions about whether it might conflict with a proposed European Union space law, yet to be introduced after extensive delays. That law is expected to set its own rules about debris mitigation that would apply not just to EU member states but also to companies in other countries seeking to operate in the EU. “I think it’s not either-or,” said Anna Christmann, German federal aerospace coordinator and ESA ministerial council chair, at a briefing after a joint ESA-EU space council meeting in May. She argued there was a role for an EU space law with space sustainability provisions. “But on the other hand, it’s very important that ESA is active on this going forward with, I think, really outstanding standards for zero debris.” The charter is not legally binding, “but ESA has decided for itself that we are following the zero-debris approach in which we make these requirements applicable to all our missions,” Krag said, although those requirements will not take effect immediately. “What we are talking about here is technology to be there. We cannot ask for requirements that are not technically fulfillable.” Notably, the Summit for Space Sustainability took place just days after ESA launched the inaugural Ariane 6. That mission profile included a final burn of the upper stage intended to deorbit it, but a malfunction in the stage’s auxiliary power unit meant that the engine could not relight, stranding it in low Earth orbit. That is, at the very least, an embarrassment for ESA given its focus on space sustainability and zero debris guidelines. Might it become an opportunity, though, to demonstrate active debris removal technologies like what JAXA is doing with Astroscale with the CRD2 program? “It is something that we regret,” ESA director general Josef Aschbacher said in an interview last week during the Farnborough International Airshow. He added that, when the upper stage engine failed to restart for that deorbit burn, controllers decided to leave two reentry capsules, which were to deploy after the burn, attached to the stage: “we did not want three debris units in orbit but instead only one.” ESA has its own project, ClearSpace, to demonstrate the ability to deorbit debris, but that particular spacecraft under development is not designed to handle a large upper stage like the Ariane 6. “We will look into options” for deorbiting the Ariane 6 stage, he said, “but it may be a question of funding, if we can find the extra funding to deorbit it.” However, it’s clear overall awareness of the growing debris problem is changing. Ray Fielding, head of sustainability and active debris removal at the UK Space Agency, recalled at the Summit for Space Sustainability panel that a young girl at a science fair the agency attended wanted to know why there was space junk. “Well, nobody has been cleaning up. We’ve just been leaving it,” he recalled telling her. “She said, ‘You are stupid! You are stupid! Why have you done that? Why have you let this happen?’ She was certainly convinced that space sustainability is important.” Hopefully others will be convinced sooner rather than later. Jeff Foust (jeff@thespacereview.com) is the editor and publisher of The Space Review, and a senior staff writer with SpaceNews. He also operates the Spacetoday.net web site. Views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone. Note: we are now moderating comments. There will be a delay in posting comments and no guarantee that all submitted comments will

For ISS: To Be Or Not TO Be?

ISS The International Space Station is scheduled to be deorbited around 2030, but some want to instead boost its orbit to preserve it. (credit: Maxar) For the ISS, to be or not to be? by Ajay Kothari Monday, July 29, 2024 Bookmark and Share An op-ed in SpaceNews by Jean-Jacques Dordain, former ESA director general, and Michael D. Griffin, former NASA administrator, recommends postponing the International Space station deorbit decision for now and to leave it in the hands of future generations. It is not just “passing the buck”. This is the right approach, especially with unknown future technology developments that could make this deorbit decision very shor-sighted. And indeed it is. It could be taken to 800-kilometer orbit and just stored as a world treasure with minimal maintenance for one more generation at least… What is the hurry? Rick Tumlinson makes a similar case in another op-ed, also in Space News. As he rightly says, it is indeed a travesty that the ablest space company, SpaceX, is tasked with destroying the greatest space structure. What a conundrum! What a dichotomy! It could be taken to 800-kilometer orbit and just stored as a world treasure with minimal maintenance for one more generation at least, and then let them decide, after new technologies have been developed by then. What is the hurry? As a worst-case scenario, even with no (or minimal) maintenance, it could remain as a dormant historic piece, similar to the recommendation #5 of Tumlinson. It would cost the same to deorbit as to reorbit, or