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Wednesday, May 21, 2025

An Asteroid's Threatened Impact May Still Impact Planetary Defense

NEO Surveyor NASA’s NEO Surveyor mission is set to launch as soon as the fall of 2027 to search for near Earth asteroids. (credit: NASA/JPL-Caltech) An asteroid’s threatened impact may still impact planetary defense by Jeff Foust Monday, May 19, 2025 It says something about the state of the world that, for a brief time earlier this year, the prospect of death from the skies was a welcomed distraction. In January, observations of the near Earth asteroid 2024 YR4, discovered near the end of last year, showed a small chance that it would hit the Earth in December 2032. Such odds are not that uncommon for near Earth objects, or NEOs, that have just been discovered and with limited data that can be used to project an orbit. Usually, within a few days the odds fall to zero as the orbit is refined. “Everything that we’ve been preparing started happening,” Fast, NASA’s acting planetary defense officer, said of 2024 YR4. However, for 2024 YR4, an object estimated to be between 40 and 90 meters across at the time, the impact probability did not immediately fall, but instead rose, soon going above 1%. That attracted more attention, and even some alarm, as more observations caused the probability to creep higher, reaching 3.1% by February 18. Online, some wondered if the risk was now high enough to prompt action of some kind. A few days later, though, this particular threat vanished. Additional observations updated the asteroid’s orbit enough that there was effectively no chance of a collision in December 2032 or for the foreseeable future. It was, though, an exercise of existing capabilities and procedures by NASA and others to respond to a potential impact threat. “Everything that we’ve been preparing started happening,” said Kelly Fast, NASA’s acting planetary defense officer, at a meeting of a National Academies committee at the end of March. She noted that once the asteroid’s impact risk increased above 1%, it triggered a formal notification policy to both other government agencies as well as the International Asteroid Warning Network, a group of astronomers who could follow up on the discovery with additional observations. Also notified was the Space Mission Planning Advisory Group (SMPAG, or “same page”), where representatives of national space agencies discuss how to respond to any asteroid impact threats. It was the first time that formal notification process was used, she added. “We’re going through the lessons learned right now to see what all worked well and what we learned from this we could utilize in future situations,” she said. At a hearing last week of the House Science Committee’s space subcommittee, Nicky Fox, NASA’s associate administrator for science, offered a similar message. “We let the world see the science of planetary defense in action,” she said of the monitoring of 2024 YR4. The formal notification “wrung out some of the kinks” in the process, she noted. That process included a meeting chaired by NASA’s acting administrator, Janet Petro, with officials from other agencies, who Fox noted had to be explained just what was going on because, in the first weeks of the new administration, were new to their jobs. “We have not seen the details of the budget yet,” Mainzer said of potential effects on NEO Surveyor. “From my perspective, we do not know the impact yet.” The case of 2024 YR4 brought a new spotlight to NASA’s planetary defense program, a tiny part of the agency—less than 1% of its 2024 budget—but one with outsized interest. In his opening remarks at last week’s hearing, Rep. Mike Haridopolos (R-FL), chairman of the space subcommittee, cited a July 2023 poll by the Pew Research Center where 60% of respondents said planetary defense should be a top priority for NASA, more than any other mission mentioned. (Sending humans to the Moon, by contrast, was a top priority for only 12% of respondents, with human missions to Mars a percentage point lower.) NASA used the hearing to tout the progress of its next planetary defense mission, NEO Surveyor. The mission will send a small infrared space telescope to the Earth-Sun L-1 Lagrange point, 1.5 million kilometers from Earth. The goal of the $1.2 billion mission is to significantly increase the rate of NEO discoveries, helping NASA comply with a goal mandated by Congress two decades ago to find at least 90% of all such objects at least 140 meters across. NEO Surveyor is scheduled to launch no later than June 2028, but is currently on track to launch as soon as the fall of 2027. “They are on schedule. They are within the budget that we confirmed for them” in 2022, Fox said at the hearing. The only recent hiccup for the mission was a pause in work on the spacecraft’s telescope at JPL in January when the center was closed because of wildfires nearby. Fox said that team lost nearly a month of schedule due to that. “That does put the telescope on the critical path, but something has to be on the critical path,” she said. “The last child out of the house dictates what time you get to school.” The biggest concern, it seemed at the hearing, was how astronomers would handle all of the data NEO Surveyor would return. Matthew Payne, director of the Minor Planet Center at the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory, said at the hearing that NEO Surveyor, along with the Vera Rubin Observatory in Chile, will soon provide the center with ten times the data on NEO than all other current sources combined. “We’ve made, and must continue to make, improvements in our