The Future of Space Exploration: Beyond Mars

Target Earth 1954 Film in English, Richard Denning, Kathleen Crowley, Vi...

After 55 Years, This Banned TWILIGHT ZONE Episode Can FINALLY Be Shown

Forgotten 60s Sci Fi Movies That Put Today’s Blockbusters to Shame

Man Vs Space (1959)

The Omega Speedmaster Has Been The Official Wristwatch of NASA For 60 Years!

60 Years Since NASA Qualified the Omega Speedmaster Inbox National Air and Space Museum Unsubscribe Fri, Jun 27, 2:21 PM (14 hours ago) to me Smithsonian's National Air and Space Museum A watch photographed against a dark background June marks the 60th anniversary of NASA’s announcement that the Speedmaster was space qualified for human spaceflight. These chronograph watches have performed exceedingly well outside the spacecraft, from Ed White's first American spacewalk on Gemini IV, to the most recent spacewalks by Anne McClain and Nicole Ayers in 2025. The Smithsonian’s collection of chronographs includes 63 Omega Speedmasters and Speedmaster Professionals, the vast majority of which arrived at the Museum in the mid-1970s following the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project. In the spring of 1977, 55 chronographs were offered to and formally accepted by National Air and Space Museum curators. Documents also reflect the arrival of the hand-carried shipment. Astronaut wearing a watch while inside of a spacecraft. Buzz Aldrin wearing his Omega Speedmaster watch on Apollo 11. As the current Museum curator for astronaut chronographs, Jennifer Levasseur has served as their caretaker since late 2009. Through the opportunity to undertake a conservation project with the Omega Museum from 2013 to 2018, she sought to understand their greater significance to the material culture of astronaut life in space and the wearers of them in their work at NASA. Read the new blog DONATE Ignite Tomorrow National Air and Space Museum 6th St. and Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, DC 20560 Steven F. Udvar-Hazy Center 14390 Air and Space Museum Parkway, Chantilly, VA 20151 Contact Us Unsubscribe Privacy Policy

ADRIANNE PALICKI: Exposed on Smallville, Finding Normal with Celiac Dise...

ADRIANNE PALICKI Explains Why THE ORVILLE Only Filmed 36 Episodes in 6 Y...

Is China REALLY winning the race to the Moon against NASA and SpaceX?

Tesla Called Me During my First Robotaxi Ride...

