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Still Waiting For Liftoff From the U.K.
RFA fire
The first stage of the RFA ONE rocket burning in a static-fire test that went awry in August at SaxaVord Spaceport. (credit: RFA)
Still waiting for liftoff in the UK
by Jeff Foust
Monday, September 16, 2024
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Tucked away in a corner of one of the sprawling exhibit halls at the Farnborough International Airshow in July was the show’s “Space Zone,” a collection of booths of space companies. That included Lockheed Martin, which showed off its role in space in the United Kingdom with displays that included a scale model of an ABL Space Systems RS1 rocket that featured the logos of both Lockheed Martin and the UK Space Agency.
“If anybody tells you in this industry when a launch is going to be,” Hammond said, “they’re lying to you because there are a lot of speed bumps.”
The model was a representation of a planned launch of a “UK Pathfinder” mission by Lockheed for the agency using the RS1. At Farnborough six years earlier, the UK government announced a contract to Lockheed to conduct a launch from a spaceport in the country as part of the government’s initiative to foster a domestic launch capability. Lockheed later selected ABL, a launch startup that Lockheed had both awarded contracts to and invested in, to carry out the mission, which after many delays was projected for 2025.
The timing of the display, though, was unfortunate. On the first day of the air show, ABL announced that its second RS1 rocket had suffered “irrecoverable damage” in a fire on its launch pad in Alaska during tests ahead of a launch there.
ABL, in a statement about a month later, said that fuel leaking from engines fed a fire that broke out under the vehicle during an aborted static-fire test. The pad at the Pacific Spaceport Complex – Alaska on Kodiak Island did not have its own water supply, and water tanks there ran out without extinguishing the fire. The flames, now unchecked, destroyed the rocket.
The incident was the latest setback in the UK effort to become a launching state. Since the rollout of the initiative at Farnborough in 2018, which included funding to both Lockheed Martin and startup Orbex and selection of a site in northern Scotland for a spaceport (see “British launch plans finally lift off”, The Space Review, July 23, 2018), the effort suffered problems ranging from vehicle development delays to launch and business failures.
By 2024, the planned UK Pathfinder launch was no longer expected to be a pathfinder. It would not be the first orbital launch attempt from the country: in January 2023, Virgin Orbit conducted a mission of its LauncherOne air-launch system from Spaceport Cornwall in southwestern England. That launch, though, failed to reach orbit, and three months later Virgin Orbit filed for bankruptcy, to be liquidated soon thereafter.
It was also no longer expected to be the first vertical launch from the UK. At Farnborough, the focus was on German company Rocket Factory Augsburg (RFA), whose RFA ONE rocket was undergoing final testing at SaxaVord Spaceport in the Shetland Islands.
“Everything is gearing up very much for the next steps in our journey to space,” declared Scott Hammond, deputy chief executive and operations director of SaxaVord Spaceport, during a presentation at Farnborough. RFA had already performed some static-fire tests of the rocket’s first stage at the spaceport and, he said, would soon resume them, this time with all nine of the engines in the stage.
If all went well, he suggested, the inaugural RFA ONE launch could take place as soon as September, although he offered some caution. “If anybody tells you in this industry when a launch is going to be,” he said, “they’re lying to you because there are a lot of speed bumps.”
The spaceport, and RFA, hit a major speed bump weeks later. In a static-fire test at the pad August 19, a fire broke out on the pad as one of the nine Helix engines appeared to explode. The entire stage itself was soon destroyed.
In a statement several days later, Stefan Brieschenk, co-founder and chief operating officer of RFA, said that a fire likely broke out in an oxygen pump in one engine, a “very unusual” failure mode not seen in previous engine tests that vehicle and pad systems were not designed to contain. “It appears that everything that followed thereafter was simply not sized for this extensive damage from this oxygen fire in the turbopump,” he concluded.
“We wanted to launch within the next few weeks and months,” he said, but that schedule is on indefinite hold as it investigates the failure and builds a new first stage. He added that the launch pad infrastructure largely escaped damage.
Orbex has still not gotten to the launch pad—or completed that launch pad. The company is making progress on Sutherland Spaceport, the northern Scotland site picked by the UK government in 2018. “We expect the spaceport to be ready in early spring of next year,” Phil Chambers, CEO of Orbex, said at Farnborough.
“The key thing for that first mission was always going to be exercising, stress testing, our ability to license, and Virgin Orbit definitely did a lot of stress-testing of that process,” Archer said.
The company had not offered many public updates about its progress on its Prime small launch vehicle in recent months but had gone through a series of executive changes since last year. Chambers, who took over as CEO early this year, said he expected that the company to be ready for a first launch attempt some time next year, but did not a more specific date other than a desire to avoid poor weather conditions in the winter there. “But I do want it to be 2025,” he added.
He said the company is planning to raise another round of funding for a factory that will allow it to scale up production of Prime. “We can probably handmake about three or four a year” with its current facilities, he said; a new one would allow production to grow to 24 per year.
It’s unclear if there is demand for 24 launches a year of Prime, a vehicle capable of placing up to 180 kilograms in orbit. Rocket Lab’s Electron, in a similar performance class, has done ten launches so far this year (an eleventh is scheduled for this week) and the company has said issues with customers have prevented it from doing more.
RS1 model
A model of ABL’s RS1 rocket, in livery for the UK Pathfinder launch, on display at the Farnborough International Airshow in July. (credit: J. Foust)
Several factors have played a role in the struggles that the UK has seen trying to develop a launch industry. “Covid threw a spanner in everyone’s works,” said Matthew Archer, director of launch at the UK Space Agency, in an interview at Farnborough. “For most of our companies, they lost 18 months to two years in their overall production schedule, mostly because of Covid.”
Companies have also struggled to raise money, which he said is linked to a broader contraction in space industry investment in the last couple of years as interest rates rose; at the same time, space insurers suffered major losses that made it harder for companies to secure coverage.
However, there has been progress in other areas, like launch regulations that Virgin Orbit was able to successfully navigate to win approval for its launch. “The key thing for that first mission was always going to be exercising, stress testing, our ability to license, and Virgin Orbit definitely did a lot of stress-testing of that process,” Archer said.
Commercial launches are regulated in the UK by the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). “Virgin Orbit’s mission didn’t do what it hoped it would do, but for us it assured that entire system does work from end to end,” said Colin Macleod, head of UK space regulation at the CAA. He added that four companies have “plausible ambitions” to launch from the UK in the next 18 months.
Archer said that, in hindsight, he might have taken a different approach to supporting launch from the UK. “We deliberately picked a range of spaceports and providers on the basis that we knew that not all of them would succeed,” he said. “I would probably targeted more on specific spaceports” like SaxaVord and Sutherland. “We might have done more to de-risk some of those programs.”
“Sometimes I worry that the politicians want to see success straight away and, if not, they lose interest,” Hammond warned.
It's unclear how much additional support the UK government might provide for launch. The air show took place just weeks after the Labour party won parliamentary elections. While industry officials were gratified that Peter Kyle, the new minister whose portfolio includes space, made his first speech since taking the post at Farnborough, the government has offered few details about how it might approach space issues.
SaxaVord’s Hammond said he was concerned in general that launch failures might cause a loss of support. “This is a test flight, and it is an iterative process: we learn as we go along,” he said, setting expectations for the expected first flight of RFA ONE. “Sometimes I worry that the politicians want to see success straight away and, if not, they lose interest.”
RFA plans to return to SaxaVord and make another launch attempt, some time next year. The future is less certain for ABL and the UK Pathfinder launch: in late August, ABL announced it was laying off an unspecified number of employees as part of efforts to cut costs. The company had already been working to trim its costs without layoffs, wrote CEO Harry O’Hanley in an email to employees. “Through these efforts, we were able to get onto a good glidepath, but the recent staticfire issue knocked us from it.”
That announcement gave few details about the schedule for RS1, though. The reorganization and layoffs would “reset the cost structure of the business to be sustainable in any environment,” he wrote, including one that has turned far less hospitable than what companies and agencies on both side the Atlantic expected six years ago.
Jeff Foust (jeff@thespacereview.com) is the editor and publisher of The Space Review, and a senior staff writer with SpaceNews. He also operates the Spacetoday.net web site. Views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone.
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Launching Space Missions From Australia
Arnhem Space Centre
A technology safeguards agreement between the US and Australia provides new opportunities for facilities like Australia’s Arnhem Space Centre to host American launches. (credit: Equatorial Launch Australia)
Navigating new frontiers: Assessing the opportunity for US entities to launch and return space missions in Australia
by Brett Loubert, Byron Riessen, Arthur Anglin, and Adrian Young
Monday, September 16, 2024
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Spaceflight has never been more common than it is now. If satellite demand remains strong and the frequency of launches continues to accelerate, so too will the need for increased capacity at spaceports. To date, US launch demand has largely been filled by domestic spaceports. Going forward, there may be new options abroad. Similarly, potential increases in payload return operations could also create new opportunities for international spaceports.
Australia, specifically, is an interesting candidate for both launch and return operations. Following the 2023 announcement of the US-Australia Technology Safeguards Agreement (TSA), industry voices included both optimism and open questions about the presence of demand for US companies to use Australian spaceports.[1] Now that the TSA has been ratified by both nations,[2] it is worth examining the prevailing drivers and key barriers that stakeholders may encounter on the journey to extend US launch and return vehicles to Australian soil.