hardware and software and processes to ensure that the planetary defense community is able to utilize this wealth of new data to safeguard us all,” he said. That includes developing artificial intelligence capabilities to better identify NEOs in the data it receives. “A very reasonable question is whether NASA should, in fact, be spending more money on asteroid monitoring and defense, given the catastrophic risk to our country and civilization,” said Whitesides. However, the hearing took place amid the specter of budget cuts proposed for NASA’s science programs in the 2026 top-level, or “skinny,” budget request by the White House. Many Democratic members of the committee criticized the proposed cuts at the hearing, as well as similar steep reductions at other federal agencies, from NSF to FEMA, also involved in various aspects of planetary defense. “It’s clear that planetary defense leverages many of our S&T [science and technology] agencies,” said Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-CA), ranking member of the full committee. “Whether that expertise continues, I think, is now in question.” How that will affect planetary defense, including NEO Surveyor, is unclear. “We have not seen the details of the budget yet,” said Amy Mainzer, a professor at UCLA who leads NEO Surveyor. “From my perspective, we do not know the impact yet.” Fox noted that the budget released in early May singled out by name only two science missions, Mars Sample Return and Landsat Next. “We’ve had no direction to take any action based on the ’26 skinny budget,” she said. “NEO Surveyor is well-funded.” Being on budget and on schedule for launch in two and a half years would seem to insulate NEO Surveyor from cuts. Yet the Nancy Grace Roman Space Telescope, also on budget and set to launch as soon as the fall of 2026, is reportedly targeted for cancellation in the budget. Janus Scientists have called for repurposing the twin Janus smallsats, currently in storage, for an Apophis flyby mission. (credit: Lockheed Martin) One thing that NEO Surveyor, and planetary defense in general, may have going for it is support by the agency’s likely next administrator. “Personally, I think there is a lot of taxpayer-funded science that should be reviewed & potentially reduced, but planetary defense against NEO threats seems disproportionately underfunded relative to the likelihood and magnitude of the associated risks & consequences,” wrote Jared Isaacman on social media on February 14, near the peak of interest in 2024 YR4. He didn’t elaborate on how much more money planetary defense should receive—or what other science should be reduced—but the idea of spending more on planetary defense does have advocates in Congress. “A very reasonable question is whether NASA should, in fact, be spending more money on asteroid monitoring and defense, given the catastrophic risk to our country and civilization,” said Rep. George Whitesides (D-CA) at the hearing. “That might be a conversation we can have in the coming months.” There are concepts for missions that could be carried out if there is additional funding. The planetary science decadal survey, for example, recommended NASA pursue a “rapid response” mission to send a spacecraft to a small NEO, testing the ability to quickly carry out such a reconnaissance mission if there was a real impact threat. There are also ongoing efforts to secure support for missions to study the near Earth asteroid Apophis both before and after it makes an April 2029 flyby of Earth, coming closer to the planet than satellite in geostationary orbit (although with zero risk of an impact.) NASA has already repurposed the main spacecraft from the OSIRIS-REx asteroid sample return mission, now called OSIRIS-APEX, which will arrive at Apophis a couple months after the asteroid’s Earth flyby. There is interest, through, in missions going to Apophis before the flyby, enabling before-and-after characterization of any changes to the asteroid caused by tidal forces from the close flyby. ESA has provided initial funding for one such mission, RAMSES, with full funding pending a decision at the agency’s next ministerial conference in November. The Japanese space agency JAXA is developing DESTINY+, a mission that will go to another NEO, Phaethon, but could fly by Apophis on its way to Phaethon. Scientists continue to advocate for a NASA-led mission to Apophis before the flyby. One leading option is to use the twin Janus smallsats originally built for flybys of binary asteroids. Those spacecraft were put into storage when NASA canceled the mission in 2023 because delays in its rideshare launch on the Psyche mission kept it from carrying out that original mission. Last fall, NASA issued a request for information (RFI) seeking concepts on how the Janus spacecraft could be repurposed for an asteroid mission. Responses to the RFI were due last fall but NASA has not provided an update since then. In a document outlining the conclusions of an Apophis science workshop in April, scientists again advocated for NASA to act on potential reuse of Janus for Apophis. Noting that a workshop a year earlier called Janus the “highest recommendation” for a NASA-led pre-encounter mission, “we follow-up by urging NASA to issue a timely response to the Apophis 2029 Innovation Using the Janus Spacecraft Request for Information.” “If we can’t all unite on a large chunk of rock hurtling towards the planet,” Fox said, “what are we going to unite on?” The Janus RFI did not come up at the House hearing last week, where Fox noted a NASA effort to look at alternative concepts for a mission came up empty. “We looked at the possibility