The South Korean Space Program

Nuri launch South Korea’s KSLV-II, or Nuri, rocket lifts off on its third flight in 2023. (credit: KARI) Propelling and navigating South Korea’s space ambitions by Jennifer Hong Whetsell and Seokjin Yun Monday, June 23, 2025 As the global space economy enters a new era marked by both competition and collaboration, South Korea is emerging as a serious contender with ambitions to lead. Once constrained by Cold War-era missile restrictions and dependent on foreign partnerships, South Korea is now steadily building sovereign space capabilities as a core pillar of its national strategy. With the creation of the Korea Aerospace Administration (KASA) in 2024, Seoul is signaling a decisive shift toward integrating space into its broader goals for technological innovation, economic growth, and national security. Seoul is signaling a decisive shift toward integrating space into its broader goals for technological innovation, economic growth, and national security. This article begins by examining the strategic context driving South Korea’s expanding space ambitions and the institutional reforms that are reshaping its approach to space. It then provides an in-depth assessment of two flagship projects: the KSLV-III rocket and the Korean Positioning System (KPS) satellite constellation. Both are key to elevating South Korea’s standing in the international space arena, yet each face distinct technological and bureaucratic challenges. For the KSLV-III, the transition to a public-private partnership model has been hindered by intellectual property disputes and the recent pivot toward reusable, methane-based engines. The KPS project grapples with project management inefficiencies and design setbacks that threaten to delay deployment. There are also growing calls to expand the system’s scope: adopting a more ambitious multi-orbital architecture to counter regional security threats and advance commercial applications. This article concludes by exploring how South Korea is responding to these hurdles: through bold technical revisions, governance reforms to better manage civil and commercial actors, and a more proactive role in shaping international norms and partnerships. Background Asia is emerging as the forefront of the modern space race, and South Korea is determined to lead it. South Korea’s pursuit of indigenous space capabilities has evolved from a Cold War-era security necessity into a multifaceted national strategy that integrates defense, technological innovation, and economic development. Historically constrained by missile range guidelines established in the 1970s and its accession to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 2001, South Korea faced limits on domestic rocket development and collaboration with non-MTCR countries. Today, those constraints have become overly prohibitive, as Seoul views sovereign space capabilities as vital to deterring North Korea’s military threats, expanding regional influence, and gaining a competitive edge in the global space economy. International space competition is fierce, with countries racing to advance key technologies such as positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT); satellite communications; and Earth observation. These advancements are expected to fuel massive economic growth, with projections estimating the global space economy could reach $1.8 trillion by 2035, more than triple its 2023 value. South Korea aims to position itself among the top five global space powers by 2045 by aligning its space ambitions with leadership in AI, semiconductors, and next-generation telecommunications. Simultaneously, Seoul is leveraging space collaboration to strengthen its alliance with the United States and bolster its regional standing. The establishment of the Korea Aerospace Administration (KASA) in 2024 marks a turning point, establishing a centralized authority to coordinate research and development (R&D), space policy, international engagement, and industrial partnerships. This institutional consolidation supports ambitious goals such as landing spacecraft on the Moon by 2032 and on Mars by 2045. South Korea believes that two landmark projects are crucial in achieving these objectives: the next-generation KSLV-III rocket (KSLV: Korea Space Launch Vehicle) and the Korean Positioning System (KPS) constellation, both led by the government-funded Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI). However, as South Korea strives to keep pace with rapid technological innovation, it must overcome the challenge of integrating commercial actors into its traditionally state-dominated rocket development program, while also managing the complex demands of large-scale, civilian-led programs like KPS. This moment will serve as a critical test of KASA’s ability to foster effective public-private partnerships and demonstrate robust project management and institutional oversight: capabilities that will define the next phase of South Korea’s ascent in space. KSLV: Building a launchpad for South Korea’s space competitiveness South Korea’s recent success of the Nuri (KSLV-II) rocket, making it the latest nation to achieve independent orbital launch capability, has raised expectations for its emergence as a potential regional space hub for Asia. This milestone comes at a time when the region is benefiting from the “democratization” of space—a trend marked by lower barriers to launch and satellite operations, which has enabled new countries and commercial players to participate in space activities that were once limited to global superpowers. Yet, South Korea’s rockets still have a long way to go to become economically competitive. Compared to regional peers like Japan, China, and India, whose space programs began decades earlier, South Korea remains a relative latecomer. It now faces the challenge of catching up just as Asia’s space sector is experiencing rapid transformation driven by technological advancements and increasing commercial space activities. Decades of dependence on foreign partners, compounded by export controls and shifting geopolitical alliances, have underscored the risks of relying on others for access to space. To establish itself as a collaborative leader in Asia’s evolving commercial space ecosystem, South Korea must develop a globally competitive and commercially viable launch sector. Japan’s trajectory in commercial space launch offers a compelling blueprint. In 2012, Japan conducted its very first commercial launch of a foreign satellite: South Korea’s KOMPSAT-3, a multipurpose Earth observation satellite, aboard the H-IIA rocket. That launch marked Japan’s entry into the competitive commercial launch market and was followed by broader cooperation with regional partners, such as Vietnam and the Philippines, through technology transfer and data-sharing initiatives. In contrast, as a latecomer to the market, South Korea has so far focused primarily on using its rocket launches for technology validation and has yet to launch a foreign payload as of 2025. Capturing a share of the growing commercial space market will require lowering launch costs through innovation, particularly via reusable rockets and innovative fuels that can carry heavier payloads. These innovations have allowed companies like SpaceX to achieve economies of scale in low Earth orbit (LEO), or below 2,000 kilometers, which has become the focal point of commercial expansion due to its relative accessibility and affordability. Lower launch costs are not just fueling satellite deployments, but are also laying the groundwork for the coming “space-for-space” economy, where demand for orbital infrastructure—habitats, labs, factories—will soar. However, access to higher-value orbits, such as geosynchronous orbits (about 35,786 kilometers) and lunar transfer orbits, requires significantly more powerful rockets with greater payload capacity. Despite progress, South Korea’s space ambitions face persistent structural challenges rooted in geography and economics. The country’s high-latitude launch site lacks the equatorial boost that countries closer to the Equator enjoy, which provides fuel efficiency via the Earth’s rotational speed. Additionally, South Korea’s geographic proximity to densely populated neighboring countries, such as China, Japan, and the Philippines, restricts launch angles, requiring careful trajectory planning to avoid potential debris fallout. To overcome these constraints, South Korea must invest heavily in propulsion technologies and precision engineering: investments that carry uncertain commercial returns. Some experts suggest that instead of prioritizing independent launch capabilities, South Korea should focus on complementing the space activities of established partners like the United States and Japan, which could offer more immediate returns and strengthen Seoul’s role within the broader regional and global space ecosystem. Nevertheless, the drive for autonomous launch capabilities runs deep in South Korea’s history and strategic outlook, rooted in the country’s broader experience of navigating security challenges and asserting national sovereignty. Decades of dependence on foreign partners, compounded by export controls and shifting geopolitical alliances, have underscored the risks of relying on others for access to space. Notably, during the development of KSLV-I, South Korea relied heavily on Russian technology and launch services, but this partnership was abruptly severed following the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian War in 2022. That rupture highlighted the fragility of external arrangements and reaffirmed the strategic logic of sovereign launch capabilities. By mastering independent access to space, Seoul aims to make its own security decisions, safeguard critical satellite infrastructure, and deploy assets without bottlenecks in foreign launch services. Yet, South Korea’s technological edge risks dulling as the Nuri (KSLV-II) rocket’s launch cadence slows to a crawl. Although Nuri’s third launch in 2023 marked a historical milestone, the fourth launch is not scheduled until November 2025, marking a 2.5-year gap. This sluggish pace threatens to erode hard-won technical expertise, as engineers and private firms struggle to maintain specialized workforces and institutional knowledge in the absence of consistent launch activities. In the global space launch market, momentum is critical; extended intervals between missions can sap both confidence and capital, jeopardizing future viability. This challenge becomes more acute as South Korea eyes the next leap to the KSLV-III rocket. Outlined in the country’s Fourth Space Development Promotion Plan (2022), the KSLV-III is intended to triple LEO payload capacity and enable a domestically developed lunar lander mission by 2032. The plan also envisions public-private partnerships to transfer launch capabilities to the commercial sector, reflecting a global pivot from state-led civil space programs to commercially driven ventures. Without a faster launch cadence, a robust framework for public-private collaboration, and a clear path to economic competitiveness, Seoul risks being left behind—not just in the race for the Moon, but in the broader contest to shape the future of space. But the transition to a public-private model is already testing the limits of South Korea’s space ecosystem. KSLV-III’s development has gotten off to a rocky start, as relations between KARI and Hanwha Aerospace—the defense industry powerhouse contracted to lead system integration—have soured due to an intellectual property (IP) rights dispute. Hanhwa, citing its significant financial and technical investment in Korea's next-generation launch vehicle program, has advocated for joint IP ownership, while KARI insists that exclusive rights belong to the public sector due to government funding. These dynamics unfold as the international space landscape continues to evolve. In the US, debates over whether to prioritize the Moon or Mars in human exploration have resurfaced. At the fourth US-Korea Civil Space Dialogue in April 2024, joint goals for Moon and Mars exploration were discussed explicitly, underscoring the pressure on Seoul to keep pace with its partners and competitors alike. Seoul’s own timeline to reach the Moon looks increasingly tight, especially as the global conversation shifts toward Mars and beyond. Without a faster launch cadence, a robust framework for public-private collaboration, and a clear path to economic competitiveness, Seoul risks being left behind—not just in the race for the Moon, but in the broader contest to shape the future of space. Adapting at full thrust in a rapidly evolving space environment Starting from 2025, Hanhwa Aerospace will assume systems integrator responsibilities from KARI for Nuri’s fourth launch, marking a pivotal step in South Korea’s shift toward a public-private partnership model in space. This move signals a broader effort to accelerate the nation’s launch schedule and build commercial capacity. KASA has already committed to ramping up launch frequency, pledging to increase the number of missions beyond the planned sixth launch in 2027 to as many as nine launches by 2030, aiming for at least one launch per year. Government support for expanded Nuri operations is also growing. The Korean Ministry of Defense recently proposed using Nuri to deploy two additional military satellites, which would further increase demand and solidify the rocket’s role in national security. This strong institutional backing is promising, but it also highlights the need to carefully coordinate the transition to commercial leadership. Ongoing debates within KASA reflect this tension, particularly over whether future launches should be managed through formal contracts rather than relying on KASA’s discretionary budget, which could strain other agency projects. These discussions highlight the differing priorities between bureaucratic actors, who emphasize national objectives, and personnel with private sector backgrounds, who prioritize commercial sustainability and long-term market viability. Ultimately, the success of Nuri’s upcoming fourth through sixth launches will be crucial not only for demonstrating the rocket’s reliability but also for bridging the gap between public and private stakeholders and advancing a unified, sustainable vision for South Korea’s space future. At the same time, KASA has also been cautiously dipping its toes into the world of reusable rockets. In September 2024, the agency announced initial plans for a lightweight reusable rocket capable of delivering 500 kilograms to LEO, separate from the heavier, single-use KSLV-III. While a reusable engine would be a major achievement, the proposal drew criticism for lacking the payload capacity of the heavy-lift, reusable rockets that increasingly dominate the global market. In a significant policy shift, the Third National Space Council in February 2025 greenlit design changes to the KSLV-III, formally integrating reusability into South Korea’s national space transportation strategy. The program has now pivoted from improving Nuri’s kerosene-based engines to developing a reusable methane-powered launch vehicle. However, this shift introduces new risks. In April, the Ministry of Science and Information and Communication Technology determined that the proposed methane-based redesign did not meet the criteria for a “special evaluation,” a streamlined approval process for plan modifications. As a result, KASA was required to submit the project for a full feasibility reassessment through the Ministry of Economy and Finance, a more rigorous and time-consuming process that may take six to nine months to complete. The evolution of the Nuri program, the contested development of KSLV-III, and the ambitious pivot toward reusable methane-based rockets reflect a nation trying to redefine its space identity amid growing international stakes. The situation is further complicated by the ongoing intellectual property dispute between Hanhwa Aerospace and KARI. To bridge the conflict, KASA launched an internal review in October 2024 to explore models for intellectual property sharing and agreements based on international best practices. Although KASA had previously promised to establish clear guidelines by September 2025, the recent shift to reusability may deepen the rift between KARI and Hanhwa. That company has expressed interest in participating in the revised KSLV-III design, but these changes may prompt a new round of bidding, inviting fresh competition from others, including Korean aerospace giant Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI). Notably, KAI previously withdrew from the KSLV-III bid to focus on its own reusable rockets, but the KSLV-III’s new objectives could change its strategic calculus. As a result, all research and development activities have effectively paused. Despite the challenges, South Korea is not alone in facing growing pains as it builds a vibrant commercial space sector. A useful parallel can be found in NASA’s experience in the early 2000s, when the agency faced contractor disputes over resupply missions to the International Space Station. Kistler Aerospace initially secured the contract in 2004, but SpaceX—then a relatively unknown startup—successfully contested the decision through a Government Accountability Office complaint. NASA’s response was to start the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) program in 2006, which tied funding to technical milestones and helped foster a thriving US commercial launch sector KASA is now trying to emulate a similar commercial model as it advances its next-generation launch systems. To succeed, it must overcome critical challenges in governance, public-private collaboration, and industrial scalability. The evolution of the Nuri program, the contested development of KSLV-III, and the ambitious pivot toward reusable methane-based rockets reflect a nation trying to redefine its space identity amid growing international stakes. South Korea must maintain momentum, cohesion, and stakeholder alignment to realize its space ambitions and secure a lasting role in the emerging space order. KPS: A guiding star for the new space race The Korea Positioning System (KPS) stands as another flagship project, designed to provide regional satellite navigation coverage akin to Japan’s Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) and India’s NavIC. Once operational, KPS will offer secure, independent, and highly precise positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) services across the Korean Peninsula, Southeast Asia, Australia, and New Zealand. KPS is engineered to offer significant technological advantages to the long-standing US Global Positioning System (GPS). In South Korea, today’s GPS accuracy can deviate by as much as 20 meters, making it insufficient for next-generation applications like autonomous vehicles, urban air mobility (UAM), and automated ports. By integrating KPS with GPS, positioning accuracy could be improved to as little as 2.5 centimeters, unlocking new markets for innovative, navigation-dependent industries. Security concerns are equally central to KPS’s development. North Korea’s frequent GPS jamming campaigns have exposed the risks of overdependence on foreign systems. KPS is being developed to supplement US signals, a critical capability for military operations in South Korea’s mountainous terrain and dense urban environments, where signal degradation is a constant risk. KPS will also play a crucial role in Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) in the Indo-Pacific, an area that depends on integrated communication, surveillance, and navigation capabilities. By providing enhanced navigation services, KPS can significantly strengthen MDA efforts not only for Korea but also for other countries in the region. Security concerns are equally central to KPS’s development. North Korea’s frequent GPS jamming campaigns have exposed the risks of overdependence on foreign systems. Despite its strategic promise, KPS has encountered significant setbacks. A critical “design failure” during the preliminary design review had delayed the program by approximately 20 months, pushing the expected launch from 2027 to 2029. Although KASA has promised to meet its original deadline of finishing the constellation by 2035, criticism has mounted over the agency’s project management. Observers have pointed to a lack of a dedicated project manager, limited multi-agency coordination experience, and insufficient oversight mechanisms as key shortcomings. Beyond the timeline concerns, experts have questioned whether the KPS architecture is sufficiently ambitious. The current plan includes eight satellites—three in GEO and five in inclined GEO, all positioned approximately 36,000 kilometers above Earth. However, repeated jamming of GPS signals, which have disrupted civilian aviation and maritime activity, has prompted calls for additional navigation satellites in LEO. Such navigation satellites, operating at around 500 kilometers, would provide stronger, more resilient signals, enhancing both commercial and military applications, from indoor drones and UAMs flying through tunnels to military operations in trenches. Mapping out new frontiers head-on Despite these setbacks, South Korea now has a strategic opportunity to reform its organizational approach to space programs and develop a comprehensive strategy to meet its broader objectives. One immediate step is the restructuring of the KPS. Responsibility for KPS is being shifted from an independent project team to direct oversight by the KARI administrator, which could help solve stove-piping and improve coordination across KARI divisions and with industrial stakeholders. Although independent teams were originally created to shield projects from frequent leadership changes—KARI administrators rotate every three years—this structure has resulted in long-standing problems of accountability and integration, also evident in the Nuri rocket program. While the 20-month delay in KPS development will likely slow strategic timelines, it also provides South Korea with space to reassess its ambitions. In response, KASA’s 2025 Satellite Strategy outlines plans for a feasibility study on a multi-orbital PNT system, including LEO satellites, with a test launch targeted for 2035. This signals a willingness to pursue more resilient and scalable solutions beyond the current GEO and inclined GEO constellation designs. In the meantime, South Korea is deepening its operational partnership with the United States to bridge capability gaps, especially as reliance on the US GPS system remains critical. However, the challenges facing KPS extend beyond hardware delays. Equally important is the need to develop the human and institutional expertise required to operate and seamlessly integrate space assets into joint military command-and-control structures. Although the US-ROK alliance has long enabled joint operations, effective space-domain integration is a relatively new frontier that demands specialized expertise, from satellite operations to data fusion and secure communications. This close cooperation with the United States is cultivating a nuanced understanding of shared threats and strengthening both diplomatic and operational awareness. Most importantly, South Korea is gaining invaluable hands-on experience as it works to build its own autonomous space operations capabilities and to utilize KPS as a cornerstone for national security in the years ahead. Increased exposure to US space operations and coordinated responses to PNT attacks is helping South Korea develop a deeper understanding of the risks involved, along with the technical and human expertise required for effective space operations. These joint exercises provide practical training in detecting and responding to space threats while also fostering expertise in satellite command-and-control, rapid decision-making under pressure, and secure data transmission. South Korea can refine the design, operational procedures, and security protocols of KPS, ensuring the system is robust and resilient. Not only does this strengthen the alliance’s collective response capabilities, but it also empowers Seoul with the expertise and confidence necessary to independently develop, deploy, and operate an autonomous PNT system for military use. Ultimately, KPS represents far more than a technical upgrade: it is a foundational capability for Korea’s national security, economic competitiveness, and future presence in both terrestrial and lunar space domains. A key driver of this operational integration is South Korea’s growing partnership with US Space Forces Korea (SPACEFOR-KOR), established in 2022 to embed space-domain expertise within the alliance. In 2025, two major joint exercises were especially noteworthy. In March, SPACEFOR-KOR became the first US component command to conduct a full-scale Polaris Hammer exercise, an exercise to enable component field commands to practice operational planning, refine command-and-control procedures, and clarify command relationships. Held alongside the annual Freedom Shield exercise with participation from South Korean Air Force personnel, this event centered on integrating space capabilities to advance Korean theater campaign objectives and developing streamlined operational processes to enable seamless interoperability between US and Korean forces. Complementing these advancements, the Polaris Lynx joint tabletop exercise held in May addressed North Korea’s evolving space threats by focusing on deterring jamming and preparing for future hostile satellite maneuvers targeting GPS infrastructure. During the event, both sides analyzed recent GPS jamming incidents and hostile satellite maneuver scenarios to refine diplomatic and military countermeasures, preparing for present and emerging dangers to PNT systems. Beyond the US-ROK alliance, international cooperation represents an underutilized avenue for advancing South Korea’s space agenda. One important venue for such collaboration is the United Nations’ International Committee on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (ICG), which brings together countries and organizations to coordinate the world’s major satellite navigation systems. Within the ICG, the Providers’ Forum serves as the main platform for coordinating compatibility and interoperability among the world’s global navigation satellite system (GNSS) providers. In 2025, South Korea may join the Providers Forum, aiming to stand alongside the United States, China, the EU, Russia, India, and Japan. Membership would ensure South Korea has a direct voice in shaping GNSS signal standards and helping to secure its place in the competitive GNSS landscape. Although no consensus was reached regarding South Korea’s 2024 membership request, hosting the 2025 Annual Meeting of the ICG this October in Busan offers a prime opportunity to build momentum and demonstrate effective international space policy leadership, perhaps securing entrée to the Providers Forum in the process. The meeting comes at a pivotal moment in GNSS governance, as the focus expands to lunar PNT services—essential for everything from robotic and human surface operations to broader lunar infrastructure. The ICG recommended establishing a fifth Working Group, Working Group-Lunar (WG-L), to support interoperable, compatible, and accessible lunar PNT systems. Recent demonstrations, such as the February 2025 LuGRE experiment, have shown that existing constellations like GPS and Europe’s Galileo can be adapted for lunar navigation. The United States, EU, and Japan are already collaborating on the Lunar Augmented Navigation Service (LANS) under the LunaNet framework, aimed at supporting interoperable robotic and human surface operations on the Moon. KASA has expressed interest in joining these efforts and is conducting preliminary research on a Korea Lunar Positioning System (LPS) that could extend KPS capabilities to the cislunar environment. Ultimately, KPS represents far more than a technical upgrade: it is a foundational capability for Korea’s national security, economic competitiveness, and future presence in both terrestrial and lunar space domains. KASA’s effectiveness as the lead agency for research, development, and international engagement in this project is now being tested. With ongoing project management challenges, delays, and an evolving North Korean threat, KASA must manage internal stakeholder cohesion, accelerate development of multi-orbital architectures, and seize diplomatic opportunities, such as the 2025 ICG meeting, to shape the evolving norms of global and lunar navigation governance. Conclusion South Korea’s space program stands at a pivotal crossroads. The country has achieved notable milestones, becoming one of the few countries with independent orbital launch capabilities and advancing flagship initiatives like the KSLV-III and KPS systems. Yet, sustaining this progress will require addressing a range of systemic challenges, including technical delays, interagency friction, and questions about commercial readiness. As KASA works to modernize its governance structures, develop reusable launch technologies, and deepen international partnerships, the imperative is clear: ambitions must be matched by timely and effective execution. Encouragingly, South Korea’s relatively late entry into the commercial space race offers a distinct advantage. Unencumbered by legacy systems or entrenched industrial practices, the country is well-positioned to leapfrog older models and learn from the experiences of others. As a result, Seoul is better positioned to adapt to the dramatic technological and geopolitical shifts now reshaping the global space sector. The decisions made in this formative decade will determine not only South Korea’s role in the space economy but also its capacity to shape the emerging international order beyond Earth. The authors would like to express sincere gratitude to Michael Mazza and Dr. Svetla Ben-Itzhak for their valuable comments and constructive feedback. Jennifer Hong Whetsell is senior director at the Institute for Indo-Pacific Security (IIPS), formerly known as the Project 2049 Institute. Seokjin Yun is a research intern at the Institute for Indo-Pacific Security (IIPS), formerly known as the Project 2049 Institute.

