Friday, January 23, 2026
Thursday, January 22, 2026
European Space Launch Startups Lift Off
Isar Spectrum
The second Spectrum rocket built by Isar Aerospace is scheduled to launch as soon as January 21. (credit: Isar Aerospace)
Liftoff for European launch startups
by Jeff Foust
Monday, January 19, 2026
It was a little after six o’clock on a Friday evening and the factory was quiet. A little too quiet, perhaps.
“Where is everyone?” asked Stefan Brieschenk as he took a visitor on a tour. It was clear that, despite it being late on a Friday, he expected more people to be at work on the company’s rocket. There were, in fact, some people still working: installing cabling in the rocket’s first stage, assembling subsystems, putting equipment into test cells.
This scene played out in a facility not in Southern California or Seattle, or Austin or Central Florida. Instead, it was in Augsburg, Germany, a short train ride northwest of Munich, where Rocket Factory Augsburg (RFA), whose chief operating officer is Brieschenk, is developing its RFA ONE small launch vehicle.
“We set out to gather data primarily, and that is something that we have successfully achieved,” Isar CEO Daniel Metzler said after the first Spectrum launch.
RFA is one of several European companies working to develop new launch vehicles intended to provide dedicated launches of small satellites and ensure European access to space, an issue highlighted by the “launcher crisis” a couple years ago when no European launch vehicles were in service that is now being further emphasized by geopolitics (see “The long recovery from a launcher crisis”, The Space Review, July 7, 2025).
In July, the European Space Agency picked RFA and four other companies—Isar Aerospace, MaiaSpace, Orbex, and PLD Space—as “preselected challengers” for its European Launcher Challenge, a program to support those companies through launch contracts and funding to develop upgraded vehicles . It would be up to ESA’s member states to decide which companies to fund, and at what levels, at the agency’s ministerial conference in late November in Bremen, Germany.
At the time, ESA officials expected member states to provide about €400 million (US$465 million) in funding: enough to fully fund two of the companies, perhaps, with partial support for one or two others. Instead, ESA members loosened their purse strings and provided more than €900 million, enough to fully fund all—or nearly all—of the five companies. Now it’s time for the companies to deliver.
First (and second) to the pad
So far, only one of the five companies participating in the European Launcher Challenge has attempted an orbital launch. Last March, Isar Aerospace performed the first launch of Spectrum from Andøya Spaceport in northern Norway. However, the vehicle malfunctioned shortly after liftoff, plummeting into waters adjacent to the launch pad less than a minute after liftoff (see “Europe’s launch challenge”, The Space Review, March 31, 2025.)
That launch was billed as a test flight by the Munich-based company, with no customer payloads on board. “We set out to gather data primarily, and that is something that we have successfully achieved,” Isar CEO Daniel Metzler said at a briefing a few hours after that launch.
Nearly six months later, the company was ready to explain what went wrong. At a briefing held on the sidelines of the World Space Business Week conference in Paris in mid-September, company executives said the main problem was a loss of attitude control of the rocket, which the company blamed on bending modes of the rocket at liftoff that had not been properly modeled. A second issue was a vent valve on the rocket that was left open, reducing pressures in a propellant tank; that was not directly linked to the failure but would have been an issue if the flight continued.
“This flight test for Spectrum was a fully successful story for the company,” argued Alexandre Dalloneau, vice president of mission and launch operations at Isar, at that briefing, collecting essential data for vehicle development.
Just as importantly, he added, was that it showed the vehicle’s flight termination system worked. “That’s a huge criterion for us to come back on the pad because we can guarantee a safe system if something goes wrong.”
At the time, the company said it was planning a second Spectrum launch near the end of the year or early in 2026. Last Friday, the company announced a launch date for that second launch: no earlier than this Wednesday, January 21, at 9 pm local time (3 pm EST) from Andøya.
This mission, unlike the first, will carry customer payloads: five cubesats from European companies and universities, selected as part of an ESA program, along with a hosted payload that will remain attached to the rocket.
However, Isar still considers this mission, called “Onward and Upward,” to be a test flight. “We want to push our systems yet again to the limit to see what works and what needs further refining,” Metzler said on a call with reporters January 19 about the launch.
The goal of the launch is to deliver those cubesats into a 500-kilometer polar orbit. “We’re a rocket company. Obviously, your goal is always to get to orbit,” he said. But for this flight, success is also collecting data about the vehicle for as long as it flies, through max-Q or maximum dynamic pressure on the first stage, stage separation, and second stage insertion into orbit.
“We’re a rocket company. Obviously, your goal is always to get to orbit,” Metzler said.
“For us, the goal is actually to make progress overall,” he said. “We want to test more systems. Testing more systems we will do with anything basically more than 30 seconds. Even up to that point we will test more systems. Anything that pushes further than flight one is good for us.”
He said there is strong demand for Spectrum, with the vehicle sold out through 2028. He did not disclose how many launches that includes, but noted the company is planning three to four Spectrum flights this year and scaling up from there, with the long-term goal of producing as many as 40 rockets a year.
While there is interest in Spectrum worldwide, Metzler cited strong European demand, including from governments. That included not just the European Launcher Challenge, where Isar secured more than €205 million at the ministerial, but also the German government, which plans to spend €35 billion on military space programs over the next five years.
“Europe has finally realized how important launch is,” he said. “It’s a good sign for Europe, and we’re there to deliver.”
RFA
The RFA ONE rocket will launch from SaxaVord Spaceport in the Shetland Islands. (credit: RFA)
RFA’s automotive approach
For a time, it appeared that RFA would be the first of those European startups to attempt an orbital launch. In 2024, the company was testing its first RFA ONE rocket at SaxaVord Spaceport in the Shetland Islands, and by August it appeared the company was only weeks away from a first launch.
Then disaster hit. During a static-fire test of the first stage, one of the engines in the booster had a fire in an oxygen pump, which spread to other engines. The fire engulfed the entire stage, which exploded.
The company has been working to incorporate lessons learned from that incident as it builds a new first stage. (The upper stages of the rocket for that first launch were not installed on the first stage for that static fire test, and have been in storage.) The company had hoped to launch in 2025, but by November it was clear that would not happen.
“We are now working towards the first launch. This will not happen this year but next year,” said Indulis Kalnins, CEO of RFA, during a panel at Space Tech Expo Europe in November. Kalnins, a former executive with German aerospace company OHB, which owns a majority stake in RFA, took over as CEO in April.
He suggested he was focused on trying to mature the company as it moved into operations of RFA ONE. “We have a young team. We have over 300 people from 40 nations, and all of them are motivated,” he said. “But we need to grow up. We need to go into industrialization. We need to build rockets in serial production.”
“We have a young team. We have over 300 people from 40 nations, and all of them are motivated,” Kalnins said. “But we need to grow up.”
On a visit to RFA’s factory in Augsburg a few days after the conference, the new first stage, featuring engine and other improvements, was on the factory floor. The company has not announced a date for shipping the stage to SaxaVord for testing, or a launch date. However, the company already has a launch license from the UK Civil Aviation Authority.
The company is, as Kalnins stated, already thinking about how to ramp up production of the rocket as well as improve performance. One notable aspect of its approach is that it has eschewed the vertical integration that some companies, like SpaceX, has pursued. Instead, it has cast a wide net for suppliers, seeking to have multiple sources for major components.
Brieschenk said that included looking to the automotive industry for suppliers of some components rather than traditional aerospace ones. The approach they use, he said, involves looking for off-the-shelf components that come closest to meet their needs, then asking the suppliers if they can modify them to meet RFA’s requirements.
The result, he said, is a component that might cost twice as much as the off-the-shelf item. But, he added, that is still far cheaper than what a traditional aerospace supplier can offer.
PLD Space
The first qualification model of PLD Space’s Miura 5 rocket. (credit: PLD Space)
Engines and launch pads
Isar Aerospace is, for now, the only one of the European launch startups to have attempted an orbital launch, but another company has flown higher. In October 2023, PLD Space launched its Miura 1 suborbital rocket from a Spanish military base. The rocket reached a peak altitude of 46 kilometers on the flight, which the company declared a success.
The company has moved on to Miura 5, its orbital launch vehicle. On a November visit to its facility in an industrial park in Elche, Spain, near the coastal city of Alicante, a qualification model of Miura 5 was on the factory floor. That vehicle, not intended for flight, will instead be used for testing such as a wet dress rehearsal. Elsewhere in the factory, technicians were working on a second qualification model as well as hardware for the first flight model.
One key driver for getting Miura 5 ready for its first launch is qualification of the vehicle’s engines, said Raúl Torres, co-founder and CEO of PLD Space, in an interview last fall. “That will go through the first quarter” of 2026, he said.
“I think it's easier to do this in the US, because there are a lot of US rocket companies and people can jump from one to the other,” Torres said. “In Europe, there are not so many rocket companies.”
The other key factor is development of the launch site for Miura 5 in French Guiana. The company announced last June an agreement with the French space agency CNES to operate from a launch site there formerly used by the Diamant rocket. CNES is converting that pad into a multi-user facility for small launch vehicles, with PLD Space the first to formally sign on to use the site.
Building the launch site, he said, was just as difficult as building the rocket. “We’re in the middle of the jungle at a site that is humid, with a lot of water,” he said. “Doing the foundations for that is quite tricky, so it’s going to take more time than expected.”
The company is still aiming for a first launch in 2026 of Miura 5. It is also planning to ramp up work on Miura Next, a family of larger launch vehicles.
The company has grown to more than 400 employees, but Torres said one challenge has been attracting talent. “I think it's easier to do this in the US, because there are a lot of US rocket companies and people can jump from one to the other,” he said. “In Europe, there are not so many rocket companies. The mindset is different. You want to stay in your country, close to your family.”
As a result, he estimated more three-quarters of the company's employees come from outside the space industry. “So, you need to teach, and that takes time,” he said. “It’s quite hard finding people with previous experience in rocket science.”
MaiaSpace
MaiaSpace CEO Yohann Leroy poses with a prototype of the company’s launcher at its factor in Vernon, France, in September. (credit: J. Foust)
A different kind of launch startup
Many European launch startups are just that: companies with entrepreneurial roots that bootstrapped themselves and raised venture capital. MaiaSpace, by contrast, was spun out of ArianeGroup, the aerospace and defense giant that is the prime contractor for the Ariane 6 as well as for French ballistic missiles.
Those ties have given the company an advantage, at least among French launch startups. Others, like HyPrSpace and Latitude, expected MaiaSpace to be a shoo-in for the European Launcher Challenge because the French government planned to back just a single company in the program, picking the one with ties to the aerospace establishment.
MaiaSpace still considers itself a startup. Most of the company’s engineers work in an office near Paris, but the company’s factory is west of Paris in Vernon, part of a larger ArianeGroup facility there. MaiaSpace is working on a new factory in Vernon set to begin operations in 2027, with a goal of producing 20 vehicles a year by the early 2030s.
“The European Launcher Challenge is important for us,” said Yohann Leroy, CEO of MaiaSpace, during a visit to the Vernon factory in September. “Public support is essential.”
Notably, while the European Launcher Challenge allowed companies to seek funding for launch contracts as well as development of enhanced launch versions, MaiaSpace was interested in only the former. “We want to stay within our logic, which is that we fund the development with private money,” he said. “We prefer public money to come as a result of the services we provide.”
That development has been initially supported by a €125 million investment from ArianeGroup. That, though, is just a downpayment on the overall development cost of MaiaSpace’s launcher.
“We want to stay within our logic, which is that we fund the development with private money,” Leroy said. “We prefer public money to come as a result of the services we provide.”
“It’s a high single digit of hundreds of millions of euros for a project of our size,” he said, a figure that covers development costs as well as operating losses in the early years of operations of the vehicle.
During the September visit, he said he was expecting another capital infusion of potentially several hundred million euros from ArianeGroup by the end of the year. “We are not like a standard startup who gets money from financial investors,” he said. “We get money from a strategic investor, which is ArianeGroup.”
Neither ArianeGroup nor MaiaSpace have announced that additional investment, but MaiaSpace achieved another milestone last week. Paris-based satellite operator Eutelsat said it signed a multi-launch agreement with MaiaSpace to deploy some of its 440 OneWeb replenishment satellites being built by Airbus Defence and Space. The companies did not disclose terms of the deal but said those launches could begin as soon as 2027.
“This agreement with an experienced and renowned satellite operator confirms that Maia is well-suited for deploying or replenishing satellite broadband constellations,” Leroy said in a statement.
Orbex
Orbex released this image in November of hardware for its Prime launch vehicle, although the company did not clarify if this was flight or test hardware. (credit: Orbex)
Odd one out?
At the ESA ministerial, MaiaSpace secured €184.2 million, slightly more than the €169 million it sought, almost all from France. Germany, which provided most of the funding Isar Aerospace received, also provided nearly all the €190.5 million RFA received. Spain fully funded PLD Space at €169 million.