of partnering with non-traditional partners to be able to do that,” she said. “We didn’t find a viable path forward without significant budget from us that we actually didn’t have.” She appeared to suggest that OSIRIS-APEX could handle the pre-encounter observations, as it can start observing Apophis a couple weeks before the Earth flyby. “Even though they’re going to be low-resolution, we’re going to have some really nice images of how the light and the brightness changes,” she said. After the hearing, though, she said that NASA hasn’t ruled out using the Janus spacecraft for an Apophis mission. “We’re still discussing it,” adding it would depend on budgets for fiscal year 2026 and beyond. There’s not much time to waste, with less than four years before Apophis makes it Earth flyby. “We collectively entreat and emphasize to our respective agencies, member states, funding sources, and all interested parties that time is of the essence for moving forward decisively in funding current science investigations proposed and underway,” the document stated, emphasizing the phrase “time is of the essence” in bold, italics, underlining, and yellow highlighting. While 2024 YR4 doesn’t pose and impact threat to the Earth, it may yet impact planetary defense, if NASA and Congress see it as an opportunity to support the agency’s work on the topic even within constrained budgets. “If we can’t all unite on a large chunk of rock hurtling towards the planet,” Fox said at the hearing, “what are we going to unite on?” Jeff Foust (jeff@thespacereview.com) is the editor and publisher of The Space Review, and a senior staff writer with SpaceNews. He also operates the Spacetoday.net web site. Views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone.

Space Mining: Corporate Autocracy orr Global Solidarity?

lunar base Developing international mechanisms governing space mining could prevent a single country or company from amassing too much power in space. (credit: ESA) Space mining: corporate autocracy or global solidarity? by Nikola Schmidt and Martin Švec Monday, May 19, 2025 This text was originally written in the Czech language as a policy paper at the Institute of International Relations in Prague and has been slightly adapted for a broader global audience. As a result of rapid advances in space technologies and improved understanding of the composition of celestial bodies, the mining of mineral resources in outer space has increasingly become a topic of discussion at international forums. In particular, the growing commercial opportunities in space related to the utilization of space resources have led to reflections on the urgent need to resolve the legal uncertainty surrounding the legality and conditions under which mineral resources in outer space may be exploited. The current debate on the future regulatory regime for space mining primarily revolves around two opposing principles: the “first-come-first-served” approach and the concept of the “common heritage of mankind,” which emphasizes the shared benefit of all states regardless of their level of economic development, or indeed the benefit of humanity as a whole. Mining will trigger rapid economic development, making it crucial to prevent a scenario of chaotic, anarchic, or politically and economically advantageous systems favoring a single state, corporation, or individual. We consider it absolutely essential to enrich this debate with the fundamental question of why we have states as political authorities: whether it is to create, through the systems they establish, corporations whose power surpasses that of states themselves, or whether our goal is to foster the development of an economic environment that emphasizes social and biospheric sustainability of the planet and, above all, democracy as the legitimate political system? If democracies fail to meet the needs of their citizens and contribute to the well-being of humanity, they will gradually lose both their legitimacy and their appeal. We perceive the current political developments in the United States, along with the commercial success of SpaceX—steadily monopolizing entire sectors with openly declared ambitions beyond Earth—as a historic moment when it becomes both possible and necessary to agree on the political organization of power in outer space. Mining will trigger rapid economic development, making it crucial to prevent a scenario of chaotic, anarchic, or politically and economically advantageous systems favoring a single state, corporation, or individual. Current debates on space mining The first actual mining activities will not focus on precious metals on distant asteroids, but rather on the extraction of water from the permanently shadowed craters on the Moon, where the first permanent bases are planned. One proposed method for melting the ice contained in the lunar regolith involves redirecting sunlight from the crater rim using mirrors positioned above a constructed dome, a concept developed in 2019. The Colorado School of Mines has been engaged in various concepts, including for NASA, continuously since 1999. Since most countries have not ratified the Moon Agreement, the legality and conditions for the extraction of mineral resources in space are derived from the general principles of the Outer Space Treaty. Regarding the mining of mineral resources in space, two of the most significant principles are the prohibition of national appropriation of outer space and celestial bodies (Article II of the OST), and the imperative that outer space should be used for the benefit and in the interests of all countries (Article I of the OST). However, there is