How Should Lunar Infrastructure Be Establsihed?

Lunar base How should lunar infrastructure be established, and what would it be used for? (credit: ESA/P. Carril) Strategies for lunar development by Jeff Foust Monday, June 23, 2025 For advocates of lunar development, these are uncertain times. NASA’s Artemis lunar exploration campaign, which had seemed like a foundation on which a sustained lunar presence for research and commercial activities, is at an inflection point as the White House proposes terminating many elements of the effort and turning them over to commercial capabilities in ways the agency has yet to define. The administration also now appears more focused on Mars (which may or may not survive Elon Musk’s departure from the administration’s good graces) with proposed major investments in Mars, potentially at the expense of a sustained presence at the Moon. Figuring out to sustain a human presence on the Moon—not so much technically but economically—has been a challenge that long predates Artemis. “Governments change, budgets change. Is that really a reliable, sustainable model?” asked Hoyt Davidson of Near Earth LLC during a panel discussion over the weekend at the National Space Society’s International Space Development Conference (ISDC) in Orlando, Florida. “Governments change, budgets change. Is that really a reliable, sustainable model?” asked Davidson. Even if NASA did lead a lunar base, he said, how willing would other countries be to serve as “second-class citizens” in an outpost, he asked. On the other hand, a more commercial approach might lead to versions of company towns, he said, which has its own problems. “No one wants to live in a company town.” The panel he was on was examining a different approach called the Lunar Development Cooperative, or LDC. The concept is the brainchild of Michael Castle-Miller, who has worked in international development projects known as “special jurisdictions,” like ports and trade zones, set up to stimulate economic growth in a region. He got interested in the Moon six years ago attending another ISDC. “We started talking about a framework that would borrow some of the tools and things that I work on on Earth to support a lunar economy,” he said. He and some others have spent the last several years fleshing out how those terrestrial approaches could be used on the Moon, which now take the form of the LDC concept. “The LDC will fund the development and public services for anyone operating on the Moon who becomes a member,” he said. Membership would be open to both governments and companies, and those who join would have to agree to certain rules to support sustainable activities on the Moon. “We want to make the LDC humanity’s holding company for the Moon,” he said, with shares in it available to almost anyone. One benefit of the LDC is financing for that lunar infrastructure. “This structure allows for blended financing,” he explained, an approach used on Earth for seaports and similar large infrastructure projects. “Sovereigns are lowering the risk for high-risk, high-cost infrastructure that doesn’t produce a return on investment for a long period of time. That unlocks a lot more private capital to be invested.” The benefits of the LDC, they argue, go beyond financing. One thing the LDC would develop is a “site use register” where organizations who are members would record their planned uses of the Moon. Other members of the LDC would pledge not to interfere with those uses. Those rights could be marketable to other members, he added, effectively a form of property rights that gets around the prohibitions in the Outer Space Treaty to countries making territorial claims on the Moon. Those who make those claims, though, would have to pay registration fees to the LDC that would become a primary source of income to the cooperative. “They’re not a tax,” Castle-Miller explained. “The fees will be based on the value of the rights they have in the LDC registry.” The value of the rights, he said, would be based on the demand for infrastructure the LDC would provide, like power and landing pads, needed for those uses. The fees would also ensure that the organizations registering potential uses will, in fact, implement them, rather than squatting on territory. He envisions that would lead to a “virtuous cycle” where the LDC invests in infrastructure that is in demand for members, increasing the value of the registry and in turn the fees charged to members to support LDC operations. But what about an organization—a company or a country—that doesn’t want to join the LDC? He argued if they tried to operate near LDC infrastructure, they would find themselves in constant conflict with LDC members as it tried to build its own infrastructure. (Or, he added, it could try to seize the LDC infrastructure, something that would lead to “major international backlash.”) More likely, he concluded, that entity would go elsewhere and be undisturbed. “We want to make the LDC humanity’s holding company for the Moon,” Castle-Miller said. While Castle-Miller and others have been working on the LDC concept for a few years, including a white paper on the concept, he acknowledged it is still in its early stages. “We’re not going to launch the LDC right away,” he said, focusing for now on research to lay the groundwork for it through stakeholder engagement and build support, and determining what infrastructure to develop first. “We’re between four and five years of this support building before we’re really ready to launch the LDC.” The LDC is not the first concept for coordinating infrastructure development on the Moon. A study a decade ago for an “Evolvable Lunar Architecture” proposed an International Lunar Authority to oversee development, something that Davidson said was patterned on a port authority like the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, which operates infrastructure ranging from bridges to airports. “This is the weakest part of the ELA study,” he said of that governance concept. “If you lived in New York or New Jersey, you wouldn’t think this is such a great authority,” citing high tolls, crumbling infrastructure, and political bias. “If I could do it over again,” he said of the earlier study, “I would pull out all that Lunar Authority stuff and put LDC in its place.” Lunar markets The LDC offers one approach to setting up infrastructure on the Moon to support government or commercial activities. A more fundamental question, though, is what people will be doing on the Moon to require that infrastructure. In other sessions at ISDC, people took a skeptical approach to some proposed activities on the Moon. That included extracting helium-3, the isotope long associated with (as-yet undeveloped) fusion reactors but which has other applications, like quantum computing. Startups like Interlune have developed plans for robotic missions to prospect and, eventually, extract helium-3 from lunar regolith. “I’ve been hearing about helium-3 on the Moon since the ’80s,” said Thomas Matula of Sul Ross State University. “But the world has changed since the ’80s.” He noted helium-3 is far more abundant on Earth than previously thought. Meanwhile, the current market for heium-3 is $800 million annually. “It’s a small market that’s easily undercut by production from Earth,” he said, which he argued extends to other lunar mining concepts. “To me, the water at the south pole of the Moon is still at the level of a scientific curiosity. It’s not a resource yet,” Lee concluded. Water ice deposits in permanently shadowed craters at the south pole of the Moon could be another product, supporting lunar activities and potentially fueling other spacecraft. The problem, said Pascal Lee of the SETI Institute, is that water is in very low concentrations that would costly to extract: one cubic meter of regolith would yield just five liters of water. “To me, the water at the south pole of the Moon is still at the level of a scientific curiosity. It’s not a resource yet,” he concluded. It would be technically feasible, but challenging, to extract it, putting its economic viability in doubt. “Meanwhile, a single Starship landing can bring 125 metric tons of water.” That push for resources, he said, was putting the cart before the horse. “We have to bite the bullet of setting up an exploration and logistics base, not a mining operation up front.” Another question is what will be taking place on the Moon that will require humans. “What are we going to do on the Moon that is of sufficient value to risk human life? It’s not clear to me right now that there’s anything like that other than geopolitical reasons,” said Rand Simberg. “The only reason to have large numbers of people on the Moon is that people want to be on the Moon for whatever reason,” he concluded. In those sessions, people identified other commercial markets at the Moon, such as providing commercial and navigation services. Matula suggested a Starship lander could deliver a large number of teleoperated rovers to the Moon, time on which could be sold to scientists or others. “How many people here would pay $1,000 an hour to run a rover on the Moon?” The infrastructure needed for robotic rovers, research missions, and potentially small government bases is far different from sprawling outposts and mining installations. An LDC may be a solution to a problem that may not exist for decades, if ever. Jeff Foust (jeff@thespacereview.com) is the editor and publisher of The Space Review, and a senior staff writer with SpaceNews. He also operates the Spacetoday.net web site. Views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone. Note: we are now moderating comments. There will be a delay in posting comments and no guarantee that all submitted comments will be posted