Rising demand for spaceport services
The global space industry landscape has experienced significant changes over the past decade, marked by new and innovative spacecraft, an exponential growth in the number of active satellites, and increased commercial activity across the space value chain. Perhaps one of the most visible signs of industry growth is the resulting uptick in launch activity. In 2023, a record-breaking 219 orbital launches were completed, a dramatic increase compared to the 82 launches in 2013.[3]
If satellite demand remains strong and the frequency of launches continues to accelerate, so too will the need for increased capacity at spaceports.
While the awesome footage of rockets thundering into space has quickly become common, it wouldn’t be possible without spaceports. Like airports and seaports serve other modes of transportation, spaceports comprise the necessary infrastructure and operations for space vehicles to access and, in some cases, return from space. Spaceports support a range of important functions such as payload integration, vehicle testing, fueling, communications, and launch.[4]
Looking ahead, plans for new and expanded satellite constellations, particularly in telecommunications and Earth observation, are poised to drive launch demand even higher.[5] The market for in-space servicing, assembly, and manufacturing (ISAM) is also forecasted to grow in the coming decade, which could increase demand for both launch and payload return services. As these in-space activities and services increase, the strain on spaceport infrastructure will likely follow.[6]
The United States currently leads the world in the number of orbital launches per year, tallying nearly as many as all other countries combined in 2023, as shown in the chart below. This feat was enabled in part by decades of investment from the government and private sector entities to build a robust US launch infrastructure. Spaceports at Cape Canaveral in Florida and Vandenberg Space Force Base in California have been able to support the bulk of launches to date and, as the pace picks up, some launch providers are making use of a growing network of private and public/private facilities all the way from Virginia to Alaska.[7]
chart
Global Orbital Launch Attempts in 2023 by Country. Source: Krebs, Gunter D., “Orbital Launches of 2023”. Gunter’s Space Page. Retrieved August 5, 2024.
To help keep pace with the upward-trending demand, a new opportunity for US launch providers may be emerging overseas. Australia now hosts several spaceport providers with noteworthy potential in the rapidly evolving landscape of global space exploration and commerce. While still maturing, particularly for orbital missions, these facilities could provide an option for new US-based space companies to build out their launch and return infrastructure or for established operators to expand.
Even if these dynamics play out and US firms seek capacity at spaceports abroad, the question arises: why Australia? There are several factors unique to Australia that make it an interesting prospect.
Until recently, the regulatory environment between the US and Australia was complex, particularly with respect to maintaining control of technologies like rockets and spacecraft with national security implications. In July 2024, however, the US-Australia Technology Safeguards Agreement (TSA) was fully ratified, establishing a clearer legal framework for US entities seeking to launch or return space assets in Australia. The TSA aims to streamline the regulatory processes and remove barriers while safeguarding sensitive technology.
The sections that follow explore the opportunity for US companies to operate from Australian spaceports by focusing on three key questions:
What are the dynamics shaping the opportunity for US space companies to launch and return at Australian spaceports?
What will companies in both countries need to navigate regarding the regulatory requirements of the TSA?
What else needs to be done to ready the Australian spaceport market to host US launch and return operations?
A launchpad for growth? Dynamics shaping the opportunity for US space companies to launch and return at Australian spaceports
Current demand for US rocket launches from Australia appears limited due to entrenched investment in domestic facilities. However, if the launch market continues growing into the 2030s, it may become attractive for US launch companies to establish an international network of spaceports. Some of the potential benefits of international expansion include:
Greater agility enabled by diversified supply chains and redundant infrastructure
Less congestion at existing spaceports (especially those with multiple tenants)
Flexible access to different orbital regimes
Closer proximity to regional demand hubs for launch customers/payloads
Even if these dynamics play out and US firms seek capacity at spaceports abroad, the question arises: why Australia? There are several factors unique to Australia that make it an interesting prospect. The continent offers access to polar, sun-synchronous, equatorial, and a range of mid-inclination orbits. Its geography, characterized by vast, uninhabited landscapes and less air and sea traffic than Cape Canaveral and Vandenberg, opens a broad window of trajectories for launch, reentry, and landing. Furthermore, Australia is a close US partner and ally, and the TSA now makes it more accessible for US companies to conduct launch and return operations in Australia.
Collaboration on defense and intelligence
US firms may become well-positioned to capitalize on strategic dynamics that could become increasingly significant over the next decade. Most notable is the alliance between the US and Australia. The countries’ collaboration in intelligence and defense is demonstrated through the Five Eyes alliance and the AUKUS security partnership, respectively.[8] While these agreements lack specific pillars for space launch, they have promising implications for future collaboration in the space domain. For example, the US Space Force’s Commercial Space Strategy emphasizes “diversification” and a “hybrid space architecture,” which could include leveraging international partnerships.[9] While specifics are nascent, allied launch capabilities for defense and intelligence missions could provide a strategic benefit to both countries’ defense capabilities as well as the commercial space industry that supports their missions.
Commercial payloads for international markets
US launch companies may be unlikely to use spaceports abroad as primary launch sites for payloads manufactured in the US – the cost and complexity of logistics would likely outweigh most benefits. However, the business case changes for payloads originating elsewhere. For example, customers with satellites built in the Asia-Pacific region (including Australia) might streamline logistics and minimize costs when launching or returning in Australia versus the US. Further, Japanese satellite operators may benefit from more permissive and less costly regulatory environment compared to domestic launches. In any case, US operators would likely need a clear and consistent signal of regional demand to justify expansion for commercial customers.
Future payload return missions
Australia presents several distinct advantages as a destination for payload return, particularly when compared to established space-faring regions like the US and Europe. Australia’s sparsely populated landscape enables safer land-based returns, plausibly reducing both risk and cost. Less crowded airspace also makes for simpler clearance. Adding Australia as a payload return destination for US space firms may also increase agility or enable a higher overall cadence for return missions because overflights are out of phase compared to the US. These factors could be valuable over the next decade if commercial space stations come online as planned. For example, in-space manufacturing of pharmaceuticals is a commonly cited application for future space stations and would require reliable and efficient transport to ground-based logistics networks.[10]
Cleared for liftoff? Navigating regulatory requirements of the TSA
The US-Australia TSA mandates strict controls over the handling of sensitive items including products, equipment, tools, software, and technology that is classified as military or dual-use in the USA and Australia. While the TSA presents a positive move toward both countries approving space launch activities, companies will still need to obtain the appropriate export authorizations from both countries. Companies also need to implement adequate controls to comply with export regulations. Below are some of the basic considerations for companies:
Establish secure facilities within Australian spaceports to prevent unauthorized access to controlled items and ensure compliance with both Australian and US regulations.
Implement comprehensive export controls compliance programs that focus on having the appropriate processes, systems, and controls in place to manage the export and transfer including access to controlled items
Define data security measures including encrypted communication systems, secure data storage solutions, and access controls that align with the stringent requirements of the TSA
Have knowledgeable and trained personnel to ensure that people involved in handling sensitive items are properly vetted and trained on the regulatory requirement and compliance protocols
Define clear governance structures that establish clear rules of engagement between relevant individuals and organizations in the US and Australia, including roles and responsibilities, communication protocols, and accountability measures
Streamlining the systems and processes used to meet TSA requirements—and ensuring compatibility between related Australian and US regulatory frameworks—may reduce administrative cost and risk. Doing so may be a promising strategy for Australian spaceports to attract business from US launch providers.
All systems go? Considerations for readying the Australian spaceport market to host US launch and return operations.
It is plausible that with continued growth in the space industry, particularly in scenarios with a strong global customer base for commercial launch services and increased US-Australia collaboration in defense and intelligence space missions, US firms could seek to expand launch and return operations to Australian spaceports. Of course, preparing the Australian spaceport market will likely take time and investment.
At a minimum, this involves the continued development of essential spaceport infrastructure to support launch and return operations. However, making Australia an attractive destination for US firms may entail further steps to strengthen the overall space industry with support from the Australian government and the entire commercial space enterprise.
Infrastructure needs for launch and return
For Australian spaceports to be a viable destination, they need adequate facilities. The infrastructure requirements for launch and return missions are unique, a factor that may influence the strategic choices and timing for development as spaceport operators court prospective customers.
Having the infrastructure to operate is, of course, a necessity. But “if you build it, they will come” is an unlikely strategy for success.
Launch infrastructure, particularly for orbital flights, is extremely costly. It starts with reliable access to essential resources like water, common propellants, telecommunications, ground support equipment, safety systems, and a transporter/erector. These can often be used to support multiple customers. However, elements closer to the vehicle often cannot. Many launch providers seem to favor bespoke components for much of the launch complex, due to the added flexibility and control they offer over multi-use pads. The resulting cost to build a dedicated launch site can range from tens of millions of US dollars for a small-lift vehicle to one billion dollars or more for heavy-lift vehicles. Co-investment strategies between government entities and commercial players across the value chain—including the spaceport, the launch and/or return operator(s), and possibly downstream customers—may be needed to fulfil these substantial capital needs.
Supporting return missions may be less capital-intensive, but still requires a few key infrastructure components. Nearby payload processing facilities are needed, and they may have unique security, environmental, and scientific requirements. In addition to clean rooms and laboratories, these facilities may also need to support rapid packaging, shipping, and integration with international transportation networks.
Building strength across the Australian space enterprise
Having the infrastructure to operate is, of course, a necessity. But “if you build it, they will come” is an unlikely strategy for success. A host of supporting capabilities and conditions will also need to be in place across the broader space industry ecosystem for Australia’s spaceports to be a viable business proposition for US firms.