Then there is Orbex, the fifth pre-selected challenger. The company, based on Scotland with engine development facilities in Denmark, has been working for several years on its Prime small launcher. In 2018, it won funding from the UK Space Agency as part of plans to establish a launch site in northern Scotland.
Development of Prime, though, had fallen years behind schedule. In December 2024, the company announced it was halting plans to develop that spaceport and would instead use SaxaVord Spaceport, with plans for a first launch there in 2025. But 2025 came and went without a launch, and with few updates on vehicle progress.
While the United Kingdom was expected to be the champion and lead funder for Orbex through the European Launcher Challenge, much like France, Germany, and Spain did for their companies, the British government appeared to hedge its bets. While the government committed €144 million overall to the European Launcher Challenge, it provided only €21.7 million to Orbex. It assigned €10 million to RFA, which launches from SaxaVord, but the remaining €112.3 million was unallocated.
“To get an anchor tenant in the European Space Agency for a European launch company is absolutely essential,” Bone said.
“We are working with multiple partners to ensure this funding delivers our requirements for assured access to space and benefits U.K. taxpayers,” a UK Space Agency spokesperson said in early December. “Allocations to specific operators will be set out in due course.”
Orbex, like the other companies, had been banking on getting European Launcher Challenge funding for launch contracts and vehicle development. “From an Orbex perspective, ELC was very welcome,” John Bone, Orbex’s chief commercial officer, said at Space Tech Expo Europe in November. “To get an anchor tenant in the European Space Agency for a European launch company is absolutely essential.”
After the ministerial, the company said little about the UK’s decision not to immediately allocate more funding to it. “The most important thing is to see continued state backing for our industry, and we are delighted that remains in place,” the company stated, adding it was “digesting the details” from the ministerial.
The UK government will soon have to decide what to do with its unallocated ELC funds. At a press conference earlier this month, Toni Tolker-Nielsen, ESA’s director of space transportation, said the UK needed to assign its unallocated funds to a program before ESA could start awarding contracts to the companies.
“There’s no contracts without the UK taking a decision to allocate this money to a specific project,” he said. “That should happen in the coming two to three months.”
How many survive
As the ELC companies move forward on their vehicles, one overriding question remains: how many will survive? Even those that overcome technical and financial obstacles still need to find sufficient demand to close their business cases.
That has proven difficult in the United States, where small launch vehicle startups found it difficult to compete with the low prices of SpaceX rideshare missions and the high launch cadence of Rocket Lab’s Electron. Most have either moved to larger vehicles, like Relativity Space abandoning the Terran 1 for the larger Terran R, or have pivoted to other markets, like ABL Space Systems’ move to missile defense. Others have gone out of business.
There is similar skepticism in Europe. “I believe the market is not large enough for more than a maximum of two players to survive in Europe,” MaiaSpace’s Leroy said in September.
He added he expected MaiaSpace to be one of those companies because of the higher performance of its rocket, which can place up to four tons into orbit. “I believe having a few hundred kilograms of performance makes no sense. You cannot build a profitable business.”
Isar’s Metzler, though, thinks there is larger demand in Europe for small launch vehicles, driven in part by an increase in European military and other government spending and a desire to develop sovereign capabilities.
“Launch is the smallest common denominator in the space industry,” he noted. “Everything you put up there and operate there has to go through launch.”
“We could sell every rocket almost 20 times based on customer demand,” he added. “I can’t follow anyone saying there’s going to be too many rockets, especially out of Europe.”
Jeff Foust (jeff@thespacereview.com) is the editor and publisher of The Space Review, and a senior staff writer with SpaceNews. He also operates the Spacetoday.net web site. Views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone.
The PSLV-C62 Marks A Failure For India's Space Program
PSLV
The PSLV rocket before the launch of the ill-fated PSLV-C62/EOS-N1 mission. (credit: ISRO)
The PSLV-C62 failure marks a setback for India’s space ambitions
by Ajey Lele
Monday, January 19, 2026
On January 12, the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) experienced a setback when its PSLV-C62/EOS-N1 mission failed to reach the designated orbit. While the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) performed nominally during its first two stages, an anomaly occurred during the third stage of the launch. Notably, on the previous PSLV mission, C61, launched in May 2025, also failed to reach orbit because of a problem with the third stage. Since September 1993, there have been 64 PSLV launches and, among them, five missions have failed. Because the PSLV has built an excellent track record over the years, the recent failures represent a serious concern.
Because the PSLV has built an excellent track record over the years, the recent failures represent a serious concern.
The PSLV-C62/EOS-N1 mission had carried India’s EOS-N1 Earth observation satellite along with 15 co-passenger satellites from domestic and international customers. Interestingly, one of these satellites, Kestrel Initial Demonstrator (KID), a small-scale prototype of a reentry vehicle from Spanish startup Orbital Paradigm, beat the odds and managed to transmit some data.
It is important to analyse the loss of this mission at the technological, commercial, and strategic level.
ISRO has already established a fact-finding committee, the failure analysis committee, to identify the exact reasons behind this loss. Surprisingly, the fact-finding committee’s report on the loss of PSLV-C61 has not been placed in the public domain. As a result, there is little clarity on the specific lessons drawn from the 2025 failure and what corrective measures, if any, were implemented before undertaking the first PSLV mission of 2026.
The PSLV is capable of placing multiple payloads into orbit. It is a four-stage rocket that uses solid- and liquid-propulsion systems alternately. The third stage uses solid propellant and produces a maximum thrust of 250 kilonewtons, and its burn duration is bit less than two minutes. According to some reports, during the PSLV-C61 mission, there was a pressure drop, which could have impacted the acceleration. This could have been caused by a possible manufacturing defect in some unit. During its latest flight, the mission did progress normally through the first two stages and most of the third stage. However, controllers detected increased disturbances near the end of the third stage burn, followed by a deviation in the flight path. During the third stage, the rocket is largely operating on pre-programmed guidance and inertial navigation. Hence, the failure could be caused by problems with hardware, materials, ignition, or control systems.
The KID payload of Orbital Paradigm survived the PSLV-C62 launch failure. According to reports, there was a transmission of flight data for 190 seconds despite the launch vehicle’s third-stage anomaly. According to ISRO, KID was to be the last co-passenger to be injected (connected with the fourth stage of the rocket) into the orbit, after which it was slated to re-enter the Earth’s atmosphere towards splashdown in the South Pacific Ocean. Importantly, KID, a 25-kilogram football-sized space capsule, endured forces beyond design limits and returned partial telemetry. The company said various key systems like separation, power supply, and data transmission worked properly even under degraded conditions and after reentry. Their initial analysis suggests that four of the five planned mission milestones were achieved, though in an unexpected, off-nominal way. However, because customer data could not be delivered, the company is not declaring the mission as a success.
However, the main EOS-N1 payload and the other 14 payloads were lost. There were five payloads from an Indian startup, Dhruva Space, which was co-partnering with university students. The satellites were meant for technology demonstrations, including running large AI models directly on the satellite. Another Indian start-up, OrbitAID Aerospace, had a satellite designed to perform an on-orbit satellite refuelling experiment. There was one more satellite for another Indian agency. A company from Brazil, AlltoSpace, had five payloads that included IoT sensors for collection of data on agriculture and some other purposes. There was also a satellite for Nepal University.
India has been launching satellites for foreign organizations since 1999, when the first satellite was launched for Germany. India has launched 434 satellites for 36 countries so far. Importantly, until now all ISRO carrying missions foreign payloads had been successful. Recently, ISRO developed another vehicle for launching payloads of up to 500 kilograms to LEO, called Small Satellite Launch Vehicle (SSLV). It was designed to support future commercial interests.
Today, India’s share in the global space market is only about 2–3%, but the country aims to raise this to around 8–9% in the coming years. Given ISRO’s previously unblemished record in providing launch services to foreign customers, many clients worldwide had been keen to work with them. Will the failure of PSLV-C62 erode the confidence of such customers? It may be too early to draw such a conclusion, but ISRO will certainly need to tighten its processes and demonstrate renewed reliability quickly.
From an Indian perspective, the back-to-back PSLV failures have also affected military preparedness. ISRO’s first mission failure of 2026 was not only a setback for the space agency, but also for Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). The mission’s primary payload, EOS-N1, was a DRDO-developed hyperspectral Earth imaging satellite intended to meet specific surveillance and infrastructure-monitoring requirements. As India’s first such strategic satellite, it was envisioned to provide near real-time intelligence for national security needs. It is worth noting that ISRO had earlier launched the Hyperspectral Imaging Satellite (HySIS) in 2018, primarily for civilian applications.
From an Indian perspective, the back-to-back PSLV failures have also affected military preparedness.
India’s neighborhood has become increasingly disturbed because of a combination of persistent border disputes and internal political instability in nearby states. India’s unresolved tensions with Pakistan and China, coupled with recent military operations such as Operation Sindoor (May 7-10 of last year), underline the increasingly contested security environment. The persistent border violations and sustained infrastructure buildups by adversaries along India’s international borders demonstrate the value of timely and reliable satellite imagery to support strategic assessments.
India is aware that China has successfully launched Pakistan’s first hyperspectral imaging satellite on October 19, 2025, called HS-1 (Hyperspectral Satellite-1). Pakistani officials have mentioned that the satellite data would be supporting major infrastructure initiatives having geostrategic significance, such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) linking Xinjiang to Gwadar Port. Pakistan also called the satellite’s deployment a pivotal step towards deepening strategic partnership with China. It is known that China had provided Pakistan with real-time support from space-based systems for military use during India's Operation Sindoor.
During the May 2025 PSLV-C61 mission, India lost the Earth observation satellite EOS-09, also known as RISAT-1B. It was intended to be the seventh satellite in India’s RISAT series. The satellite’s primary payload was a synthetic aperture radar (SAR), which has significant defense utility as it enables imaging at both day and night as well as under adverse weather conditions.
Unfortunately, over the past five years, two other ISRO missions involving strategic payloads also encountered setbacks. The GSLV-F10/EOS-03 mission failed in August 2021, resulting in the loss of EOS-03, a next-generation Earth-observation satellite. More recently, the GSLV-F15 mission in January 2025, which was ISRO’s 100th rocket launch from the Sriharikota spaceport, was only a partial success: the launch vehicle’s performance was precise, but the navigation satellite NVS-02 could not be maneuvered into its designated geostationary orbit.
It can be said that, in the domain of space, failure is inevitable. On December 22, 2025, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) experienced a failure of its H3 launch vehicle, while it was carrying a navigation satellite. This failure has also come as a shock to JAXA since the previous five H3 launches were all successful. By the end of 2025, China’s ambition to operationalize reusable launch vehicles encountered setbacks, with two back-to-back missions failing to recover the first-stage booster despite successful launches. This is the nature of the space business. The back-to-back failures will momentarily derail ISRO’s space ambitions, with some projected timelines for future missions likely to slip further. ISRO will need to learn from recent failures and move on.
Ajey Lele is Deputy Director General at MP-IDSA, New Delhi, India and the views expressed are personal.
The Late Great Martin Caidin
Caidin
Martin Caidin, who died in 1997, was a prolific aviation and space author. (credit: Wikipedia)
A hell of a character: the late, great, Martin Caidin
by Dwayne A. Day
Monday, January 19, 2026
There was a time when novelists—not all of them, but some of them—were larger than life versions of the characters they wrote: hard-drinking, cigar-chomping manly men who tried to out macho their literary rivals. They treated their typewriters as weapons and had reputations that were legendary. Hemmingway and Norman Mailer were the epitome of that stereotype.
Although he was a much less capable writer, Martin Caidin was cut from that mold. He deserves a biography, he is getting a documentary, and he currently has a small museum exhibit at the Sands Space History Museum just outside the gate of Cape Canaveral Space Force Station in Florida.
Caidin was an author, screenwriter, and an authority on aviation. And he was also a bit of a weirdo.
Martin Caidin was born in 1927 and died of thyroid cancer in 1997 at the age of 69, leaving behind a wife, two daughters, and three grandchildren. He began writing in the 1950s and then started writing fiction a few years later. He was one of those people who could crank out books and articles like a machine. He wrote more than 50 fiction and non-fiction books (one source claims as many as 80), and more than 1,000 magazine articles during his lifetime.
His most famous successful book was Cyborg, the novel that formed the basis of The Six Million Dollar Man television franchise. In some ways Caidin was typical of the authors who wrote for men’s magazines in the 1950s and 1960s, stories illustrated with shirtless heroes fighting off Nazis—or tigers—while a buxom damsel hid behind them. Caidin primarily wrote about flying, aviation and planes, spaceflight and astronauts, and current and near-term science fiction. He was nowhere near as talented as Norman Mailer or the other literary greats, but he was damn prolific.
Caidin was an author, screenwriter, and an authority on aviation. He was also a pilot and bought and restored a 1936 Junkers Ju 52 airplane. Later in life he became a talk show host. And he was also a bit of a weirdo.