Intellectual Property Challenges In The Space Economy

patent Space technologies have long been patented, but how can those patents be protected when the technologies in space? (credit: USPTO) Intellectual property challenges in the space economy by Phil Merchant Monday, June 23, 2025 Across the upstream and the downstream in the space industry, patentable technologies are being developed, and companies of all sizes are seeking to secure patent protection for their inventions. Patents are being granted for novel thruster designs, software algorithms for space debris mitigation, spacecraft launch systems, AI technologies for satellite image processing, and many other innovations. To what extent can a granted patent be enforced as an object is manufactured, launched into space, and then used for downstream activities? A granted patent in any technology field is highly desirable: it can be enforced by its owner against competitors, can increase the likelihood of securing investment, and can be used for corporation tax relief (e.g. via the UK Patent Box scheme). Given the recent increased appetite for commercialising space, it is perhaps no surprise that interest in patenting of space technologies has significantly increased in recent years.[1,2,3]. For example, US patent applications in space tech have risen by 144% since 2003, compared to a 37% increase across all technology fields.[1] Some specific sectors have been highlighted as growth areas, such as in Earth-based remote sensing and in quantum technologies.[3] However, the space industry poses an interesting consideration for those seeking to protect their IP. Much innovative space technology that is protected by patents is deployed and used in outer space, which is not part of the territory of any country on Earth. By contrast, patent law frameworks are terrestrial by nature, with geographical limitations on the enforcement of a granted patent. This apparent incompatibility has sparked much discussion[4] among IP professionals about just how far patent protection (and IP more generally) can extend in the space industry. To what extent can a granted patent be enforced as an object is manufactured, launched into space, and then used for downstream activities? The answer to this question can have important implications for a patent filing strategy and associated costs. On-Earth activities For on-Earth activities, there is more certainty: infringement can be largely assessed in the same manner as other technical fields. Granted patents can be enforced in the country of patent registration, and patentees can prevent competitors from undertaking acts with respect to the invention, such as manufacture, use, or sale. For example, for the upstream, a patented electrical thruster design can be enforced against manufacturers operating in the country of the patent. For downstream activities, similar considerations apply. For example, if a patentee owns a UK software patent covering the processing of satellite data, then this can be enforced against competitors processing their data in the UK. Outer space activities For protection of outer space activities, the situation is less certain due to the territorial considerations of space set out above. One specific answer can be found in the ISS Intergovernmental Agreement. This agreement includes Article 21, on Intellectual Property, which states that activities taking place inside an ISS partner module may be deemed to take place within the territory of that ISS partner state. Thus, national patents may be enforced against infringing acts taking place on ISS modules. However, actions on the ISS form only a very small part of the wider space economy, particularly the actions of many NewSpace companies. The retained jurisdiction and control provided by the Outer Space Treaty can serve as a means to extend terrestrial patent laws into outer space. For the general case, a path forward might be found in reference to international law. Under the Registration Convention, space objects launched into Earth orbit are registered on the local registry of the Launching State. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967[5] further stipulates that the Launching State “shall retain jurisdiction and control” over the registered space object. It has been argued that the retained jurisdiction and control provided by the Outer Space Treaty can serve as a means to extend terrestrial patent laws into outer space. As a result, inventions made or used in outer space on a registered space object might be considered to be made or used within the territory of the Launching State. The United States has specifically legislated along these lines.[6] However, to our knowledge, the US is the only country to have specifically addressed outer space activities in its patent law. It is currently not clear which countries may similarly allow extension of their patent laws. It is also unclear whether international law and existing domestic legislation is sufficient, or whether additional legislation would be necessary to clarify the position. It will depend on how the law is interpreted in each country, and to our knowledge this has not yet been tested. The future At present, practical enforcement of patents will likely remain focused for on-Earth activities (after all, all in-orbit systems have some origin on Earth.) Patents could be enforced against in-orbit activities indirectly by enforcement against the Earth-based systems and methods necessary to achieve the in-orbit operation. For example, a patent to a new satellite thruster can be more practically enforced at the point of manufacture rather than when it is in orbit. However, it is unlikely that the uncertainties regarding space technology and IP will remain unaddressed for long. There is increasing commercial attention on in-orbit activities in the space sector, such as in-orbit manufacturing of pharmaceuticals and semiconductors, or on-satellite AI processing of data. As these highly valuable fields of technology mature, more certainty regarding the application of patent law specifically to outer space may become necessary. For now, a prudent long-term IP strategy for space sector companies would be to (i) protect on-Earth activities by obtaining IP protection in countries where you anticipate your invention being made, used, or sold; and (ii) seek protection for in-orbit activities by obtaining patents in major launching states, including the US. This would not only be in recognition of existing US law, but also in anticipation of other countries potentially following their example. References hUS Patent and Trademark Office “Privatizing the space economy.” January 2025. World Intellectual Property Organization. “Introduction to space transportation.” European Patent Office. “Technology insight reports” (see reports on Cosmonautics, July 2021, Quantum technologies and space, November 2021, Space-borne sensing and green applications, October 2022, Propulsion systems for space, May 2024) See, for example, “IP In Space”; WIPO, “Intellectual Property and Space Activities” See Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty. 35 U.S.C 105 – Inventions in Outer Space Phil Merchant is Principal at Marks & Clerk, a leading global intellectual property firm. He leads the Marks & Clerk space technologies team and is a regular adviser and speaker to space accelerators and space clusters across the UK.