A strong demand signal for payloads (to launch or return) is of utmost importance. Without it, potential investors—whether launch companies or otherwise—may see too much risk to commit the funding needed to expand operations or build new facilities. To be successful, Australian spaceports will need to prove out the presence of sustainable demand. And, for the cost structure to warrant operations in Australia, domestic and regional payloads (including Australian government payloads) will likely need to be part of the mix.
Another component of a strong space industry ecosystem is local engineering talent and manufacturing capability. The ability to build, operate, and maintain space vehicles and their associated components is not only indicative of a well-rounded ecosystem but also a key part of a competitive cost structure. For example, a launch provider with a reusable upper stage would be unlikely to find economies of scale if refurbishment and reuse involved shipping hardware elsewhere in the world.
To capture the opportunity, Australia’s spaceports would likely need to meet several conditions that are missing today.
Finally, sustained policy and funding support from the Australian governmental is seen as a key ingredient for the country’s space industry. Unfortunately, recent budget cuts could undermine the creation of sovereign space capabilities[11] and make it harder for the Australian space industry to secure funding.[12] As a result, some US launch providers may approach opportunities in Australia more cautiously.
Conclusion
Over the past five years, global orbital launches have doubled, primarily driven by the increased deployment of medium and small lift vehicles, with the US leading in launch numbers. Whether it's satellite communication, in-space or on-orbit Servicing, Assembly and Manufacturing (ISAM/OSAM), Earth Observation, or exploration missions, the need for in-space capabilities continues to increase.[13] Amidst this growth, Australian spaceports have a significant opportunity to support the necessary facilities and services for launch and return activities.
To capture the opportunity, however, Australia’s spaceports would likely need to meet several conditions that are missing today. Developing new infrastructure, broadening capabilities across the Australian space industry ecosystem, and building systems to comply with the TSA and other regulations are critical steps in the journey. Recognizing these needs, stakeholders and key space service providers may need to navigate significant uncertainties to capitalize on the industry's long-term potential. But by understanding the key drivers and challenges shaping prospects for US-Australia collaboration in launch and landing on in Australia, stakeholders can position themselves to harness the opportunities presented by this rapidly evolving landscape.
About this article
This article contains general information only and Deloitte is not, by means of this article, rendering accounting, business, financial, investment, legal, tax, or other professional advice or services. This article is not a substitute for such professional advice or services, nor should it be used as the basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified professional adviser. Deloitte shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person who relies on this article. As used in this article, “Deloitte” means Deloitte Consulting LLP, a subsidiary of Deloitte LLP. Please see www.deloitte.com/us/about for a detailed description of our legal structure.
Endnotes
Foust, Jeff. “New agreement enables U.S. launches from Australian spaceports,” October 27, 2023
Australian Space Agency, “Technology Safeguards Agreement: Everything you need to know about the TSA,” retrieved August 9, 2024
Krebs, Gunter D. “Chronology of Space Launches,” Retrieved July 2024
Deloitte, “Spaceports of the Future,” May 2023
Fortune Business Insights, “Space Launch Services Market,” May 2022
Deloitte, “The commercialization of low Earth orbit | Volume 5,” Spring 2023
Deloitte, “Spaceports of the Future,” May 2023
Blaxland, John. “Revealing Secrets About Deep Australia-UK-US Intelligence Connections,” May 17, 2024
United States Space Force, “US Space Force Commercial Space Strategy,” April 2024
Deloitte, “The commercialization of low Earth orbit | Volume 4,” Fall, 2022
Australian Academy of Science, “Statement regarding June 2023 cuts to Australian space programs,” July 13, 2023
Daly, Nadia. “Experts warn Australia’s space industry ‘in limbo’ after axing of key programs,” August 3, 2023
World Economic Forum, “Space: The $1.8 Trillion Opportunity for Global Economic Growth,” April 2024
Brett Loubert leads Deloitte’s US Space practice with over 20 years of experience working with leaders in the defense, national security, and civilian sectors to engineer, modernize, and operate IT systems and services. Byron Riessen leads Deloitte’s Australia Space practice with 25+ years of experience in shaping and accelerating the development of entrepreneurial high growth tech organizations. Arthur Anglin is a Specialist Leader in Deloitte’s US Space practice, where he leads research related to space technology’s applications and benefits for humanity. Adrian Young is a Director in Deloitte’s Australia Space practice who specializes in the commercialization of space technology and applications.
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Framing THhe Success Of Polaris Dawn
spacewalk
Jared Isaacman emerges from the Crew Dragon hatch on the first commercial spacewalk September 12 during the Polaris Dawn mission. (credit: SpaceX)
Framing the success of the Polaris Dawn mission
by Ajey Lele
Monday, September 16, 2024
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Frame one: Spacewalk and commercial success
Walking in space is a dream. It was the Soviet cosmonaut Alexei Leonov who went through a process of “living a dream” for around 12 minutes when he undertook a spacewalk on March 18, 1965. Since then, a few hundred humans have undertaken walks in space, and 12 individuals have also walked on the lunar surface. Almost six decades after the first spacewalk, on September 12, two private astronauts conducted the first-ever commercial spacewalk. This happened during SpaceX’s Polaris Dawn mission. This mission is a collaboration between SpaceX and Jared Isaacman, an American billionaire entrepreneur. Isaacman performed the spacewalk with Sarah Gillis, an engineer from the SpaceX.
This mission has busted the myth that only the astronauts from state-supported space missions can undertake spacewalks.
The 41-year-old Isaacman is a qualified pilot and is known to be flight-qualified in multiple military jet aircraft. He holds a world record for circumnavigating the globe in a light jet. In September 2021 he went to space as commander of the Inspiration4 mission, also flown by SpaceX. This was the first all-civilian spaceflight to orbit. This indicates that apart from his finances, he also had other essential qualifications to undertake such a challenging mission. Few specific details about his training process for undertaking a spacewalk are known.
The International Space Station (ISS) was set up in 2000 and since then about 270 spacewalks (aka extravehicular activities, or EVAs) have been conducted by the astronauts and cosmonauts at the station. So far, Chinese taikonauts have successfully carried out 16 spacewalks. The first Chinese spacewalk which lasted for around 19 minutes was conducted on September 27, 2008 during Shenzhou-7 mission.
The ISS and Tiangong space station are located around an altitude of 400 kilometers above the Earth’s surface. However, the Dragon capsule was located as high as 740 kilometers. There could have been some different sets of challenges, such as radiation exposure, associated with undertaking a spacewalk for the first time around these altitudes.
An important goal of the Polaris Dawn mission was to test and learn more about the requirements for advanced spacesuits. These new versions of spacesuits would play a role towards deciding about the requirements of suits required for travel and stay on Moon and Mars. The successful operation further reinforces that space travel is no longer the exclusive province of professional astronauts working at governmental space agencies like NASA.
This mission has busted the myth that only the astronauts from state-supported space missions can undertake spacewalks. During the last few years, private space travel has become a reality and now it appears that private individuals can also undertake spacewalks if they can fulfill some financial, physical, and training requirements necessary for such missions.
It is important to celebrate the success of Jared Isaacman and his crew. This should not be viewed only with the narrow prism of commercial success, but there could be some important scientific findings for future space travels, which could be useful for both government and private space missions.
Frame two: Mount Everest and copious commercialisation
Mount Everest, with an elevation of 8,848.86 meters about sea level, is Earth’s highest mountain above sea level. It is in the Himalayan ranges and the China-Nepal border runs across its summit point. Tenzing Norgay and Sir Edmund Hillary were the first climbers to climb this world’s tallest mountain on May 29, 1953. Conquering this tallest peak demands both physical and mental strength and a considerable amount of mountaineering experience. This expedition is expensive and, by some estimates, could cost around $75,000. There are two main climbing routes for Mount Everest, one from the southeast ridge from Nepal and other from the north ridge from Tibet. So far, close to 7,000 people have climbed Mount Everest and reached the summit. More than 330 climbers have died during the expedition on Mount Everest and close to 200 bodies remain on the mountain, since their recovery back to foothills is unmanageable.
Richard Bass, an American businessman and mountaineer, took a guided expedition to Mount Everest during 1985 and with this began the era of Everest summit commercialization. There is a long story about how this process of commercialization has evolved mainly over the last three to four decades. It contributes significantly towards Nepal’s tourism revenue.
For some years now, many climbers have been hiring a “full-service package.” Services provider companies are providing everything from assistance to get permits to medical facilities to connecting with a trained and experienced mountaineer guide, providing porter services, and catering for meal requirements. Some such packages are known to cost around $200,000. Eventually, it all depends on the nature of services hired by a group or an individual.
It is becoming increasingly evident that in some cases, more than the spirit of adventure and love for exploring nature, the journey has become more about exhibitionist attitude, essentially for the consumption of social media. Mostly, the attitude has been, “since I have money, I can even reach Everest!” It is more about millionaires and billionaires looking for new thrills.
Presently around 600 people reach the top of Everest per season. Along with them, there are porters and guides too. In addition, almost 500 per day visit Everest base camp. During the trek towards the peak, the climber meets many “co-travellers.” They are forced to walk in a single file and at times it becomes difficult to stand on the Everest top due to overcrowding. Over the years, the entire region in general and Mount Everest in particular is getting increasingly polluted. In 1991, a Pollution Control Committee was established; however, it appears that their efforts are insufficient mainly owing to the burden of so many people trying to reach the summit within a very short span of time.
The experiences of the commercialization of Mount Everest, and interest in Antarctic resources, could provide lessons for space.