Caidin
Caidin's book Cyborg inspired the 1970s television show The Six-Million Dollar Man. (credit: Universal Television)
Have typewriter, will fly
Martin Caidin was one of several authors, like Willy Ley, whose name became attached to the early space age because they were all over that topic. If you were looking for books on aviation and spaceflight in the 1960s, Caidin’s name appeared on the spines of many of them, and his articles popped up in many magazines. He lived near Cape Canaveral and wrote books about astronauts and pilots. He was for a while enamored of stories involving humans merged with machines and set in the present day.
Caidin’s writing career started in the mid-1950s with Jets, Rockets and Guided Missiles, and Rockets Beyond the Earth. In 1954 he published Worlds in Space. The book proposed a future of space exploration that included a space station and a colony on the Moon, as well as journeys to the planets. He did not think that a space station would be militarily useful and focused on its scientific value.
At that time, before there were real satellites, writing realistically about satellites was essentially writing science fiction. He knew he was speculating about spaceflight but acknowledged that it was hard not to speculate about a technology that was on the edge of literally taking off. Caidin’s book was reviewed by the New York Times, a major achievement by a young author.
Caidin
Caidin's original draft for his most popular book, Cyborg. (credit: author)
Throughout the 1960s Caidin wrote non-fiction books, primarily about airplanes, and began to expand into fiction, including spaceflight. He wrote Cyborg in 1972, and within a year it became the basis of the television movie The Six Million Dollar Man. He wrote three sequels: Operation Nuke, High Crystal, and Cyborg IV. He reportedly witnessed the crash of the M2-F-2 lifting body aircraft that was featured at the beginning of the TV show.
Caidin
Caidin's book Marooned inspired a movie by the same name. (credit: Columbia Pictures)
Astronauts were the protagonists in many of Caidin’s novels, although fully developed characters were not his forte. His 1964 novel Marooned was about American astronauts who become stranded in space and NASA's attempt to rescue them. In 1969, the book was adapted into a movie of the same name. Caidin also revised his earlier novel as a movie novelization, changing the focus from the Mercury program of the original to the then-current Apollo program.
Caidin
Notes for Caidin's manuscript The Cape, about saboteurs blowing up a Saturn V rocket in the Vehicle Assembly Building. (credit: Glen Swanson)
Another 1970s Caidin novel, The Cape, featured terrorists blowing up a Saturn V rocket inside the giant Vehicle Assembly Building. Caidin knew that the rocket would not be fueled in the VAB, so he concocted a plot by which it was loaded with propellants when it went boom. Caidin also wrote a novel about the Soviets beating the United States to the Moon, and also Four Came Back, about a space station. He also wrote about artificial intelligence in the form of a supercomputer that seeks to take over the planet. One of his favorite books that he wrote was called Exit Earth, about a space ark leaving the Earth.
Caidin also played in other authors’ sandboxes. He wrote Buck Rogers: A Life in the Future, an adaptation of the pulp fiction and comic strip character, and an Indiana Jones tie-in novel. He wrote the movie novelization for The Final Countdown, about the then-new aircraft carrier USS Nimitz traveling back in time to just before the Pearl Harbor attack. (Nimitz is now being decommissioned.)
Although he was too young to serve in World War II, Caidin wrote many books about pilots and planes during the war, including Flying Forts, Thunderbolt!, and Fork-Tailed Devil: The P-38. He wrote a book about the C-130 Hercules, and helped write autobiographies, including cosmonaut Gherman Titov’s I Am Eagle!, and Saburo Sakai’s Samurai!. He also wrote the Man-In-Space Dictionary, Man Into Space, Vanguard!, Spaceport U.S.A., and Rendezvous in Space.
Caidin’s audience was male and he undoubtedly had a substantial teenage boy fandom enamored with his flying tales. He also worked to get young people into aviation.
Caidin
Caidin was the author of at least fifty books on a wide variety of aviation and space subjects. (credit: author)
The author has wings
Caidin wasn’t just a writer: he had experience with many of the topics he wrote about. In 1961 he was one of the pilots of a formation flight of B-17s across the Atlantic Ocean. He turned that into a book called Everything But the Flak. He worked as a pilot for a movie and used his pilot connections to spend time in military aircraft.
If he was alive today, Caidin would undoubtedly have a YouTube channel and a podcast. In the mid-1980s he hosted a confrontational television talk show.
The biggest contributor to his reputation as a larger-than-life character was a pre-World War II German transport plane. Caidin bought and restored a Junkers Ju 52 aircraft and named it Iron Annie. In November 1981, Caidin was flying the plane when 19 people walked on one of its wings, setting a world record. In 1984, he sold Iron Annie to Lufthansa, which renamed it Tempelhof after a Berlin airport. The plane continues to fly for the airline for special flights. Of course, Caidin turned his experiences restoring the plane and flying it into several more books.
Moving things with his brain
In the 1970s, paranormal stories were popular and there was a mass market for books about UFOs, extraterrestrials, ghosts, Bigfoot, and the Bermuda Triangle. In 1975 Caidin wrote a Bermuda Triangle novel Three Corners To Nowhere. But although he was a purveyor of what some called “engineering fiction,” with a heavy emphasis on technology, Caidin also eventually claimed that he had telekinetic powers, and could move objects with his mind. Whether this was just Caidin telling tall tales for publicity, or if he truly believed he could do it, is unclear, but he refused to prove it to a public skeptic.
If he was alive today, Caidin would undoubtedly have a YouTube channel and a podcast. In the mid-1980s he hosted a confrontational television talk show. This was an emerging trend at the time, with CNN’s Crossfire, The Morton Downey Jr. Show in the late 1980s, and perfected by Jerry Springer in the 1990s. Caidin’s unique twist was that he went after far-right organizations such as the head of the Jewish Defense League, the head of the American Nazi Party, and other far-right spokespeople. These confrontational shows were a double-edged sword, however: Caidin was not just talking with people he disagreed with, he was giving fringe hate-mongers a platform to espouse their views when they would otherwise have trouble gaining media attention. A spokesman for the Aryan Nations hate group would almost never be able to get on television unless he was arrested, but Caidin gave him airtime. That issue is current in today’s politics, but a major difference is that today it is much easier for fringe characters to reach mass audiences than it was when Caidin hosted his show.
Caidin
Caidin
Caidin
Caidin
Caidin
Caidin
The Sands Space History Center in Florida currently has a display about Martin Caidin, who lived nearby and regularly wrote about about aviation and space subjects, both fiction and non-fiction. (credit: Dwayne Day)
Have cigar, will travel
Martin Caidin was known for haunting the bars and hangars around Cape Canaveral—he met his fourth wife, Dee-Dee, when she came up to him in his regular booth in the famed Bernard’s Surf bar in Cocoa Beach to argue with him about the ending of one of his books. But nobody has fully chronicled the story of the man himself. How did he treat his family and friends? He was prolific, but what did his editors think of him? Did he miss deadlines, bounce checks, tell lewd jokes? How much of his public persona was real vs. invented? How many of his non-fiction stories were true vs. exaggerations to sell books? Hopefully, the upcoming documentary will shed more light on him.
The Sands Space History Center display is small and devoted primarily to his works rather than the man. But hopefully it may inspire somebody to dig deeper about the crazy, cigar-chomping guy who wrote about spaceflight and aviation in the ’50s, ’60s, ’70s, and ’80s, and flew a German transport plane with people walking on the wing.
Dwayne Day can be reached at zirconic1@cox.net.
Russian Counter Space Capabilities
Cosmos 2589 launch
The launch of Cosmos 2589, a spacecraft with a likely counterpsace mission. (credit: Russian MoD)
The successful development of Russia’s counterspace activities in LEO and GEO
by Matthew Mowthorpe and Markos Trichas
Monday, January 19, 2026
Russia has continued to develop its arsenal of counterspace capabilities. This has been undertaken often under the guise of developing experimental space systems. This research and development once in orbit and successfully proven has become operational. This includes co-orbital ASAT (Nivelir) systems described as space domain awareness and space-based situational systems.
Soviet history has shown Russia capable of developing multiple classes of orbital ASAT systems. As will be shown in the analysis of orbital regime, maneuverability, and actions, there is a strong likelihood that Russia is developing multiple kinetic interceptor types of co-orbital ASATs. However, for simplicity in this article, we shall refer to all co-orbital ASATs with some sort of kinetic intercept capability as “Nivelir” class satellites.
Soviet history has shown Russia capable of developing multiple classes of orbital ASAT systems. There is a strong likelihood that Russia is developing multiple kinetic interceptor types of co-orbital ASATs.
Russia recently successfully developed a Nivelir ASAT capability in GEO. Alongside this has been ground-based ASAT development, most notably the successful interception in November 2021 against a Russian defunct satellite. This was seen by some observers as a warning to the US and NATO allies, prior to the invasion of Ukraine, not to interfere with Russia’s military attack. Other Russian counterspace systems, such as the potential deployment in 2022 of a nuclear weapon, have signalled Russian intent to overcome US megaconstellations such as Starlink. This article analyses these offensive ASAT capabilities, along with directed energy weapons and electronic warfare both from space- and ground-based ASATs.
Direct-ascent assets
Besides the highly advanced co-orbital assets, Russia has been developing highly capable direct-ascent systems. Direct-ascent systems are ground-based systems, often mobile, which include a ground-to-space missile designed to intercept a target satellite. Such a Russian system, named Nudol, has been tested around ten times with varying levels of success. Almaz-Antey, whose principal role is active space defense technologies, has pitched the system as valuable for holding US LEO assets at risk.[1] Nudol is a TEL-based system composed of the 14A042 Nudol rocket, 14P078 command and control system, and 14TS031 radar. In November 2021, Russia successfully intercepted one of its own satellites in LEO, using Nudol. The operational capability of NUDOL is up to 850 kilometers. It is likely, given successful testing, Nudol is operational.
Russian co-orbital ASAT development: Nivelir
On December 25, 2013, three small satellites were launched into LEO that looked like a routine Rodnik satcom activity. The Russian Ministry of Defense publicly announced the three satellites—Cosmos 2488, 2489, and 2490—had successfully separated from the upper stage. However, a fourth payload, Cosmos 2491, was catalogued by the US military. Cosmos 2491 remained dormant until the end of 2019, in LEO at an altitude of 1,500 kilometers. Cosmos 2491 was identified by NASA as a secretive Russian satellite which performed orbital rendezvous and inspection maneuvers.
On May 23, 2014, during another Rodnik mission, three military satellites were declared by the Russian government: Cosmos 2496, 2497, and 2498. Like the 2013 launch, a fourth payload was identified, Cosmos 2499.They performed a similar maneuverers to the previous satellites. In 2015, three Gonets-M satellites were launched and openly declared as Gonets M11-M13, along with a classified military payload, Cosmos 2504.[2] After a period of inactivity, on March 27, 2017, Cosmos 2504 lowered its orbit and passed within two kilometers of a piece of Chinese debris from the 2007 ASAT test.
On June 23, 2017, Cosmos 2519 was launched, which Russian officials included “a space platform which can carry different variants of payloads”[3] It made a series of small maneuvers in late July and August. On August 23, 2017, a small satellite designated Cosmos 2521 separated from Cosmos 2519. Cosmos 2521 was declared by Russian officials as “intended for the inspection of the condition of a Russian satellite.”[4] On October 30, Cosmos 2523, another small satellite, separated from Cosmos 2521. Cosmos 2523 was released at a velocity of 27 meters per second. At this speed, it appears likely that Cosmos 2523 could be a projectile and part of an ASAT mission. Throughout March, April, and June 2018, Cosmos 2519 and 2521 conducted several rendezvous and proximity operations (RPOs) of each other.[5]
On November 25, 2019, Russia launched Cosmos 2542, which was likely the second satellite in the Nivelir series. On December 6, Cosmos 2542 released a sub-satellite, Cosmos 2453, which remained within two kilometers of Cosmos 2542 for three days before it conducted a series of maneuvers to raise its apogee to 590 kilometers by December 16. These maneuvers suggest that Cosmos 2453 moved to where it could observe a US intelligence satellite, USA 245. Cosmos 2453 came within 20 kilometers of USA 245 several times in January 2020. This proximity sparked concerns from US Space Command.
In June 2020, Cosmos 2543 maneuverer to come within 60 kilometers of Cosmos 2535. On July 15, like the first Nivelir, a small piece of debris separated from Cosmos 2543 at a relative velocity between 140 to 186 meters per second. It is likely this is a similar event to Cosmos 2523 in October 2017, which was the first of Russia’s Nivelir test program. Both the US and UK Space Commands called on Russia to desist their testing of the system.[6]
Cosmos 2589 may achieve GEOin April. This is of significance as it represents the first time Russia will have an ASAT capability in GEO using Nivelir.