no universal consensus on how these principles should be interpreted. In recent years, we have therefore witnessed various attempts to eliminate precisely this legal uncertainty. While discussions on the need for and the form of a legal framework for the exploitation of mineral resources are ongoing within the Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), a number of parallel multilateral initiatives have emerged—for example, the Artemis Accords or The Hague Space Resources Governance Working Group—and some states, such as the United States, Luxembourg, the United Arab Emirates, and Japan, have addressed the legal issues related to mining through their national legislation. At the same time, the past decade has shown that national legislation cannot fully replace an international legal framework, as it fails to remove legal uncertainty for investors at the international level. Moreover, many states have expressed concern over efforts to bypass the lengthy negotiation process within the COPUOS Legal Subcommittee through unilateral national regulation. To seek a multilateral solution, Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, and the Czech Republic proposed in 2021 the establishment of a working group that would ensure that activities related to the utilization of mineral resources in outer space are conducted in a safe, sustainable, and peaceful manner for the benefit and in the interests of all states, regardless of their level of economic or scientific development, and in accordance with international law. The Working Group on Legal Aspects of Space Resource Activities was successfully established in the same year. Its tasks are: To collect relevant information on activities related to the exploration, extraction, and utilization of mineral resources in outer space; To analyze existing legal frameworks for these activities and to assess the benefits of further developing such a framework, including the potential development of rules and standards for these activities, as well as mechanisms for benefit-sharing. The crossroads of the dilemma of benefit and interest of all nations It can be stated that the activities of the Working Group on Legal Aspects of Space Resource Activities may significantly influence the formulation of the conditions under which mineral resources in outer space will be allowed to be exploited. The group consists of states that hold entirely different views on how the use of space resources should be approached. The United States operates on the assumption that as long as a state does not exercise territorial sovereignty during mining operations, the exploitation of space resources is consistent with Article II of the Outer Space Treaty and therefore, there is no need to establish a comprehensive legal framework at the level of international law. The conclusions of this debate may have far-reaching consequences for how power is distributed in outer space. In contrast, countries like Norway and Austria draw on the interpretation of benefit and interest of all nations—a requirement set by the Outer Space Treaty for the use of outer space—and find inspiration in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and its concept of the “common heritage of mankind.” Developing countries, such as Ethiopia, emphasize the principle of equality among states in the use of mineral resources in outer space. According to the US interpretation, the Outer Space Treaty allows the extraction of mineral resources in outer space (“Article I recognizes the right of exploitation”). In its statement submitted to the working group, the US delegation noted: “We acknowledge that this view is not shared by all States or commentators, but as U.S. Department of State Legal Adviser Brian Egan stated in 2016, ‘notwithstanding the variety of States’ political positions on space resource utilization, the United States remains confident that its interpretation of Articles I and II over many decades and many administrations represents the better reading of the Treaty.’“ Thus, entities engaged in space resource utilization activities will retain ownership interests in their equipment, including whatever non-interference rights flow from those ownership interests, even though they will not acquire ownership interests in the ground beneath their equipment. The question remains how the United States perceives the functioning of the working group, particularly in the context of its Artemis Accords initiative, which represents a set of legally non-binding principles intended to guide the Artemis space program. Article 10 of the Artemis Accords seeks to interpret the Outer Space Treaty in such a way that the extraction of space resources does not, in itself, constitute national appropriation under Article II of the Treaty. Therefore, legal instruments concerning space resources should be considered as complying with existing space law. Countries such as Norway fundamentally perceive this approach as being in conflict with the position they uphold. They explicitly refer to the principle of the common heritage of mankind, currently embedded, for example, in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which presupposes the creation of a robust legal framework and the fair sharing of benefits among all states. In fact, this very principle was one of the main reasons why many states refused to ratify the Moon Agreement. Norway explicitly stated: “the working group should consider looking to other governance frameworks which could serve as lessons learned or inspiration for how to govern space resources. The achievements of the International Seabed Authority could