Today, Mount Everest is accumulating a lot of garbage, leading to contamination of the entire region and the local watershed. According to some estimates, every individual is responsible for generating around eight kilograms of trash, which mostly gets left on the mountain. From cracked tents to abandoned food containers and packages, and from empty oxygen cylinders to broken mountaineering equipment to human waste, many things litter the mountain heights on a regular basis. Also, extreme cold temperatures ensure that no decay of the garbage happens. Every fresh snowfall covers the garbage, eventually leading to the accumulation of piles of garbage.
Frame three: Antarctica, resources are not up for grab
The Antarctic Treaty entered into force in 1961 and, according to treaty provisions, the Antarctic continent should remain a demilitarized zone and should be preserved only for scientific research. The place cannot have any military bases and nuclear testing and the disposal of radioactive waste is prohibited. Mining in Antarctica is banned ad infinitum by the Protocol on Environmental Protection (the Madrid Protocol, 1998).
There are overlapping claims to territory on this continent by few states; however, the treaty survived possibly since all these years, the process has remained dynamic with debates and advancing some additional conventions and other legal protocols.
Since 1960, the domain of technology has evolved significantly and has made Antarctica much more accessible. More states are showing interests in the affairs of Antarctica. From fisheries and minerals, some states are found probing a bit deep to understand if they can somehow manage their quest for resources by investing in this region, possibly by exploiting some loopholes in treaty mechanism. It is important to note that any mining activity will disturb the ecological balance of the Antarctic region.
Frame Four: Connecting the dots in an implicit way
The success of the Polaris Dawn mission needs to be celebrated. During the last few years, the private sector has leapfrogged in the space domain. The recent accomplishment could open doors for the private sector to play an important role in various human space programs. States are going to increase their dependence on the private sector while undertaking various ambitious space projects. The private sector could play a major role in regards to on-orbit servicing, space situational awareness, space debris removal technologies, and developing the structures for space traffic management. They have already made some significant investments towards Moon and Mars missions. Commercialization of spacewalks could become a reality in near future and space tourists would also be offered opportunities to undertake spacewalks.
The experiences of the commercialization of Mount Everest, and interest in Antarctic resources, could provide lessons for space. Space is an inherently inhospitable and hazardous environment and same is the case of Himalayan ranges and particularly the site of Mount Everest. Nevertheless, issues associated with the garbage on Everest and debris in space are not comparable. However, there could be some indirect learnings from the Everest experience. On the other hand, the Antarctica experience communicates the strengths of treaty mechanisms. Currently, the world has no plan in regards to the management of planetary resources. Unfortunately, in regards to space security, the possibility of major states agreeing on any legally binding and rule-based mechanism looks unlikely. There is now a need to understand the aspects of space security in connection with the growth happening in the private space sector. Mostly this growth remains unchecked from a security standpoint. It is said that no appropriate theory of space power has evolved so far. However, that should not stop us learning from the environment and the story of Mount Everest should be viewed in that context.
Ajey Lele is Deputy Director General at MP-IDSA, New Delhi, India and the views expressed are personal.
Mercantilism In Space
LVM-3 launch
Emerging space powers in the Global South, like India, need to look after their own interests as more advanced powers take on bigger roles in space. (credit: ISRO)
Mercantilism in outer space: discussing a political-economic approach for the Global South
by Aritra Ghosh
Monday, September 16, 2024
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This essay focusses on the political-economic impact of the utilization of outer space on economically capable Global South states. A frontier that was predominantly accessed by the Global North has since seen the rise of developing countries, such as India, who are taking an active interest in the economic and security concerns on the use of space as they themselves have become spacefaring nations. States, specifically actors from the global south, benefit from taking a mercantilist approach to outer space. While there does exist regulation of activities in space, such as the Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967, it can be considered outdated for the advancements made in the economic and military potential of outer space in 21st century and it should be noted that the bodies that govern peaceful cooperation of outer space are part of the United Nations and hence this means that the ultimate decision-making body on matters regarding space are the five permanent members of the UN Security Council who hold veto power. All five are spacefaring nations, and four out of the five (excluding China) are a part of the Global North.
So why must economically capable Global South countries take a mercantilist approach to outer space? The answer is to prevent further domination over them by the Global North.
Therefore, this essay claims that countries of the Global South such as India and others that have an active interest in utilizing outer space for economic interests must follow a mercantilist approach or they will not be able to succeed in a frontier that is slowly being hegemonized by the Global North. What exactly is a mercantilist approach? Mercantilists take the approach “that economic activity is and should be subordinated to the primary goal of building a strong state. In other words, economics is a tool of politics, a basis for political power. That is a defining feature of mercantilist thinking. Mercantilists see the international economy as an arena of conflict between opposing national interests, rather than an area of cooperation and mutual gain.” (Jackson and Sørensen, 2015, pg. 4)
The utilization of outer space has become essential for the functioning of the global economy on Earth. An example of this is satellites providing GPS and connectivity that have become crucial for telecommunications, e-commerce, trade, and hence the international economic order (IMF, 2021). There are also military usages of satellites in space for the purpose of communication, navigation, and intelligence gathering. (Space.Com, 2014) Recently, private companies have pushed for a move towards greater privatization in space, like SpaceX’s Starlink or Virgin Galactic’s suborbital space tourism services. These companies have also been closely working with government institutions such as SpaceX’s collaboration with NASA (Costa, 2022). For these private companies, having access to outer space earlier than others helps in creating a potential monopoly over private business in space for themselves (Foust, 2023).
As technology has developed, mining in space of asteroids and the moon has become a real possibility. Asteroid or lunar mining can potentially solve resource scarcity issues on Earth as well as be a highly lucrative endeavour for states and private businesses involved: “Despite the high price tag, the development of asteroid mining technology may very well be a worthwhile endeavor due to the extremely valuable resources that asteroids have to offer. For example, Asterank, which measures the potential value of over 6,000 asteroids that NASA currently tracks, has determined that mining just the top 10 most cost-effective asteroids–that is, those that are both closest to Earth and greatest in value–would produce a profit of around US$1.5 trillion.” (Yarlagadda, 2022)
However, the Outer Space Treaty is largely ambiguous on the matter and states have proceeded to make their own legislation regarding mining in space, an example of this bring the US Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015 (Oduntan, 2015). The Artemis Accords (2020), drafted by the US, are a series of non-binding bilateral agreements between the US and other countries for a “common set of principles to govern the civil exploration and use of outer space”(NASA, n.d.). The Artemis Accords reinforces principles of cooperation in space while including issues of concern in the 21st century such as the “extraction and utilization of space resources, including any recovery from the surface or subsurface of the Moon, Mars, comets, or asteroids” (Artemis Accords, pg. 4). Emphasis should be given to the fact that the Artemis Accords are a non-binding agreement and hence there are no legal consequences to breaking the principles of the accord, especially to the USA. Even if the UN decides to impose sanctions on those that have breached the Artemis Accords, if the US themselves are a breacher they would simply veto any decision against them. Therefore, the international political system is grossly tilted in favour of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, benefitting them greatly in the utilization—and potential exploitation—of resources in outer space without significant consequences.
So why must economically capable Global South countries take a mercantilist approach to outer space? The answer is to prevent further domination over them by the Global North. There are various resources in space that are scarce on Earth, and accessing resources in space such as helium-3 would transform the nuclear energy sector on the planet. (Kilment, 2006) Any state that manages to successfully extract these resources first would immediately gain the upper hand in international trade of the said resource as well as using the new resources to further push economic development and production. Strengthening of a state’s economy would lead the periphery/semi-periphery states to be less reliable on the exploitative “core” countries of the world system. (Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1982) and allow them to have a greater say in economics and geopolitics
Economically capable Global South states with an interest in outer space must pursue a defensive mercantilist policy and use outer space to the best of their abilities to strengthen their position economically and militarily on Earth so they too can have an equal presence in global power politics.
Another feature of mercantilism of space would be the militarization or weaponization of this frontier. Hence, from an offensive realist lens, this essay argues that states from the Global South, such as India, that have the economic capability to weaponize/militarize space should do so, and it is only after building such weapons the state should show restraint. The purpose of such weapons should not be aggressive in nature, but rather to protect their own economic interest in space while also ensuring they do not fall back to the Global North in military capability. While states should invest in protective measures in space by the production of weapons that can be used in outer space, all states should avoid military conflict in space. Such a conflict could spill over to the terrestrial plane leading to large-scale destruction and the use of weapons of mass destruction. The aim of the Global South should be to strengthen their economic and political position to such an extent that they do not let outer space be another frontier where the current terrestrial status-quo applies, but rather use the resources present in outer space and utilize them to strengthen their terrestrial political power.
In conclusion it should be noted that this essay does not advocate aggressive mercantilism in outer space, but rather defensive mercantilism, one where “states look after their national economic interests because that is an important ingredient of their national security; such policies need not have overly negative effects on other states.” (Jackson and Sørensen, 2015, pg. 4) It also does not dispute key principles of the OST, (United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 1966) but rather encourages it; fair and peaceful cooperation in outer space has the potential to bring about profound net-positive economic change here on Earth. However, this essay recognizes the existing deficiencies in international space law and the repeated lack of accountability by the P5 who use the United Nations as a tool to their means of power politics (Glennon, 2003, pg. 18) rather than benefitting the international community as a whole. The reasonable solution to this is either major reforms in the UN Security Council or creating a new international governing body specifically related to activities in outer space that is more neutral in nature than the current United Nations. Pessimistic about the former, the latter scenario is more likely as the politics and economics of outer space further complexes. When such a scenario does arise, the Global South should be in a position to play a more active role in the making of such an institution and the creation of stronger space legislation. Thus, economically capable Global South states with an interest in outer space must pursue a defensive mercantilist policy and use outer space to the best of their abilities to strengthen their position economically and militarily on Earth so they too can have an equal presence in global power politics, refusing to be subordinates to the Global North’s interests.