Commercializing Inda's SSLV Rocket

SSLV India’s Small Satellite Launch Vehicle lifts off on its inaugural, but unsuccessful, first launch in 2022. (credit: ISRO) Commercializing India’s SSLV rocket by Ajey Lele Monday, June 23, 2025 Since its inception in the early 1970s, the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) has recognized that, for any independent space agency aspiring to develop indigenous capabilities in rocket launching and satellite building, the most critical area of investment is the launch vehicle sector. India became a spacefaring nation on July 18, 1980, when its Satellite Launch Vehicle 3 (SLV-3) successfully placed the Rohini satellite into orbit. Since then, India has designed and developed various categories of launch vehicles to place satellites into different orbits. In recent years, India developed the Small Satellite Launch Vehicle (SSLV), and very recently, ISRO identified an agency for the technology transfer of this vehicle. This marks an important step toward India realizing its vision of space commercialization. This marks a significant milestone in the history of India’s space program, as it represents the first time ISRO has transferred a complete technology package to a single agency. ISRO developed the Small Satellite Launch Vehicle (SSLV) to deliver payloads of up to 500 kilograms to low Earth orbit (LEO) at an altitude of 500 kilometers and 300 kilograms to Sun-synchronous orbits. SSLV is meant to be used for launching small satellites. The key features of the SSLV include low cost, a quick turnaround time of approximately 72 hours or less (according to some reports it could even be 24 hours), flexibility in accommodating multiple satellites, and minimal launch infrastructure requirements. So far this vehicle has undertaken three launches. The first launch on August 7, 2022, was a failure, however the subsequent two launches in 2023 and 2024 were successful. The SSLV is a four-stage launch vehicle with three solid-propulsion stages and a liquid-propulsion Velocity Trimming Module (VTM) as the terminal stage. From the outset, ISRO decided it would focus solely on designing, developing, and testing the technology, after which it would be transferred to other agencies for mass production and launches. Following two successful launches, ISRO determined that the technology was ready for transfer and initiated a bidding process. After a detailed assessment, the Indian government awarded the contract to Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), a public sector aerospace and defense company established in 1940, seven years before India gained independence. ISRO shares a long-standing relationship with HAL, which has actively contributed to its space missions. For instance, during India’s Mars mission in 2013, HAL provided crucial support by supplying the satellite structure and propellant tankages. According to reports, HAL won the full contract to manufacture, market, and launch the SSLV. This marks a significant milestone in the history of India’s space program, as it represents the first time ISRO has transferred a complete technology package to a single agency. HAL was selected from a pool of nine bidders, as it submitted the highest-ranked techno-commercial bid to secure the technology transfer of the SSLV rocket. Notably, this is the second contract HAL has received from ISRO in the launch vehicle sector in recent times. HAL, in partnership with the private company Larsen & Toubro (L&T), a major player in India’s defense and aerospace sector, is already jointly manufacturing the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV). Their first launch is expected within the next six months or so and will carry a technology demonstration satellite (TDS-1) designed to test up to 35 new indigenous technologies. ISRO has launched around 433 satellites to date for other countries and agencies, the majority of which fall under the small satellite category. Based on publicly available data, approximately 7,000 satellites were launched globally from the launch of Sputnik in 1957 until the end of 2014. According to Pixalytics Ltd., between 2015 and March 30, 2025, nearly 15,000 satellites have been launched into orbit, with a notable 31.5% increase since June 2023. India has wisely capitalized on this surge in the global satellite launch market. Between 2015 and 2024, the country’s space industry significantly boosted its foreign exchange earnings, generating $143 million by launching 393 foreign satellites. For a long time, ISRO has been striving to meet the expectations of various small countries and international space agencies by offering launch slots for their small satellites. Usually, ISRO used the excess capacity of larger rockets like the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) on missions primarily focused on Indian satellite launches to cater to commercial requirements. Separately, ISRO was undertaking a commercial contract for satellite launching by employing another launch vehicle, the Launch Vehicle Mark-3 (LVM3), previously known as the Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle Mark III (GSLV Mark III). It is designed to carry up to four tons of payload to geostationary orbit and ten tons to LEO. HAL should prepare for a minimum six to eight launches per year and should ensure that they can perform ten launches per year. The LVM3 has seen all seven of its launches succeed during the last decade. In 2022 and 2023, the LVM3 conducted two commercial missions to launch a total of 72 satellites for OneWeb. However, this vehicle is not an exclusively commercial launch vehicle. It has different variants and upgrades and is being human-rated for India’s Gaganyaan human spaceflight program. So, while the LVM3 is suited for heavier payloads, there remains a distinct need for small satellite launchers and, hence, ISRO started developing SSLV in 2017. That rocket is now expected to play a critical and complementary role to LMV3. ISRO has also started developing an exclusive launch site for SSLV launches. At a place near Kulasekharapatnam in Tamil Nadu (the southern part of India, around 8 degrees north of the Equator), there is a spaceport in the making to handle SSLV launches to Sun-synchronous orbit. This facility may take around a year’s time to become operational. The SSLV's ability to offer launch-on-demand (almost) services is expected to attract both domestic and international customers. ISRO has a long-standing reputation for providing reliable and cost-effective launch solutions, making it a trusted partner in the global space sector. ISRO could attract many global agencies to provide satellite launch services. HAL should prepare for a minimum six to eight launches per year and should ensure that they can perform ten launches per year. The growing importance of small satellites began to emerge in the early 1990s. Since the beginning of the 21st century, there has been increasing focus on concepts such as cubesats. Over the past three decades, major advancements in microelectronics have further accelerated interest in deploying constellations of small satellites, primarily for communication purposes. Today, small satellites play a vital role across a wide range of applications, including remote sensing, communications, weather monitoring, and military operations. Hence, it can be said that India’s SSLV is entering the market at the right time. Ajey Lele is Deputy Director General at MP-IDSA, New Delhi, India and the views expressed are personal.

SETI breakthrough! NASA scientist discovers three repeating ET signals ...

Timelapse Of The The First 10,000 Days Of Proxima Centauri B Colonization

Face facts! Starship will never get humans to the Moon! BUT it can do ...

Starship Exploded and We Now Know How BAD The Damage Is!

Journey to the Far Side of the Sun: Behind the Scenes of Doppelgänger wi...

UFO (1970) Cast: Then and Now [55 Years After]

How much damage did the Starship explosion REALLY do to SpaceX's plans?

Experiment X: Earth Threat (1954)

Elon Musk Reveals Likely Cause of Ship 36 Catastrophic Explosion

BREAKING NEWS: Starship 36 EXPLODES

Ship 36 explodes!! SpaceX Starship program suffers a significant setback!

NASA's 2026 Budget In Brief

Chandra The Chandra X-Ray Observatory is one of dozens of missions threatened by the administration’s fiscal year 2026 budget proposal for NASA. (credit: NASA) NASA’s 2026 budget in brief: Unprecedented, unstrategic, and wasteful by Casey Dreier and Jack Kiraly Monday, June 16, 2025 The full details of the President’s fiscal year (FY) 2026 budget request for NASA were released in the late afternoon on Friday, May 30. To date, NASA has held no press conferences or public briefings regarding the dramatic changes included in the budget request. There have been a limited number of perfunctory briefings to congressional committees and industry stakeholders, apparently with little detail beyond what has already been released publicly. This budget, if enacted, would not only abandon decades of American leadership in space science and exploration, but would also sabotage its own stated ambitions. The Planetary Society has spent the past two weeks closely reading this budget request, analyzing its numbers, and speaking with academics, industry representatives, and congressional staff. We have come to the conclusion that the FY 2026 budget is a deeply flawed document, formulated without the input of NASA or the stakeholders in the space community, that radically pivots the direction of the agency’s human spaceflight program while indiscriminately applying draconian cuts to science, aeronautics, STEM outreach, and space technology. It breaks the current consensus around Artemis, leaving the future of the lunar program relatively undefined after Artemis 3, proposing instead to spend billions of dollars on a rapid humans-to-Mars effort that is ill-defined, at best. It proposes cuts to infrastructure, science, and technology programs aligned with their stated goals, while also proposing large investments in duplicative commercial capabilities that are of questionable feasibility. Ultimately, we believe this budget can be summed up in three words: unprecedented, unstrategic, and wasteful. This budget, if enacted, would not only abandon decades of American leadership in space science and exploration, but would also sabotage its own stated ambitions, setting the nation’s space program on a path to political polarization, economic uncertainty, and surrender of the final frontier. Unprecedented Let’s be clear about the scale of this proposal. The request calls for a 25% cut to NASA in a single year; the largest single-year cut ever proposed by any White House for the agency. This cut eclipses even the post-Apollo drawdowns. When adjusted for inflation, this budget would shrink NASA’s buying power to a level not seen since fiscal year 1961 (which began in July of 1960), before the United States had even put a human in space, before anyone had gone into space. chart The proposal similarly decimates NASA’s workforce, the institutional knowledge and human capital that makes American leadership in space possible. It proposes severe layoffs at every NASA center, ranging from 20% to nearly 50% at Goddard Space Flight Center. No center is spared. The resulting civil servant workforce would be its smallest since fiscal year 1960. This will have real world impacts, as each NASA civil servant enables an average of 16 jobs in the overall space economy, and government spending has buoyed almost all of the growth in the space economy in recent years. chart chart The irony is that these historic cuts are being proposed not as America winds down a lunar exploration program, but as the nation spins one up and begins the much more demanding task of sending humans to Mars. To ask NASA to undertake some of the most difficult engineering projects in world history while simultaneously slashing its resources and workforce to pre-human spaceflight levels is not just ambitious; it is fantasy, divorced from the realities of programmatic execution, economic conditions or fiscal requirements. It sets up the agency, and the nation’s space ambitions, for failure. budget excerpt At numerous points the FY 2026 Budget Proposal requests hundreds of millions of dollars for programs that have no defined content or goals. If nothing else, this raises questions regarding if the amount requested is appropriate to enable the capability. This suggests a rushed process and a “budget-first” approach to program development. Both are ultimately wasteful of taxpayer dollars. Source: NASA FY 2026 Congressional Budget Justification, pg EXP-45. Unstrategic A sound space policy is built on a strategy that aligns resources with national priorities and builds an enduring coalition to ensure its continuation into the future. This budget does the opposite. The FY 2026 budget proposal is apparently the product of “budget-first” policymaking, driven by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) with little, if any, meaningful consultation with NASA. Numbers were chosen arbitrarily, provided to the space agency, with the agency staff left to assemble a program within those limits. A notable parallel is the OMB’s arbitrary cap on Space Shuttle development costs, which forced NASA to adopt a compromised design that fell short of full usability, ultimately costing the nation billions more in operational costs. This budget is far more capricious, taking little, if any, input from NASA itself. The numbers bear a suspicious resemblance to an ideological counter-proposal made years ago by the current OMB Director, Russ Vought, which called for a 50% cut to NASA Science; this budget proposes a 47% cut. This is not the outcome of a considered policy process. This budget request is the imposition of a predetermined number—not an expression of the President’s priorities, but those of the OMB Director’s. chart This lack of program strategy will directly undermine its own stated goals of sending humans to Mars by creating political division and enmity. In its rush to pivot, it divests from the very technologies and infrastructure essential for any future Martian expedition. It cancels the production of plutonium-238, the nuclear power source required for long-duration missions in the outer solar system, and used on surface missions for both power and heat. It proposes canceling active Mars telecommunications orbiters like MAVEN and Mars Odyssey—which provide vital telecom data relay for surface assets—in favor of a vague commercial replacement that does not exist and may not materialize for years. In so doing, it puts primary reliance of the remaining Mars rovers on the ESA-led Trace Gas Orbiter, a surprising choice given that this budget proposes to abandon nearly a dozen joint projects with the Europeans. Instead of building consensus, the budget destroys it by abandoning allies and commercial partnerships at the Moon, the wholesale destruction of key science, aeronautics, technology, and outreach activities. This proposal functionally cedes American leadership in space science to our geopolitical rivals. It pulls back from precisely the areas where China has announced it is moving forward: a Mars sample return mission, next generation space telescopes, and exploration of Venus and the outer solar system. By summarily canceling more than 40 active and future US science missions, including our contributions to joint projects with the European Space Agency like the Rosalind Franklin rover and EnVision Venus orbiter, we are not only abandoning the cause of exploration but also breaking faith with key international allies. The budget is a roadmap for how to abdicate leadership in the 21st century. China will be more than happy to pick up the mantle. Furthermore, by proposing such divisive and destructive cuts, it sabotages its own long-term goals, politically. Instead of building consensus, the budget destroys it by abandoning allies and commercial partnerships at the Moon, the wholesale destruction of key science, aeronautics, technology, and outreach activities. Wasteful Ultimately, the most tragic outcome of this budget is the sheer waste it would generate. It is wasteful of taxpayers’ investment, of scientific progress, and of political capital. Consider the Artemis program. For the first time in American history, a human return-to-the-Moon program survived a presidential transition. This was not an accident. It was the result of a deliberate, bipartisan effort by the first Trump administration to build a broad coalition of support. This budget demolishes that consensus. By abruptly canceling Gateway, the SLS, and Orion programs after Artemis 3, and pivoting aggressively to Mars, it breaks the coalition that made Artemis politically durable. In its place, it offers an ill-defined Mars program with no established base of support. We at The Planetary Society have long championed a “Moon to Mars” approach, but this is not it. This is a “break-the-Moon-for-Mars” approach that risks turning Mars exploration into a partisan activity, ensuring its long-term failure. It also creates opposition among members of the President’s own party by cancelling those major projects along with major cuts to the ISS. Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) has already proposed a full rejection of the human spaceflight cuts in the budget reconciliation bill currently moving through Congress. The budget is also profoundly wasteful of scientific investment. It calls for the immediate cancellation of at least 19 active science missions that are performing well and returning invaluable data. Missions proposed for cancellation include Juno at Jupiter, MAVEN at Mars—both recently rated “excellent” scientific value to the US taxpayer by an independent senior review—New Horizons in the Kuiper Belt, and the Chandra X-ray Observatory. OSIRIS-APEX, a repurposed spacecraft to perform reconnaissance of the asteroid Apophis in 2029 and the only American project currently planned for the Apophis flyby, is also cancelled. A conservative estimate of the value lost to taxpayers of just operating missions cancelled in the request totals more than $12 billion. chart NASA’s science fleet is decimated in the FY 2026 budget proposal. Many ISS instruments would be useless, as the project also cuts nearly all science activities on the ISS and reduces funding for the Microgravity and Biological Science Division by roughly 80%. Source: NASA/Paul Byrne. The budget request also cancels planned missions like VERITAS and DAVINCI, our first return to Venus in more than 30 years, before they can even launch. Support for VIPER, the fully-built rover destined to hunt for water-ice deposits at the lunar south pole, is shelved. The Nancy Grace Roman Space Telescope, though not canceled outright as feared, has its funding ratcheted back to less than half the planned amount, lowering the project reserves to levels far below the recommended levels, functionally demanding the project walk an engineering tightrope in the final year of its assembly. If anything goes wrong, the project will miss its launch date and ultimately cost far more than if the reserves had been available at the time they were needed. Planning for the Habitable Worlds Observatory is lowered to nearly zero. And as mentioned, with the halting of nuclear fuel production, the budget request ends a key infrastructure capability painstakingly restored over the course of the past 20 years. The proposal undermines its own goals, abandons American leadership, squanders decades of national investment, and destroys the political consensus needed for any great undertaking. The frantic and arbitrary nature of this proposal will inevitably create further waste through pure incoherence. You cannot simply fire a third of your workforce, cancel dozens of projects, and expect to pivot seamlessly to the most complex mission humanity has ever attempted. The loss of key personnel, the disruption to the space economy, and the collapse of institutional knowledge will create massive, long-term inefficiencies that will cost the taxpayer far more in the long run. The budget request is a self-defeating document. It is a budget without a clear, coherent plan. It undermines its own goals, abandons American leadership, squanders decades of national investment, and destroys the political consensus needed for any great undertaking. The path forward The damage proposed by the budget request seems all-consuming, but Article I Section 9 prevails. Congress has sole power of the purse, and we have already seen members from both parties, including the chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee and the leadership of the bipartisan Planetary Science Caucus, voice their opposition to the proposed gutting of our domestic space capabilities and scientific preeminence. For the sake of our nation's future in space, we believe Congress must reject this unprecedented, unstrategic, and wasteful budget and instead forge a bipartisan path forward that maintains a national space program that will continue to lead the world in discovery, innovation, and inspiration. We must invest in a space program that strengthens our economy, supports scientific excellence, advances national interests, and ignites the curiosity of the next generation. Anything less would be a retreat from the responsibility and opportunity that leadership in space demands. Casey Dreier is the Chief of Space Policy for The Planetary Society. Jack Kiraly is The Planetary Society’s Director of Government Relations. A video of the original briefing is available on YouTube. The slides referenced are available on Google Slides.