be of particular relevance.” A similar call is found in Austria’s position, which states that the seabed regime beyond national jurisdiction, as established under UNCLOS, should be taken into consideration when developing a framework for space resource governance. The tendency of states to revisit the issue of benefit- and profit-sharing from the exploitation of mineral resources in outer space is also highlighted in the “Summary by the Chair and Vice-Chair of views and contributions received on the mandate and purpose of the Working Group on Legal Aspects of Space Resource Activities”. Other states, such as Belgium and Ethiopia, call for the most solidarity-based interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty possible. Belgium emphasizes the need to establish guarantees for the fair sharing of profits and benefits derived from the utilization of space resources among all states. Exploration and exploitation of mineral resources in outer space should therefore, as part of the common heritage of mankind, be conducted on the basis of a robust international legal framework that ensures access and fairness. If the international community rejects the concept of the common heritage of mankind, the need to create an inclusive international legal framework will diminish. In such a case, we can expect the continued fragmentation of space law. These conclusions are also supported by the Draft Report of the Legal Subcommittee of COPUOS from April 2024, which points out that several delegations expressed the view that discussions on space resources should be as inclusive as possible, serving the benefit and interests of all humanity, with particular consideration for the needs of developing countries. Any approach to the establishment of a framework for the exploration, extraction, and utilization of mineral resources in outer space should be fair, constructive, cooperative, and consensus-based. Above all, it should not neglect or unfairly disadvantage developing countries. What form will political power take in the near future? The outcome of the debate over benefit-sharing should not be shaped by actors operating from a position of economic strength, but rather by actors holding political legitimacy. In the context of developments in the United States following the inauguration of President Trump for his second term, this issue has crystallized in new dimensions. Within a state, citizens expect their political representatives to establish a fair legal system where no one is unduly privileged or disadvantaged. In the international community, similarly fair arrangements are necessary to prevent conflict: this is precisely what multilateralism seeks to achieve: solutions that are not only acceptable to all participants but also provide incentives for resource extraction. The debate on the regime for the mining of mineral resources in outer space may, at first glance, appear to be merely a clash between two opposing approaches: the principles of an open free market on one side and global solidarity on the other. However, we believe this is not the case. On the contrary, these two worlds must be brought to agreement in a way that ensures the solution is globally just while also motivating the private sector to engage in mining. The conclusions of this debate may have far-reaching consequences for how power is distributed in outer space. In 1984 the United States enacted the Commercial Space Launch Act, opening orbital launch services to private companies for the first time. SpaceX, founded in 2002, soon became the most prominent beneficiary of that policy shift. After a small NASA study contract in 2003, the company received an $8 million DARPA technology-development award in 2004. NASA then awarded SpaceX $278 million under the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) program in 2006, $1.6 billion for Commercial Resupply Services (CRS-1) in 2008, $2.6 billion for Commercial Crew (CCtCap) in 2014, the $2.89 billion Artemis Human Landing System contract in 2021, and the $5.9 billion U.S. Space Force “Lane 2” launch block in 2025. These successive public-sector contracts underwrote the company’s rapid growth. Thanks largely to reusability, SpaceX now dominates the orbital launch market. By April 2025 its Falcon 9 boosters had completed more than 430 successful landings, and the record-setting core had flown 27 times; the design is being qualified for up to 40 reflights. Reuse has pushed the cost of launch below $4,000 per kilogram, creating a substantial cost advantage. Because SpaceX is privately held, exact financials are not disclosed, but analyst models from Sacra and Payload put 2024 revenue at roughly $13–14 billion and operating profit around $4–5 billion—a margin of aboutg 35%. Starlink already provides about 58% of that revenue (about $7.7 billion), with launch services contributing the other 42% ($5.5 billion). The Starlink constellation accounts for roughly 55–60% of all active satellites today and is projected to deliver more than 90% of global space-based broadband capacity by 2026. The vision for the Super Heavy and Starship launch vehicles suggests that revenues from this segment alone could reach tens of billions of dollars by around 2030 and potentially hundreds of billions by 2040, with profitability approaching 50%. Thanks to government incentives, SpaceX has, within less than two decades, reached a dominant position with profitability that openly enables the company to pursue the construction of a city on Mars, while the debate on the governance of such a city is virtually non-existent. This moment should be understood as the potential