Bibliography
Costa, J. (2022). SpaceX – All the news about NASA’s missions using SpaceX. [online] blogs.nasa.gov.
Foust, J. (2023). SpaceX launches a debate on monopolies. [online] www.thespacereview.com.
Glennon, M.J. (2003). Why the Security Council Failed. Foreign Affairs, 82(3), p.16.
Hopkins, T.K. and Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein (1982). World-Systems Analysis. SAGE Publications, Incorporated.
IMF. (2021). Brave New World: Tracking Trade from Space. [online].
Kliment, A. (2006). The Battle for Celestial Property Rights. The SAIS Review of International Affairs, [online] 26(1), pp.189–191. [Accessed 12 Apr. 2024].
NASA. (n.d.). Artemis Accords - NASA. [online].
Oduntan, G. (2015). Who Owns Space? US Asteroid-Mining Act Is Dangerous And Potentially Illegal. [online] IFLScience. [Accessed 11 Apr. 2024].
Space.com. (2014). Military Space - Spacecraft, Weapons and Tech | Space. [online] [Accessed 12 Apr. 2024].
United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (1966). The Outer Space Treaty. [online] UNOOSA.
Yarlagadda, S. (2022). Economics of the Stars: The Future of Asteroid Mining and the Global Economy. [online] Harvard International Review.
Jackson, R. and Sørensen, G. (2015). 6. International Political Economy: Classical Theories. Introduction to International Relations.
Aritra Ghosh is a Master's student at the South Asian University, New Delhi, pursuing a degree in International Relations with a keen interest in environmental and astropolitics, particularly from a Global South lens. Aritra is also an intern at the Observer Research Foundation, Kolkata.
Sunday, September 15, 2024
Jared Isaacman-An Amazing LIfe
Just before the day began, I started to watch the Polaris Dawn Dragon capsule start its reentry into the Earth's atmosphere as it flew above Western Australia. The Draco thrusters put the capsule into a position where the drag of the atmosphere started to slow it down and begin its fiery ride through the atmosphere. All went perfectly. Four drogue chutes deployed as the capsule got near the water. The capsule landed very close to the recovery ship sitting near Key West, Florida. The capsule was brought onto the recovery ship. After some tests, the four astronauts emerged from the capsule looking happy and well.
Space X did an incredible job, without a doubt. The one person who fascinates me the most is the man who financed the mission and put his heart and soul into the project. Some great biographer like Walter Isaacson (No relation to Jared) needs to write the biography of 41-year-old Jared Isaacman. Imagine what each of us was like around 17 years of age. Jared dropped out of high school at that age. He had the dream of creating a payments platform. (Elon Musk dropped out of a Stanford PhD program in materials engineering to do the same thing with what turned out to be PayPal.) To pull this off, one must have awesome skills as a software engineer. Once the platform is operating, one must have incredible commercial skills to make the platform competitive against heavyweights like PayPal and Adyen. Jared started operating in this most competitive environment. He built a publicly-listed company now valued at 9 billion dollars. He built a personal net worth of $1.9 billion.
Then Jared wanted to become a proficient jet fighter pilot. He got a degree from Embry Riddle Aeronautical University. He next faced giant obstacles to reach his goal. The first obstacle is to pass an aptitude test with a strong psychological orientation. Next comes primary flight school where young aviation cadets learn to fly basic trainer planes. A lot of candidates fail at this level. Next comes advanced flight training where many more candidates fail. Those who survive this school now must compete for the very few fighter pilot slots open. Many good pilots end up flying transport planes, tanker planes, AWAC aircraft, and even helicopters. Only the elite few get to fly advanced jet fighters. Jared became a very proficient fighter pilot respected by military fighter pilots.
His next goal was to become a proficient astronaut. In the last class of 10 NASA astronauts chosen in 2021, 12,000 qualified applicants applied for these ten positions. He achieved this goal and reached a level of proficiency to pilot a spacecraft in outer space.
What an incredible life!
Saturday, September 14, 2024
Friday, September 13, 2024
20 Years Of the Moon Europa on Planetary Radio
https://www.planetary.org/planetary-radio/2024-europa-in-reflection
Thursday, September 12, 2024
Starliner And International Law
Butch and Suni
Butch Wilmore and Suni Williams are staying busy on the International Space Station as their stay there is extended until early next year. (credit: NASA)
Starliner stranding: commercial space partnerships and international law
by Matthew Ormsbee
Monday, September 9, 2024
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In low Earth orbit, where human ingenuity first meets the unforgiving vacuum of space, government and commercial actors have created a situation that tests not only technological capabilities but also the legal frameworks governing space exploration. US astronauts Suni Williams and Butch Wilmore find themselves in an unprecedented predicament aboard the International Space Station (ISS). Their planned eight-day mission, initially delayed indefinitely due to unexpected technical difficulties with Boeing’s Starliner aircraft, now stretches to an expected eight-month mission aboard the ISS. This scenario is a testament to the inherent risks of space exploration. But it also serves as a critical case study in international space law and the complexities of commercial partnerships in space operations.
While Boeing’s technical difficulties that render the expected return trip indefinitely delayed could be dubbed an “accident,” it is unlikely that this is the sort of mishap the OST envisioned for state assistance.
The predicament of Williams and Wilmore raises several legal and policy considerations. For example, how does international law address the rescue and return of stranded astronauts, if at all? Which obligations do states and private entities have in ensuring the safety and timely return of space travelers? And perhaps most pressingly, how do we navigate the intersection of national interests, commercial capabilities, and international cooperation in the face of such challenges?
Legal authorities
To address the legal landscape relating to this situation, one turns first to the cornerstone of international space law: the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST).[1] This seminal treaty lays the groundwork for international cooperation in space and establishes fundamental principles for space activities. Article V of the OST is particularly relevant to the Williams-Wilmore situation. It stipulates that astronauts are regarded as “envoys of mankind” and that states shall render “all possible assistance” to astronauts in the event of accident, distress, or emergency landing.[2] This provision establishes a clear obligation for international cooperation in ensuring the safety and rescue of astronauts. Yet, the treaty’s language, while emphatic, lacks specificity on the exact nature and extent of this assistance, especially in scenarios involving commercial spacecraft and extended stays on the ISS.
Thankfully, the near-daily reports of the welfare of Williams and Wilmore, including statements from them to the media and loved ones, seem to indicate that the astronauts are disappointed but not in distress. Indeed, the astronauts’ daily routines on the ISS seem to keep them occupied and complacent as Boeing and NASA evaluated possible courses of action. A longer-than-anticipated stay on the ISS, while unintentional, falls outside the purview of a space accident under the OST. And while Boeing’s technical difficulties that render the expected return trip indefinitely delayed could be dubbed an “accident,” it is unlikely that this is the sort of mishap the OST envisioned for state assistance. Thus, absent a clear accident, case of distress, or emergency landing, the OST does not require intervention from other states.
The 1968 Rescue and Return Agreement further elaborates on the rescue and return obligations outlined in the OST.[3] This agreement requires state signatories to take all possible steps to rescue and assist astronauts in distress and promptly return them to the representatives of their launching authority.[4] However, the treaty was conceived in the Cold War era dominated by state-sponsored space missions, and does not explicitly address situations involving commercial spacecraft or extended stays on international space stations. The predicament of Williams and Wilmore does not cleanly fit into the scenarios envisioned by the OST or the Rescue and Return Agreement. The astronauts are not in immediate physical danger, nor have they made an emergency landing on Earth or another celestial body. Instead, they find themselves in a state of limbo, safely aboard the ISS but unable to return to Earth as planned due to issues with the Starliner spacecraft.
This situation highlights a potential gap in international space law. While the spirit of the OST and the Rescue and Return Agreement clearly prioritizes astronaut safety and international cooperation, the specific legal obligations in a case like this remain undefined. The international community does not seem to have a legal obligation to assist in returning Williams and Wilmore to Earth sooner than the monthslong timeline currently projected. Instead, the responsibility appears to lie solely with the US and its commercial partner Boeing.
Other authorities
Beyond the letter of the law, the US must consider the law’s intent and the broader principles of international cooperation in space exploration as well. The OST emphasizes that the exploration and use of outer space should be “carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries.”[5] This principle suggests that all states with the capability to assist in resolving the Starliner predicament and facilitating the astronauts’ return have at least a moral obligation to offer their support. Yet, the practical implementation of such assistance is complicated by the commercial nature of the Starliner project. Boeing, as a private company, is not directly bound by international space law like states. While the US is obligated to ensure Boeing’s compliance with space law under Article VI of the OST, the situation raises questions about the extent to which other states can or should intervene in what is essentially a commercial issue, albeit one with significant international implications.[6]
The international community does not seem to have a legal obligation to assist in returning Williams and Wilmore to Earth sooner than the monthslong timeline currently projected. Instead, the responsibility appears to lie solely with the US and its commercial partner Boeing.
Turning to domestic law, the US Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015 provides some legal context for commercial space activities by the US but does not specifically address scenarios like the current Starliner delay.[7] The act aims to facilitate the growth of the commercial space industry while ensuring compliance with international obligations. However, it does not provide clear guidance on how to balance commercial interests with international obligations in cases of extended astronaut stays due to technical issues. Most importantly, the act encourages US progress in space technology with little regard for progress that moves too quickly—at its peril.