How NASA's Proposed Budget Cuts Are Felt Across The Atlantic

Orion ESM A proposal to end Orion after Artemis 3 is causing ESA and European industry to study alternative uses of the Orion service module it currently provides. (credit: NASA/ESA/ATG Medialab) How NASA’s proposed budget cuts are felt across the Atlantic by Jeff Foust Monday, June 16, 2025 The focus of the discussion about the 2026 NASA budget proposal has primarily been the effect of the request on the agency itself. The proposal, if enacted, would cancel dozens of missions and programs and lay off thousands of employees, radically reshaping NASA. “We value deeply the collaboration between Europe and NASA,” Mundell said. “But we do have the technical capabilities in Europe today, should it be necessary, to reproduce missing elements.” The impact, though, goes beyond NASA itself and even the broader space industry in the United States. Across the Atlantic, European officials are pondering what the NASA budget means for the many programs it is involved with, and by extension whether it can continue to rely on the US as a partner in spaceflight. Representatives of the European Space Agency’s member states discussed in detail the NASA budget proposal at a meeting of the ESA Council last week, examining how the agency’s work in human spaceflight, space science, and Earth science would be affected by cuts to NASA programs where ESA is a partner as well as ESA-led mission where NASA is a partner. “We are impacted on quite of number of domains that, at least for the moment, are proposed for cancellations or reductions,” Josef Aschbacher, ESA director general, said at a press briefing after the ESA Council meeting last Thursday. The biggest impacts are in human spaceflight. ESA provides the service module for the Orion spacecraft that the budget proposal would terminate after Artemis 3. It is also building modules for the lunar Gateway that would be cancelled in the budget. Science missions would be hit. Carole Mundell, ESA’s director of science, said at the briefing that ESA and NASA work together on 19 space science missions. Most will be unaffected by the budget with what she called “good planning,” but three face problems: the Envision mission to Venus, the LISA gravitational wave observatory, and the New Athena X-ray telescope. Those ESA-led missions would require “recovery actions” by ESA, she said, to mitigate the impacts of NASA’s proposal to end cooperation on them. She didn’t elaborate on the specific recovery actions, but said there would be ways for ESA to go it alone on all three missions, still in early phases of development. “The point that I would like to underline is that we value deeply the collaboration between Europe and NASA,” she said. “But we do have the technical capabilities in Europe today, should it be necessary, to reproduce missing elements.” (That list of 19 space science missions does not include Mars Sample Return, which NASA’s budget also proposes to cancel, as ESA includes that in its human and robotic exploration directorate. That is also home to the Rosalind Franklin rover mission to Mars, whose NASA support is jeopardized by the budget.) “I think there is a window of opportunity for Europe to begin a lunar initiative,” Fuchs said. “This ministerial conference is a good opportunity to start that.” In Earth observation, the budget affects the “excellent collaboration” between ESA and NASA, said Simoneta Cheli, director of Earth observation at ESA. The NASA budget affects some joint missions, including Sentinel-6C, the third in a series of joint missions studying rising sea levels. She said ESA was looking at potential options if NASA drops out of those missions, but noted ESA was still trying to understand the implications of the budget cuts on other collaboration with NASA. The challenge for ESA is two-fold. One is finding ways to mitigate the impacts on the agency, and European industry, from the proposed NASA budget cuts. The other is the uncertainty about what the final NASA budget for 2026 will look like and when it will be completed. In the former category, Daniel Neuenschwander, ESA’s director of human and robotic exploration, said the agency and industry were looking at what they could do with the Orion service module, also known as ESM. ESA has delivered the service modules for the first three Artemis missions and expects to deliver later this year the ESM for Artemis 4—if, of course, there is still an Artemis 4. “We are studying with the industry consortium delivering the European service modules some alternative missions for ESM,” he said. “We will continue to deliver the ESM as long as they are needed.” He didn’t elaborate on what those alternative uses for ESM could be. Asked about that at a briefing at the Paris Air Show on Monday, Alain Fauré, head of space systems at Airbus Defence and Space, the prime contractor for the ESM, said it was too early to discuss specific alternative uses for the service module. “ESM is able to provide everything: energy, water, fresh air,” he said. “We need to discuss, for sure, with the various institutions to see what would be the repurposing.” Those assessments are complicated by the uncertainty of what exactly NASA’s 2026 budget will look like and when it will be finalized. While neither House nor Senate appropriators have started formal work on spending bills that would include NASA, Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX), chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, said he would seek to add $10 billion to a budget reconciliation bill being considered by the Senate for NASA human spaceflight. That proposal would funding SLS and Orion through Artemis 5 as well as complete the Gateway. It would not though, address cuts to science missions. For ESA, the proposed cuts come as it prepares for its next ministerial conference in late November, where ESA member states will agree on a spending plan for the next three years. Aschbacher said the agency’s current plans seek about 23 billion euros ($26.5 billion) for three years, a significant increase from the 17 billion euros member states approved at the 2022 ministerial. Aschbacher suggested there may be ways to compensate for the cuts at the ministerial, hoping that the final NASA budget would be completed by then. That is unlikely, though, based on the recent history of NASA budgets that were not finalized until months after the start of the fiscal year on October 1. “We need to assess on one side how much does it cost to wait,” he said, “and how long can we wait, because there are decision points coming up on our side.” The timing of NASA and ESA budgets “are not perfectly aligned,” he said during a briefing Monday at the Paris Air Show. “We can take into account last-minute changes that may occur, triggered from the NASA budget decisions, but, of course, we are consolidating already our ministerial proposal and therefore we are making some assumptions of increasing autonomy already now.” Even if the worst of the proposed budget cuts at NASA are rejected by Congress, preserving programs with ESA cooperation, there is a growing concern in Europe that the United States may no longer be a reliable partner in space. It comes at the same time Europeans are worried that NASA may be pulling back in defense as well in Europe even as Russia grows more aggressive. “It seems that Artemis is coming to an end before there is a return of humans on the Moon,” said Marco Fuchs, CEO of German aerospace company OHB, at a press conference during the Paris Air Show on Monday. He suggested that Europe do more to develop its own capabilities for lunar exploration. “I think there is a window of opportunity for Europe to begin a lunar initiative,” he said. “This ministerial conference is a good opportunity to start that.” Walther Peltzer, director general of the German Space Agency at DLR, noted at the same briefing that one ESA lunar project, the Argonaut cargo lunar lander, started as a joint French-German initiative, and only later became a potential ESA contribution to Artemis. “So we discuss within ESA now that we actually go back to the initial idea to have a European Moon mission.” “We are known as a reliable, trusted partner that has always delivered,” Aschbacher said, “and we will continue to deliver on those promises.” Aschbacher, at the ESA Council briefing and later at the Paris Air Show, emphasized that ESA continued to work well with NASA, thanking it for providing updates on the budget process. He noted at the air show that he had a meeting with NASA leadership earlier in the day. (Janet Petro, NASA’s acting administrator, is attending the show but keeping a low public profile.) “We are in close and constant dialogue,” he said. “It is very clear that some of the proposals made have a significant impact, but I can say we really have a good exchange.” At the ESA Council meeting, though, he emphasized partnerships with other nations, such as an agreement signed with India in May to cooperate on human spaceflight that could eventually lead to European astronauts going to India’s proposed space station in the 2030s. He also noted strong collaboration with Canada, a “cooperating state” of ESA that, while not a full member, can contribute to and participate in ESA programs. “We are known as a reliable, trusted partner that has always delivered,” he said, “and we will continue to deliver on those promises.” Jeff Foust (jeff@thespacereview.com) is the editor and publisher of The Space Review, and a senior staff writer with SpaceNews. He also operates the Spacetoday.net web site. Views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone.