emergence of an unelected authoritarian corporate sovereign power in the 21st century, a power that unregulated space mining could amplify to levels far exceeding the power of any state in the world, including the United States. This is a development that states valuing democratic principles should, at the very least, carefully monitor. Supporting the concept of the common heritage of mankind and benefit-sharing is not limited to the redistribution of profits from space mining. First, if the international community rejects the concept of the common heritage of mankind, the need to create an inclusive international legal framework will diminish. In such a case, we can expect the continued fragmentation of space law, which, if not sufficiently harmonized, will create conditions conducive to political or even military conflict, the rise of corporate autocracy, and the further weakening of state authority in space. No democratic state would benefit from such a development, neither economically nor in terms of security. The activities of potential investors would depend on access to infrastructure that might be controlled, if at all, by a single country. The primary beneficiaries of mining would be those with the necessary technologies, capital, and national political representation that does not reflect well-being of humanity. The struggle for resources would undermine international security, further fragment the liberal international order, and erode trust in democratic systems. The rejection of the common heritage of mankind concept should also be seen as a missed opportunity to create a source of funding for addressing global challenges such as climate change or the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), for which states would otherwise have to allocate their own financial resources. Secondly, the rejection of the concept of the common heritage of mankind would lead to the concentration of control over key technologies in the hands of just a few of the wealthiest individuals and companies (such as SpaceX, Blue Origin), supported by their respective governments, with no interest in a fair international order. A warning sign of the risks associated with such dependence on a specific technology controlled by a private entity is already evident in the dominance of SpaceX in providing Internet services via satellite. Opponents of the concept of benefit-sharing within the future legal regime for space mining argue the necessity of upholding the principle of the free market, warning against the risk of legal uncertainty that could discourage investors, the potential burden on companies that might stifle innovation, national sovereignty and national interest, the fact that the Moon Agreement has been ratified by only a small number of states, and, above all, the precedent set by terrestrial practice, where profits from resource extraction are not shared globally. However, all these arguments can be easily refuted: legal uncertainty already exists today, as there are ongoing debates about whether national space laws adequately reflect the principles contained in the Outer Space Treaty; the principle of benefit-sharing is not limited to the Moon Agreement but is also embedded in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; the argument of national sovereignty is directly at odds with the Outer Space Treaty; taxation does not break free markets or stifle innovation; and the terrestrial precedent of “first-come-first-served” has historically often led to conflict. However, we consider the possible consequences of abandoning the concept of benefit-sharing to be particularly serious. Above all, it is reasonable to expect a significant concentration of power in the hands of global—or, in the future, interplanetary—corporations, super-rich individuals, and other actors whose economic position creates direct political competition to democratic states, or in the hands of authoritarian regimes operating without democratic oversight, potentially for many decades or even centuries to come. Although the current debate may be perceived as a clash between the opposing ideologies of an open free market on one side and global solidarity on the other, we believe it should primarily be seen as a debate about the form of governance for areas beyond the jurisdiction of nation-states and about the role of democracy as a political system both at the national and international level. If the international community agrees on the need to finance, for example, the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the fight against climate change, and other globally significant initiatives for the benefit of humanity, then benefit-sharing is not merely a redistribution of profits between states: it represents a compromise solution for the common good of humanity, precisely in line with the vision of human development in outer space as envisaged by the Outer Space Treaty. Supporting the concept of the common heritage of mankind and benefit-sharing is not limited to the redistribution of profits from space mining. It also implies the establishment of global cooperative oversight over mining activities, the potential creation of financial resources for addressing global challenges, the strengthening of international security, and the maintenance of the debate on future political power in outer space within the United Nations framework, with the potential to promote other multilateral solutions and regulatory mechanisms for space activities in the interest of humanity. The effort to prevent conflicts among members of the international community in areas beyond national jurisdictions has