The Starliner problem also brings into focus the role of soft law in space governance. United Nations resolutions, while non-binding, can provide important guidance and reflect international consensus on space-related issues. For instance, UN General Assembly Resolution 68/74 on “Recommendations on National Legislation Relevant to the Peaceful Exploration and Use of Outer Space” encourages states to consider ways to support the sustainability of outer space activities, including through international cooperation.[8] This resolution and others like it underscores the international community’s recognition of the need for cooperative approaches to space challenges, even when not strictly mandated by treaty law.
Commercial actors and ISS governance
Additionally, the involvement of SpaceX—the most prominent commercial entity in space operations—in resolving the situation adds another layer of complexity to the legal landscape.[9] SpaceX is expected to return Williams and Wilmore to Earth in early 2025. As the largest commercial provider of rocket launches to the US government, SpaceX is once again exemplifying private-sector cooperation in addressing difficult problems in space. However, this also raises concerns about potential liability and responsibility. Under the 1972 Liability Convention, for example, states are internationally liable for damage caused by their space objects.[10] In a scenario involving multiple commercial entities, determining the allocation of liability, should it arise, could become a tangled web for all parties.
Moreover, the extended stay of Williams and Wilmore on the ISS brings into play the legal framework governing the station itself. The International Space Station Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) establishes the legal framework for the operation of the ISS, including provisions for crew safety and emergencies.[11] While the IGA does not explicitly address scenarios like the current Starliner debacle and delay, it emphasizes the importance of cooperation among partner agencies in ensuring the safety and well-being of ISS crew members. The parties to the IGA are unlikely to redraft or amend the IGA. Therefore, careful planning to avoid unexpected visits and delays to the ISS is even more important.
The Williams-Wilmore situation also raises important policy considerations regarding US reliance on commercial partners for critical space operations. The Commercial Crew Program, under which Boeing and SpaceX were contracted to develop spacecraft for transporting astronauts to and from the ISS, was designed to reduce costs and foster innovation in the space sector.[12] However, the current predicament highlights the potential risks of this approach, particularly when technical issues arise. From a policy perspective, this situation may prompt a reevaluation of the balance between commercial partnerships and government oversight in space operations. It may lead to calls for more stringent safety regulations, enhanced backup plans, or even a partial return to government-led spacecraft development that is more risk-averse. Still, any policy changes must be carefully considered to avoid stifling the innovation and cost-effectiveness that commercial partnerships can bring to space exploration.
Conclusions
The legal and policy implications of the Williams-Wilmore dilemma extend beyond the immediate concern of their return to Earth. This case sets a precedent for how similar situations may be handled in the future, particularly as commercial space activities continue to expand. It underscores the need for clearer international guidelines on extended astronaut stays and the responsibilities of various actors—states, international organizations, and private companies—in ensuring astronaut safety and timely return. Furthermore, the Starliner problem highlights the importance of developing more comprehensive legal frameworks for commercial space activities. As private companies play an increasingly outsized role in space exploration, there is a growing need for legal clarity on issues such as liability, rescue operations, and the intersection of commercial contracts with international obligations.
From a policy perspective, this situation may prompt a reevaluation of the balance between commercial partnerships and government oversight in space operations.
The Starliner fiasco paints a complex interplay of international space law, national legislation, commercial space policy, and practical considerations of space operations. While existing legal frameworks, primarily the OST and its follow-on treaties, provide a foundation for addressing astronaut safety and international cooperation, they do not offer clear-cut solutions for this specific scenario. The situation calls for a nuanced approach that balances respect for international law, recognition of commercial realities, and a commitment to astronaut safety. It may well serve as a catalyst for the development of more comprehensive legal and policy frameworks to address the evolving landscape of space exploration, particularly as it relates to commercial partnerships and extended space missions.
As the international community watches and waits for a resolution to the Williams-Wilmore situation, this case will certainly have lasting implications for space law and policy. It underscores the need for continued international dialogue and cooperation in space matters as well as the importance of adapting our legal policy frameworks to keep pace with the rapid advancements in space technology and commercial space activities. The safe and expedient return of Williams and Wilmore must remain the paramount concern. How this is achieved, and the precedents set in the process, will shape the future of international space law and commercial space operations for years to come. Our legal and policy frameworks must evolve to ensure that the safety of astronauts and the principles of international cooperation remain at the forefront of our endeavors in the final frontier.
Footnotes
United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA), “The Outer Space Treaty,” UNOOSA, 2021.
Ibid., Art. V.
United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA), “The Rescue Agreement,” UNOOSA, 2021.
Ibid., Arts. 1-4.
OST, Art. I.
OST, Art. VI (stating in relevant part: “The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty.”).
U.S. Congress, “U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act” (2015).
United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 68/74: Recommendations on national legislation relevant to the peaceful exploration and use of outer space (2013).
Kenneth Chang, “NASA Extends Boeing Starliner Astronauts’ Space Station Stay to 2025”, New York Times, Aug. 24, 2024.
United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA), “The Liability Convention,” UNOOSA, 2021..
European Space Agency, International Space Station Legal Framework (1998).
NASA, Commercial Crew Program (2021).
Matthew Ormsbee is an Assistant Professor of Law and the Director of Space Law at the United States Air Force Academy. He earned his LL.M. in air and space law from McGill University in 2023. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force Academy, the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the US Government. PA#: USAFA-DF-2024-604.
NASA And Safety: More Is Better
Starliner CFT capsule
Recovery teams work on the Starliner crew capsule after it landed at White Sands, New Mexico, late Friday night without a crew on board. (credit: NASA/Aubrey Gemignani)
NASA and safety: more is better
by Roger Handberg
Monday, September 9, 2024
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The ongoing crisis with the Starliner has moved in the direction of making crew safety the prime driver. As an organization, NASA has learned that minimizing risks can be disruptive and resisted by some but after three incidents involving loss of crew—the Apollo 1 pad fire, the Challenger loss during liftoff, and the most recent loss of the Columbia during reentry—the agency is no longer willing to take the chance. The previous losses occurred due to identifiable hazards: the warnings were ignored, never came, or were pushed aside by NASA leadership in pursuit of larger organizational goals. Recovery from those disasters took time and a refocus on crew safety.
NASA might not survive another disaster involving crew loss and NASA had an option apparently safer than a Starliner return flight.
Two factors now led to a choice maximizing crew safety. One is simply institutional survival. NASA might not survive another disaster involving crew loss and NASA had an option apparently safer than a Starliner return flight. Having this second, safer flight option vindicated the US Air Force resistance decades ago to designating the Space Shuttle as the sole American flag space carrier. The Air Force resisted what they perceived as NASA dominance, but part of their resistance was the specter of a single-point-failure launch profile. Tragically, the 1986 Challenger launch failure drove their point home. After more than two years, NASA’s return to flight was successful. Having the shuttle solo option removed, the Air Force restarted their ELV flight program. That effort also encountered difficulties with flight failures, but no personnel died.
NASA, in developing the Commercial Crew Program, actively encouraged and funded the program to produce several flight options. The goal was to have a backup if one flight option encountered issues, possibly disrupting service. Ideally, the result is a continuous ability to conduct flight options. The difficulty becomes if the second option encounters difficulties disrupting operations. That occurred briefly this summer when SpaceX suffered two flight anomalies. The first involved a leak in an upper stage of the Falcon 9 that prevented the Starlink spacecraft on board from reaching their proper orbit. That grounded the Falcon 9 for about two weeks in July. The second accident occurred in late August when a booster broke up while descending on its landing barge, halting launches for two days. The delay imposed by the FAA was short in both instances, the latter incident occurred during booster recovery rather than during launch. The FAA was acting based on an evaluation that SpaceX Falcon 9 rockets had a long run of successful launches with only minimal disruption.
Regardless, the situation reinforces the need for alternative launch options. In fact, alternative launch options for payloads exist both domestically and internationally, but what is less available are human passenger carriers, with the Chinese and Russians being the only currently available flight options. For a few reasons, neither is likely to be acceptable to American politicians having just lifted the yoke of Russia as the sole American way to the International Space Station. Other international options are developmental: India or, much later, Europe or possibly Japan. Domestically, Dream Chaser and Blue Origin were earlier competitors who NASA encouraged to continue but did not fund. Both need to demonstrate a capacity to launch successfully then move forward to launching crews. Real consistent development of human access to orbit and beyond demands more than one or two flight options.
For reasons of cost and redundancy, even a two-flight option is suboptimal but at least somewhat of an improvement. Losing one flight option leaves NASA and the commercial human spaceflight market dependent on a single option. The costs may not decrease because the incumbent has no incentive to reduce prices. The longer the delay in developing a second option or a third option means greater incentives for other states to push expansion of their independent options. American prominence in space matters is based on its technological edge, one that is eroding. The world grows more skilled and sophisticated regarding space operations, reducing the American margin of difference.
NASA may need to become reengaged in the pursuit of additional human spaceflight options, not because it wants to do, but because it must if the United States is remain competitive globally and in the future.
NASA must encourage alternatives beyond the two designated flight options. This might involve some funding to possible new entrants. The unknown is always difficult especially when NASA wants to focus on deep space operations, moving out of low Earth orbit. Necessity forces NASA to reengage in developing other human spaceflight options. Most interesting is the NASA response given administrator Bill Nelson’s earlier astronaut experience just before the Challenger accident; safety was always his first instinct. Nelson is not considered a “real” astronaut given the political nature of his flight but it does appear to impact him as if he were such an individual. In fact, his perspective might be even more safety focused since he was not chosen from those considered to have the “right stuff.”