A NASA Foundation-A Method of Privately Financing NASA Science

Roman A “NASA Foundation” modeled on the National Park Foundation could allow the public to fill gaps in the NASA budget, like for the Roman Space Telescope. (credit: NASA/Chris Gunn) The NASA Foundation: A method for privately funding NASA science by Thomas L. Matula Monday, June 16, 2025 Recently Jared Isaacman posted on X that, if he had become NASA administrator, he would have made up the shortfall in funding for the Nancy Grace Roman Space Telescope by personally funding its launch. It is a sentiment that is likely shared by many space advocates who wish there was an option to keep a program going by donating money to NASA to support it. This raises a question: why isn’t there a mechanism that would allow the public to contribute money to NASA? Although numerous organizations exist that are focused on lobbying Congress for a larger NASA budget while building public support for greater NASA funding, there are none that allow individuals to contribute money to fund NASA programs. A NASA Foundation would provide a way for individuals and corporations to financially support NASA in the same matter as the National Park Foundation supports America’s national parks. This contrasts with another widely support government agency, the National Park Service. In 1967, the United States Congress created the National Park Foundation as a 501(c)(3) charity to support it. The National Park Foundation’s purpose was to “encourage private gifts or real and personal property, or any income” to support the National Park Service.[1] Since then billions of dollars in money and property have been donated to the National Park Service through the National Park Foundation. Example of projects that the National Park Foundation has funded over the years include purchasing land within Grand Teton National Park,[2] establishing the Katahdin Woods and Waters National Monument in Maine,[3] and supporting the Flight 93 National Memorial.[4] In 2016, their Centennial Campaign raised $350 million to help fund America’s national parks.[5] The National Parks Foundation also regularly funds outreach and STEM programs at numerous national parks. A NASA Foundation established on the same principles would provide a way for individuals and corporations to financially support NASA in the same matter as the National Park Foundation supports America’s national parks. Ideally the foundation would be created by Congress and modelled on the very successful National Park Foundation. If created privately, it would need to work out a legal arrangement with NASA to fund its programs and use its logo. Early campaigns could provide NASA funding for the Nancy Grace Roman Space Telescope and for the NASA STEM programs that are being cut in the current budget proposal for NASA.[6] The proposed NASA Foundation would allow individuals and corporations to make tax deductible donations to fund specific NASA programs and missions. Corporations could also contribute by creating “cause marketing” campaigns to raise funds for NASA. Cause marketing is a promotional strategy in which a portion of the sales price of an item is donated to a non-profit like the NASA Foundation. This would be ideal for corporations like Lego that often promote toys based on NASA programs. Corporations that support the NASA Foundation could be allowed to display a logo indicating their financial support of NASA that would serve to create greater visibility for the foundation. Unlike existing space organizations, the NASA Foundation would be strictly focused on providing funding for NASA programs. It would not be political or engage in lobbying, just as the National Parks Foundation stays focused on its mission of raising money for the national parks. However, a strong public response in donations for specific NASA programs is likely to be noticed by Congress. It is one thing to lobby Congress with letters, emails, and petitions, especially with today’s technology. It is quite another matter to see the public putting their money where their mouth is by actually donating to keep a specific program or mission going forward. The creation of a NASA Foundation would be a way to send a strong message on the level of public support for NASA. It would also send a message to budget makers that the recent cuts in the NASA budget are not supported and the public is willing to donate its hard-earned dollars to keep specific programs open. This could be a powerful message in a time of budget cuts as the government seeks to reduce the budget deficit. References Congress (December 18, 1967), “An Act to Establish the National Park Foundation” PDF retrieved June 10, 2025. Koshmrl, Mike (December 13, 2016). “Antelope Flats tract secured”. Jackson Hole News & Guide. Retrieved June 10, 2025. Sharon, Susan (August 24, 2016). “It’s Official: Obama Declares Katahdin Woods and Waters National Monument”. Maine Public. Retrieved June 10, 2025. De Groot, Kristen (June 4, 2018). “Tower at Flight 93 memorial to open by 9/11 anniversary”. Associated Press. Retrieved June 10, 2025. National Park Foundation (February 15, 2016). “National Park Foundation Announces $350 Million Centennial Campaign for America’s National Parks”. Retrieved June 10, 2025. Henrikson, Eric (April 17, 2025) “STEM programs face uncertain future amid potential NASA budget cut”. Retrieved June 10, 2025. Thomas L. Matula is a Professor of Business Administration at Sul Ross State University in Alpine Texas and holds a Ph.D. in Business Administration from New Mexico State University. Dr. Matula is the Sul Ross State University representative to the Texas Aerospace Research and Space Economy Consortium (TARSEC) and the director of the new online MBA in Space Commerce offered by Sul Ross State University. A board member of Space Renaissance International he may be reached by email at thomas.matula@sulross.edu.