historically led to the adoption of legal regulation of these zones through instruments such as UNCLOS. At the time, however, the debate about the role of super-rich individuals was nowhere near as prominent as it is today, a time when unelected billionaires without political legitimacy openly pursue major political ambitions, including ambitions that extend beyond planet Earth. National governments have, in the past, intervened from time to time when monopolistic practices emerged around newly developing economic activities dominated by a single actor. For example, in 1882, Standard Oil (owned by John Rockefeller) controlled 90% of oil production in the United States. In response, the US Congress adopted the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890, though the breakup of Standard Oil did not occur until 1911 after a prolonged legal battle. A similar case was that of AT&T, which held monopoly control over the entire telephone infrastructure in the US, leading to the company's breakup in 1982. Recommendations Democratic states committed to maintaining a fair international order should strongly advocate for the implementation of a benefit-sharing regime grounded in the principle of the common heritage of mankind. Benefit-sharing is crucial for preserving international security, safeguarding the legitimacy of democratic systems, and ensuring political oversight over emerging power structures beyond Earth. At the same time, it could lay the groundwork for establishing global financial resources to address shared global challenges, such as combating climate change or achieving the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), without placing additional financial burdens on individual states. Benefit-sharing is crucial for preserving international security, safeguarding the legitimacy of democratic systems, and ensuring political oversight over emerging power structures beyond Earth. A benefit-sharing system that supports the SDGs could help reduce migration pressures, thus contributing to international security. It could also provide funding for public space infrastructure, creating room for competition from all states, including developing countries, in line with the principles of the Outer Space Treaty. Moreover, it could ensure financing for regulatory and oversight bodies modeled on the International Seabed Authority (ISA) under the UNCLOS regime. Finally, such a system has the potential to pave the way toward an acceptable framework for a future global tax: a topic still largely taboo in current debates, yet recent developments within the OECD toward a minimum corporate tax show that such solutions are far from utopian. A firm commitment to benefit-sharing in this debate is therefore not merely about redistributing profits to the developing world. It is also about establishing global cooperative oversight over space mining and maintaining the discussion on future political power in outer space within the United Nations framework. Effective oversight and an agreed benefit-sharing mechanism would help prevent the emergence of tax havens at the national level by introducing a system of global taxation at the source. Ultimately, democratic systems were created to empower people, not corporations. Benefit-sharing would ensure a fair distribution of power and prevent the rise of new communities in space governed by corporate interests. UNCLOS designates the seabed beyond national jurisdiction and its resources as the common heritage of mankind. It is difficult to imagine why outer space—like the seabed, beyond the jurisdiction of states—should be governed by fundamentally different principles, even though UNCLOS has, for various reasons, not yet triggered actual seabed mining. Advocating for this principle is in the interest of any state that wishes to ensure that its private companies will have the opportunity to participate in space mining without dependency on the infrastructure controlled by quasi-monopolistic structures or at the mercy of the ambitions of unelected billionaires. It also aligns with the view that the United Nations, as an institution, should be empowered with its own financial resources to strengthen its capacity to contribute to the advancement of humanity—the very mission for which it was established. Nikola Schmidt is the head of the Governance of New Technologies Center at the Institute of International Relations and a lecturer at the Department of International Relations at Masaryk University in Brno. His research interests focus primarily on the relationship between scientific knowledge (and its stigmatization) and political order in outer space, particularly in the areas of planetary defense, space mining, and the political-security regime of outer space more broadly. Beyond space-related topics, his work also covers artificial intelligence, climate change, and the impact of disruptive technologies on global governance systems. Martin Švec is an assistant professor at the Institute of Law and Technology, Faculty of Law, Masaryk University in Brno, and the head of the Energy Law Department. His research focuses on international energy law, climate law, and international investment law. Previously, he worked at the Faculty of Social Sciences of Charles University, where he specialized in the legal aspects of space mining. He gained practical experience through an internship at the Secretariat of the Energy Charter in Brussels and as an external researcher at Tel Aviv University. He also serves as the coordinator of the Interest Group on International Environmental Law within the European Society of International Law (ESIL).