That focus on safety is not a unique view but often neglected due to the pressure of events and concerns for organizational survival. There was active disagreement over the flyback decision based on technical issues but also institutional factors. Boeing is in a difficult position to argue that the crew should come back with the Starliner, but to not do so places Boeing in a position where its efforts to this point are signaling disaster for its long-term space activities. If this flight is not designated as a completed mission certifying the Starliner, the cost that Boeing incurs may be sufficient for it to exit the field. This did not occur in a vacuum for Boeing as it is an organization under stress.
For that reason, NASA decisions here appear more reasonable at the time. The successful return of the Starliner does not change the original calculation especially given that one thruster failed but was not fatal to the return flight. Regardless, NASA may need to become reengaged in the pursuit of additional human spaceflight options, not because it wants to do, but because it must if the United States is remain competitive globally and in the future.
Roger Handberg is a professor of political science at the University of Central Florida.
Wither Starliner?
Starliner descending
The Starliner crew capsule descends under parachutes before landing at White Sands, New Mexico, late Friday night. (credit: NASA)
Whither Starliner?
by Jeff Foust
Monday, September 9, 2024
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For some people in northwestern Mexico and parts of southern Arizona and New Mexico, Starliner appeared as a streak in the evening sky Friday, returning to Earth after more than three months in space. For those watching online on the agency’s new streaming service, NASA+ (the decades-old NASA TV channel having recently been retired), Starliner appeared in infrared camera views, descending under its three parachutes to the desert floor at White Sands Space Harbor in New Mexico, touching down at a minute after midnight Eastern time Saturday.
“For me, one of the really important factors is that we just don’t know how much we can use the thrusters on the way back home before we encounter a problem,” said Bowersox.
The landing concluded the Crew Flight Test (CFT) mission for Starliner, but when technicians opened Starliner’s side hatch after landing, there was no crew inside. NASA astronauts Butch Wilmore and Suni Williams, who launched on Starliner in early June, remained on the International Space Station, spectators to the spacecraft’s return rather than participants.
Nearly two weeks earlier, NASA made the decision to keep the astronauts on the ISS, one that became increasingly likely as the weeks wore on without a resolution to the thruster problems Starliner experienced on its approach to the station (see “Starliner’s uncertain future”, The Space Review, August 12, 2024). Agency leadership decided August 24 to fly Starliner back without a crew, requiring Wilmore and Williams to extend their stay on the ISS through the Crew-9 mission early next year. (A side effect of the decision is removing two astronauts assigned to Crew-9, Zena Cardman and Stephanie Wilson, less than a month before launch to free up seats for Williams and Wilmore,)
Officials said at a briefing announcing the decision that, despites weeks of thruster testing and work on models of the thrusters, they still could not fully understand what was causing thrust levels to drop. “That uncertainty remains in our understanding in the physics going on in the thrusters,” said Jim Free, NASA associate administrator.
The tests had shown that a Teflon component in the reaction control system (RCS) thrusters was heating up, calling it to swell and extrude, blocking the flow of propellant. What was not clear to engineers, though, was how much use of the thrusters would cause a loss of performance, a concern during critical phases of flight like the deorbit burn, where the RCS thrusters maintain attitude control while larger thrusters perform the actual burn.
“For me, one of the really important factors is that we just don’t know how much we can use the thrusters on the way back home before we encounter a problem,” said Ken Bowersox, NASA associate administrator for space operations, at the briefing.
Those discussions among NASA and Boeing personnel took place amid heightened concerns about safety and avoiding a repeat of Challenger and Columbia, when dissenting views were ignored or never expressed.
“I’ve been very hyper-focused lately on this concept of combating organizational silence,” said Russ DeLoach, chief of NASA’s Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, at a briefing a week and a half before the decision. “I recognize that may mean at times we don’t move very fast because we’re getting everything out, and I think you see that at play here.”
At the time there were rumors of heated debates and even formal dissents, but NASA officials said at the earlier briefing that there was no consensus yet about what to do with Starliner and thus nothing to dissent. “It really was, ‘Do you feel like you have all the data you would need now to make a good decision?’” DeLoach recalled. “To me, most people were at, ‘No, we need a little more work.’”
After NASA made the decision to bring back Starliner uncrewed, agency officials said the debates were not nearly as strident as some claimed, with the decision for the uncrewed return being unanimous. “I would not characterize it as heated,” said Steve Stich, NASA commercial crew program manager, at a briefing last week, although he noted there was “some tension in the room” in those discussions. “I wouldn’t say it was a yelling screaming kind of meeting. It was a tense technical discussion.”
After all that, Starliner’s return was almost anticlimactic. The spacecraft undocked from the station at 6:04 pm EDT Friday and swiftly moved away from the ISS, a change from previous procedures intended to simplify the spacecraft’s departure. The spacecraft later executed its deorbit burn and made what Stich called a “bullseye landing” at White Sands.
That return was not without problems. Stich said that two RCS thrusters got hotter than expected during the deorbit burn, but continued to function. Stich said that software that would have turned off malfunctioning thrusters had been disabled for Starliner’s return, but didn’t immediately know if that software would have otherwise turned off the thrusters.
“He expressed to me an intention that they will continue to work the problems once Starliner is back safely,” Nelson said of Boeing’s CEO.
A separate thruster on the crew capsule, one of 12, also malfunctioned, but Stich noted it was of a different design than those on the service module, using a monopropellant and catalyst bed rather than the bipropellant design of the RCS thrusters on the service module. However, a redundant thruster meant no loss of performance for the capsule. A navigation computer struggled to get a lock of GPS signals after emerging from the blackout caused by the plasma created during reentry.
None of those problems would have prevented a safe return for Williams and Wilmore, but agency officials said they had no regrets about their earlier decision to leave them on the station. “I think we made the right decision to not have Butch and Suni on board,” Stich said after landing. “It’s awfully hard for the team, it’s hard for me, to sit here and have a successful landing and be in that position, but it was a test flight and we didn’t have confidence in the certainty of the thruster performance.”
Starliner patch and signatures
Inside the Starliner crew cabin, a Crew Flight Test patch ang signatures of NASA astronauts Butch Wilmore and Suni Williams, who remain on the space station. (credit: NASA/Aubrey Gemignani)
Boeing’s silence and the path to Starliner-1
Notably absent from the discussions about Starliner’s return was Boeing. The company, which had been included in earlier NASA updates about the CFT mission, had not participated in any NASA briefings since late July. The company’s own “Starliner Updates” website was not updated after an August 2 post where the company declared its confidence in the spacecraft until the actual uncrewed return of Starliner Friday night.
That was supposed to change with the post-landing briefing late Friday night, with two company executives— John Shannon, vice president of Boeing Exploration Systems, and Mark Nappi, Boeing vice president and commercial crew program manager—originally scheduled to participate. But those in the briefing room at the Johnson Space Center noted that shortly before the press conference was scheduled to start, the two chairs reserved for the Boeing executives were removed.
“We talked to Boeing. They said, ‘Hey, we’d like NASA to take the press brief.’ They deferred to us,” Joel Montalbano, NASA deputy associate administrator for space operations, said at the briefing when asked about their absence. Those executives were present for the landing at mission control, he added, and spoke with NASA officials after the successful landing. “Boeing is committed to continue their work with us,” he said.
At the August 24 briefing to announce the decision to return Starliner without a crew, NASA administrator Bill Nelson said he spoke with Boeing’s new CEO, Kelly Ortberg, after the agency’s decision. “He expressed to me an intention that they will continue to work the problems once Starliner is back safely,” Nelson said. Asked later in the briefing how confident he was that Starliner would carry astronaut again, he simply replied, “100%.”
However, Ortberg, along with other Boeing executives, have remained quiet publicly about Starliner’s future. After landing, the company released a brief statement, attributed to Nappi: “I want to recognize the work the Starliner teams did to ensure a successful and safe undocking, deorbit, re-entry and landing. We will review the data and determine the next steps for the program.”
Boeing has already taken $1.6 billion in charges against the Starliner program to date, including $125 million in the second quarter this year. That is only likely to grow as the company works to correct the thruster problems and helium leaks Starliner suffered on CFT.
“We’re going to take our time to figure out what we need to do to go fly Starliner-1,” Stich said. “It’s probably too early to think about what the next flight looks like.”
The assumption many in the industry had was that Boeing would have to conduct another test flight, with or without astronauts on board, to demonstrate those problems had been corrected before NASA would certify the vehicle and allow regular crew rotations to begin, starting with a mission designated Starliner-1. That mission is currently planned for no earlier than next August, although NASA is hedging its bets by preparing another SpaceX Crew Dragon mission, Crew-11, in parallel with Starliner-1.
At the post-landing briefing, though, NASA officials suggested Boeing might be able to win certification and proceed directly to Starliner-1 without the expense of another test flight. Stich, for example, discussed the work ahead to replace seals that likely caused the helium leaks, as well as changes to how thrusters are used. “That’s the path to Starliner-1,” he said.
Even without returning with astronauts on board, he estimates that the CFT mission met 85% to 90% of its objectives. “We’re going to take our time to figure out what we need to do to go fly Starliner-1,” he said. “It’s probably too early to think about what the next flight looks like.”
Earlier last week, Stich said it was possible that the thruster issues could be resolved without modifying the thrusters themselves. Instead, NASA and Boeing were looking at ways to modify how they are used to reduce heating that caused the degradation in performance.