China's Guowang Satellites

Maxar imagery A Long March 5B launches a set of Guowang satelites. (credit: Xinhua) Developing and testing China’s Guowang constellation by Greg Gillinger Monday, June 16, 2025 One of China’s top priorities is the fielding of its state sponsored Guowang Proliferated Low Earth Orbit (pLEO) constellation. Since December 2024, China has conducted four launches carrying a combined 34 operational Guowang satellites. We know very little about the capabilities of these satellites, however China has released some information on the constellation’s architecture. According to Chinese news sources, Guowang plans to launch a total of 12,992 satellites. Of those, 6,080 will be in an extremely low orbit of 500 to 600 kilometers while the other 6,912 satellites will orbit at 1,145 kilometers. Western media commonly refers to Guowang as China’s state-sponsored version of SpaceX’s Starlink internet service constellation. However, China’s statements noting several other mission areas and their planned deployment of nearly 13,000 satellites hints at a much broader effort. Additional Chinese news sources note that “The ‘GuoWang’ satellite program can carry a variety of payloads, including broadband communication payloads, laser communication payloads, synthetic aperture radar payloads, optical remote sensing payloads, and others, to meet the needs of different users and scenarios. It offers comprehensive technical support across numerous fields such as maritime and aviation operations, information security, navigation and positioning, and meteorological research, while also enabling expansion into the global satellite internet access market.” This article examines China’s on-orbit test and development of Guowang. From July to December 2023 China launched nine satellites into the higher orbit of 1,111 kilometers. China added another test satellite in November 2024 to bring the number to ten. Finally, in April 2025 China launched its first test satellites to the “low” orbit of 450 kilometers (see table and graphic below). We lack any technical details or capability descriptions for the Guowang satellites, however there was a Taiwanese media report that noted Guowang integration testing with Chinese Coast Guard surface vessels operating near (or in) Taiwanese territorial waters on February 27, 2024. Taiwanese media reported that the Chinese Coast Guard vessels were involved with some sort of testing involving the Guowang constellation and China’s DF-21D & DF-26B missiles. The DF-21D is known as a “carrier killer” designed to target US aircraft carriers in the Western Pacific and South China Sea while the DF-26B is known as the “Guam Killer” and is China’s first conventionally-armed ballistic missile capable of striking Guam. Guowang Western media commonly refers to Guowang as China’s state-sponsored version of SpaceX’s Starlink internet service constellation. However, China’s statements noting several other mission areas and their planned deployment of nearly 13,000 satellites hints at a much broader effort including imagery, radio frequency (RF) detection, PNT and communication services. Integration of these capabilities with Chinese Air, Land & Sea forces will threaten US and allied operations in the Western Pacific, the South China Sea and beyond. Guowang Table 1: List of 6 Launches & 14 Guowang Test Satellites and Their Orbital Parameters on 25 May 2025 (celestrak.org) Guowang Visualization of 14 Satellites in Guowang Test Constellation (spaceaware.io) Initial Guowang test deployment July-December 2023 Based on publicly available data, China began on-orbit testing of its Guowang constellation in 2023. From July to December of that year China conducted four launches with a total of nine “internet technology test” satellites (see table/orbit visualization below for details.) For three of the four launches China publicly stated an incorrect number of satellites. As is often the case with Chinese satellites, the naming convention is also inconsistent. In Western catalogs, six of the satellites are named “Hulianwang Jishu Shiyan,” while the three satellites launched on November 23 are listed as “Chuangxin-20A/B/C.” The orbital parameters for the nine test satellites are similar to those observed with the first three operational Guowang groups; all are inclined at 50 or 86.5 degrees and have slightly higher average altitude than the test satellites: 1,170 vs 1,111 kilometers respectively. Guowang Possible integration testing on February 27, 2024 In April 2024, Taiwanese media reported: On the afternoon of 27 February (2024), three Chinese coast guard ships No. 2303, 2304 and 2305 raided the waters adjacent to (Taiwan’s) eastern 24 km (territorial waters) at a high speed of close to 20 km/hr… According to people familiar with the matter...the Chinese coast guard ships sailed at high speed in a ‘full silence’ mode, and after the analysis of electronic signals detected by friendly forces, it was judged that it should be helping the PLA test China's version of Starlink's ‘State Grid’ (Guowang) to provide information on future precision strikes by the Rocket Force. According to a person familiar with the matter, the three (Chinese) coast guard ships are testing the Dongfeng-21D and Dongfeng-26B missiles of the Chinese State Grid (Guowang) and providing information to the Chinese Rocket Force to achieve precision strikes. It was not until the southernmost point of the Miyako Strait that the three coast guard ships were detected by friendly forces, and it cannot be ruled out that they were linked to low-orbit satellites launched by China. Guowang 27 Feb 2024: Visualization of Guowang Test Satellites & Miyako Strait (saberastro.com) Guowang Table 2: List of nine Guowang Test Satellites and their orbital parameters on 27 Feb 2024 (celestrak.org & saberastro.com) Coverage analysis While we have no technical information regarding the capabilities of Guowang constellation, based on the orbital information available on February 27, 2024, it appears China would have potential Guowang coverage of the Miyako Strait for about 8 hours and 26 minutes on that day (TST timezone). There were several instances where the Guowang satellites provided about 30–60 minutes of consecutive coverage. (see graph below). Guowang Estimated Coverage of 9 Guowang Test Satellites 26 Feb 2024 1400 - 28 Feb 2024 1600UTC (Taiwan is UTC +8) Each | | = 120min (LSAS Tech) Guowang Sporadic Multi-Satellite Coverage over Miyako Strait on 27 Feb 2024 (Times in UTC) (LSAS Tech) Concluding Thoughts on 27 Feb 2024 Test: While we do not know the specific support the Guowang test satellites may have provided the Chinese Coast Guard vessels during this exercise/demonstration/operation, we do know there were nine satellites on orbit and China could have used them in some capacity and in a way which was difficult for the Taiwanese to track. With these test satellites Guowang could provide sporadic coverage to the Miyako Strait. Coverage limitations would constrain testing to roughly 30–60 consecutive minutes at specific times of the day. However, testing would still be possible (see the example of US military testing of Starlink in 2020 when Starlink had about 10% of its current number of satellites on orbit). The 10-month gap between the test near Taiwan and the first operational launch may have provided China with time to incorporate lessons learned into the operational satellites or just confirmed the performance of existing technologies and weapon system compatibility. Follow-on developments As noted previously, the four test satellites launched in December 2023 had yet to reach their operational orbits in February 2024. The satellite 58505 (this was the one launched on the Jielong-3 on December 5, 2023, from the Yellow Sea) increased its average altitude about 189 kilometers from May 6 to June 25, 2024. The maneuvers placed 58505 at the same semi-major axis (SMA) as satellites 57288 and 57289 at 1,111 kilometers. The three satellites are all inclined 86.5 degrees with 58505 having a right ascension of the ascending node (RAAN) offset 32 degrees west of 57288/57289. China timed 58505’s maneuvers to place the satellite at a nearly equal distance from 57288 and 57289. (see graphics below). Satellites 58691/92/93 (launched December 30, 2023) increased their average altitudes about 165 kilometers from March to April 2024 and have maintained their orbits at 1,104 kilometers. Guowang Guowang Guowang May-Jun 2024: China Increased Average Altitude (SMA) of 58505 to Match 57288/89 at 1,111km The Maneuvers Were Timed to Place the Satellites Nearly Equal Distance from One Another (celestrak.org, spaceaware.io & saberastro.com) China launched another Guowang test satellite, 62186, on its inaugural Long March-12 launch on November 30, 2024. There were two satellites onboard; the other, 62185, appears to be another experimental satellite, as the naming convention and orbit suggest it is not associated with Guowang. China referred to 62186 as a “Satellite Internet Technology Test Satellite” which is identical to other Guowang missions. More importantly, China launched 62186 into a nearly co-planar orbit with the three satellites it had launched almost exactly one year prior, on November 23, 2023 (58425, 58426, and 58427). The satellite increased its SMA for its first two months on orbit, finally stabilizing at 1,104 kilometers, just 7 kilometers less than 58425/26/27. There is a slight RAAN offset of less than 1 degree. All four satellites are in 50-degree inclined orbits. Guowang Guowang Launched 53 Weeks Apart 62186 is Nearly Co-Planar with 58425/26/27. 62186 is at a slightly lower SMA and will slowly lap the other three satellites. (spaceaware.io & celestrak.org) Finally, on April 1, 2025, China launched four satellites (63428–63431) into a much lower orbit (450 kilometers) and a new inclination (55 degrees.) China used a Long March-2D from Jiuquan with the first use of a 3.8-meter composite payload fairing. I suspect these are test satellites for the lower altitude Guowang variant. According to Chinese social media, two of the satellites were manufactured by Galaxy Space and the other two were from the Chang Guang Satellite Technology Co. Three of the four satellites have since increased their average altitude since launch to about 452 kilometers. The fourth satellite (63428) may have suffered an anomaly. The satellite has yet to maneuver and its SMA has decayed to 428 kilometers; it is also no longer co-planar with the other three due to a west RAAN offset of 1.3 degrees. Guowang Guowang 3 of 4 Low Altitude Guowang Satellites have increased SMA to ~452km & Remain Co- Planar. “Obj A” has yet to maneuver and may have suffered an anomaly. (spaceaware.io & celestrak.org) Comparison with Western constellations In terms of average altitude and inclination, China has placed their test and operational satellites into orbits like those used by the OneWeb constellation. OneWeb satellites orbit about 100 kilometers higher than the Guowang test satellites (1,200 vs. 1,100 kilometers average altitude respectively), but are at nearly the same average altitude as the 29 operational Guowang satellites, the first of which are orbiting at 1,170 kilometers (see table below). All of OneWeb’s satellites are in orbits inclined at 87.5 degrees. China is using two inclinations, 50.0 and 86.5 degrees. Western media tends to compare Guowang with Starlink, while in reality the Guowang constellation is likely to be capable of providing remote sensing and PNT services in addition to high-throughput, low-latency connectivity Operating at 1,200 kilometers, OneWeb is able to provide global coverage with its 654-satellite constellation and supporting ground sites. China’s Guowang constellation plans to have more than ten time this number (6,912) at about the same average altitude. The volume of satellites will likely enable intersatellite connectivity, decreasing ground station support requirements (the current OneWeb constellation does not have this capability) and could indicate the use of other missions such as remote sensing and PNT. In terms of remote sensing, 1,100–1,200 kilometersis higher than is typical high resolution imagery satellites, but is near the same altitude as China’s Yaogan-31 radio frequency detection/geolocation satellites, which are orbiting at just under 1,100 kilometers. China also plans to operate more than 6,000 satellites at average altitudes of 400–500 kilometers. By comparison, Starlink satellites operate at about 550 kilometers. Starlink has previously announced its final constellation would be about 12,000 satellites, but that number has been revised several times. As of late March 2025 there were 7,135 Starlink satellites in orbit, of which 7,105 are working. Announced plans for Guowang call for 6,080 low-orbit satellites that, by themselves, may not be sufficient for global communication coverage but could be more than capable of providing ultra-low latency and high data rates in the Western Pacific and South China Sea regions. Operating at this altitude will also support high-resolution imagery and other remote sensing collection. As stated previously, China has not publicly released any detailed information regarding the capabilities of the Guowang satellites. However, a recent Andrew Jones report noted, ”The China Academy of Space Technology (CAST)… stated in December [2024] it had developed large and small satellite platforms for Guowang, without disclosing functional differences.” China has conducted three operational launches to date, two of which used the massive LM-5B (LEO capacity of about 25,000 kilograms) to launch 10 satellites each, and the third using the new LM-8A (7,000 kilogram LEO capacity) to launch nine satellites. It is a solid assumption to assume the LM-5B launches were used for the larger variant while the LM-8A was used for the smaller variant. Mass is one of many factors in deciding a launch platform, but China’s use of the LM-5B hints of satellites which are decidedly more massive (up to 2,500 kilomgrams) than those used for OneWeb (150 kilograms) or any of the Starlink satellite variants (260-–1,250 kilograms). Guowang Table 3: Guowang Launch Vehicles, Max Mass Lift to LEO & Average Mass/Satellite (spaceaware.io & celestrak.org) Conclusion While China has released some information regarding the Guowang constellation architecture, little information is known regarding the capabilities of its Guowang satellites. Western media tends to compare Guowang with Starlink, while in reality the Guowang constellation is likely to be capable of providing remote sensing and PNT services in addition to high-throughput, low-latency connectivity. High-resolution commercial non-Earth imagery and video of these satellites would reveal additional capabilities. Tracking the operational status of such a large volume of satellites will present a tremendous challenge to US and coalition forces. While difficult, providing this operational intelligence to friendly air/land/sea forces operating in the Western Pacific and South China Sea, is imperative. Early Guowang testing involved supporting long-range precision strike weapon systems and it is logical that China is building Guowang to improve its find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess kill-web. Lowering or eliminating classification restrictions through the use of commercial or other publicly available sources will greatly increase the number of countries and personnel able to contribute to the operational intelligence analysis effort. Greg Gillinger is a Senior Vice President at Integrity ISR, LLC where he leads Integrity ISR’s drive to partner with US and international entities to develop Space operations and intelligence training. Beginning in August 2020, Greg has authored and published the “Integrity Flash” newsletter that analyzes Chinese and Russian space operations. Greg is a retired US Air Force intelligence officer. Special thanks to Alex Ridgeway of LSAS Tech Inc for his support in determining potential coverage during the 27 Feb 2024 test.