Opportunities For New Zealand As Geopolitics Reshape The Space Economy

Electron launch New Zealand’s space industry is most closely associated with Rocket Lab, but the country is looking for ways to grow its industry. (credit: Rocket Lab) Opportunities for New Zealand as geopolitics reshapes the space economy by Peter Zámborský, Christian Dietrich, and Denis Odlin Monday, May 19, 2025 The Conversation The space economy is being reshaped—not just by innovation, but by geopolitics. What was once dominated by state space agencies, and more recently by private ventures, is evolving into a hybrid model in which government priorities and commercial capabilities are intertwined. What was once dominated by state space agencies, and more recently by private ventures, is evolving into a hybrid model in which government priorities and commercial capabilities are intertwined. The rise of protectionist policies, tariff wars, export controls and national security concerns is forcing space firms to adapt their strategies—and, in many cases, to rethink where and how they operate. This offers countries such as New Zealand the opportunity to stand out in the new space race: becoming neutral ground with fewer trade and other regulatory barriers for the growth of the emerging hybrid space economy. Looking to space The New Zealand government plans to double the size of the space and advanced aviation sectors by 2030. Already, about 20,000 workers are employed in these sectors, generating US$1.8 billion in revenue. New Zealand’s flagship player in the space sector is Rocket Lab. Founded in 2006, the integrated space firm was listed on NASDAQ in 2021. By the end of 2024, the company was worth around US$8 billion. While its headquarters are in the United States, Rocket Lab also operates in Canada and keeps around 700 of its 2,000 global staff and its key launch site in New Zealand. Recently, it also announced the acquisition of a German optical communications supplier, Mynaric. Opportunities in US trade war Rocket Lab’s decision to engage in substantial foreign investment and diversify its operations across the US, New Zealand, Canada, and Europe gives it flexibility in responding to the US-initiated trade war. The current and possible future US tariffs have created uncertainty for investors. Along with retaliatory measures by China and other nations, these developments have significant consequences for space firms. Companies in this field rely on globally sourced components (for example, semiconductors and electronic components) and materials such as steel and specialized fuel for their operations. Firms based in just one location can suffer from tariffs or retaliatory restrictions. But those with operations in several countries—especially in more neutral countries such as New Zealand and some Southeast Asian nations—may benefit from geopolitical tensions. Geostrategic diversification gives them more options, including less risky locations for operations, trade and investments in the space sector. A recent Deloitte report noted that companies in the space ecosystem may prefer to look for launch sites and satellite providers on neutral ground. Initiatives are already emerging in Indonesia and Malaysia to construct commercial spaceports and attract investment in satellite manufacturing. The benefits of being neutral The rising geopolitical tensions mean new space firms from relatively neutral countries such as New Zealand are increasingly aligning with national defense priorities. The emerging hybrid space economy is, in some ways, a response to this global power realignment. New Zealand has historically sought to balance strong trade ties with China, its largest trading partner, with security cooperation with the US as part of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance. But recent developments have prompted a reassessment. Notably, the presence of Chinese warships in the Tasman Sea and upheavals in the global security climate after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has led to a review of New Zealand’s defense posture. Rocket Lab’s decision to engage in substantial foreign investment and diversify its operations across the US, New Zealand, Canada, and Europe gives it flexibility in responding to the US-initiated trade war. The government is now aiming to double defense spending to 2% of GDP. The US military has held talks with New Zealand about launching more satellites from this country. Earlier this year, Rocket Lab also declared it was “ready to serve the Pentagon.” Rocket Lab became one of five launch companies invited to compete for missions under the US National Security Space Launch program. This program puts the most valuable military and spy satellites into orbit, worth up to US$6 billion of Pentagon contracts in the next few years. Tapping into foreign investment Nations’ increased needs for domestic space defense capabilities also create foreign investment opportunities. For example, Airbus will design and build a new military satellite system costing about US$170 million in the United Kingdom to improve real-time military imagery. Ongoing economic strife and possible military conflicts have important implications for the strategies of new space firms and the policies of nations seeking space investment. New space firms may redirect their investment to countries where their main customers are located (for example, the US or European Union) or to neutral countries less affected by geopolitical tensions (for example, New Zealand). This allows them to diversify and reduce exposure to tariffs and other restrictions. In New Zealand, this may mean more government investment not only for Rocket Lab, but also involvement by other industry players from the US, Japan, or Europe. Commercial opportunities in the new space sector will remain. But the shape of the sector may move towards a more hybrid space, recognizing both commercial and national security interests in times of economic war. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article. Peter Zámborský is the International Business Disciplinary Area Lead in the Department of Management and International Business at the University of Auckland Business School in New Zealand. Christian Dietrich is a PhD candidate in International Business at the University of Auckland. His research examines how government policies influence the internationalization of small and medium-sized enterprises, with a particular focus on the impact of trade policies on firms’ market entry strategies, operational structures, and resource allocation. Denis Odlin is a lecturer in International Business at the University of Auckland with an interest in small firm internationalization, in particular how small firms compete.