“We know the thrusters are working well when we don’t command them in a manner that overheats them and gets the poppet to swell,” he said, referring to the component that was restricting the flow of propellant. That could include, he said, changes to the structures called “doghouses” on the service module that host the thrusters to reduce the heat buildup inside them.
That will take some time to figure out, he noted. “We’ve been entirely focused this summer on understanding what is happening on orbit, trying to decide if we could bring the crew back or not,” Stich said. “What we need to do now is really lay out the overall plan, which we have not had time to do.”
Fincke and Tingle
NASA astronauts Mike Fincke (left) and Scott Tingle look inside Starliner after landing. Both are assigned to Starliner-1, the first operational Starliner mission to the ISS. (credit: NASA/Aubrey Gemignani)
A decade of commercial crew development
Starliner’s uncrewed return comes almost exactly a decade after NASA issued contracts for the development of that spacecraft and SpaceX’s Crew Dragon. In mid-September 2014, NASA announced it selected the two companies for Commercial Crew Transportation Capability, or CCtCap, contracts to cover the final development of the spacecraft as well as uncrewed and crewed test flights. Boeing’s contract was worth $4.2 billion while SpaceX’s came in at $2.6 billion (see “Commercial crew and commercial engines”, The Space Review, September 22, 2014.)
“From a commercial standpoint, we have two crew vehicles,” said Montalbano. “Is it slower than what we expected? Absolutely. It is slower, but we’re making progress.”
A decade later, the two CCtCap companies are in very different positions. Crew Dragon has become the kind of success that NASA dreamed of for commercial crew. After a successful crewed test flight to the ISS in the summer of 2020, Crew Dragon has now flown eight crew rotation missions to the ISS, ending NASA’s reliance on Russia’ Soyuz (although NASA and Roscosmos still swap seats between the spacecraft for operational purposes.)
In addition, Crew Dragon has won additional business. It has flown four private astronaut missions, three to the ISS for Axiom Space and a standalone mission, Inspiration4. By the end of this month, SpaceX may have two more Crew Dragon launches under its belt: the Crew-9 mission for NASA and the Polaris Dawn private astronaut mission (see “Polaris’s dawn”, The Space Review, September 3, 2014.)
Boeing, by contrast, is clearly struggling. CFT launched four years after SpaceX’s Demo-2 and, unlike that earlier mission, could not bring its astronauts back. It is increasingly unclear if Boeing will be able to fly the six crew rotation missions available under its CCtCap contract before the ISS is retired around the end of the decade, and the company has not announced any commercial deals for Starliner other than potential participation in the Orbital Reef space station.
So does NASA feel that the commercial crew program, with that mixed bag, has been a success? NASA officials at the post-landing briefing late Friday night weren’t particularly reflective, perhaps because of concentrating on the specifics of getting Starliner back over the last several weeks.
“From a commercial standpoint, we have two crew vehicles,” said Montalbano. “Is it slower than what we expected? Absolutely. It is slower, but we’re making progress.”
“I would say we've done a great job at fielding two transportation systems in fairly record time,” said Stich. “You’re starting to see that market get fostered with non-NASA missions, which is what we want.”
“When we started, it was kind of an experiment,” he added of the commercial crew program. “But now, we’re starting to see the benefits of the investments by both NASA and our partners.” Those benefits, like the achievements of the companies, remain unequally distributed, with long-term implications for NASA and the broader space industry.
Jeff Foust (jeff@thespacereview.com) is the editor and publisher of The Space Review, and a senior staff writer with SpaceNews. He also operates the Spacetoday.net web site. Views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone.
Book Review: "The Wrong Stuff" How The Soviet Space Program Crashed And Burned
book cover
Review: The Wrong Stuff
by Jeff Foust
Monday, September 9, 2024
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The Wrong Stuff: How the Soviet Space Program Crashed and Burned
by John Strausbaugh
PublicAffairs, 2024
hardcover, 272 pp.
ISBN 978-1-5417-0334-6
US$30.00
On Wednesday, a Soyuz rocket is scheduled to lift off from the Baikonur Cosmodrome, sending the Soyuz MS-26 spacecraft to the International Space Station. It is a routine crew rotation mission to the station, but the launch itself is not: it will be just the tenth orbital launch so far this year by Russia. China has performed four times as many launches this year and the United States about ten times as many. Russia is on a pace for its lowest launch total in decades this year.
Russia has had its share of triumphs in space, like its string of firsts in the early years of the Age, but also tragedies and tribulations. In The Wrong Stuff, John Strausbaugh argues that the Soviet space program of the 1960s in particular should be remembered more for its failures than its successes.
Without new insights into the Soviet space program, the purpose of the book appears to be to summarize and synthesize what others have written. It is also, it seems, intended to sensationalize.
The book seeks to be a condensed history of the Soviet/Russian space program, starting from its postwar origins developing rockets as ballistic missiles, although the primary focus (particularly after discussing Sputnik) is on the Soviet human space program in the 1960s. Those missions racked up an impressive series of firsts, but also flirted with disaster many times in a manner Strausbaugh suggests was reckless.
If you’re familiar with that era of Soviet space history, you won’t find much new in this book. That’s because, in large part, Strausbaugh relies on secondary sources like other history books on the era, based on the slender two-page bibliography; the closest things to primary sources are Boris Chertok’s Rockets and People and Yuri Gagarin’s autobiography. The book also lacks images, endnotes, and even an index, strangely enough.
Without new insights into the Soviet space program, the purpose of the book appears to be to summarize and synthesize what others have written. It is also, it seems, intended to sensationalize: the book goes into great detail about the drinking and sexual escapades of Russian cosmonauts, for example. That approach extends to the writing style, where Strausbaugh says that Khrushchev was “jonesing” for another chance to “troll the Americans” with another space first. And the program’s chief designer, Sergei Korolev, didn’t just snatch victory from the jaws of defeat with one mission, he “pried open the jaws of Defeat, stuck his head in, reached all the way down Defeat’s throat, and yanked out Victory.” One is surprised he didn’t kick Defeat in the shins as well.
There are also some odd errors in the book. In the chapter talking about Valentina Tereshkova’s flight, he references America’s “Mercury 13” and claims that none of them went to space: Wally Funk, he argues, did not go to space on a Blue Origin New Shepard suborbital flight in 2021 because it “peaked at about seventy-six kilometers, shy of the one hundred kilometers conventionally considered the edge of space.” That flight, in fact, reached an altitude of 107 kilometers, well above the Kármán Line. Late in the book, he claims that a Kazakh businessman named Dauren Musa owned the Baikonur Cosmodrome and that the Russians paid rent to him. Musa instead claims to own an abandoned Buran shuttle there (although it is true that he reportedly offered to hand it over to Roscosmos in exchange for the skull of a 19th century Kazakh leader.)
If you are completely unfamiliar with the history of the Soviet/Russian human spaceflight program, The Wrong Stuff will at least provide you with an introduction, particularly of its early history. If you’re reading this publication, though, that’s likely not the case; the book may instead fail to make it off the launch pad, with few novel insights about either the program’s past or its uncertain future.
Jeff Foust (jeff@thespacereview.com) is the editor and publisher of The Space Review, and a senior staff writer with SpaceNews. He also operates the Spacetoday.net web site. Views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone.
Wednesday, September 11, 2024
Tuesday, September 10, 2024
Ancient Egypt's First Observatory Found
Star Struck
Archeologists recently uncovered what is believed to be ancient Egypt’s first known astronomical observatory, which they hailed as the “first and largest” of its kind.
Discovered in the ancient city of Buto, in the northern Kafr El-Sheikh governorate, the site dates back to the sixth century BCE and was initially mistaken for a temple because of its peculiar layout.
It had an L-shaped structure with a traditional east-facing pylon entrance that measured more than 9,100 square feet.
But the presence of key artifacts – most notably a large sundial – confirmed the site’s true purpose as an observatory.
“Everything we found shattered our expectations,” said Hossam Ghonim, head of the Egyptian archeological mission, in an interview with Live Science.
Ghonim and his team explained that the ancient building faced east and was aligned with the sunrise where a sky observer, known as a “smn pe,” would have stood to monitor celestial movements.
They added that the observatory has a carving of the “smn pe” facing the rising Sun, which symbolizes the ancient civilization’s close relationship with the cosmos.
But what stood out was a slanted stone sundial, which used the Sun’s shadows to track time, from sunrise to sunset. The researchers also found a “merkhet,” a timekeeping tool the Egyptians used to organize their solar calendar and schedule religious and agricultural events.
The findings provide some insights into how Egyptians used astronomy to determine the solar calendar, religious ceremonies, and the agricultural year. Statues of gods found around the observatory, such as Horus and Wadjet – the latter being a serpent goddess protective of the king – emphasized the spiritual and scientific roles of the site.
Perhaps most intriguing was the discovery of a stone mat inscribed with astronomical depictions of sunrise and sunset across three seasons.
“The ancient Egyptians envisioned the Earth and sky as two mats,” Ghonim said. “They mapped the sky on the ‘Themet Hrt’ – the sky mat – and the ‘Themet Ghrt,’ or Earth mat, represented their calendar, marking events like the Nile flood and harvest. This is the first inscribed stone mat of its kind ever discovered.”
Mohamed Ismail Khaled, secretary-general of Egypt’s Supreme Council of Antiquities, called the observatory a testament to ancient Egypt’s “prowess and skill in astronomy,” Artnet added.
The discovery further attests to humanity’s fascination and quest to learn more about the cosmos, even in the early days.
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