On August 1, 2022, a Russian Soyuz 2.1v launch vehicle placed a mysterious satellite, dubbed Cosmos 2558 (2022-089A, 53323) into LEO. The launch timing and initial orbit appeared to coincide with the orbital plane of USA 326, a classified NRO imagery satellite that was launched in February 2022. Analysis suggested that the orbits of Cosmos 2558 and USA 326 were very similar in inclination and would periodically come within 60 to 70 kilometers in altitude of each other. On August 18, 2022, USSPACECOM released a statement condemning Russia for this action, calling the activities of Cosmos 2558 “dangerous and irresponsible behavior.” Further analysis confirmed that, as of September 2022, Cosmos 2558 had altered its orbit to continue to match the orbital plane of USA 326, although it is not in an actual proximity orbit. It is unclear whether Cosmos 2558 is related to Cosmos 2535 or Cosmos 2542.
It is highly likely that Cosmos 2576 launched on May 16, 2024, is part of the Nivelir ASAT program. It is the fourth in the series of co-orbital ASAT testing satellites, like those condemned by both the US and UK Space Commands previously.
Recent Cosmos 2588 Nivelir ASAT activity
On 26 June 2025 Russia released a subsatellite from Cosmos 2558 what was called Object C (64627).[7] Russia maneuvered Object C twice between July 6 and 20. On July 8-10, Object C decreased its average altitude 16 kilometers, then on July 10-11 increased Object C’s altitude 33.7 kilometers.[8]
Object C, as of July 20, had an average altitude of 453.3 kilometers, whilst Cosmos 2558 had not maneuvered since mid-April 2025 and was losing average altitude and, as of Jul 20, was down to 449.4 kilometers.[9]
Object C’s orbital maneuvers put it at a closest point of approach with USA 326 on July 19 of 58 kilometers.[10] Prior to this the closest point of approach was about 76 kilometers.
Open-source speculation is that Cosmos 2558 and Object C are part of the Nivelir program[11] and that Object C was mirroring similar behavior to Cosmos 2542 and 2543, which came within 20 kilometers of USA 245 in January 2020.[12]
Between September 6 and 9, Cosmos 2588 raised its orbit by about 6.4 kilometers, remaining nearly coplanar with USA 338.[13] The closes point of approach is less than 100 kilometers every four days.
Cosmos 2589 and 2590 assessed Nivelir HEO proximity operations
On June 23, 2025, Cosmos 2589 (64467) was launched into a highly elliptical orbit (HEO) with an apogee of 51,200 kilometers and perigee of 20,374 kilometers. On June 26, Cosmos 2589 released a subsatellite, Object D (64527), and conducted maneuvering with Cosmos 2589. It is suspected that Cosmos 2589 is a Nivelir inspection satellite and has a counterspace capability.
Analysis of Cosmos 2589 and Object D
Cosmos 2589 and Object D continued to perform orbital manoeuvres between July 21 and August 2.[14] An observable maneuver from Cosmos 2589 was on July 7 with ranges between Object D varying between 100 kilometers on July 22 and less than 1 kilometers on July 27. At their closest approach they were less than one kilometer apart for more than hours, from about 1800 to 2223 UTC.[15] On August 1, the two satellites separated to beyond 60 kilometer, then rendezvoused to less than 10 kilometers.
On about August 3, Object D maneuvered, ending the proximity operations, or proxops, with Cosmos 2589.[16] On August 16, the two satellites were 55 to 130 kilometers apart.
Between August 20 and 27, Object D made small maneuvers, resuming proxops with Cosmos 2589.[17] It is assessed that Object D made the majority of the maneuvers, and closes point of approach was less than 15 kilometers.
On 18-19 July 2025 Cosmos 2589 and Object D conducted a close approach of less than five kilometers, some reports that it could have been less than one kilometer.[18] Object D was registered in September 2025 as Cosmos 2590.[19]
Cosmos 2589 and Cosmos 2590 continue to perform operations. Their orbital parameters are separated by 6 to 15 kilometers.[20] Cosmos 2590 is performing the bulk of the maneuvers while Cosmos 2589 likely did not perform any maneuvers in August and September. The last reported clear maneuver was July 8.[21] Cosmos 2590 maneuvered several times between September 29 and October 9. Cosmos 2589 and 2590 had proxops of seven kilometers on October 1 at 1016 UTC.[22] Following this, the two satellites separated and, as of October 10, they are more than 200 kilometers apart.
After months of operating in proximity with one another Cosmos 2589 and Cosmos 2590 appear to be heading their separate ways. Cosmos 2589 began conducting maneuvers to circularize its orbit on November 19.[23] Once Cosmos 2589’s orbit has been circularized, the satellite will have finally joined the geosynchronous belt. From the orbital projections below, assuming that Cosmos 2589 maintains its current circularizing maneuvers, it will achieve GEO on April 21, 2026. This is of significance as it represents the first time Russia will have an ASAT capability in GEO using Nivelir.
Electronic warfare (EW) at space targets and from space
Russia demonstrated its GPS jamming capability during the Russian 2017 Zapad military exercise[24] and during a NATO exercise, when Norway determined Russia was responsible for jamming GPS signals in the Kola Peninsula during Exercise Trident Juncture.[25] The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in April 2021 identified in Ukraine an increase in GPS jamming by Russian or pro-Russian forces. On April 6, 2021, a Special Monitoring Mission long-range UAV was unable to take off from a Ukrainian airbase in Stepanivka due to GPS signal interference. In addition, Russian jamming of GPS signals in Ukraine has been detected by US forces in the region.
On the February 24, 2022, a cyberattack against a commercial satellite network belonging to the US company Viasat not only had an impact on Ukrainian military actors but also damaged the terminals of civilian customers across Europe and affected thousands of wind turbines in Germany. Tens of thousands of satellite modems had their internet service knocked out after being flooded with traffic along with destructive commands to overwrite key data. This highlights the wider impact that cyberattacks can have on the satellite industry.
Jamming of satellite communications
“Traditional” satcom jamming is another counterspace area where Russia have invested significant effort. The R-330Zh “Zhitel” mobile jammer is reported to able to jam commercial Inmarsat and Iridium receivers within a tactical local area. The TsNII research institute has declared that Tirada-2S was under development and will be used to conduct uplink jamming of comsats.[26] It is likely Tirada-2S is currently in service. Another system under development is Bylina-MM, which is designed to suppress the on-board transponders on comsats such as Milstar, Skynet, and Italsat.[27]
Another key project in Russia’s EW program is TOBOL, designated 14Ts227 with a project infrastructure code of 8282. Indications about the goals of Tobol suggest that the site would have an array of ground-based antennas that would pick up and jam what are called unauthorized signals sent to satellites or relayed via satellites to the ground. Vladimir M. Vatutin, who heads a department within Russian Space Systems and is identified as TOBOL’s chief designer, has coauthored several papers and patents related to the protection of satellites from electronic attack. One such patent describes an array of ground-based antennas that would be used to pick up and jam unauthorized signals sent to satellites relayed via satellites to the ground.[28] In another scenario, unauthorized signals downlinked from a satellite to the ground would be identified by monitoring stations, following which the tropospheric stations would transmit jamming signals that would reach receivers after being reflected off the troposphere and cancel out the effects of the unauthorized signals.[29]
Another paper co-authored by Vatutin discussed the possibility of using EW techniques to prevent both optical and radar reconnaissance satellites from sending images to data relay satellites as they fly over. This reflects growing interest in the use of EW systems to counter foreign reconnaissance assets. Finally, the Krashuka-4 mobile EW system, designed to counter airborne early warning and control and other airborne radar, has an effective range of 300 kilometers. Due to its range and power, it is also effective against LEO synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imaging satellites.
Directed energy weapons
Russia has a long history of research in high-energy laser physics. Directed energy weapons (DEW) damage a target with highly focused energy without a solid projectile. Russia revived its old Soviet Airborne Laser system in 2012, called Sokol-Echelon. The Russian ABL was designed to counter space-based reconnaissance assets in the infrared part of the spectrum, dazzling rather than destroying. The laser type selected was a carbon monoxide laser. In mid-2018 a court document declared that the MOD had decided to cancel the project in late 2017; however, contracts signed as part of the project continue to appear on the Russia’s government procurement website afterwards. Reporting has suggested that Ukraine had destroyed the airfield which contained the Russian ABL system which would indicate that Russia no longer has such a capability.[30]
What is clear is any detonation in LEO of a Russian nuclear weapon in space would have an indiscriminate effect on satellites in LEO for a significant period of time.
Russia is upgrading its Krona optical surveillance system in North Caucasus with laser dazzling capabilities. The Krona complex historically included ground-based radars and optical telescopes for tracking, identifying, and characterizing space objects. Under a project codenamed Kalina for the Ministry of Defense, its goal was the creation of a channel for the suppression of electro-optical systems of satellites using solid-state lasers. Russia is also planning to develop a laser with a range of 40,000 kilometers to attack early warning satellites in geosynchronous orbit.
Russian pursues nuclear weapons in space
US officials stated in February 2024 that Russia was pursuing the development of a space-based ASAT weapon equipped with a nuclear device. Clarification came from the White House National Security Council spokesman John Kirby that it was “not an active capability that’s been deployed.”[31] Further details were not provided, but he did confirm it was “related to an anti-satellite weapon that Russia is developing.” This action would be in clear breach of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits the deployment of weapons of mass destruction in space.
The Russia satellite referred to is Cosmos 2553, was launched February 5, 2022. The Russian Ministry of Defense referred to it as a “technological satellite equipped with newly developed on-board instruments and systems in order test them in conditions of radiation and heavy particle charged particles.”[32] This is likely a cover story for Cosmos 2553’s likely nuclear mission. It was launched into an orbit of 1,987 by 1,995 kilometers with an inclination of 67 degrees. The detonation of a nuclear weapon in LEO, and the subsequent nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects, could render that orbital regime unusable for up to a year if not longer. US intelligence agencies have assessed that Cosmos 2553 was a practice test run for putting a nuclear weapon into orbit.[33]
The Russian development of a nuclear weapon in orbit in space is seen as the only effective way of countering a megaconstellation such as Starlink or the US Space Development Agency’s Proliferated Space Warfighting Architecture. What is clear is any detonation in LEO of a Russian nuclear weapon in space would have an indiscriminate effect on satellites in LEO for a significant period of time.
Summary of Russian Counterspace Activities
Launch Date Country Satellite System
25/12/2013 Russia Cosmos 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491 Nivelir ASAT development
5/2023 Russia Cosmos 2496, 24907, 2498, 2499 Nivelir ASAT development
23/6/2019 Russia Cosmos 2519, 2520, 2521, 2523 Nivelir ASAT development
10/7/2019 Russia Cosmos 2542, 2543 Nivelir ASAT development
5/2/2022 Russia Cosmos 2533, 2558 Nivelir ASAT development
16/5/2024 Russia Cosmos 2576 Nivelir ASAT development
5/2/2025 Russia Cosmos-2581, 2582, 2583 Nivelir ASAT development
6/2025 Russia Cosmos 2558 & Object 64627 Nivelir ASAT development
6/2025 Russia Cosmos 2589 Nivelir ASAT development in GEO predicted 21 Apr 26
7/2025 Russia Cosmos 2590 (Object) Nivelir ASAT development
21/10/2022 Russia Cosmos 2561 and Cosmos 2562 RF Directed Energy RF ASAT[34]
15/11/2021 Russia Nudol Direct Ascent ASAT
5/2/2022 Russia Cosmos 2553 Nuclear ASAT
Table of Russian Counterspace Activities compiled from various sources including Secure World Counterspace, Final Frontier Flash, ISR University and STK predicted orbital analysis.
References
Weeden & Samson, 2021. Weeden, B., and V. Samson. Global Counterspace Capabilities, April 2021, 67
Weeden, B. "Dancing in the Dark Redux: Recent Rendezvous and Proximity Operations in Space." The Space Review, October 5, 2015.
"Soyuz-2-1v Launches a Secret Satellite." RussianSpaceWeb.
"Soyuz-2-1v Launches a Secret Satellite." RussianSpaceWeb.
Weeden, B., and V. Samson. Global Counterspace Capabilities, April 2021, 70.
The Guardian, 2020. "Britain and US Accuse Russia of Launching 'Weapon' in Space." The Guardian, July 23, 2020.
Russia Update: Cosmos 2558 & Object C, Issue 125 issue 125 - ISR University, ISR Integrity Flash, 21 July 2025
Russia Update: Cosmos 2558 & Object C, Issue 125 issue 125 - ISR University, ISR Integrity Flash, 21 July 2025
Russia Update: Cosmos 2558 & Object C, Issue 125 issue 125 - ISR University, ISR Integrity Flash, 21 July 2025
Speculation KH-11 optical satellite
Stephen Clark, “It’s hunting season in orbit as Russia’s killer satellites mystify skywatchers”, ArsTechnica.com, 11 July 2025
Matthew Mowthorpe, The Russian Space Threat and a Defence Against it with Guardian Satellites, 13 June 2022, The Space Review. In July 2020 a piece of debris separated from Cosmos 2543 at a relative velocity 140 to 186 meters per second, similar to the Russian Nivelir event in of Cosmos 2523 in October 2017.
Russia Maneuvers Cosmos 2588, 14 Sep 25, Flash ISR University
Russia: Cosmos 2589 and Obj C 21 Jul-1 Aug, 4 Aug ISR University Flash
Russia: Cosmos 2589 and Obj C 21 Jul-1 Aug, 4 Aug ISR University Flash
Russia Update: Cosmos 2589 & Object C, 18 Aug 25, ISR University Flash
Russia: Object C Renews RPO with Cosmos 2589, 30 Aug 25, USR University Flash
issue 125 - ISR University, ISR Integrity Flash, 21 July 2025
Russia: Cosmos 2589 & Cosmos 2590 (Object C) Update, ISR Integrity Flash, 14 Sep 2025
Russia: Cosmos 2589 & Cosmos 2590 (Object C) Update, ISR Integrity Flash, 14 Sep 2025
Russia: Cosmos 2589 & Cosmos 2590 (Object C) Update, ISR Integrity Flash, 14 Sep 2025
Russia: Cosmos 2589 and 2590 Update, USR Integrity Flash, 13 Oct 2025
Cosmos 2589 Moving to GEO, Update, ISR Integrity Flash , 8 Dec 2025
The War Zone, 2019 "Russia Jammed Phones and GPS in Northern Europe During Massive Military Drills." The War Zone, 2019.
Episkopos, 2021. Episkopos, M. "GPS Jamming: Can NATO Defeat This Russian Weapon in the Arctic?" National Interest, March 3, 2021.
Hendrickx, 2020. Hendrickx, B. "Russia Gears Up for Electronic Warfare in Space (Part 2)." The Space Review, November 2, 2020.
Weeden & Samson, 2021
Hendrickx, 2020. Hendrickx, B. "Russia Gears Up for Electronic Warfare in Space (Part 2)." The Space Review, November 2, 2020.
Hendrickx, 2020. Hendrickx, B. "Russia Gears Up for Electronic Warfare in Space (Part 2)." The Space Review, November 2, 2020.
Dwayne A. Day, “Burning Falcon: the death of a Russian laser ASAT plane”, Space Review, 1 December 2025.
BreakingDefense, 2024 Hitchens, T. "Local Russian GPS Jamming in Ukraine Hasn’t Affected US Support Ops, So Far." Breaking Defense, March 1, 2022.
Final Frontier Flash." ISR University, February 13, 2022.
Hendrickx, B. "Russian Research on Space Nukes and Alternative Counterspace Weapons Part 1." The Space Review, May 13, 2024.
For further details see “Russian and Chinese development of radiofrequency directed energy weapons (RF DEW) for counterspace”, The Space Review, 12 May 2025. The author would like to thank Bart Hendrickx for his comments in connection with the article.
Professor Markos Trichas is Director National Security and Defence Space BAE Systems Digital Intelligence. He was previously Head of UK National Eyes Only Space programs at Airbus Defence and Space UK. He was at Airbus for 10 years. Prior of joining Airbus he worked at Harvard CFA/NASA CXC, STFC RAL, and Imperial College London. He holds a PhD in Astrophysics from Imperial College London.
Dr. Matthew Mowthorpe currently works in the National Security and Defence Space BAE Systems Digital Intelligence. Prior to this, he worked at as Space Threats Team Lead at the UK National Eyes Only Space Programs at Airbus Defence and Space UK. Additionally he worked at the Ministry of Defence for nearly two decades, where he managed the Space Team examining threats to and from Space. Dr Mowthorpe has published in numerous journals on the weaponization of space and notably published the book The Militarization and Weaponization of Space published by Rowman and Little in the US.
The views expressed in the article are personal ones.
Book Review: Apollos Anew
book covers
Apollos anew
by Dwayne A. Day
Monday, January 19, 2026
Many aspects of American space history have been extensively covered by historians. There are dozens of books about the Mercury and Gemini programs, and dozens more about the Apollo program. There are books about the missions themselves, astronaut biographies and autobiographies, official histories and technical histories. There are numerous documentaries and podcasts. Thus, it is almost impossible to produce something that is unique and new and adds substantively to what has already come before. In 2019, for the 50th anniversary of the Apollo 11 landing, the BBC World Service produced the amazing podcast “13 Minutes to the Moon…” which told the story of the final minutes before the landing so well, with so much detail, that it reshaped the listener’s understanding of what happened. That podcast proved that we could still be surprised.
And now somebody else has done it again, this time visually.
J.L. Pickering, John Bisney, and Ed Hengeveld have recently published Apollo 1 in Photographs, Apollo 7 in Photographs, and Apollo 8 in Photographs, and demonstrated that it is still possible to do something new and clever that can reshape our understanding of the Apollo program. These books will amaze you. Even if you have read everything about Apollo, watched everything about Apollo, listened to everything about Apollo, stood underneath all three Saturn Vs, and seen all of the spacecraft, you will still have your brain expanded by these books.
book interior
Each volume is hundreds of pages thick, and each page contains two or more photos from the mission: many hundreds of photos per book, and I guarantee that you have seen no more than a dozen of them. You may have seen a photo of the Apollo 8 astronauts standing outside with their rocket in the background, but it’s always been the same photograph. The authors have now included multiple photos from that publicity shoot, some of them with the astronauts smiling, others with them looking bored, or borderline annoyed. Looking at them, you realize that it must have been awkward for those guys to stand there and pose, when what they really probably wanted to do was spend more time in the simulator.
book interior
But it’s not just that they are new or have never been published before. These photos also reveal things you have never thought about or even knew existed. There are photos of hardware being tested and assembled, astronauts training for many different phases of their missions, and equipment being moved to the Cape prior to launch. Even if you are aware that atop every Apollo Command Module there was a Launch Escape System, you almost certainly never wondered how that piece of emergency equipment was assembled or placed atop the rocket. Now there are photos of that sequence of events and, looking at them, you realize that there were people assigned to that particular piece of equipment that could save the astronauts if the rocket blew up. It probably never occurred to you that long before Apollo 8 roared off its pad, construction workers installed water pipes throughout that pad and performed tests pumping millions of liters through those pipes to suppress the noise from the Saturn V’s rocket engines. Now there are photos of those tests.
book interior
There are revelatory photos in these books but also depressing ones. There are multiple photos of the funeral service for the Apollo 1 astronauts—both the West Point funeral and the Arlington Cemetery service. Nothing like that has probably been published since early 1967. Seeing them is not quite as impactful today as the event was when it happened, but they do make us understand the reality a little better.
book interior
A photograph is a single point in time. But because these books contain so many photographs, you start to change your mindset. You start to view these missions not just as a single event, but years of work by hundreds of thousands of people who got up, went to work, and methodically built the machines that flew to the Moon, or the astronauts who spent day after day after year training and meeting and training and studying, all leading up to a mission that lasted only a few days. For just a brief moment, you can begin to understand that Apollo was not simply an event, or series of events, but an experience, a life, for those who were involved in it.
book interior
The reproduction quality is excellent and the paper quality, although not at the level of super-expensive Taschen art books, is also very good.
The authors have plans to publish a book for each of the remaining Apollo missions. Personally, I’m more interested in some of the later missions than the earlier ones. The late Apollo missions gathered far less media interest but were much more complicated. I hope that these early issues are successful and we eventually get to see all of them. The authors have truly advanced the history of Apollo a great deal with this work.
Dwayne Day has read everything about Apollo, watched everything about Apollo, listened to everything about Apollo, stood underneath all three Saturn Vs, and seen (almost) all of the spacecraft. He can be reached at zirconic1@cox.net.
Wednesday, January 21, 2026
Tuesday, January 20, 2026
Monday, January 19, 2026
Sunday, January 18, 2026
Saturday, January 17, 2026
Friday, January 16, 2026
Thursday, January 15, 2026
Wednesday, January 14, 2026
Space Medicine Takes Center Stage
Crew-11
The four members of Crew-11 in their Crew Dragon pressure suits in a photo taken January 9, a day after NASA announced they would return early because of a medical issue with one of them. (credit: NASA)
Prescriptions for space medicine
by Jeff Foust
Monday, January 12, 2026
For a while, Jared Isaacman looked like he could ease into his new position as NASA administrator. Sworn in a week before Christmas, an end-of-year lull offered a chance to get up to speed on the agency and its activities, including plans to visit NASA’s field centers and learn about agency programs. At an American Astronomical Society conference early last week in Phoenix, one NASA official said he was leaving the meeting early to return to Washington for briefings with Isaacman on science programs.
Any lull, though, ended sharply last Wednesday as Isaacman faced a problem that none of his predecessors had to deal with: a medical emergency on the International Space Station.
“In this particular incident, the medical incident was sufficient enough that we were concerned about the astronaut. We would like to complete that workup, and the best way to complete that workup is on the ground,” said Polk.
The first public sign of any problem came late Wednesday afternoon, when NASA issued a brief statement that a spacewalk planned at the station the next day by astronauts Zena Cardman and Mike Fincke had been postponed. “The agency is monitoring a medical concern with a crew member that arose Wednesday afternoon aboard the orbital complex,” the agency stated. Medical privacy constraints kept the agency from providing any additional details, including who was involved or the specific medical concern.
That announcement alone was not alarming. Minor medical issues have taken place on the station over the years. “There’s a host of different things that we’ve treated on orbit,” J.D. Polk, NASA’s chief health and medical officer, said at a later briefing, citing things like toothaches and earaches. “Things that you see commonly on the ground over a six-month period in an urgent care can happen in space as well.”
People who monitor the live audio feeds from the ISS noted that one of the station’s astronauts, JAXA’s Kimiya Yui, has asked for a private medical conference with a flight surgeon. Such conferences, which allow astronauts to discuss medical issues confidentially, are not uncommon, and there was no sign if Yui was requesting the conference on his own behalf or for a crewmate. Later in the day, the public audio feeds were turned off.
Overnight, the issue came more serious. “Safely conducting our missions is our highest priority, and we are actively evaluating all options, including the possibility of an earlier end to Crew-11’s mission,” NASA said in a statement issued just after midnight EST on Thursday. The agency provided no other information on what it now called a “medical situation” on the station other to say that the crewmember in question was stable.
Behind the scenes, there were discussions about what to do about the astronaut their medical situation. That culminated in a briefing held about 24 hours after NASA’s initial announcement.
“I have come to the decision that it is in the best interest of our astronauts to return Crew-11 ahead of their planned departure,” Isaacman said at the briefing, flanked by Polk and associate administrator Amit Kshatriya.
As with earlier statements, Isaacman and others declined to go into specifics other than stating that it involved one of the four Crew-11 members: Cardman, Fincke, Yui, and Russian cosmonaut Oleg Platonov. The four arrived at the station on a Crew Dragon in early August and were scheduled to return no earlier than the latter half of February, after the arrival of a replacement crew on Crew-12.
Officials did state that the medical situation was not related to preparations for the spacewalk or any other “injury in pursuit of operations,” as Polk put it. He suggested that, whatever it was, it took place suddenly. “The crew is highly trained and came to the aid of their colleague right away,” he said.
It was also, he indicated, more of a precautionary measure than an urgent issue. “We have a very robust suite of medical hardware on board the International Space Station, but we don’t have the complete amount of hardware that I would have in an emergency department, for example, to complete a workup of a patient,” he said.
“In this particular incident, the medical incident was sufficient enough that we were concerned about the astronaut. We would like to complete that workup, and the best way to complete that workup is on the ground, where we have the full suite of medical testing hardware,” he said.
He and others emphasized that this was not an emergency evacuation, where the spacecraft would depart the station and return to Earth within hours, likely without the traditional ground support equipment used for Crew Dragon splashdowns. But staying on the station through the planned end of the mission in February created “lingering risk,” he concluded. “Always, we err on the side of the astronaut’s health and welfare.”
“This was a deliberate decision to allow the right medical evaluations to happen on the ground, where the full range of diagnostic capability exists. It’s the right call, even if it’s a bit bittersweet,” wrote Fincke.
At the briefing, Isaacman said only that Crew Dragon would return in the “coming days.” On Friday, NASA provided a more specific time: the spacecraft will undock from the station around 5pm EST Wednesday, splashing down off the California coast at 3:40am EST Thursday.
That return will not involve any changes in reentry and recovery procedures. “This is the first time we’ve done a controlled medical evacuation from the vehicle,” said Kshatriya. “However, the procedures that we’re using to prepare for that are nominal procedures.”
“What’s important for us is the whole crew, and we don’t want to do anything, given the nature of the condition, that would put any additional risk on the crew by diverging from our normal processes,” he said of Crew-11’s “controlled and expedited return.”
While NASA leadership discussed the decision to return Crew-11 early and various implications at the briefing, one set of voices was missing: the crewmembers themselves. That cone of silence only lifted early Sunday, when Fincke posted on LinkedIn about the incident and decision to come home early.
“First and foremost, we are all OK. Everyone on board is stable, safe, and well cared for,” he wrote. “This was a deliberate decision to allow the right medical evaluations to happen on the ground, where the full range of diagnostic capability exists. It’s the right call, even if it’s a bit bittersweet.”
His post included a photo of the four members of Crew-11, wearing their Crew Dragon suits as part of preparations for their return. The photo offered no evidence of any medical conditions any of them might be suffering.
The four were smiling, cupping their hands into a heart shape. The photo, he wrote, was a sign of them performing “a normal, methodical step in getting ready to come home, and a reminder that this decision was made calmly and carefully, with people at the center.”
ISS spacewalk preps
NASA astronaut Chris Williams (left) and JAXA astronaut Kimiya Yui work with NASA astronau Mike Fincke (right) on spacewalk preparations before the medical incident cancelled the spacewalk. Williams will be the only NASA astronaut on the ISS for several weeks after Crew-11 departs. (credit: NASA)
Lessons for the future
The medical incident and NASA’s response has an immediate near-term effect by reducing the crew on the ISS from seven to three people. Remaining on the station once Crew-11 departs will be Roscosmos cosmonauts Sergey Kud-Sverchkov and Sergey Mikaev and NASA astronaut Chris Williams. They arrived on the station in November on a Soyuz spacecraft.
NASA said they are looking into moving up the Crew-12 launch, currently scheduled for February 15, to shorten the time the station only has a three-person crew. That could push it close to the current Artemis 2 launch period of February 6 to 11, although Isaacman claimed at the briefing that the two missions would be “totally separate campaigns” with no need to deconflict. (NASA had, in fact, moved up the Crew-12 launch last November, from late March to mid-February, to avoid potential conflicts with another Artemis 2 launch period in early April.)
Having a three-person crew for several weeks should not be a constraint to ISS operations, said Kshatriya, given that the station has in the past had three people on board for longer periods. He noted, though, that the spacewalk that was planned for last week, as well as another originally planned for this week, would be deferred indefinitely given the limited crew, including a single US astronaut.
“Chris is trained to do every task we would ask him to do on the vehicle,” he said. “He will have thousands of people looking over his shoulder, like our crews do all the time, to help ensure they continue groundbreaking science.”
Russian cosmonauts, he added, had previously been trained to “higher levels” to operate systems on the US segment of the station, but that training had been reduced in recent years as the US segment crew to four astronauts.
“We will absolutely learn from this situation as well to see if that informs our future on-orbit operations,” Isaacman said.
The incident is the first time that NASA has cut short a crewed mission because of a medical issue. Polk indicated that was somewhat surprising. “We’ve had many models, Monte Carlo analysis models, that have said that we should have had a medical evacuation approximately every three years in that 25-year history” of crews on the ISS, he said. He didn’t attribute that lack of evacuations to good training and preparations or simply good luck (or, maybe, inaccurate models.)
At least for the ISS evacuation is an option. For upcoming missions to the Moon, and longer-term missions to Mars, getting an ailing astronaut back to Earth is something that will take anywhere from a week or two to potentially years. For example, on Artemis 2, once Orion leaves Earth orbit a day after launch, it will be on a free-return trajectory that will bring it back to Earth more than a week later.
Asked at the briefing what medical capabilities he would like to see for future exploration missions, Isaacman offered few specifics. “We will absolutely learn from this situation as well to see if that informs our future on-orbit operations,” he said.
That included whether future missions needed a dedicated medical officer: none of the people on ISS are doctors, although Williams has worked as an emergency medical technician. “All of our astronauts go through extensive medical training,” Isaacman said. “I don’t think that if one our astronauts on board was a medical doctor, it would have changed anything.”
While this incident is the first medical situation on a NASA-led mission to require an early return, it is not the first medical issue on a recent spaceflight. When Crew-8 returned to Earth in October 2024 after nearly eight months on the station, the three NASA astronauts and one Roscosmos cosmonaut initially appeared to be good conditions. But hours after their return, NASA announced the four had been transported to a Florida hospital for additional evaluations “out of an abundance of caution.” One of the four remained in the hospital overnight before being discharged.
The agency again cited medical privacy issues for not disclosing what prompted the evaluations and who was kept in the hospital overnight. At a press conference a couple weeks after their return, the three NASA astronauts declined to go into details about what happened.
“Spaceflight is still something we don’t fully understand. We’re finding things we don’t expect sometimes, and this was one of those times,” said astronaut Michael Barratt, a doctor, stating that medical privacy kept him from discussions more about the incident.
“Space medicine is my passion,” he added. “In the fullness of time, we will allow this to come out and be documented. For now, medical privacy is very important to us.” NASA has yet to publicly release additional details about the incident.
Jeff Foust (jeff@thespacereview.com) is the editor and publisher of The Space Review, and a senior staff writer with SpaceNews. He also operates the Spacetoday.net web site. Views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone.
Japanese Space Industry That Benefits From Policy Changes
Astroscale
Satellite servicing startup Astroscale is part of a growing Japanese commercial space industry that benefits from policy changes. (credit: Astroscale)
Japanese commercial firms as drivers of Japanese space policy
by Owen Chbani
Monday, January 12, 2026
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the United States Government.
The rise of America’s commercial space industry has become a key enabler of ambitious programs across the U.S. government and private sector. NASA’s Artemis Program, Golden Dome, and megaconstellations like Starlink and Kuiper all depend on the capabilities of America’s commercial space industry. Since the passage of Japan’s Basic Space Law in 2008, key Japanese firms have acted as key drivers of commercial-enabling policy, leading to a push within Japan for market-enabling regulations, legislation, funding schemes, and a quasi-commercial civil space program. This has also led to the recentering of aspects of the US-Japan space alliance to commercial-led ventures.
History
The US-Japan space relationship was not isolated from the tumultuous environment of the 1980s and 1990s. Commercial space issues first came to the forefront when the Japanese attempted to build a domestic launch and satellite industry through a “buy-Japanese” policy for government-funded projects. This helped Japanese corporations like Mitsubishi, Toshiba, and NEC, whose satellites were up to twice as expensive as their American counterparts,[1] build capacity. Eager to protect the aerospace sector, which was the one area in which American firms still maintained a trade surplus, the US Trade Representative initiated a “Super 301” investigation of the Japanese satellite procurement policy to determine if “major barriers and trade-distorting practices” were in place. The investigation found that:
“Japan's policy of promoting indigenous production capability by prohibiting government procurement of foreign satellites applies to the entire range of satellites (broadcast, communications, earth resource, weather). The United States has long been the world leader in satellite production, and is thus denied significant market opportunities by this policy.”[2]
Negotiations culminated a year later with the 1990 Exchange of Notes concerning the Policy and Procedure of the R&D and Procurement of Artificial Satellites, which, in a major win for American industry, dismantled Japan’s domestic procurement restrictions. Just three years later, the policy had led to over $670 million in revenues for American firms.[3] Wray argues that this strategy was part of a general trend in US space policy towards increasing privatization of rocket and satellite R&D. In Japan, the policy led Toshiba, Mitsubishi, and NEC to form a consortium to ensure their satellite divisions’ survival and to compete domestically.[4]
Just as in the United States, Japan’s space industry at the turn of the 21st century was dominated by defense-industrial behemoths. Unlike the United States, however, Japan’s nascent commercial ecosystem faced much stronger headwinds.
That period also saw Japan attempt and successfully develop an autonomous launch capability with the H-II vehicle. Previously, Japan was dependent on licensed American “black-box” technology that significantly restricted Japanese capabilities and technology transfer.[5] Japanese policymakers viewed a domestic launch vehicle as critical to independence in space, with commercialization a secondary concern. As a result, H-II per-launch costs ballooned to more than two to three times those of comparable Western rockets like Ariane, Atlas, and Delta.[6]
Just as in the United States, Japan’s space industry at the turn of the 21st century was dominated by defense-industrial behemoths, struggling for business against increasing international competition and declining defense spending. Unlike the United States, however, Japan’s nascent commercial ecosystem faced much stronger headwinds, with a less defined policy environment, unfriendly business and capital environment, as well as a much smaller domestic market. Japanese firms and policymakers must work together to clear obstacles to a successful commercial industry.
Current space policy legislation
Basic Space Law
Japan’s 2008 Basic Space Law represents the fundamental enabling piece of legislation for non-governmental space activities in Japan. Articles 4 and 16 took a proactive stance towards cultivating the activities of the private Japanese space sector. Article 16 promotes:
“the taking of taxational and financial measures and other necessary measures in order to facilitate investment by private operators in the business with regard to Space Development and Use.”[7]
This critical step acknowledged not just the utility of a government-dependent space sector, but also represented the first attempts towards building a private-sector space industry. The ‘five-pillars’ of the Basic Space Law are:
Improving the Welfare and Safety of Daily Life
Strengthening the International Security by Applying the Space Technology
Performing Constructive International Roles through Space Technology
Developing the Private Sector as the Strategic Industry in the 21st Century
Inspiring People to Dream and Investing in the Future[8]
Additionally, the Basic Space Law aimed to expand investment in Japan beyond “rockets and satellites” or basic enabling technologies, towards a more comprehensive “utilization of space” by government and commercial actors in service of the pillars identified by the Basic Space Law. The Basic Space Law was later paired with the 2009 Basic Plan on Space Policy to send a strong demand signal to Japan’s space sector, which had “suffered from smaller governmental demand and insufficient R&D for commercialization and industrial promotion since the 1990s.”[9] The Plan identified remote sensing, human exploration, and space sustainability as areas of opportunity for Japanese industry to contribute to national goals.
Another notable pillar of the Basic Space Law was the emergence of domestic national security space applications. After the “Super 301” measures crippled the domestic satellite production industry, Japanese industry, under the Keidanren (Japanese Business Federation), advocated for the creation of a national security space sector to provide business opportunities not open to foreign competition.[10]
The 2008 Basic Space Law and 2009 Basic Plan for Space would set the tone for the rapid expansion of commercial space activities in Japan. Before the law, industrial conglomerates, mostly involved in satellite and rocket production, dominated Japan’s space industry. Today, Japan is a leader in a diverse range of space activities, including those highlighted in the Basic Plan for Space.
Space Activities Act
The 2021 Act on the Promotion of Business Activities for the Exploration and Development of Space Resources[11] is basic enabling legislation that implements Japan’s treaty-based obligations to commercial users for both commercial and civil users. The two fundamental activities it establishes licensing frameworks for are space launch and satellite control. The Japanese government aims to introduce a revised Space Activities Act to better capture novel commercial space activities not currently covered by the Act.[12] Prime Minister Ishiba pointed to innovations by private companies as driving the revision of the Act, with feedback from the companies into a standard mechanism being critical to the process.[13,14]
Satellite Remote Sensing Act
The 2016 Act on Ensuring Appropriate Handling of Satellite Remote Sensing Data[15] licenses imaging activities, as they may have national security considerations. The licensing aims to ensure that data is properly stored and prevented from being transferred inappropriately to third parties, the Act also stipulates that purchasers of remote sensing data must be accredited by the Japanese government.
Space Resources Act
The 2021 Act on the Promotion of Business Activities for the Exploration and Development of Space Resources[16] promotes the use and ownership of space resources by commercial entities. Under this law, ispace was the first company to gain a license under this Act, which entitled it to collect lunar regolith in a highly publicized sale to NASA.[17] Any activities licensed under this act must comply with international treaties Japan is a party to, and publish business plans to ensure non-interference and transparency.[18] Japan, the US, Luxembourg, and the UAE are the four countries that have passed space resources acts in line with the Artemis Accords, which states that the extraction of space resources does not constitute national appropriation under the Outer Space Treaty.[19]
ispace
Japanese space policy has helped ispace, a company developing lunar landers and other infrastructure. (credit: ispace)
Case studies
To illustrate how commercial firms have evolved alongside the nascent Japanese space policy framework, this article examines five Japanese firms and how Japan’s policy environment has shaped, and been shaped by, their activities. Many have US-based subsidiaries, demonstrating just how central American markets and budgets are to their businesses and underscoring the importance of the American commercial market even to international firms.
Astroscale
Astroscale is one of the largest commercial space firms in Japan with subsidiaries in the US, UK, and Europe, and is a global leader in the space servicing and debris removal market. It was founded in 2013 in Singapore (but later headquartered in Japan) by CEO Nobu Okada after he was inspired to pursue space entrepreneurship by attending conferences and understanding the threat of increasingly congested orbits.[20,21] Japan’s willingness to support the company and embrace commercial solutions, as well as the company’s ability to shape the domestic policy environment, have been critical to its success.
Many Japanese startups have US-based subsidiaries, demonstrating just how central American markets and budgets are to their businesses and underscoring the importance of the American commercial market even to international firms.