even less as described herein. Another scenario maybe to have government and commercial entities share the cost of maintaining it at 800 kilometers, perhaps as a waystation to the Moon, sort of like in 2001: A Space Odyssey, and maybe as fuel depot. At $10,000 per pound to LEO, the 450-ton ISS's value is in its position and velocity. It would be asinine to lose that. The cost of $9–10 billion is perhaps a bean-counter argument, but it’s much worse to lose an incredible historic treasure that should not be measured in dollars and cents. Civilizations are not always built on bean counting. There has to be other considerations or we would not have any national parks, just a takeover by salivating land developers showing large bottom lines. Two flights of Falcon Heavy (FH) with its center stage expended but the side boosters recoveres would cost about $100-125 million each (FH all expendable costing about $150 million as of a 2022 quote.) The payload to LEO capacity of this option is 54 tons. The upper stages that carry no payload but that much additional propellant each instead would have 54 tons of propellant left over in LEO. The upper stage would have to have 50% longer tanks to carry a maximum of about 147 tons and minimum of 133 tons of propellant instead of the standard 93 tons. The mission to LEO remains unchanged. We are willing to spend billions on so many other things, but cannot spend half a billion for this immense national treasure? Let us play the numbers game. Here they are for Hohmann transfer from 220 nautical miles (407 kilometers) and 52-degree inclination that ISS is in to an 800-kilometer orbit with the same inclination as suggested: table The ratio of payload to ISS orbit versus LEO is approximately 58%. Hence we would have 31 tons of propellant left over in the upper stage by the time it reaches ISS instead of the 54 tons mentioned above. As described above, with two flights of Falcon Heavy, we would have 62 tons of propellant in two ten-ton dry weight upper stages. To the 213 meters per second Delta V (TotDelV in the table above) is added a 15% margin for uncertainty to compute the propellant required for the transport from the 407-kilometer ISS orbit to the almost benign 800-kilometer orbit. This is given below for the Merlin 1Dv engine upper stage as it is currently for FH. table The total of 34 tons of propellant needed, shown in the above table, is substantially below the 62 tons available with the two upper stages now attached to appropriate truss points on the ISS (based on the load-bearing strength and center-of-gravity considerations that the author is not knowledgeable about.) The diameter of each upper stage is 3.7 meters, which would be about right for possible points of attachment as shown in the figure below. ISS (ISS picture courtesy NASA) With almost 500 tons of initial mass and 95 tons thrust now throttled down to 40% or 38 tons for each upper stage, the acceleration of the system would be ~0.15 meters per second squared. Studies are needed to determine if this would or would not cause any vibration issues. It needs to be combined with the political will at NASA, National Space Council, Congress, and the White House. One hopes it does so before the point of no return, the Point Nemo. The point is that this is eminently doable and at much smaller cost than what has been quoted for deorbiting and then destroying it, $843 million, with parts thereof sinking at “Point Nemo” in the Pacific Ocean. (Captain Nemo would not agree, and neither would Jules Verne nor multitude of people here on Earth!) One need only see the animation of the ISS assembly to appreciate the incredible effort that went into assembling it in such a hostile, unforgiving environment with astronauts and cosmonauts doing multitudes of EVAs to put the modules together, starting from 1998 with Zarya and Unity. It is and was an astounding effort that should be conserved for many future generations as a source of inspiration, not just the next generation. One can be sure, instead, that the future generations would call us idiots for destroying such a monument. It is not important at this junction as to whether this is done by two Merlin 1Dv engines or many smaller ones of some other potential solution, strategically placed, The Delta V required does not change and nor does the analogous physics. It just says that the answer is within reach. It needs to be combined with the political will at NASA, National Space Council, Congress, and the White House. One hopes it does so before the point of no return, the Point Nemo. Dr. Ajay Kothari is President and Founder of Astrox Corporation, an Aerospace R&D company located in suburban Washington, DC. His PhD and MS in Aerospace Engineering are from the University of Maryland and BSc in Physics from Bombay University. He is Associate Fellow of AIAA and member of AIAA Aerospace Power Technical Committee. He has over 40 professional publications and has been PI on more than 35 NASA and DOD

No Press Coverage For Space?

