Since I was a young child Mars held a special fascination for me. It was so close and yet so faraway. I have never doubted that it once had advanced life and still has remnants of that life now. I am a dedicated member of the Mars Society,Norcal Mars Society National Space Society, Planetary Society, And the SETI Institute. I am a supporter of Explore Mars, Inc. I'm a great admirer of Elon Musk and SpaceX. I have a strong feeling that Space X will send a human to Mars first.
Wednesday, November 18, 2026
Project Meridian Could Reshape Lunar Bases Before Cislunar Weapons Arrive
Project Meridian could reshape lunar bases before cislunar weapons arrive
by Zohaib Altaf
Monday, November 16, 2026
On September 30, US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth gave Project Meridian 120 days to examine future battlefields “from subterranean depths to the cislunar frontier.” MITRE will lead the study, with Elon Musk, Palmer Luckey, and Newt Gingrich as co-directors, and issue a public report with a classified annex. Formally, Meridian is a study: it has ordered no cislunar weapon, created no lunar unit, and announced no deployment date. But what makes the project significant is that the Earth-Moon region has entered an official search for future warfighting capability.
What makes the project significant is that the Earth-Moon region has entered an official search for future warfighting capability.
Even if none of Meridian’s recommendations becomes a deployed weapon, that decision could influence how the United States, China, and their partners design lunar settlements. Bases planned for science and exploration may be hardened against military disruption; antennas, navigation links, and reactor power may later support military spacecraft as well as crews. The result would be an awkward reversal. Infrastructure built to keep astronauts alive could acquire military value, while measures intended to protect it could look like preparations to control access. Washington therefore needs safety rules before it needs a lunar weapons policy.
A wider battlefield
For most of the Space Age, cislunar space was treated mainly as a route to the Moon and a setting for scientific missions. But in April 2025, the US Space Force published a warfighting framework that divided counterspace operations among orbital, electromagnetic, and cyberspace warfare and listed such actions as orbital strike, space-link interdiction, and active space defense. On September 14, 2026, Air Force Secretary Troy Meink said the United States had “on-orbit space control weapons,” although he declined to identify them. Two days later, Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Dan Caine said the joint force must be prepared to “fight, endure, and win” from the seabed to cislunar space. Meridian followed two weeks later.
That chronology matters, but the three claims do not carry the same weight. Meink placed the acknowledged weapons in Earth orbit. When Caine widened his description of the operating environment to cislunar space two days later, he did not announce a lunar campaign. Meridian goes no further than commissioning a study. But together, the three developments move military planning outward: not a deployment order yet, but a signal.
And that signal is backed by programs closer to hardware. President Donald Trump’s January 27, 2025 missile-defense order called for proliferated space-based interceptors. By April 2026, Space Systems Command had awarded 20 agreements to 12 companies, with a possible combined value of $3.2 billion, for a low Earth orbit interceptor constellation intended to demonstrate an initial capability in 2028. Meink said in September that the program had moved from initial contract to “flight-ready hardware” in less than a year. The distinction is important: flight-ready hardware is not necessarily an operational interceptor in orbit, and Golden Dome interceptors are different from the undisclosed space-control weapons. In fact, one program is producing hardware while another official is acknowledging weapons already overhead.
To read those developments as proof of imminent warfare around the Moon would go too far. Cislunar orbit and the lunar surface are physically and operationally distinct, and Meridian’s public documents specify neither a cislunar threat nor a weapon for meeting one. But treating the two regions as strategically unrelated would be just as misleading. A sustained base on the surface will depend on communications relays, navigation, transport, warning, and logistics that pass through the surrounding space. Competition in that connective tissue will reach the base through antennas and cables.
The civil timetable is already crowded. Artemis 2 carried four astronauts around the Moon in April. NASA plans an Artemis 3 rendezvous and docking demonstration in Earth orbit in 2027 and its first Artemis lunar landing during Artemis 4 as soon as early 2028. In September, the agency sought proposals in five areas for lunar base at the south pole, including vertical solar arrays, oxygen extraction from regolith, radioisotope power, advanced manufacturing, and nanomaterials. NASA and the Department of Energy are also working toward a lunar surface reactor by 2030; an earlier industry request set a minimum output of 100 kilowatts electric, enough to make power distribution an organizing feature of the settlement.
China’s schedule is slower but structurally similar. Beijing’s International Lunar Research Station plan calls for a basic south pole station by 2035 and an expanded system, linking the surface, lunar orbit, and Earth by 2045. Chang’e-7, a four-part mission intended to survey the south pole and search for water ice, missed its August 2026 launch window; partner institutions now expect a 2027 attempt. Chang’e-8 will test resource use later in the decade. Russia has proposed a reactor for the joint station by 2035, while a Chinese mission presentation has included nuclear power among the possible energy sources. Indeed, the dates may move. The wiring comes first.
The base as signal
What looks like a civil engineering choice in Houston or Beijing may become a military signal at the lunar south pole. Why would a peaceful settlement adapt to a warfighting study? Because a weapon need not land beside a habitat to affect it. A relay can be jammed, a data link can be penetrated, a navigation service can be denied, or a supporting spacecraft can be disabled. The International Committee of the Red Cross already identifies electronic warfare, cyber operations, directed energy, and harmful proximity operations among the threats facing space systems. Those methods could reach a surface crew through the services on which it depends.
A broken Earth link would remove more than instructions from mission control. The crew could lose medical consultation and some warning information at the same time, while a separate failure in navigation would complicate the arrival of a lander or an emergency delivery. Interruption of reactor controls presents a different problem because power would probably support heat, oxygen production, communications, and other basic functions. Designers are therefore likely to ask for extra batteries, local sensors, manual controls, shielding, and a shutdown function that works without permission from Earth. Some of this equipment would sit quietly for years, but would matter on the first bad day.
Once American officials place cislunar space inside a future warfighting study, Chinese planners have a reason to examine what an American protective architecture could do, not simply what Washington says it is for.
Those precautions, sensible by themselves, make the settlement harder to classify once military users enter the network. The high-gain antenna that returns scientific data could later carry a military message. A beacon installed to guide cargo landers might also guide a military spacecraft, while the reactor that keeps the habitat warm might power a tracking sensor for several hours. Not only could military use alter the legal position of a particular component, but it could also make a civilian service dependent on the survival of a military network.
Calling the entire settlement “dual-use” would nevertheless be too crude. Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I, which defines military objectives through their nature, location, purpose, or use, requires two findings. The object must contribute effectively to military action, and its destruction, capture, or neutralization must offer a definite military advantage in the circumstances then prevailing. Would military traffic through one antenna turn the adjoining habitat into a military objective? No. It could affect the antenna, perhaps its dedicated terminal, but the legal test still has to be applied to each object and to what that object is doing at the time.
But the distinction works only if the engineering leaves something to distinguish. Lunar planners, who will face strict limits on mass, spare equipment, and available power, have good reasons to connect several loads to one electrical bus or route several users through one communications terminal. That arrangement saves hardware. It also means that an operation directed against a military sensor could interrupt the heater or oxygen plant that shares its power supply. If targeting data passed through the settlement’s principal terminal, a cyber operation intended to stop that traffic might take the civilian link down with it. No such combined base exists today. This is a design risk that can still be removed.
Protection brings a second ambiguity. An escort accompanying cargo through cislunar space might genuinely be there to guard the vehicle, but another operator would see its trajectory and operating range, not its private instructions. A proximity sensor could be used to avoid collision and, with different software or data, to support targeting. Even a safety zone changes character if a military spacecraft appears ready to enforce it. What was announced as deconfliction could then be read as control over an approach route.
That possibility does not mean Meridian will recommend armed escorts or defenses around a Moon base. It may not mention either. Yet once American officials place cislunar space inside a future warfighting study, Chinese planners have a reason to examine what an American protective architecture could do, not simply what Washington says it is for. American planners would make the same calculation about China. If both sides add sensors, electronic protection, or escort vehicles in response, an arriving spacecraft could be judged against an anticipated military role before its actual purpose is known.
There are limits to this argument. Meridian remains a 120-day study, NASA has revised lunar schedules before, and the postponement of Chang’e-7 shows that Chinese plans can slip too. Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty, moreover, reserves celestial bodies for peaceful purposes and prohibits military bases, installations and fortifications, weapons tests, and military maneuvers on them. None of this supports a claim that weapons are about to appear near a lunar settlement. Yet since power lines, communication terminals, and approach procedures must be settled before a crew arrives, expectations can enter the architecture years ahead of hardware. In fact, that is when they are hardest to see.
Rules before hardware
The law does not begin from zero. Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty contains the Moon’s peaceful-use restrictions, while its rule for orbit expressly prohibits weapons of mass destruction, not every conventional weapon. Article VI places responsibility for national activities on states and requires them to authorize and continually supervise private operators. Article IX adds due regard and consultation when an activity may cause potentially harmful interference. Article XII, meanwhile, permits reciprocal visits to stations and equipment after reasonable advance notice. Those terms govern relations between states, but they do not yet tell an operator how to run traffic around a working base. How close may an unidentified vehicle come to a reactor? If a relay changes orbit, how much notice is enough? And what should be disclosed about an antenna that serves a crew one hour and military users the next?
Section 11 of the Artemis Accords carries the discussion closer to operations. A signatory is expected to disclose the location and general nature of its activities, coordinate where harmful interference may arise, and limit a safety zone to the operation that justifies it. Before an accident, that shared routine has value. But it only works among states that have accepted it. The vehicle causing the alarm may belong to one that has not.
To give Article VI practical force before launch, a national regulator should ask the operator for a functional-separation plan. The useful part would begin with a wiring diagram. Does the reactor controller share power or a data path with military tracking equipment? Is the crew’s emergency link routed through a command system? Complete physical separation may consume too much mass and duplicate equipment that is already difficult to deliver. That constraint does not excuse a single, inseparable network. A regulator could require identified isolation switches, a local manual mode, and a shutdown sequence that still works after Earth contact fails. There is no reason to publish frequencies, encryption arrangements, or system vulnerabilities. Indeed, another operator needs to recognize which functions are reserved for crew safety but doesn’t need instructions for entering them.
Meridian cannot negotiate a lunar treaty in 120 days, even if that was included in its scope. It can, though, put the relevant agencies to work.
A distance rule would settle only where the vehicle may fly. Notice should also cover the communication window that an approaching vehicle will use, its expected route, and what it will do if contact fails. Article XII visits need a comparable procedure because “reasonable advance notice” will mean little if the host and visitor have never agreed on a channel or response time. Were Washington and Beijing to publish compatible practices before permanent crews arrive, a vehicle that goes silent could first be handled as a navigation failure. Without them, silence leaves more room for speculation.
The larger omission concerns nuclear safety. The COPUOS-IAEA Safety Framework for Nuclear Power Source Applications in Outer Space, adopted in 2009, covers the launch, operation, and end-of-service phases of nuclear power sources, but it is voluntary. More importantly, its stated objective concerns people and the environment in Earth’s biosphere. Protection of humans in space, which the document describes as an area of continuing research, lies outside its scope; so does protection of the environments of other celestial bodies. That limit reflects the problem the 2009 framework mainly had in view: launch accidents and nuclear power sources carried by spacecraft. A reactor in the 100-kilowatt class, supplying a settlement from the lunar surface, moves the risk beside the people who depend on it. The question becomes harder if its power system feeds oxygen equipment and a military load as well as the habitat.
COPUOS and the IAEA don’t need to address the legality of a future military operation to deal with that risk. A supplement to the 2009 framework could begin with the loss of remote command. Which loads are isolated? How is an autonomous shutdown checked, and when is another state told that the reactor has malfunctioned? Local radiation monitors belong in the answer because an instruction from Earth may arrive after the dangerous period. In fact, the proposal is narrow: finish the reactor guidance where the existing framework stops.
Article 56 of Additional Protocol I creates a different uncertainty. It gives nuclear electrical generating stations special protection when an attack may release dangerous forces and cause severe losses among civilians, although the protection has narrow exceptions. China and the United States enter that argument from different legal positions. China acceded to the protocol in 1983. The United States signed but did not ratify it, and it has rejected Article 56 as customary law. What counts as the protected population is unsettled too: lawyers may dispute whether a small lunar crew amounts to the “civilian population” the provision contemplates. The engineer cannot wait for that dispute to be settled. Reactor controls kept outside military command networks have a clearer safety function, which makes them easier to identify and spare. They also give an attacker less to gain.
Meridian cannot negotiate a lunar treaty in 120 days, even if that was included in its scope. It can, though, put the relevant agencies to work. The Pentagon, State Department, NASA, and Department of Energy should be asked to agree on functional separation and reciprocal approach procedures, then take the uncovered reactor questions to COPUOS and the IAEA. These sound like administrative matters. In practice, they decide where a cable runs, which switch remains usable after Earth contact is lost, and how to interpret a silent vehicle. Should Meridian instead describe cislunar space as an empty theater awaiting weapons, civilian planners will still build against the omitted risks. Rival governments, seeing the precautions without the assumptions behind them, will probably read the worst case. Long before an interceptor reaches lunar orbit, the first arms-control decision may be written into lunar infrastructure.
Zohaib Altaf is Associate Director at the Centre for International Strategic Studies Azad Jammu and Kashmir (CISS AJK), Pakistan. His work focuses on nuclear strategy, deterrence stability, and emerging military technologies. He has written for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the Stimson Center, The Diplomat, and the South China Morning Post. He is also an alumnus of the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA), National Defense University, Washington, DC.
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