Its $7.7 million Series A in 2015 was in the words of Okada, “the first successful fund raise in commercial space venture in Asia,” and represented a shift towards private-led innovation.[22] Astroscale’s efforts directly support the sixth pillar of the 2009 Basic Space Plan, “Consideration of the environment,” which states that “addressing the debris problem appropriately is an urgent necessity.”
Astroscale’s second funding round in 2016 would raise $35 million from previous investors, as well as $30 million from the Innovation Network Corporation of Japan (INCJ), which was established via a public-private partnership to promote Japanese industrial policy.[23] INCJ would be able to take on more risk than traditionally conservative Japanese firms, work to promote Japanese firms in key sectors, as well as combat structural issues in Japan’s industrial economy.[24]
Astroscale would continue to grow internationally and, domestically, began to attract attention from JAXA. The agency awarded the company a Phase 1 contract under the Commercial Removal of Debris Demonstration (CRD2) program, which seeks to mature new space businesses in the field of debris removal, with the explicit goal of helping “Japanese companies [...] capture new markets.” This mandate enables the CRD2 program to employ procurement methods like firm fixed price contracts, milestone payments, and goal-oriented, rather than requirements-oriented procurement.[25] This contract has helped Astroscale develop a product maximally useful to commercial customers while fulfilling JAXA’s stated need for debris removal capabilities. Astroscale has also won the CRD2 Phase II contract, leading to an extended campaign of proximity operations with an H-II upper stage in 2024.[26]
The company has also received an approximately $47.5 million contract from the Japanese Ministry of Defense, which seeks to have the company develop a rendezvous and proximity operations demonstrator for geostationary orbit. This activity would have been impossible without the Basic Space Law enabling military space activities.
To enable these operations, the National Space Policy Secretariat published “Guidelines on a License to Operate a Spacecraft Performing On-Orbit Servicing” in 2021.[27] The Cabinet Office also maintains a transparency page that outlines current Japanese on-orbit servicing missions.[28] In 2025, the Cabinet Office announced that Japan will lead an international effort to identify the legal and procedural barriers to space debris removal.[29] Astroscale itself advocates for the creation of “clear” policies for facilitating on-orbit servicing by engaging with international and Japanese stakeholders, and has driven much of this change in Japan’s policy environment.[30,31] An Astroscale comment to the Space Policy Committee of the Cabinet Office provided comments on how the Space Activities Act could be revised to better enable on-orbit servicing activities. This standing feedback mechanism that directly absorbs industry feedback is a critical element to building a permissive policy framework that enables innovation.[32]
Synspective
Synspective is an Earth observation company developing a constellation of synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellites for disaster monitoring, defense, and environmental monitoring.
The company currently operates seven StriX satellites and is planning a constellation of more than 30 to enable rapid revisit of sites across the globe. Synspective gives credit to the imPACT government-led innovation program with developing the fundamental underlying technology behind their satellites before the company’s founding in 2018.[33] The imPACT program supports “high-risk, high reward research” with the aim of benefitting Japanese industry and overcoming social challenges.[34]
Just a year after its founding, Synspective had already raised $100 million, followed by two other rounds also dominated by private industry and venture capital, in contrast to Astroscale’s significant public investment in early rounds. In just five years, the traditionally conservative Japanese venture capital markets had warmed up to space technology.
This was in large part thanks to the ever-growing commercial space industry on the other side of the Pacific validating the thesis of commercial space companies, but Synspective could also take advantage of a rapidly maturing policy environment that increased predictability, liability, and government programs purpose built to support commercial actors.
Synspective’s first satellite, StriX-a, was the focus of a partnership through JAXA’s Space Innovation through Partnership and Co-creation (J-SPARC), which used Synspective data in partnership with the Saga prefecture to analyze flooding impacts in the region and validate SAR performance.
The Cabinet Office and National Space Policy Secretariat have partnered with Synspective to being implementing SAR data in the work of government agencies. While the constellation hasn’t matured to the point of full utilization, support from the government acts as a key demand signal and continued evidence that SAR data can be effective in policymaking. Pathfinder data can help governments begin to understand how they can use Synspective’s data and products well before the constellation has reached full maturity.
Additionally, the company has advocated for “batch approvals” from the Cabinet Office, as their constellation has largely been frozen in design, but requires a review each time a satellite is launched. This makes changes harder, as the company will soon reach a point where it will always have a satellite in review, and it will need to produce onerous levels of documentation if changes are made in the process of approval.[35]
Synspective was also selected by the Space Strategy Fund in 2024, under the theme of “Accelerating Commercial Satellite Constellation Deployment,” which contains about $600 million of funding spread among four companies.[36] In September 2025, Synspective signed an additional ten launches with RocketLab, bringing its total to 33 satellites with launch contracts already signed. With a full constellation of SAR satellites, Synspective and Japan gain a major capability for commercial and national security applications, it has already received contracts from the JASDF, and a visit from US Space Force, Japan leadership.[37,38]
ispace
ispace was formed out of the failed Google Lunar X Prize, which sought to reward the first private company to successfully land on the Moon with a $30 million reward,[39] directly building on the Ansari X Prize, which many say initiated the commercial spaceflight era.[40] The company then began fundraising privately, securing $90 million in 2017 from INCJ, the Development Bank of Japan, and private backers. This was followed by an infusion from a 2018 billion-dollar fund established by the Abe government for supporting space startups, including a technology transfer program from JAXA, talent and investor matching programs, as well as legislative reforms in space resources and satellite servicing.[41] These proposed reforms would later become the Space Resources Act and Guidelines on Servicing.
Unlike the commercial space relationship in the 1980s and 1990s, commercial space has evolved into a key strength of the Japan-US relationship. One key difference is that Japanese industry has largely pursued complementary capabilities to American civil and commercial capabilities.
ispace would go on to initiate the Hakuto-R program, which has so far failed in two attempts to put a spacecraft on the surface of the Moon. Its next attempt is through its US subsidiary, ispace US, in partnership with Draper in the United States for a Commercial Lunar Payload Services contract in 2027. The company has also received $80 million from the Ministry for Economy, Trade, and Industry’s (METI) Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) grant, to develop a 100-kilogram payload lander for the Moon. This instrument is modelled after the American SBIR program, which ironically was created to combat Japanese encroachment upon domestic American industry.[42] Much like Astroscale for on-orbit servicing, as of 2025 ispace is the only Japanese firm to have applied for a space resources license, one for each of its missions.[43] It has benefitted from the Space Strategy Fund as well, receiving a contract to build a lunar water detection satellite as a contractor for the Institute of Science, Tokyo. The firm also went public in 2023 on the TSE Growth exchange, raising over $150 million in equity since.[44,45] This is in addition to nearly $200 million in fundraising pre-IPO.
ispace has also had a large influence on Japan’s policy environment. Its existence and advocacy was critical to actualizing Japan’s Space Resources Act, which came after ispace was contracted by NASA to conduct a sale of lunar regolith. Beginning in 2016, ispace was formulating recommendations to the national Diet as it began considerations of a national Space Resources Act.[46] In a 2019 presentation to MEXT facilitated by the Society of Japanese Aerospace Corporations, ispace included requests for firm rules on space resources to enable Japanese firms to capture the nascent market.[47] In 2021, ispace applauded the passage of the act, which it said will “bring opportunities and order to commercial activities” on the Moon and elsewhere.”[48]
Yet, just a month later, ispace published a 31-page “Lunar Industry Vision” on the next steps the Japanese government should take to enable the company’s, and commercial lunar industry’s, continued growth.[49] This included seven targeted recommendations focusing on implementation of the Space Resources Act, stimulation of domestic industry, and even calling for a government-sponsored landing demonstration. This call would later be answered by METI’s $80 million 2023 contract for a 100-kilogram-class lander.
The company operates in three of the four countries that have passed space resources acts, pointing to the “chicken or egg” nature of commercial actors in shaping legislation. In Japan, ispace was able to advocate for a suitable regulatory framework, while in Luxembourg, an established space resources act was able to attract ispace EU to headquarter in Luxembourg. A partnership was established in 2017 between the SpaceResources.lu initiative and ispace EU to support the commercialization of space resources technology. Some nations may have mature space regulatory frameworks because their local industry has advocated for it, others because they wish to encourage its growth or attract already mature foreign companies.
SpaceBD and Japan LEO Shachu
JAXA’s 2017 Kibo Utilization Strategy outlined Japan’s attempts at LEO commercialization, announcing that operations on the Kibo ISS module, previously conducted directly by JAXA for a fee, would transition to private operations. JAXA aimed to have private companies expand usership as well as explore new markets.
JAXA first transitioned the deployment of satellites from the Kibo module to SpaceBD and Mitsui in 2018,[50] with the use of the external facility transitioned in 2019.[51] Later, JAXA would designate SpaceBD as the only commercial provider of rideshare opportunities on the H-IIA and H3 rockets. These attempts to extend a commercial ecosystem to LEO have been successful, with SpaceBD transferring 13 satellites to JAXA for deployment in 2024, a record.
In 2022, JAXA selected SpaceBD to formulate how commercial Kibo operations could translate into post-ISS commercial opportunities. This model demonstrates JAXA’s attempts to understand the potential for commercial business opportunities in LEO, and how they may shape its ambitions in a post-ISS world. Even American operators like Nanoracks, now Voyager, have struggled to fully utilize the ISS, and external interfaces like Bishop Airlock and SpaceBD is likely to be facing similar issues even despite its growth. National policies are still contending with this lack of a robust demand for LEO services.
Japan LEO Shachu (Japan Low Orbit Corporation), a Mitsui subsidiary founded in 2024 that is aiming to build a “Japan Module” for a future US commercial station, won Space Strategy Fund support to pursue a successor to the Kibo module and an autonomous cargo vehicle. It hopes to leverage Mitsui’s experience on commercial Kibo operations to develop, own, and operate a commercial Japan-module.[53] Japan LEO Shachu also aims to deepen the Japan-US collaboration through its business, by expressly stating it is developing an additional capability for American stations, underscoring the fact that it is not developing an independent capability. This reflects a growing recentering of space ties between the United States and Japan onto commercial entities, as both nations seek to stimulate a robust space economy.
Japanese policy and fiscal instruments to stimulate commercial industry
Space Strategy Fund
In 2023, JAXA and the Japanese government created the Space Strategy Fund (SSF) to support the nation’s space industry with over $6 billion in funding over the next decade from MEXT, METI, and MIC. The fund has three goals:[54]
To double the size of Japan’s domestic space market from $30 billion to $60 billion by the early 2030s;
Contribute to solving global and social issues through space utilization; and
Strengthen fundamental knowledge and basic technologies
Thirty-eight different organizations have won awards under the first round, many among them commercial actors.[55] The SSF also sends a critical demand signal to private industry and investors through a multi-phase approach, demonstrating the Japanese government’s priorities and rewarding private investments in key technologies.
SBIR
Japan’s SBIR program supports small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with maturing technologies.[56] While the SBIR program is a Cabinet Office initiative, METI and the New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization (NEDO) implement Phase I space-related SBIR programs, with the originating organization (usually METI, MEXT, or MIC) able to implement later phases of the grant themselves. SBIRs may mature capabilities on behalf of a specific organizational need, or aim to fill market gaps by boosting SME capabilities.
NEDO
NEDO also has several programs aimed at supporting startups and space technology. This includes the Deep Tech Startup Support program, which seeks to support startups across the green technology area, those engaged in joint international R&D projects, and fundamental technology.[57] NEDO has also supported space component ventures, in order to support Japanese industrial competitiveness on the global stage.[58]
SMRJ loans and support
The dominance of large enterprises in Japan’s business landscape, combined with a traditionally risk-averse startup financing ecosystem, has inhibited the growth of Japan’s startup sector.[59] One prominent organization that has supported several space enterprises has been SME Support Japan (SMRJ), which has a mandate to support SMEs across Japan’s business landscape. One of the most powerful instruments in its toolkit is its ability to secure 50% of loans to finance innovative SMEs, effectively increasing the risk tolerance of lending to innovative firms while backstopping risk.[60] Astroscale, ispace, Synspective, and iQPS have all taken advantage of SMRJ financed loans, allowing them to effectively scale their businesses.[61,62,63,64]
J-Startup
METI’s J-Startup program aims to encourage Japan’s startup ecosystem to address societal challenges and enable their competition on the global stage.[65] Once a company is accepted into the J-Startup program, it has access to preferential government and private sector support. This includes:
“preferential treatment in support measures such as subsidies, and simplifying procedures”
“Utilization of a regulatory sandbox system”
“Handling requests related to regulations”
More than a dozen space firms are members of J-Startup, including Astroscale, Synspective, and ispace. The responsiveness of the Japanese regulatory ecosystem has been a critical facet of their success, and the J-startup program helps to institutionalize this responsiveness while helping startups’ competitiveness against existing large enterprises when competing for government funding.
K-Program
The Cabinet Office’s Key and Advanced Technology R&D through Cross Community Collaboration Program (K Program), looks to support critical R&D efforts to maintain Japan’s global competitiveness. In 2025, Astroscale was awarded about $75 million to mature refueling and life extension technologies.[66] Several other companies have received awards under sensing and communications themes.
These programs, along with commercial advocacy and ingenuity, have reshaped Japan’s space sector and led to substantial changes in Japan’s policy framework. Conscious efforts have begun to bear fruit, as demonstrated by the increasing success and globalization of Japanese commercial firms. Additionally, Japanese funding is disproportionally allocated towards satellites and exploration, receiving more than three times the funding of space transportation projects. This represents a continuation of Japanese policy, which focuses on space as a tool for societal improvement and industrial development, but also an implicit acknowledgement of Japanese firms as complementary to a maturing global commercial space ecosystem.
The emerging Japan-US commercial space alliance
“Given the increasing importance and expanding role of the private sector in exploring outer space, including to both countries’ national security, both sides committed to deepening linkages between their respective space industries, and expressed their intention to pursue a space industry network composed of Japanese and U.S. space companies interested in deepening cooperation in order to support the goals of the Japan-U.S. alliance in space.” - 2023 CompDial[67]
Unlike the commercial space relationship in the 1980s and 1990s, commercial space has evolved into a key strength of the Japan-US relationship. One key difference is that Japanese industry has largely pursued complementary capabilities to American civil and commercial capabilities. Rather than aggressively pursuing commercial launch, satellite construction, and human spaceflight markets, which are currently dominated by American firms, Japanese firms like Astroscale, Synspective, ispace, SpaceBD/JLS, and others, have shown a willingness to advance and enhance US commercial interests.
By learning the lessons of Japan’s many successes and challenges in building a vibrant commercial sector, policymakers across the world may learn how to cultivate a domestic industry—and agile policy ecosystem—able to serve national goals.
Especially critical is the ability for Japanese and American firms to contribute to mutual security. Synspectives’ SAR technology enables a plethora of military benefits, including all-weather imaging, radar site detection, and advanced observation techniques.[68] Astroscale US is conducting the first refueling of a US Space Force satellite in geostationary orbit.[69] American industry also has a critical role in enabling Japanese missile tracking and defense capabilities, explicitly mentioned in a 2024 joint White House statement between Biden and Kishida. Additionally, Japan’s Ministry of Defense has contracted with US firm LeoLabs to provide space situational awareness data.
From low Earth orbit to the lunar surface, the US-Japan relationship in civil space has embraced the potential of civil space. The marquee civil space partnership between the US and Japan has been the ISS, which is retiring in 2030. Replacing it is the Commercial Low Earth Orbit Destinations, or CLD, program, which hopes to have a commercially operated space station in orbit by the time ISS is deorbited.
Japanese industry has demonstrated significant interest in CLDs, with Japan LEO Shachu specifically targeting a partnership with American CLD providers. SpaceBD and Voyager Space have cooperated on the ISS, and Mitsubishi has taken an ownership stake in Starlab, a subsidiary of Voyager charged with building the Starlab space station. Mitsui, owner of Japan LEO Shachu, has secured a joint venture with Axiom Space for their CLD partnership.
Operating a commercial space station with Japanese and American modules and astronauts is a complex and expensive task that will require both governments to take on new and uncomfortable roles. By beginning to commercialize elements of Kibo operations, beginning HTV-X cargo deliveries to ISS, and funding exploratory development of a “J-module”, Japan has demonstrated a unique willingness to embrace this commercial model. This operational experience helps Japanese firms build a case to both American policymakers and commercial companies that they will be credible partners in a post-ISS world.
In 2024, Prime Minister Kishida and President Biden announced that two Japanese astronauts would be the first non-American astronauts to land on the Moon. In support of these aims, SpaceX will be delivering the Toyota Pressurized Rover to the lunar surface. In addition, ispace, Dymon, and GITAI are all Japanese firms focused on the development of lunar infrastructure. From the NASA’s Commercial Lunar Payload Services program, Human Landing System, and METI’s ispace lander contract, both nations are integrating commercially operated services into Artemis. Japanese firms provide needed services and critical early demand for American transportation services and platforms, which enable missions Japan could never achieve alone. This symbiotic civil space relationship is a critical facet of the two nation’s deepening commercial relationship.
In purely commercial terms, the rise of Japan’s commercial space industry has brought in considerable revenue for American firms. Synspective alone has 21 Electron launches contracted with Rocket Lab, over a year’s worth of dedicated launches for the US-headquartered company, with Astroscale’s ADRAS-J also launching on Electron.[70] Until HTV-X’s maiden flight, SpaceBD and Mitsui were entirely reliant on American commercial cargo capabilities to launch experiments to the ISS. SkyPerfect JSAT is the first commercial customer for SpaceX’s Starship launch vehicle. Additionally, SpaceX’s Starlink gained market access in Japan in 2022, partnering with local telecom providers to provide service, and AST SpaceMobile demonstrated the first direct-to-device video call enabled by satellite.[71] Commercial space ventures increasingly underpin exploration, security, and common prosperity between the US and Japan.
Institutionalization of cmmercial ties
The year 2023 saw the first year a “Track-1.5” dialogue between the two nations’ industries alongside the eighth civil space dialogue, an acknowledgement that commercial actors were becoming an increasingly important facet of the commercial space relationship. In 2024, the second Track 1.5 dialogue discussed topics including “market access, regulatory interoperability, spaceflight safety and space sustainability, and novel space activities.”[72] In addition, a Track 2.0 dialogue directly between Japanese and American firms was hosted on the margins of the official dialogue to help build direct partnerships and commercial, regulatory, and policy advocacy platforms to help create a more conducive business environment between the two nations.
The State Department organized a Partnership Opportunity Delegation to Japan in July 2025 for commercial space companies to continue building commercial collaboration with an eye to aligning private sector norms, standards, and regulatory approaches.[73] The United States and Japan continue to integrate commercial perspectives into decision-making, enhancing interoperability, security, and innovation.
Conclusion
By learning the lessons of Japan’s many successes and challenges in building a vibrant commercial sector, policymakers across the world may learn how to cultivate a domestic industry—and agile policy ecosystem—able to serve national goals. In Japan, trailblazing commercial firms like Astroscale, Synspective, ispace, Japan LEO Shachu, and SpaceBD are increasingly shaping space policy in a convergence of national and commercial interests. Nowhere is this made clearer than in the increasing role commercial companies play in the US-Japan alliance, presenting an opportunity to use commercial firms as a new anchor for an evolving relationship between the two nations in space, and on Earth.
Endnotes
Wray, “Japanese Space Enterprise: The Problem of Autonomous Development”, 469-470.
54 Fed. Reg. 26,136 (1989) (initiating the investigation and request for public comment); see also OVERVIEW AND COMPILATION OF U.S. TRADE STATUTES, supra note 22, at 81.
https://escholarship.org/content/qt1ts5573q/qt1ts5573q.pdf
Wray, “Japanese Space Enterprise: The Problem of Autonomous Development, 475
Neil W. Davis, Japanese Space Policy: Communications Satellite and Launch Vehicle Technology Policy Issues, Research Report P-85-10 (Cambridge, MA: Program on Information Resources Policy, Harvard University, August 1985), PDF.
Wray, “Japanese Space Enterprise: The Problem of Autonomous Development, 482
https://stage.tksc.jaxa.jp/spacelaw/country/japan/27A-1.E.pdf
https://www.unoosa.org/pdf/pres/lsc2009/pres-09.pdf
https://www8.cao.go.jp/space/plan/plan-eng.pdf
https://apjjf.org/maeda-sawako/3243/article
https://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/en/laws/view/4332/en
https://www.gtlaw.com/en/insights/2025/7/japanese-government-plans-to-amend-space-activities-act-part-1
https://www.gtlaw.com/en/insights/2025/7/japanese-government-plans-to-amend-space-activities-act-part-1
https://www8.cao.go.jp/space/comittee/31-katsudou_minaosi/k_m-dai4/gijisidai.html
https://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/en/laws/view/4344/en
https://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/en/laws/view/4332/en
https://www.nasa.gov/news-release/nasa-selects-companies-to-collect-lunar-resources-for-artemis-demonstrations/
https://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/copuos/lsc/space-resources/LSC2023/StatesResponses/Japan_Information_to_Space_Resource_WG.pdf
https://www.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Artemis-Accords-signed-13Oct2020.pdf?emrc=690021753eac6
https://www.astroscale.com/en/about
See link.
https://www.astroscale.com/fr/news/astroscale-raises-usd7-7-million-in-series-a-funding
https://www.astroscale.com/en/news/astroscale-secures-up-to-usd-35-million-capital-injection
https://www.incj.co.jp/english/about/about/index.htm
https://www.kenkai.jaxa.jp/eng/crd2/project/
https://www.astroscale.com/en/news/astroscales-adras-j-achieves-historic-15-meter-approach-to-space-debris
https://www8.cao.go.jp/space/english/activity/documents/guideline_oosgl.pdf
https://www8.cao.go.jp/space/english/activity/application.html
https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/japan-seeks-to-create-international-rules-on-space-debris-removal
https://www.astroscale.com/en/policy
https://indico.esa.int/event/516/contributions/9980/attachments/6377/10993/ESA%20CSD%202024%20-%20Astroscale%20Policy.pdf
https://www8.cao.go.jp/space/comittee/31-katsudou_minaosi/k_m-dai4/gijisidai.html
https://synspective.com/company/
https://stip.oecd.org/moip/case-studies/17?answerId=A2-17
https://www8.cao.go.jp/space/comittee/31-katsudou_minaosi/k_m-dai5/siryou2-2.pdf
https://fund.jaxa.jp/content/uploads/Overview_of_The_SpaceStrategy_Fund.pdf
https://synspective.com/information/2025/ussf/
https://synspective.com/information/2025/japan_air_self_defense_force_bid/
https://www.xprize.org/competitions/google-lunar
https://www.space.com/27339-spaceshipone-xprize-launched-commercial-spaceflight.html
https://spacenews.com/new-fund-to-boost-japanese-space-startups/
https://www.fedtech.io/resource/the-evolution-of-sbir-from-confronting-japan-to-competing-with-china
https://www8.cao.go.jp/space/english/resource/application.html
https://ssl4.eir-parts.net/doc/9348/tdnet/2699804/00.pdf
https://www.skadden.com/about/news-and-rankings/news/2023/04/ispace-completes-tokyo-ipo
https://ispace-inc.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/ispace_pressrelease_161109_eng.pdf
See link.
https://ispace-inc.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Release_SpaceMiningAct.pdf
https://ispace-inc.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/LunarIndustryVision_Full_JP-lowres_ver1.1.pdf
https://global.jaxa.jp/press/2018/05/20180529_microsat.html
https://global.jaxa.jp/press/2019/03/20190308a.html
https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/space/article/nanoracks-bishop-airlock-space-station-17878034.php
https://japan-leo-shachu.com/32/
https://fund.jaxa.jp/content/uploads/Overview_of_The_SpaceStrategy_Fund.pdf
ibid.
https://www.nedo.go.jp/english/activities/activities_ZZJP_100205.html
https://www.nedo.go.jp/english/activities/cross-sectoral.html
https://www.nedo.go.jp/english/activities/activities_ZZJP_100139.html
https://www.weforum.org/stories/2024/01/transforming-failures-into-opportunities-through-trust-in-japan/
https://www.smrj.go.jp/english/activities/c6f7jl00000004jr-att/smrj_serviceguide.pdf
https://www.astroscale.com/en/news/astroscale-raises-jpy-5-billion-through-a-term-loan-agreement-with-mufg-bank-ltd
https://www.smrj.go.jp/press/2023/a19vbo00000055sx-att/20230720_press01.pdf
https://www.smrj.go.jp/sme/funding/guarantee/fbrion0000004j3t-att/a1658884414369.pdf
https://www.smrj.go.jp/press/2023/a19vbo00000053el-att/20231031_press01.pdf
https://www.j-startup.go.jp/en/about/
https://www.astroscale.com/en/news/astroscale-japan-selected-to-develop-in-space-refueling-technologies
https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100717795.pdf
https://www.mrcy.com/company/blogs/seeing-unseen-synthetic-aperture-radar
https://www.astroscale.com/en/news/astroscale-u-s-to-lead-the-first-ever-refueling-of-a-united-states-space
https://synspective.com/press-release/2025/rocketlab_additonal10/
https://corp.mobile.rakuten.co.jp/english/news/press/2025/0423_01/
https://space.commerce.gov/u-s-japan-hold-ninth-comprehensive-dialogue-on-space/
https://www.state.gov/office-of-global-partnerships/opportunities-office-of-global-partnerships
Owen Chbani is a master’s student at George Washington University’s Space Policy Institute. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the United States Government.
Subscribe to:
Comments (Atom)