2018 IAC The IAC is held around the world, such as in Bremen, Germany, in 2018 (above), but only this year has become more restrictive about the media it accredits. (credit: B. Harvey) No more space for the press? by Brian Harvey Monday, July 29, 2024 Bookmark and Share The International Astronautical Federation (IAF) is one of the oldest and best known organizations in the space world, most famous for its annual congresses, which attract up to 10,000 people. It’s also one of the most publicity-hungry, which is why it’s surprising that this year it’s closing the door on the press. Well, some press. “Press” used to be mainly full-time journalists from well-established institutions from Aviation Week and Space Technology to Air & Cosmos to Flight International. But the nature of space reporting is different now. The IAF was set up in 1950 by the British Interplanetary Society (BIS), the Groupement Astronautique Français, and the German Rocket Society. They comprised amateurs and professionals, initially ridiculed as cranks and nutters. That criticism stopped during its eighth congress in Barcelona on October 4, 1957, when, by coincidence, Sputnik was launched. Since then, the IAF grew, attracting industrial, professional, scientific, and promotional organizations worldwide. Its annual congresses move globally, typically in Europe each other year, this year in Milan in October. For the space press, it’s the biggest, most valuable, and important gathering on the calendar. In a large exhibition hall, the big space agencies, like NASA, France’s CNES), Germany’s DLR, and Italy’s ASI, put on displays of their latest designs and models, distribute leaflets, and make officials available for interviews. The Japanese space agency JAXA once displayed asteroid rock collected from the far end of the solar system. The real meat is in the well-illustrated presentations by engineers, scientists, and experts on rockets, satellites, missions, and applications, anything from microsatellites to past history to future technologies. Heads of the space agencies speak. Astronauts come: the congress introduced to the world China’s first astronaut, Yang Liwei, and first space women, Liu Yang. Indeed, China has often had a major presence, exhibiting full-scale models of its lunar and Mars probes long before anyone else saw them, so it’s a photographic event. It’s also newsy: it is no coincidence that announcements and evolving outlines of future missions (e.g. Mars Sample Return) are made there. With the rivalry between east and west in full swing, American astronaut and NASA deputy administator Pamela Melroy spoke on the Artemis Accords. Press are normally provided with a small room with desks where journalists file their reports. “Press” used to be mainly full-time journalists from well-established institutions from Aviation Week and Space Technology to Air & Cosmos to Flight International. But the nature of space reporting is different now. It’s not just that typewriters and phones have given way to laptops and mobiles, but it has become more diverse. As Jacqueline Myrrhe, publisher of Raumfahrt Concret and editor-in-chief of Go Taikonauts!, put it, “the press landscape of the last decade has undergone profound changes. Most mainstream media do not have any expert journalists for space any more. Freelance journalists and authors have become an indispensable source of high-quality and high-professional content for media, publishers and online media.” And they were welcome… until this year. (Full disclosure: although attending these events since 1999, this writer is one of those not welcome any more.) This is how it works. Journalists normally apply for press credentials far ahead, in this case in May, sending in not only a passport but the one document that matters most, a professional press card, normally issued by a trade union. What’s new is that even if an applicant is acknowledged as a bona fide journalist, that of itself no longer ensures admission. Now the IAF applies “criteria” to decide if journalists should then be admitted, but will not disclose these criteria, making it intrinsically difficult, if not impossible, to argue one’s case. The criteria are known only to the IAF and have never been publicized, despite multiple requests to disclose them. Representations to reconsider have come from writers, authors, publishers, podcasters, political parties, academics, institutes from Europe and the United States, even founder member BIS, but have so far been ignored. The only clue lies in conditions just issued to approved journalists to “encourage” them to “prominently” feature IAF hashtags, logos, and banners of hosts, co-hosts and sponsors, as follows: All publications resulting from the IAC 2024 should prominently feature the hashtags #iafastro and #iac2024. For printed / digital materials you can incorporate the official IAF logo and the official IAC 2024 banner featuring the names and logos of the host, co-hosts, and sponsors of the event. You are cordially invited to the link containing useful materials such as high-quality logos, banners and a brief summary of the IAF. Does the IAF now welcome only journalists who will publicize the organization, including its for-profit commercial sponsors? Journalists go to events to report on what they see and hear, not to do the job of the host’s publicity department. The dangers of favoritism and manipulating the purpose of the press are obvious. But it’s the only clue we have. Now the IAF applies “criteria” to decide if journalists should then be admitted, but will not disclose these criteria, making it intrinsically difficult, if not impossible, to argue one’s case. How widespread are refusals to admit press? We don’t know. The IAF was asked how many journalists had been turned away this year and in previous years, but won’t say. Are some countries preferred more than others? Big, influential states or small ones? Again, we don’t know: the IAF will not give the nationalities of those accepted or rejected, although it knows from the application forms. If these refusals happened in states adjudged authoritarian, there would be uproar (interestingly, there were no such cases documented when the IAF was in Beijing in 2013.) France (where the IAF is based) and Italy (this year’s congress location) are members of the European Union and Council of Europe, which means bound by their laws and conventions. Keeping the press out like this is contrary to the: European Union (EU) Charter of Fundamental Rights; Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights; The new EU Media Freedom Act, which came into effect on April 11 of this year; EU directives and legislation against non-discrimination, for example on grounds of age, gender, disability, nationality, and political belief. It is certain that the issue will be raised in the autumn session of the new European Parliament. The IAF was asked was it familiar with and trained in the application of these laws, and how was the refusal of individuals consistent with anti-discrimination law, but would not say. Key words here are “press freedom” and “media pluralism.” Press freedom sets down the general proposition that press should be let in, included rather than excluded. It’s not as if there is not room for a handful of press among the ten thousand present, or that national security issues are at stake. Jacqueline Myrrhe again: “The participation of freelancers is not financed by media outlets or any other organization, all costs are on the individual freelance expert. Such commitment requires enormous dedication” for attending such conferences. Media pluralism means recognition of media diversity: full-time, part-time, freelance, general, specialized, popular, technical, using a multiplicity of methods: printed, electronic, broadsheet, tabloid, magazine, journal,, and all the new social media (podcasts, websites, Twitter, Tiktok, Instagram, YouTube, Facebook, LinkedIn, etc.) Not just hashtag publicists. A final, but intriguing question. Has IAF, unknown to us, introduced security vetting of journalists, the appropriate checking agency being presumably the French government’s Direction Général de Securité Extérieure (DGSE). That might explain some “no” decisions. The IAF would not say if it applied security vetting, or not, which is worrying. Does a blacklist exist? What’s really going on? Brian Harvey is author of European-Russian cooperation in space, from de Gaulle to ExoMars (Praxis-Springer, 2021).

Book Review: Creature Comforts In Space

book cover Review: Creature Comforts in Space by Jeff Foust Monday, July 29, 2024 Bookmark and Share Creature Comforts in Space: Designing Enjoyment and Sustainability for Off-World Living by Samuel M. Coniglio, IV BookBaby, 2024 Paperback, 162 pp., illus. ISBN 979-8-21824-640-2 US$33 In May, the Space Tourism Conference took place just before the start of the International Space Development Conference in Los Angeles. The one-day event focused less on the technology of space tourism—spacecraft and space stations—than on the experience, with sessions on entertainment, dining, and space “lifestyle brands.” The session offered a very forward-looking view of people traveling to space, and one not that different from might have been presented 10 or 20 years ago, given the slow pace of progress in commercial human spaceflight. One session focused on creating “creature comforts” for future commercial space travelers: “those hard-to-describe things that make life more enjoyable, have mental health benefits, and are fun!” writes Sam Coniglio in his new book, Creature Comforts in Space. Example of such comforts range from cocktails and hot meals to fluffy towels, sweatpants, and silence. They are, by and large, lacking from spaceflight today but may be essential to a future where more people live and work in space for extended periods. There is very little investment going into these concepts given that utilitarian focus. Coniglio includes some images of toilets on the ISS and asks, “can they design it to look better?” Coniglio examines many of these topics in the book, from cooking to showering to the inevitable discussion of toilets. He approaches the topic from his own interdisciplinary background that includes working as a technical writer for NASA and developing “drinkbots,” or drink-making robots. A decade ago, inspired by NASA astronaut Don Pettit’s creation of a zero-g coffee cup that makes use of surface tension and capillary action, he developed a zero-g cocktail glass using the same principles. (The glass never flew on the ISS, he said, because of skittishness from NASA public affairs about anything that might be associated with drinking alcohol in space.) In the book, he examines the challenges about things we take for granted on Earth, like preparing a meal in a kitchen or taking a shower. Microgravity is perhaps the biggest obstacle, but there are also the constraints of the limited volume and resources available on spacecraft. There are potential ways to deal with those challenges, though, he argues, citing various concepts that include his own designs. One interesting concept is his “shower in the garden” for a shower that includes moss growing in the bottom half of the cylindrical shower: the moss would filter the water, he argues, while providing some psychological benefits. It's unclear when or if any of the concepts he describes in the book would ever be implemented. Creature comforts on the ISS today are limited, with an environment he likens to extreme camping. There is very little investment going into these concepts given that utilitarian focus. Coniglio includes some images of toilets on the ISS and asks, “can they design it to look better?” Right now, there’s no incentive for NASA or its contractors to design the toilets to look better, just to work effectively and reliably. At some point, though, there may be a demand for toilets that both work well and look good, as well as showers, cooking facilities, and more. Commercial space stations proposed for launch in the next decade may still look fairly utilitarian, focusing on the needs of NASA, other government agencies, and corporate users. (Axiom Space, several years ago, did show off designs of the interior of a future space station habitation module developed by Philippe Starck that, at a minimum, look nicer than the ISS.) But, eventually, even corporate researchers will want the option of relaxing at the end of a long day with a nice meal and a cocktail, just like on Earth. A few create comforts will go a long way towards improving the experience for researchers and tourists alike. Jeff Foust (jeff@thespacereview.com) is the editor and publisher of The Space Review, and a senior staff writer with SpaceNews. He also operates the Spacetoday.net web site. Views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone.